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

Nordic Voices

Madeleine Gustafsson
Bernt Hagtvet
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Matti Klinge
Lars Lönnroth
Erling Olsen
Gösta Rehn
Erik Rudeng
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Nordic Voices

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

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Preface to the Issue, "Nordic Voices"

THIS IS THE SECOND of two *Daedalus* issues on the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. It is intended to introduce Americans and Europeans—but also those who live in the vast reaches of the Nordic world—to a universe frequently described, often lauded, sometimes criticized, but remarkably little known, either in its diversity or in its uniformities. It is extraordinary that this situation prevails, particularly when one considers how rare it is in the contemporary world for states to achieve what these five have managed to accomplish: each is in a position to claim for itself political institutions that are democratic, free, and stable; high levels of economic productivity and well-being; a social order characterized by a continuing concern with equality, fairness, and justice. By all traditional standards, these are among the progressive societies of our day, twentieth century "gardens" that show their distinctiveness whenever they are compared with characteristic institutions in so many other regions of the world.

Yet, even here, where the record of accomplishment is so extraordinary, there are evidences of *angst,* of barely concealed uncertainty. These derive less from a fear of losing what has been so recently gained, often at some cost, than from a gnawing dubiety about the meaning and import of the achievement itself, about its sufficiency and adequacy. The Nordic world is a place of "silences"; it is not much given to advertising itself; it does not always choose to present the kind of conspicuous profile that others deem important. Indeed, some would say that these are nations with little interest in drawing attention to themselves. They do not strive to be preeminent in ways that will generate envy, that will provoke resentment. Yet, even among those who are most cautious—and not all are—and least interested in playing a great role on the world stage, there is a sense that all does not go well in the North and that the problems do not

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derive simply from the failures of others less concerned with freedom, equality, and social justice. The realization that so little of what exists is in fact in the control of those who putatively govern, that "interdependence" and "dependence" are not abstract conditions, relevant to others who are less fortunate because they are less free and less rational, cannot fail to rankle. So, also, the weight of bureaucratic controls must seem onerous at times, particularly to those who understand their uses but still feel free to question their dimensions and administration. Abundance itself—once thought to be an incontestable good—has its critics. Beyond all such specific criticisms, however, and perhaps undergirding them all, is a yearning for a life that does not now exist, has never existed, cannot even be described or articulated. The utopian imagination has run dry, or is, for the moment at least, obliged to use an idiom and images that may have been wonderfully compelling in 1930 or 1950, but that seem strangely antiquated in the context of events in the 1980s. There are very few evidences here of nostalgia for a vanished past; there are equally few visions of a new and different future. In this, the Nordic world may simply be clarifying the condition of our time, drawing attention principally to our intellectual limitations and inhibitions.

The voices of the Nordic world are rarely raised; these are not men and women given to shouting. For those who have some interest in looking at what is distinctive in the contemporary world—understanding that not all of it has cosmic significance—this volume may serve to suggest how societies superficially alike, actually quite different, view their problems, themselves, and the contemporary world more generally. It may even suggest why they find it so difficult to perceive the world of tomorrow, of the year 2000 and beyond.

Thanks are due to the American Scandinavian Foundation for making this issue possible. It owes a great deal also to the many citizens of the Nordic world who were ready to receive visitors from abroad, to share their concerns and observations with them. Without this guidance from those who know most about the area, this issue would not have been possible.

S.R.G.

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Nordic Voices

WHAT FOLLOWS ARE THE VOICES of Nordic men and women who spoke of their concerns candidly and, for the purpose of publication, anonymously. No effort has been made to correct their facts, when, as in some instances, they seem questionable; even less has there been any wish to argue with their positions, to suggest where these may be exaggerated or otherwise flawed. Instead, these Nordic observations and opinions are offered essentially as they came to us in numberless conversations. They suggest, we think, significant differences between the five Nordic countries in what preoccupies some of their more thoughtful citizens. There are, as will quickly become evident, differences in tone as well as in message. Though all spoke in English—a concession to the linguistic insufficiencies of many who visit the Nordic world from abroad—the idiom used and the manner of argument differed significantly, country by country. The differences reflect something more than varying levels of optimism or pessimism; they speak of different kinds of sensitivities and sensibilities. Even in a supposedly unified region, there is much that is specific to each of these societies, that helps to define them, and that makes each of them individually different and interesting. No effort has been made to exaggerate or emphasize disagreements; none has been made to deny or mute them.

Voices from Iceland

You ask what issues are being discussed in Iceland today, what concerns preoccupy us the most? Well, for one thing, we feel very burdened by taxes. It's no exaggeration to say that they encourage what I call the barter economy. Others call it a "black" economy, but I prefer to say barter. Collusion is everywhere. You work for me, paint my house, repair my garage door. I pay you. Neither one of us declares it, and we both gain from the exchange.

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In Iceland, productive industries are taxed to support unprofitable ones. This helps to guarantee full employment. A thirty to forty percent rate of inflation is, in my view, a fair trade-off to maintain full employment.

What do we disagree about in Iceland? Well, we're still unsure about Iceland's membership in NATO. U.S. forces stationed in the country don't please all of us. Still, those are questions of the past, settled long ago. Iceland's economic policy is discussed a good deal. Management is generally slow to adopt new ideas. On the purely technical side, though, ideas are quickly adopted. All ideas, you must understand, come to us from Sweden. Ideas from America are strongly resisted. I say that only half in jest. This doesn't prevent many of our young people from going to the United States for their graduate education.

* * *

I'm proud of Iceland, because it shows what a small country can accomplish in the world today. We have only two hundred and forty thousand people, but in the United Nations, our voice is as important as those of larger countries. Iceland often serves as a mediator, working behind the scenes. We're thought to be objective, neutral. Third World countries turn to Iceland. They trust us.

What am I mostly preoccupied with? I am determined to do all that I can to preserve nature in Iceland. Our natural inheritance is in jeopardy. Tourists arrive with their cars and vans, and tramp down the land. The lip of a volcanic crater is delicate. It's important that it be preserved. Iceland's natural beauty is a great resource. It must not be tampered with. We need to concern ourselves with the preservation of Icelandic culture as well. A too rapid expansion—too much infatuation with steam power—can ruin our way of life.

* * *

I'm concerned with Iceland's schools, with whether the reforms of recent years have made them better. I'm not sure they have. No good has been achieved, for example, by dispensing with examinations. Iceland has followed the Swedish lead in providing university en-

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trance to all who complete their school studies. University education is now a right. I wonder whether some system of tracking wouldn't improve matters. In any case, it's good that we haven't created graduate faculties here. Students are obliged to go abroad if they wish graduate training. That's good. It's an advantage to live away from Iceland, if only for a while. Our students are doing graduate work in Denmark, Germany, England, and the United States.

Cultural issues tend to unite Icelanders, while foreign policy divides us. Many Icelanders oppose the American airbase here. On the other hand, everyone is extremely grateful to Denmark for returning our saga manuscripts. They are an incomparable treasure.

* * *

Everyone in Iceland is an artist these days. When the country was predominantly rural, everyone was a poet. It was easy to recite as one went about plowing the fields. Now, Icelanders are predominantly urban. In their free time, they rush to the countryside to paint. Traditionally, Icelanders worked hard. They were busy between the ages of twenty and forty. After that, they found time to develop their cultural interests. Inflation has changed all that. Icelanders have to work harder and for longer hours, often at several jobs, to keep up with the cost of living. They have learned to cope with an annual rate of inflation that runs from twenty to forty percent. But we know how to take advantage of it. We learned that inflation devalued debts. Our wages are indexed so that they are tied to inflation. Icelanders would rather live with full employment than see inflation reduced.

What political issues preoccupy us? We're concerned with the use of thermal power and with how it will be developed industrially. Would it be better to give outright concessions to foreign investment, or to make it a primarily Icelandic effort with only some outside financing? Right-wing elements in the government favor foreign concessions. The left-wing accepts the inevitability of foreign investment, but insists that fifty percent of the money come from Iceland and that the ownership be Icelandic. These plants could produce much more power than we need. The thermal power resources in the east, for example, where the population is only six or seven thou-

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sand, could satisfy the needs of almost our entire population. Young Icelanders have serious questions about the value of progress. There is a move back to the land, and this bears watching.

In Iceland, the closing of the American army television station was a major event. It had become a burning issue in the Icelandic Parliament. The situation should never have been allowed to go on as long as it did. Imagine a television station, operating twenty-four hours a day, beyond the control of Icelanders, invading our homes. Children were missing school to watch it. What a situation! It was an insupportable invasion! Now that the station has been closed down, though, another threat has developed. Television tapes are flooding the market. We won't be able to control that as easily.

We're very sensitive to outside influences. U.S. troops cannot visit Reykjavik in uniform because a foreign uniform in Iceland would be considered an affront. American officers often lease apartments in Reykjavik, but they have to do this through an Icelander.

Iceland today risks being culturally "caught in Scandinavian nets." We accept subsidies that give us access principally to other Nordic peoples. Scandinavian cooperation has produced Nordic isolation. Historically, Iceland was forced into the Danish family. Now it's being forced into the Nordic movement. The "Nordic Fence" grows higher as financial considerations come into play. Although there's money available to translate Icelandic authors into other Scandinavian languages, we find it more difficult to be published in French or German. At one time, Icelandic literature could be found all over Europe. Not today! Rarely was anything translated into English, and that is still true.

Television in Iceland is restricted to a few hours a day. On Thursday, there is no television at all. That night is set aside for groups of every sort to meet. In July, the network is totally closed down. For a time, there was talk of setting up a government-controlled commercial network, but this hasn't happened. Some people have always felt it was unjust to set severe limits on television time. It's curious that not many people write to the newspapers about it.

Publishing is a vigorous industry in Iceland. Forty new books appear each month. There's a large literary review section in the daily newspaper. On Icelandic radio, a five-minute program runs daily on correct usage of the language. It's extended to thirty minutes once a week.

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How do we view our neighbors? Broadly speaking, Danes are open-minded, and easygoing. By comparison, Icelanders are serious-minded, traditional, and conservative. In twenty years, I'm afraid Denmark will no longer exist. For all practical purposes, Germany will have absorbed it. Recently, a Danish friend, showing me the view from his country house, said: "You cannot see land that is not owned by Germans." They are also buying into Danish businesses. The Danes are much too easygoing to compete in a European market. Danish agriculture and shipping are increasingly controlled by outsiders. Icelanders would find such a situation intolerable. We are "strict in the saga way." Swedes are strict, too, but in other ways. Even today, there are great social class distinctions in Sweden, although the Swedes would like to deny this. Norway is a world apart. Religious fervor and religious sects help to make it that way.

William Morris, you know, was quite interested in Iceland. "Industrial art" is coming into vogue with the Icelanders' growing interest in art. Modern education has little to recommend it. Attitudes are too soft. In the old days, every farm child could read the sagas. In my view, there's been a weakening of a very high standard.

Voices from Denmark

There are no grass roots along the Champs Elysées. Are there any in Copenhagen? Where does Denmark belong? Emotionally, the country is Nordic. Otherwise, it comes closer to being German. There is little anti-German feeling here. Economically, Denmark is tied to Central Europe. The feeling of nationhood is not very strong. Between the wars, Denmark acted as a bridge between Germany and the Nordic world. With it came a strong wish to stay outside world events. The Danes have no close ties with the French, but feel a certain sympathy for the English, perhaps because we have committed the same economic mistakes. In Denmark in the nineteen sixties, there was a distribution of wealth far in advance of any actual increase in it. We anticipated continued growth, so we weren't terribly concerned. To make matters worse, along with the huge expansion in welfare came a growing burden of foreign debt. There was too much consumption, both public and private. And there was a growing organization of white-collar workers, with unions insisting

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that their members get a fair share of the goods available. Unions also began to agitate to limit the hours of work. They wanted to establish workers' rights. As the economy tightened, particularly after the oil crisis of the early seventies, youth employment became a critical issue. In a nonexpanding economy, it was impossible to hire the young without firing the old. Minimum wage laws also discouraged employing the young. At any rate, they were not considered to be very serious, and certainly not worth the minimum wage. The open university kept the young out of the labor market for a few more years, but it unfortunately gave many of them job expectations, indeed career hopes, that could not be realized.

Danish industry is made up of many small companies and is therefore fundamentally different from Swedish industry. There are about seventy-five companies with three thousand or more employees, but the average company has between fifty and two hundred. These companies are often situated in small towns. In the past, they were subsuppliers to Swedish industries, but many now find markets in Germany. The heads of these companies are often first-generation entrepreneurs or managers. Smallness makes them flexible and also contributes to their productivity. The average age of workers in these plants is fairly low, so adaptation to new requirements and new technologies is rapid. Denmark has no basic industry comparable to Sweden's. Many farmers also work in industry, doing their early morning chores on the farm and then driving into town to another job. The location of industry in the small towns in the countryside helps to keep farmers on the land.

The training given in the technical universities doesn't equip their graduates to fit into industry at all well. Much of it is too theoretical. In any case, standards have been lowered to an alarming extent.

The unemployment insurance system in Denmark makes it politically possible to lay off surplus workers because they are paid up to ninety percent of their wages for an indefinite period.

Denmark has finally noticed Sweden's industrial decline. We are in the habit of watching Sweden. We feel that Germany's economic success is due largely to the willingness of workers to accept wage restraints and to perform industrial tasks conscientiously. The success of the Japanese comes from a similar national dedication to work. We Danes are not very much interested in these others. Too many of us feel that the world has been unfair to Denmark, that

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Danish unemployment is high because of what others have done to us.

Of course there's a growing concern that many, particularly the young, are losing confidence in the political system. Able people no longer choose a career in politics. Local politics still holds a certain attraction, whereas national politics seems much less compelling.

* * *

The integration of the Nordic way into the world economy has brought about the conditions one finds today. The Danish economy, like Danish culture, is vulnerable because of its size. People feel powerless. They think they're at the mercy of the dollar rate. The stability of Denmark's welfare system, for example, depends more on world events than it does on explicit government policy. The politicians' responsibility for the way the system performs is very limited. Perhaps you remember what happened to Danish agriculture. It was once of the highest quality, the backbone of Danish society. Now it's rapidly disappearing, primarily because of the overwhelming rise in international rates of interest. Agriculture is bound to long-term investment. Farmers are discovering seventy percent of their income goes toward interest. The farmers haven't failed. Their markets have not disappeared. Their farms are as efficient as ever. But they're dependent on something they cannot hope to influence—the international rate of interest. Social security can do nothing for them. Their bankruptcies are largely a consequence of international interest rates.

In eighteen eighty, the Danish farmer adapted quickly from a manor system to one that depended on cooperatives. In nineteen thirty, one third of the Danish population were still engaged in agriculture. Today, farming is the source of livelihood for less than ten percent. A true revolution, but not one "made in Denmark."

* * *

"Europe" is an American idea. Is "Nordic" a European concept? Nordics barely know one another. They only pretend to.

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Sweden is substantially influenced by Germany. In the years immediately after the war, the Danes were openly anti-German. Now they bend over backwards to be fair to Germany.

The children of the sixties are the teachers of today. They handle their students so tactfully that no one learns anything. Education is devalued when everything becomes acceptable.

In Denmark, it's bad manners to talk about death. Otherwise, people talk about everything, but nobody listens, nobody pays any attention. This is thought to be liberal.

One keeps a low profile in Denmark. There is a great danger of seeking or gaining attention.

Danes analyze but do not change. History is no longer taught here.

* * *

In what ways is the community of five different? What reality is there behind the idea of our being brothers and sisters? Permit me to speak a little of publishing. There are significant language differences, of course. Finnish is a totally different language. Book prices vary considerably from country to country. Economically, the countries are different. Ideologically, they are perhaps close. Stability in government came to all of them in the nineteen thirties.

Yet, Nordics appear to be moving away from one another. Each country looks outward, but not necessarily toward the other. Television programs are subtitled, though they need not be. Norwegians, for example, are quite capable of understanding Swedish without them. During the war, Scandinavia was cut off from much of the rest of the world and became very close. Everyone listened to Swedish radio. Everyone understood it. Plans were made for a Scandinavian library. After the war, it was launched, and it was a huge flop.

After the war, Finland was hungry for American books. Sweden, which had lagged behind Denmark as a literary center, suddenly experienced a literary explosion. Copenhagen, which had been the intellectual metropolis for both Norway and Sweden in the nineteenth century, lost out to Stockholm. Sweden became famous for its social novels. Denmark, the entrepôt for ideas from the Continent, now had to adjust to a large Anglo-American influence. As thought from

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England and the United States gained in importance, the Swedes became increasingly interested in everything coming out of the States. Swedish immigrants there made close ties easy. The Danes, meanwhile, found themselves increasingly attracted to England.

* * *

Denmark faces the Continent, the Common Market. Norway faces inward. Sweden is world-conscious.

What is the role of the artist in Scandinavia? What are the effects of government support? What is the place of the artist in the community? These are important but difficult questions to answer.

No Scandinavian artist is well known outside Scandinavia. After the war, the COBRA group, who were abstract expressionists, made a strong impact in Paris. Today, there is nothing comparable. It's difficult to keep contacts going internationally. A number of Scandinavians are at work in Germany and France, but their reputations are not very great.

As for the receptiveness each country shows the others, I would say that Norway is somewhat more open to Denmark than Denmark is to Norway. This may seem surprising. In Norway, internal laziness has made it necessary for everything to be translated into Norwegian. Also, there is a growing isolationism. Perhaps the Norwegians are constructing their own language to get away from Denmark. It is hard for Norwegians to accept the avant-garde. Yet they provide great support for the artist, but always for their own. Norway, like Iceland, is trying to create an identity. Denmark is losing theirs.

Compared to Denmark, Norway is more traditional, figurative, "old-fashioned." The trend in the arts has been significantly more experimental in Denmark since the end of the Second World War. In Copenhagen today, where there is no museum of modern art, the debate goes on as to whether there ought to be one. The logistics of the problem are barely understood. Prices for major works of art are now so high in the open market that Denmark could not possibly afford both to build a museum and to stock it. There are a few good private collections, however. Louisiana, near Elsinore, offers a good collection of mainly Danish artists. The owner originally hoped to

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build an international collection, but he settled for creating a Danish one.

* * *

Danish newspapers report little on the other Scandinavian countries. Danes have no historical memory. They laugh at the idea of one. Nor do they have much sense of national identity.

The Danes' idea of the welfare state rests principally on values carried over from village life. Our strength is in the diligence of our people, our ability to create something out of nothing. We created wealth out of perseverance and trust in God. By tradition, we're "property owners," not tenants. Rich or poor, a large amount of the family budget is still spent maintaining property. We are a materialistic society that has sprung out of a religious one. We must look at the years eighteen seventy to eighty to explain the sources of our spiritual strength. Our folk high-school tradition deserves close scrutiny. It tells a great deal about us.

* * *

In creating a system such as the welfare state, there's a time lag when the results are only dimly apparent. We're now beginning to question whether there's something wrong with the system, whether it needs to be changed. The Protest party, which was formed in nineteen seventy-three and which soon took twelve or thirteen percent of the vote, complicated all decision-making. In attacking the welfare system, the bureaucracy, and the tax structure, they seem to be arguing for a system of people paying only for what they actually receive. These same arguments are being heard today in Germany, Holland, and the United Kingdom.

* * *

This is a period of quiet change. Norway and Denmark are not safely through the second period of their industrialization. The first began in eighteen seventy-nine, the second in nineteen fifty. In nine-

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teen fifty-nine, twenty-five to thirty percent of our population still worked on farms. Today, only seven percent do. In nineteen fifty-nine, agricultural exports were seventy percent of our total exports. Today, they represent only twenty-five. Such quick transitions must inevitably produce social problems. It's not surprising that the high growth in the nineteen fifties and sixties, the rapid change from agriculture to industry, caused some turmoil. Then, nineteen sixty-eight brought change to all of Europe. There was a new independence of youth. The oil shock brought unemployment. In Denmark, it rose to eight or nine percent. With it came an increasingly heavy foreign debt. Governments that had grown accustomed to expansion imagined that such debts would be rapidly paid off in an expanding market. But the markets failed to expand.

Norway and Sweden suffered no comparable increase in unemployment. They subsidized their industries to keep employment stable. In short, they swept the dust under the carpet. Norway was able to use her new oil wealth to conceal her industrial troubles, but not Sweden. Swedish industries, which are scattered throughout the country, are peculiarly vulnerable. If a big industry goes out of business in Sweden, a whole region may be destroyed. The government could not permit this to happen. Subsidies are the safety hatch for avoiding political suicide.

* * *

One social problem that is drawing increasing attention is the reform of prisons. Denmark wants very much to evaluate its prison system so as to humanize and liberalize it. There is strong public support for not sending many types of offenders to jail. Just now, Danish prison officials are concentrating on training and education. Their concern is to establish good relations between the prisons and the general public. But right-wing elements, both inside and outside Parliament, are calling for more rigorous enforcement of the law. Before the mid-nineteen seventies, Parliament was not much interested in prison reform. Any interest that did exist presumed the necessity of a more liberal policy. But that is no longer true. The country seems more divided on such matters. Prison populations are changing dramatically. The number of female prisoners is on the rise. Pris-

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oners today are better educated than they once were. Narcotics criminality has brought a much more educated group of offenders into prison. We don't know how to deal with them.

* * *

Denmark may seem like paradise to those outside. But within our society, there is anxiety about anything that differs from the norm. Guest workers and homosexuals, for example, are two categories of "outsiders" that cause acute disquiet.

There is an undeniable crisis of values in Denmark today. What does it mean to be Danish? Is there a Danish people? What is the meaning of tradition in a society like ours? The country is moving fast, but in a technological sense only. There is a need for a consciousness of transcendence. Human rights are bound to time and place. We think of ourselves as sitting on a ticking bomb. The vast majority of our society knows that it's the heart that's involved, not the head.

At the end of the war, the Danes greeted liberation with confidence and joy. They looked for great changes. We are a sensible people. We seek a "fellowship" that we know we lack.

It is the role of the church to set forth a new set of concerns. The church must be seen as the asylum for the forgotten truths of our time. The important thing is for us to discover in what direction we are moving, where we are likely to be in twenty years' time. As a society, we seem to be preoccupied with quite secondary issues.

Voices from Norway

To understand the profound psychological differences between Finland and Sweden, and between both and Denmark, you must know their history. Without that knowledge, it's impossible to explain, for example, their different attitudes toward the United States and Europe. Denmark is part of the European continent. It turned to commerce because of its geographic position. Norway was industrialized only at the turn of the century, much later than its more powerful neighbor, Sweden. Norway's largely uninhabited interior contributed to this late development. It was poorer than its neigh-

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bors. For over four hundred years it was politically dominated from outside. In retrospect, Norway's acceptance of Lutheranism perhaps only served to isolate and insulate the country further. Europe remained a distant world, Catholic Europe an alien one. Does any of this help to explain why Norway rejected the idea of entering the Common Market? Maybe not. But remember, those who opposed Norway's entry insisted that the Common Market was a union of nations. Norway had left its union with Sweden early in the twentieth century. Why should it wish to join another? Wouldn't it be better to remain independent? Ibsen speaks of this Norwegian suspicion—more accurately, its shortsightedness. Still, it's easier to talk about Europe today than it was five years ago. Maybe those who wanted Norway to enter the Common Market placed too much emphasis on purely commercial issues and ignored the wider questions that might have appealed more to a people like ourselves. They talked about small, practical, commercial matters. That's *not* the way to win our allegiance. People rarely talked about the cultural and political benefits of joining. While shipping and heavy industry generally are open to external influence, the country as a whole is not. Norway is terribly afraid of being dominated by others.

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You ask about the Norwegian language. The older dialects are being fused into a single official language. There is an important social purpose behind this move. In the past, renowned Norwegian scholars taught in Copenhagen, and educated people spoke Danish. The schoolboy from the country was at a disadvantage because he spoke only his local dialect. Norway is now establishing an official language to avoid the injustices created by this situation. This is a political move that has its origins earlier in the century. It will have a profound effect on the country.

As for welfare, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark have all been pressed too far in providing for it. The fiscal burden is much too heavy. Welfare policies have certainly weakened the work ethic, but no one in politics dares to acknowledge this. The social security system is too costly. Without its oil revenues, Norway would be hard-pressed to manage its public responsibilities. Sixty percent of GNP

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goes into the public sector. In Sweden it's the same. Politicians are too timid to speak out.

The "grey market" exists in Norway today because most people cannot live on their declared incomes. They're forced to work illegally, and the money they earn in this way is never acknowledged. A wealthy individual may have his entire house built by grey market labor. He can save quite a bit—between thirty and forty percent. No one knows how much of the national product is created by grey market labor—more than five percent, certainly, and perhaps as much as ten. No one talks publicly about this. There's a conspiracy of silence. But if a large company is involved, the public learns about it soon enough. If there is even a hint of cheating, the company will be pilloried. The misdeeds of the great and the prominent help the grey market worker to feel better about his own small adventures. Politicians claim not to be interested in small-time cheats. It's the big ones they're after. There's a double standard, and perhaps it's the inevitable by-product of Norway's "development."

Many of Norway's basic industries are in decline, fishing for one. There are only twenty thousand Norwegian fishermen left. Agriculture is also going down. Only seven or eight percent of the population now work on farms. Both fishing and farming are heavily subsidized because Parliament believes that earnings in agriculture ought to be comparable to those in industry. There is great concern that certain parts of the country will become depopulated. Subsidies must be kept high to avoid this. The more northerly reaches of the country cannot compete with the south in agricultural production, but they will not be abandoned. In remote areas where fishing is the main occupation, the introduction of fish-processing plants keeps the villages alive. Both fishing and agriculture are highly organized. Both have strong pressure groups working for them. There are few large properties in Norway. Most of the land is divided into small holdings. Farming in Norway today is more rationalized than many branches of industry. Subsidies often help farmers to buy the equipment they need to mechanize. Even small farmers generally make a good living. The fisherman makes his living in the three or four months of the year that he actually goes out to sea. The rest of the time he collects unemployment insurance.

In education, the tendency in Norway today is to do away with examinations. Instead, the emphasis seems to be on rescuing the

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"loser." This isn't good for either schooling or the country. But the pendulum is beginning to swing the other way. A strong movement against permissive tendencies is developing in the schools, although it may be a while before educational policies reflect this change.

It's true that Norway is an open society where most issues are discussed. Still, there is too little attention given to many problems, including the lack of adequate capital for large-scale expenditures in the future. On the social service front, many basic needs are going unmet. It's surprising how little comment there is about the shortage of hospital workers and the closing of large sections of certain hospitals. Also, many city community centers are in decay. In many cities there aren't enough municipal employees for services to be adequately maintained.

The discovery of oil in the North Sea has blinded the Norwegian people to their national plight. Norway is a good country. Many live well, enjoy their lives, and love nature.

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As for North Sea oil, the question is simply how a country can learn to live with newfound wealth. How should it be distributed? What constraints should there be? Why? In thinking about conflicts over distribution, it's useful to look at the history of the labor movement in Norway. Originally, many small unions joined together to form the Labor party. Now it's breaking apart. We see many fragmented groups that are not overly concerned with the social consequences of their actions. Small competing groups, each wanting something for itself, battle over policies. What would happen to Norway if it didn't have its oil? But even with it, things will not be easy for us. Without it, the country would be in real trouble. The people don't understand this. The country is now passing through a crisis of rising expectations that conceals the more grave crisis of understanding.

Why are the Norwegian people blind to their country's plight? The politicians have tried to show them. Many have called for a halt in the growth of state expenditures, for a more restrictive state budget. Yet they are no match for the many powerful interest groups in this country, occupational groups with their own particular de-

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mands. Let me cite an example. There were thirty groups in the National Health Sector only a few years ago while today there are a hundred and twenty. Why? Specialization. Occupational groups are fragmented. Each fights to obtain the best terms for its members, to move it up the ladder. Several are in a position to blackmail society. Whenever the idea of uniting these small groups into a larger body is put forward, it's generally dismissed as fascist. One part of the labor movement paralyzes the other. The trade union movement in Norway is profoundly conservative. The lines were drawn up early in the Industrial Revolution. Unions today are generally governed by the older generation. They're not interested in reform. They have their constituencies and intend to serve them.

What issues are on the public's mind but are not much discussed? Declining fertility. People are worried that the population may be cut in half—and in the not too distant future. They're concerned, too, over the coming of age of the sixties generation. And they're preoccupied with how complex it is to organize one's private life today.

On "grey market" workers, there's a growing conflict between what public morality seems to demand and what in fact is really happening. There's been an enormous increase in such work in the last ten years. On the plus side, we've seen a greater availability of work—good work—for women.

Not enough attention is given today to teaching. It was once considered a calling. Now it's a job. Teachers insist on being paid for any extra work they're asked to do. They will only perform tasks, such as supervising children at mealtimes, if they're paid for it. Yet not long ago, these duties were considered part of their daily routine. There is certainly a decline in civic culture, and with it, a decline in public morality. Everyone is expected to do as little as possible. The relation between public and private interest is obscure, and it's growing increasingly so.

Still, many people are interested in voluntary work. This sector of the economy is substantially "irrigated" with public money. Four fifths of the population belong to some sort of voluntary organization, and it's increasing. A decade ago, it was seventy percent.

The free system prevailing in our schools today is divisive. If the bright students are separated into their own groups, they seem willing to be pushed. But that's not always possible. The use of time is

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always a problem. Some work to capacity, while others accommodate themselves to the slower, more leisurely pace of life in Norway today. The larger question, perhaps, is whether Norway can maintain its present standard of living and at the same time retain its decided preference for having ample leisure time.

What issues should Norway be preoccupied with? There are three: the educational structure appropriate to an egalitarian society, the issue of equal pay for equal work versus the idea of equal pay for any work whatsoever, and the problem of the work ethic and conditions created by the passion for leisure. Today we are concerned with balancing considerations of equity compared to efficiency. In America, not much is traded off for equity and thus we see a preoccupation with efficiency there. In Norway today, one is able to say, "I can claim four years of schooling after high school and so can he. So I ought to be paid as much as he." This argument ignores the kind of work being done, the market for it, and most of all, its difficulty. If considerations of equity were that simple, we would see a rush toward jobs that are pleasurable, and wages would shoot up. Yet anyone who argued against this in Norway today would be labeled an "ultraconservative." If the demand for equal pay is ignored, workers will slow down and there will be bitter feelings. Market demands and individuals are almost totally ignored in this debate.

How many Norwegians participate in the grey or black market? No one knows, but perhaps as much as forty percent of the population. The hours worked constitute two to three percent of the GNP. The overwhelming number of such workers insist on cash payment. Today, the unions negotiate for shorter hours rather than higher wages, because a worker can make more on the black market than he can earn officially. Besides, higher wages would only put him in a higher tax bracket.

There's a lot of moral ambiguity about these practices, but still they persist. Perhaps two thirds of the people approve or accept the necessity of the black market, the young more readily than the old.

From nineteen seventy-five to eighty, employment in health, welfare, and education increased enormously in Norway. Today, people talk about "more cooks causing more greasy kitchens." Professionalism is pointed to as the cause. We now have increased egalitarianism but less efficiency. The income from oil conceals this. We're

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so beguiled with our good fortune, our great expectations, that we risk losing our traditional flexibility. In ten years' time Sweden may be better off than Norway because Sweden will have been forced to deal with its real problems. Norway may be on its way to becoming the Spain of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. At that time, Spain was flooded with gold. Norway now has her black gold. What will she do with it? It may be useful for us to contemplate the example of eighteenth century England to learn from it.

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Norway is a postwar economic success story. It's the most egalitarian society in Scandinavia. But something began to go wrong in the seventies. Something was forgotten along the way. Norwegian society has become too complicated. The growing public sector has become self-defeating. Finland may yet turn out to be the economic success story of the eighties. Remember, it was a Finnish prime minister who said, "One has to say 'no' occasionally."

Norway will muddle through because it's a sensible society. The oil industry has fooled Norway, but the country will not remain blinded for long to its real condition. At one time the government was able to say there was no more money to meet a certain demand. Now there is, or it's said there is, and this makes for pressure. There is not a balance-of-payments problem in Norway, but we've lost the capacity to say "no." There's little unemployment, but only because of government subsidies.

Young people in Norway today may be unable to find jobs because they think that what's available is beneath them. Given the jobs that do exist, they may even be overeducated.

The hospital system works badly, not because the workers are idle but because they're not well organized. Out on the shop floor, there is no motivation to work. Without motivation, one is totally lost. It's much too easy to drop out. As for the politicians, their arguments are traditional and not at all interesting. There are some quite brilliant leaders among the Conservatives. The leaders of industry are hampered by complex regulations. If industry is to function efficiently, the processes must be simplified. Regulations regarding the use of the land must be relaxed. The licensing systems for air and

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land transport only hamper development. Regulations made to protect the weaker members in industry are now also hurting them. Small companies are unable to slash through the jungle of bureaucratic controls themselves, and they can't afford the battery of lawyers needed to do it for them.

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Is it sensible to increase support for the arts when everyone agrees that the economy calls for reduced public expenditures? Those in control say it's not their problem. They say the country is in need of wider cultural development, and that in any case, they're taking only a very small part of the total state budget. The budget increase will go to cover new support for the arts. They insist that artists must have income through public support on a par with what is earned in other fields, and that artists who sell to museums rather than to private collections must receive additional compensation.

How is it decided which artist will be supported? Norway has thirty-one hundred artists. Only four hundred are supported by the state. The appropriate unions decide which of these thirty-one hundred are deserving of support. The unions submit lists of applicants and their work for review by a committee from the Ministry. The committee's part is to judge the quality of the work. There are about a thousand writers and musicians who have guaranteed incomes. Once an artist applied for a grant and the Minister denied it. There was a debate in Parliament, and he had to withdraw his objection.

How do Norway's artists, writers, and musicians view their colleagues? Among the painters, the young tend to be ignored by the old. Among the writers, the old say that the young take too large a slice of the cake. Those not supported by the state collect unemployment insurance. State-supported Norwegian composers receive the highest grants. There are seventy of them. If Norway does not invest in its national culture, that culture will be in jeopardy. Still, half of the programs offered by the Norwegian Broadcasting Company come from abroad.

How important is an artist's international reputation? We don't believe it's valid for artists even to seek one. Writers must keep writing for Norwegians. The state has a responsibility to encourage the

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distribution of books. The Ministry is now trying to force Norway's libraries to be information centers for all the arts.

Composers in Norway do quite well. Of the sixty or seventy here, fifty are very active. They have guaranteed incomes and orchestra commissions, and they receive funds from copyright. They earn money in lots of ways. Radio and television play their music. There are touring concerts. We have a modern Norwegian ballet.

What problems does the Ministry face? The important thing is to uphold the overall responsibility of the state. We must be faithful to our local values. Of course, there is always the problem of quality. A municipality must not be allowed to bar the works of an author or artist it doesn't approve of. How can Norwegian culture survive in the presence of pressing foreign influences? That is the basic question. We need to establish many small drama and orchestra companies throughout Norway so that Norwegian art can be spread through all the country.

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What is new in Norway? Norway has discovered the bomb, and there is much confused discussion about it. As for problem areas in Norway, there are three. First, the social changes are much more modest than those that took place in the United States in the sixties. But we do have a drug problem, and there has been a startling increase in crime. The people have discovered that they don't need to agree with the majority. We have seen the first Norwegian civil disobedience. We have learned that a small number of workers can hold a nation hostage.

Second, Norway has stumbled into the oil age. How are we to manage our vast resources? How fast should one milk the cow? The U.S. government has made its first formal approach to Norway to release more oil to Germany so that Germany will not be compelled to turn to Russia for oil.

Finally, Norway's strategic position has changed greatly. We are finally reevaluating our position. These questions never used to be discussed much in public. Now, everyone wants to give advice. But nothing coming from the outside plays a very big role with us. Our critical mass may be too small for the enormous problems we con-

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front. There is a real cultural lag in this area. Suddenly, everyone is interested in what Norway has to say at international conferences. But we remain "allergic" to foreign influence; we are trying to build up our own technical expertise quickly.

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Norway has the same problems as the rest of the world. Most people are disillusioned with the educational system. Reforms have destroyed the schools. We're also preoccupied with women's rights. Equal pay and equal career opportunities are major issues. We want to bring women into politics. Regional equality has also become an issue. Those living on the periphery deserve an equal share. Egalitarianism has many consequences, including the gradual breakdown of the welfare society. Everyone agrees that it's in crisis. The question is how to preserve and maintain it. Equality has destroyed economic life. Insurance has been abused. The welfare society is the complete opposite of the competitive society, and suddenly we see that it produces its own moral inequities. How are we to deal with them?

Nordic cooperation has produced only meager results. Our countries are geographically close. We are in agreement ethically. We are homogeneous in all sorts of ways. We have the same religion and similar political institutions. But, by themselves, such factors do not create a sense of unity. We ought to cooperate, but we don't. "Peace" in Oslo means going back to the woods. In Copenhagen, it means going back to the kitchen.

In the past, Norway was sapped by migration, first to Iceland, then to the United States. Another kind of migration may be taking place now—internal, novel, and certainly dangerous. The people's enthusiasm seems to be waning. Norwegians used to work seven days a week. After the war, work was enormously important. But the young, who have been brought up in the welfare society, take wealth to be their right. They're to be pitied. They seem to believe in nothing. They lack enthusiasm. They are gentle, but seem to have little appetite for life. Even when young, they begin to speculate on what they will do when they retire. It's all very discouraging and disheartening.

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What is our first concern? What oil is doing to Norwegian society. How is fishing, for example, being affected by the oil industry? Fishing is a cultural phenomenon in Norway, much as coal mining used to be in England.

Norwegians are materialistic on the surface. Underneath, we have the values of a simple rural society. We are like the Icelanders. We want to be like the Swedes. We think of Danes as Germans. We see Sweden as a country much like Norway. Norwegian culture is deeply traditional. The language is integrally linked to kinship.

The oil industry is transforming coastal life. To Norwegians who live in a fishing area, all wealth comes from the sea, whether as fish or oil. Every time the Arabs raise their prices, so do we. Then the state steps in to take its royalties. In the seventies, Norwegians abandoned their idealistic view of the world when they realized that they had to look out for their own interests. Norway now recognizes that it has a world role and that it needs a foreign policy.

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What is on the minds of Norwegians today? What people are thinking about is very different from what the politicians are talking about. The people in the street may think that they have problems—housing, for example—but people with ordinary incomes have no great problems. Among the professional classes, life is a bit more difficult. Their incomes are decreasing, relatively, and the bureaucracy weighs heavily on them. But they have no real problems either. Then why are Norwegians joyless today? All our problems have been taken care of by the social system. We live in a grey society. Once we had to concentrate to succeed in life. Now we can relax. The older generation looks back to the Occupation, feeling that life had meaning in those days. There was a true fraternity then, a real solidarity. The material benefits of today are just not enough. What the political parties have to say is not really important. The experts are concerned only with running a complicated society. It's welfare that makes it all so complicated. But the people themselves aren't involved in finding the solutions. Others are there to do it for

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them. Oslo is small. Its problems are small, and for the most part come from the cuts in public spending.

The important problems are all in the future. What will happen to social security when we have more old people than young? An increasing older population means greater problems with doctors and hospitals. There's not much that politicians can do about such things.

We are seeing an increase in the cost of products. We import fifty percent of what we use. That's more than any other country except Iceland and Israel. We've used our oil income for credits abroad. But we can't expect oil to give us a permanent favorable foreign trade balance. It'll run out in twenty to forty years. What will we do then?

You ask about communications in the country. Norway has four million people living in fragmented groups. Sometimes only a hundred people live in a large valley. They're isolated by geography. This makes it much more expensive to establish communications in Norway than in any other country in Europe. There are twenty-five hundred relay stations in Norway. Denmark can be covered by one. Men have to climb to the tops of mountains to build relays. Roads must be laid so they can be maintained. We don't have nearly enough qualified people to run our television. Norwegians are moderately well informed. We read many newspapers, watch television, and listen to the radio. The average Norwegian is probably better informed than the average Englishman, German, or American.

We have always found time for pleasure. But more and more people have to work in the black market now, to pay off their debts. This is part of the present culture and its discontents. Parents and children have little time to spend together. The children are often alone. Some have problems with drugs. Still, it's not as bad as in many other countries. Children are free, but they're not wild. We have less crime than many other countries, though it's on the rise.

We see a lot of wildcat strikes now. A strike is an interesting "event" in the humdrum life of a worker. But the real problems are in the political arena. Reform is in the air. Many of the reforms are good, but they're taking place too rapidly. That makes for instability. Every year we see new school reforms. Sixty-seven is the fixed retirement age, but people can work until they're seventy. The trade unions want to lower the age of retirement. The social scientists say it's better for people in good health to continue working. Why can't

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we cope with our newfound leisure? Why are sailboats, skis, automobiles, and second homes not enough?

Voices from Sweden

All of Sweden's economic troubles started with its balance-of-payments difficulties. Before oil prices soared, Sweden imported seventy percent of its oil at very reasonable prices. After prices jumped tenfold, Sweden began to increase its hydroelectric and nuclear power in the hope of limiting the impact of the price rise. But it could not immunize itself against the series of disasters that originated in the oil crisis. At the time, Sweden built ten percent of the world's ships, including a substantial number of tankers. When oil shipments declined, orders for ships were reduced and cancelled. Fifty percent of the Swedish steel industry was engaged in making ship plate, so the threat of a vast layoff of Swedish steelworkers was very real. The Swedish government subsidized the shipyards, but couldn't make back the cost of the steel plate. You must understand that Sweden is organized into "population islands" of industry. When a worker loses his job in most industrial countries, he's often able to find a new one just down the road. In Sweden, when an industry dies, the whole surrounding area dies too. Schools and hospitals, no less than factories and offices, are deserted.

The present crisis may last for a very long time. Sweden will have to borrow its way out of its troubles. It's a sorry economic remedy, Swedes think, to throw people out of work. We're still very much committed to Keynes's theory of keeping up demand. One needs to increase national consumption if and when exports fail, and try to keep imports down. Civil servants become our wage leaders. Our export goods are still too expensive to compete in the world market. The interest on Sweden's debt has become too great a burden. Other countries, including Switzerland, were more astute. Switzerland lowered its production and froze its wages. We did neither.

In the past, only three percent of Sweden's students took the Baccalaureate and only ten percent finished high school. This could have been doubled at any time, but the standards were intentionally kept high. Now the schools have hit bottom with respect to standards. Students are not required to work at their studies. This makes the

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social class system in Sweden more powerful than ever. Home values are the controlling factor. Children of professional parents are pushed. Many hope to reach the standard-of-living of their parents. Few working-class children are given the incentive to excel. Before the school reforms, there was not much correlation between social class and classroom performance. Now it's substantial. The children are not prepared for a life of work. Swedish factories are disciplined places. Young people find it difficult to fit in. The army and the schools don't have the right to dismiss students, and naturally, without this power, they can't maintain discipline. But the employer can. The teachers are reasonably good. They're delighted with any child who has the incentive to work. The institutes of technology once produced elite students. Now they, too, have dropped their standards in the interest of equality.

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The Danes are traders, sailors, inventors, and poets. The Swedes are engineers. The Finns are warriors. The Swedes are by nature forest people. They see nature as something that must be harnessed to engineering. Norwegians love nature for itself. The Norwegians live in small, dense communities in the fjords, and this has created a certain disunity among the people. The Swedes have unity because of the traditions of the army. The Norwegians will manage their oil wells. The shipping community is a good one; they're handling their industry well. The Norwegians are not exploring the North for oil; those possible fields are thought to be too close to Russia.

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The superpowers seem anxious to involve this quiet corner of the world into their own state of tension. They want to place their weapons here in the name of security. But we value our neutrality, and will not forfeit it easily. What we aim to do is explain its value to other countries. We're active and vocal in the UN debates on disarmament. We want to disseminate accurate information so that defense issues are correctly perceived. In the early nineteen seventies, the great subject for international debate was the Common Market.

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Today, the debate is about defense and neutrality. We have a unique contribution to make to that debate.

Unemployment in Sweden is running at two and one-half to four percent, but the economic structure is in trouble here as it is in much of the rest of the world. Shipyards must be converted to some other use. The balance-of-payments deficit is troubling. Swedes consume too much. But one can't change economic policies rapidly without risking confrontation. The trade unions are in trouble precisely because they have so little to offer, so little to negotiate about.

We need to have a more efficient public sector. A limit of one or two percent expansion will force civil servants to improve efficiency. We need fewer statisticians and more people actively serving the public. There's a serious shortage of day-care centers. Plans to expand these facilities were cut for budgetary reasons. This was a mistake. In housing, there's not much available in the lower price range. Young married couples either have to live with their parents, start off in a one-room apartment, or postpone marriage entirely. A lot of housing was built in the sixties to take care of this, but the building stopped in the seventies. Housing starts are now down to what they were in the thirties. We need political initiative to stimulate new growth. As for the houses that are available, the rents are much too high.

Alcoholism is on the decline in Sweden today, down to the level of the early sixties. Drug abuse is also less of a problem. There's a new kind of moral revulsion among the young against such practices. Swedes have a very low tolerance for unemployment. They refuse to accept policies that make unemployment seem natural or acceptable.

There's an ongoing debate in Sweden today concerning the new technologies in television. Television is crucially important in its influence on popular culture. Videocassettes are becoming increasingly common. Some are highly unsuitable. They shouldn't be allowed to circulate. Yet, they can be rented quite easily. The question is whether they ought to be considered films, and therefore subject to censorship. Books are not censored in Sweden, but films are. Yes, a Nordic satellite would be a good thing because it would certainly disseminate more information. But the great danger remains the distribution of these undesirable cassettes. As people become used to watching them, the worthwhile cassettes and television itself

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will grow worse, since they will be compelled to compete with trash. Newspapers are a problem, too. They frequently have to lower their standards to attract readers. On the plus side, we have a tradition of superior foreign reporting. We maintain a continuous and lively discussion on issues like disarmament. At the moment, we're reporting extensively on the Iran/Iraq war. We also send out journalists on special projects around the world. Two years ago a group went around the world taking jobs for short periods of two or three weeks to report on working conditions in other countries.

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We live in a day of highly technical elite culture coexisting with new forms of popular culture. The sale of LPs in Sweden is declining. People seem increasingly interested in making their own music. There is a strong revival of live music, of folk music especially. In Sweden, people are building their own "key harps" and coming together in groups to play folk music. A key harp is an ancient instrument. There's no music instruction in schools. Many who play are self-taught.

As for the theater, a movement that started in Finland fifteen years ago is now popular in Sweden. Local people come together to do research about their community and to write its history in play form. Then they give the play during the summer. This has been going on in Sweden for five or six years. The state lends them a hand. There are about two million Swedes involved in these local cultural efforts. They also sponsor local handicraft exhibitions and have shown great creativity both in the arts and in their research.

Libraries in Sweden are today the largest major expenditure for the state in the area of culture. They are centers for many activities, offering exhibitions, talks, symposia. Libraries are free to buy what they wish, but you find very little poetry or experimental literature in Sweden's smaller libraries. At the moment, in fact, there's a great pressure to reduce expenses, so there's a move afoot to close branch libraries and to send a bus around to individual neighborhoods. Workplace libraries without a librarian in attendance are common. All of Sweden's libraries together can be counted on to purchase about five hundred copies of a given work. Libraries will generally

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wait for a paperback to appear before they place an order. Part of the writer's income will come from these library sales. About a hundred and twenty authors get thirty thousand kroner each as payment from the government for the use of their books in libraries, so writers have a basic security.

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We all know what happened to countries that missed the Reformation. The great events of this century have been the two world wars. How does it effect a country to have missed them? Since eighteen fifteen, Sweden has been at peace. This has shaped our culture. We have a naive attitude toward peace. We believe we play a role in superpower politics by protesting. Sweden aspires to be the conscience of the world. We have managed to remain at peace, and we ask why others can't be equally reasonable. During World War II, Hitler could have taken us in a matter of minutes. He chose not to because it would have been too difficult to occupy us from a geographic point of view. At any rate, he got much of what he wanted by our remaining neutral. If we had refused to let Germany pass through in the North, he would have taken us. We learned the advantages of submission.

Unlike the industries of the rest of Europe, ours were booming in the fifties. We became an adaptable and adoptable model. We had a bad conscience during the war. The Norwegians and the Danes threw our guilt up to us. The important credit contract we made with Russia in the postwar depression period gave us a ready market. It may help to explain our attitude toward developing countries. Swedes believe that their help to these countries shows a willingness to sacrifice. But the money we lend to developing nations we borrow in turn. We have the credit to do so. This "sacrifice" costs us only minimally, if at all.

Norway's oil is now helping her secure a capital surplus. Both countries ought to agree to invest in joint ventures. But Norway is so unused to thinking in economic terms that it will take her some time to become really adventurous. Some of us in Sweden believe that Norway wants to use us as a front for investing in the world.

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The Norwegians are not much interested at the moment in investing directly in failing Swedish industries.

Danes are good merchants. Swedes are good engineers. And Swedes are by far the best economists. The economists have been involved in political decision-making since the early part of the century. They can think ahead in planning the economy. Economics dominates both the large organizations and the government in Sweden. Norway has an inferiority complex when it comes to Sweden. The Swedes think of Finland as the new Germany because the Finns are conscientious workers. But the Finns are becoming anti-Swedish. All the best schools in Finland are run by Swedes. The top administration is Swedish, and the best jobs in the country are held by Swedes. Sweden colonized Finland in the thirteenth century. We act sometimes as if we still controlled it.

Generally, Swedes are politically indifferent. They are content to vote every third year on a slate of candidates. The parties prepare a list that the electorate votes on. The parliamentarian is included in the list as long as he votes with the party. If he does otherwise, he is thrown off the list. The voters' indifference is highly developed. Most shifts in politics are minor. Why don't we join together to show our irritation with the government? Perhaps because we rarely feel it. Who goes into politics anyway, and why? The majority of those in politics come from the public sector. They have total job security. They know that they can go back to their jobs whenever they leave Parliament. This is not as true for the private sector. The public sector is the institutional home of politicians, and therefore they rarely attack it. Instead, they keep busy banning mild beer and dandelion wine. It's safer to do that than to confront real issues.

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The public school system and college students generally concern me greatly. I'm troubled by the current low standards of knowledge and the decline in discipline. The promise given to the less privileged in Sweden has proved to be nothing but empty words. The school system expanded much too rapidly to maintain standards. Once they were very high. Today, the schools in Uppsala are good, but those in the more remote provinces are not. Ideas about education that

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were current in the United States in the thirties were taken up by Sweden after the war. They haven't been abandoned, though hardly anyone in American education espouses them today. Education is carried out in an experimental fashion, with no control group to monitor the success or failure of the experiment. We would not treat a monkey that way. Why do we do it to children? It was hoped that easier access would give the same opportunity to all, but in practice, things turned out differently. The easy access of the sixties produced a stream of unemployable semi-intellectuals of very low caliber. The able children of trade union leaders are not entering industry or the unions, but are attending university, hoping to become professionals. They no longer look to a future in Parliament. Who does? Parliament is made up of landowners, civil servants on leave, big farmers, and municipal grandees. They often first become known in local affairs. These are individuals paid by organizational interests; union men in the pay of the union. Labor was always represented by its own people. A peasant could aspire to be in the king's cabinet. *That* tells something of the educational system of the past. Nonsocialists today have great difficulty in recruiting able parliamentarians from trade or industry because their jobs will not be held open for them. Civil servants and university people can always take leave, and many do.

Once law professors by tradition entered Parliament, but that practice fell off in the early seventies. The military profession has declined terribly. So have the clergy. They still count locally, but not much otherwise. Money counts in Swedish society. So does birth. Industrialists head the social list. Trade unionists make headlines, but don't mix with the nobility. Medicine is an honored profession and is well paid. There are few perks in medicine. It's mostly a good salary and excellent fringe benefits. Those in the medical profession are paid twice what a professor makes. Science in Sweden is equal to the standards set by the Nobel scientists who visit. Swedish scientists feel equal to them.

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The Scandinavian pattern regarding foreign affairs and defense matters was established largely without design, and for a time, most

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people seemed to buy it. Today, there are grave misgivings. Many feel that there has been a substantial shift of power, with the Soviet Union gaining in strength and the United States becoming weaker. There seems to be no consensus about what this portends for the Nordic world.

As for the economy, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway all have advanced welfare programs, and all are now in trouble, the Danes deeply so. The Swedes are somewhat better off, though even that is debatable. The current dissatisfaction with social security reflects deep misgivings, not so much about its objectives as about its administration, performance, and cost. Education is in a state of unrest. The university system is acknowledged by everyone to be on the defensive. It is now undergoing reappraisal and readjustment.

Sweden was predominantly agricultural until the last war, and after it, we took great risks. The attitude can be summed up as: "We'll take a chance and things will get better." Now we are too conservative even to contemplate such recklessness. There is a good deal of debate both inside and outside political circles, but it's not clear that the public sector is becoming more responsive to new ideas, or more flexible. Ideas are certainly circulating, although not many are being tested. Everyone is too busy cutting back.

The problem is with the politicians and the media. The following story will show what I mean. An old mine was scheduled to be closed. The villagers screamed about the injustice involved, and the media picked up the story without bothering to give the rationale for the decision. Pressure was put on the politicians, and naturally, the mine was kept open. Politicians are expected to react to every problem, including those that involve an entrenched bureaucracy and special interest groups. They are endlessly trying to put out little fires that turn into media conflagrations. The politicians like to say they can solve any problem. This leads to the real problem, which is initiating bureaucratic changes by deregulation. There should be a limited but firm state power. The present system must inevitably collapse, whether through crisis or by gradual evolution.

I see it mainly as a question of deregulation, of releasing some control over the private sector. The state has involved itself in areas that make no fiscal sense at all. For example, it subsidizes a great part of the living costs of a young Swedish couple moving into a three-room apartment. It will be ten or more years before the state can extricate

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itself from this responsibility. In regulations that affect planning and building, the path is less clear. A distinction needs to be made between demands for quality and for quantity. In education and hospitals, for example, it's a question of quantity versus quality, and it's usually quantity that wins. Social security requires planning. Many live off social welfare. Although people object to welfare cheats, in Sweden it's not a big problem. Everyone cheats a little. This came to light in a check on building subsidies. It turned out that many people had cheated, and they were required to pay their subsidies back to the government. The tax system puts a severe strain on public morals and public morale. It's difficult to get work done without going to the black market. I recently moved and wanted my kitchen modernized. Politically, I can't afford to be seen using black market labor. I tried for three months to get the work done, but without success. It was unusual for people to work in the black market during the seventies. Not so anymore. As for what is happening in the family, people are going back to it. More people are getting married. Parents are losing confidence in day-care centers. In fact, there's a large black market in day care. I think women enjoy looking after children.

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The major issues confronting the Swedish people arise out of the world economic crisis, the ongoing rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, the continued difficulties of the Common Market, nuclear power, and the workers' share in Swedish industry. All other Social-Democratic parties in Europe are in much worse shape than ours. In every other, there are deep divisions. The Thatcher and Reagan policymakers are making feeble attempts to switch directions. But they can't succeed. The crisis of socialism in Poland is the same as the crisis of capitalism elsewhere. The difficulties in both have to do with the development of strong pressure groups. We know how things *ought* to be in Sweden, but that doesn't mean we can make them so. The Social Democrats can deal better with the crisis than can the opposition. In your country, Nixon found it much easier to deal with China than a Democrat would have, precisely because he was protected by his right flank. In Sweden, the Social

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Democrats have an advantage when it comes to dealing with an overgrown social welfare establishment. But everything here is decided by forces outside Sweden. Anything the government does makes only a small difference. We are the captives of others.

People speak about the acceptance of unemployment. Of course, no one accepts it. But how long can one afford to pay to keep up employment? As for culture, it's interesting to see how little official policy can influence it. In fact, the prevalence of bureaucracy is in itself anticulture. Capitalism works with stimuli and sanctions. But socialism works by blending individual egotism and the egotism of many groups.

But the Swedes are a pragmatic people, an engineering people, and in ten or twenty years we may reasonably tackle our industrial problems. Our people have good social discipline.

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There is a movement among the young to make Sweden a drug-free society. No public money may be spent on liquor. We find that many people drink quite a bit before they go to official dinners. Others bring their own and quickly get the formalities over with so they can enjoy a drink with their talk.

The important topics today are the economic system, unemployment, taxes, and nuclear development. There is agreement on reforms, but no interest in pushing them through. On the economic front, it's hard to tell people their work is now worth less than it was before, but that nevertheless they will have to work harder. All the problems of our time can be seen in Sweden. We know what they are. But the difficulty is to achieve the consensus needed to resolve them.

For example, the shipyards have experienced a dramatic cut in production, but it will take three or four more years to phase out subsidies. As for textile subsidies, eighty percent of all textiles are imported. Twenty years ago, free imports were the norm. In fact, free trade was more accepted in Sweden than in any other country. Of course, we can't do away with subsidies entirely. Steel and mining, for instance, have to be supported if we are to keep certain parts of the country alive. But we risk running into trouble with the EEC,

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which cares little for our subsidized steel. We are in the process of reconstructing the steel industry, but it will take five years.

On housing, our average subsidy is fifty percent. We really can't afford it. Ten years ago we were building a hundred thousand houses a year. Now, we're building forty thousand. Norway is building the same amount, and it has only half of Sweden's population.

Forestry is another problem area. In the nineteen seventies, there was little interest in compelling owners to cut down their trees. Many sawmills closed because there was so little wood. There ought to be tax incentives so that the forests are properly cared for. If this doesn't work, then we must compel the owners to use them. As it is, the forests are getting too old for the trees to be used. Most industries that use wood are now importing pulp. The forest industries are using many of the same marketing methods that were common in the last century. Wood is sold at small local auctions. The forests are owned by absentee landlords who keep small lots for hunting. It's a calculated risk to invest in this area.

If inflation can be reduced to six or seven percent, we will be able to manage. Most state expenditure is linked to inflation. We have many resources. We have a well-organized labor force with good unions that are highly-centralized and very stable. If that were to crumble, we would find ourselves in the same situation as England. Our purpose is to make a social contract with the workers so that everyone benefits. Finland has been successful in this. But it's easy to make grandiose statements. It has taken the Finns many years to control wages and manage profits.

Regulations are now hurting industry. Some say that workers' benefits are now so high that there is no incentive to work. That isn't true. There *is* more sickness reported today, but it's for longer-term illnesses. We haven't used all our resources to increase productivity. In the fifties and sixties, we maintained high productivity because we were able to revitalize our industries very rapidly after the war. We had a mobile labor force and were the most competitive in cost. Austria has avoided many of our present troubles. It's crucially important that we change our attitudes. Does it matter that so much of the national income goes into the public sector? There are now a million and a half people employed in it. Fifty percent of the members of Parliament come out of it. Public sector employees enjoy total security. They have the same wages as those in the private sector. In

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Sweden, many have been brought up in this protected part of the economy. It's easy to explain the economic crisis to metalworkers, but much more difficult to explain it to those in government service. The agenda is shifting. New arguments are being heard. Care for those at home does not pay foreign bills.

Conservatives believe that a radical change is necessary. They are elitists. But the vast majority of the people are in agreement with the present system. Our children are better educated. The Swedish educational system stands up well in comparison to others. It's difficult to find an education system anywhere that produces graduates who are as useful in the labor market. In the past, too many young people chose soft subjects because of "free choice." But today, more are switching to subjects that are rigorous and demanding.

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You ask what paid work does to voluntary organizations. Such organizations are suspect in Sweden because they take jobs away from people. Youth, elderly, and handicapped unemployment is a neglected subject that is only now beginning to be discussed. People are asking whether the young oughtn't to help clean up in schools. Volunteers are being used to visit the elderly. The unions objected strenuously to these voluntary activities, but they are now beginning to give way. What does it mean for a society to give all work a market value? Conservatives are beginning to ask fundamental questions, but the Left can't admit to any mistakes. Social workers feel they can't speak out against the system. There must be more self-criticism in Sweden. If the Left will not do it, who will? Leave for fathers to care for their children, men placed in charge of preschool children—all such advances are talked of, but little is done. They really don't amount to very much. Why? That's a question that's not easily answered. There's been a strong push from the top to get men to help in preschool care. Still, only a handful, three to five percent, do. Many resist the women's movement because they say it's become too aggressive. Others say it puts forward irrelevant and threatening issues. For example, many see it as connected to a movement for free sex. It would do better, they say, to pay attention to

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the economic crisis. Instead, the women's movement endlessly discusses sex segregation.

The stereotype is that women go into the public sector in Sweden and men into the private sector. It's true that the majority of our public employees are women, sixty-five percent, and the largest number of these are in caretaking and part-time work. This is an intolerable situation.

At the end of the Second World War, we welcomed immigrant workers into Sweden, but it was a costly proposition because they required a great deal of social assistance. In the sixties, women were deliberately recruited. Companies with forty percent women on their staffs were given wage subsidies. In the sixties, when everyone needed labor, and even up to the mid-seventies, women were assimilated in what had once been a male world. The issues were more confused in the second half of the decade. But we are now in an era where we are making great attempts to clarify them. There is concern to minimize wage differentials. Some unions have started to do wage comparisons. Also, I'm not certain how the women's movement is doing in other Nordic countries. In Finland, where everyone was poor, women were forced to earn their livings. As you probably know, the Finns have a tradition of highly educated women. The Finns have two cultures. They believe in nationalism and in war. Denmark possesses soul, so it has no need of nationalism. Sweden is completely security-oriented. By comparison, Finland finds danger to be the spice of life. Swedish economic domination in the Nordic world may change as Norway grows in importance because of its oil. Finland is important because of its geographic position, but also because of its work habits.

In the United States, confrontation between opposing groups is common. In Sweden, it's not acceptable. We have an agreed-upon frame for all discussion, and it's not considered good manners to argue outside it. If one tried to step out of it, perhaps others would follow. In Sweden, all things are labeled—the unions, the party system. Everything has its distinctive quality. The Social Democrats, for instance, cannot criticize the public service. Where will new ideas come from? It's difficult to say.

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The novel is more important in Sweden than the newspaper. Novelists attack the theory that failures must be allowed to survive. For example, does it make any sense for the state to preserve failing industries? Can't we learn something from our history? Consider the following story: Charles XII ordered his army to move rapidly into a new position. One of his advance battalions began to fire on a small contingent of the enemy rather than passing on quickly. In doing so, it blocked the advance for the rest of the army, and the battle was lost. They were soon sending fresh troops to fight for a lost cause. That's what we're doing now. Novelists have the ability to see the rigidity of a society. We're not against the welfare state. What we criticize has little to do with it. Though witches may not exist, heretics do, and the uses of heresy are many.

Voices from Finland

You ask who sets the pace in criminal law, who provides the new ideas. The Swedes believe they do. They have thought a great deal about criminal rehabilitation. They believe that imprisonment by itself does not reform anyone. But it was Norway and Finland that first instituted major reforms. They have massive rehabilitation programs. Still, things can't change too quickly. Nearly all our prisoners are young men. Only two or three percent of all prisoners are women. The average maximum sentence is three or four months. There has been no capital punishment in Finland for a hundred and fifty years. Twenty percent of our judges and forty percent of our lawyers are women.

There were two major rape cases in recent years that were controversial and widely discussed in the press, in part because the criminals received a conditional discharge. If the rapes had resulted in death, the sentence would have been seven years in prison. Scandinavian principles of criminal justice resemble the English and Dutch, and are very different from those in Southern Europe or even France. We believe that long sentences do no good. Only three percent of those convicted receive prison sentences for over two years. Although we try to rehabilitate prisoners, to make them employable, our efforts have not been too successful. Criminals are not ostracized by the community. Finland has a greater number of violent

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crimes than do Norway and Denmark. The percentage is about equal to that of Sweden. Alcohol prohibition only brought more crime. Drunk driving is punished, and drunks who disturb the peace are usually put in jail overnight. We decriminalized drunkenness because the offenders usually could not pay the fine and were sent to prison. There was no sense in that. Drugs have also been decriminalized. We are seeing more drugs being used as the standard of living rises.

Property crimes are not punished severely. The majority of prisoners are property offenders. Only repeat offenders go to jail. Still, the Finns have a larger percentage of their population in jail than do Sweden, Norway, or Denmark, maybe because our police are more effective in solving crimes. Also, we are a small community. We have no guest workers. It's easier to control crime in a small country than in a large one. In large countries, the criminal has a larger population to disappear into. When it's difficult to solve crimes, it's tempting to remove those who are convicted from the community. That's not our problem.

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The crucial problem at the moment is the relationship between the Finnish people and the bureaucracy. The people are growing increasingly hostile toward the bureaucracy, and this translates into a growing disenchantment with politics. Many find it difficult to distinguish between bureaucrats and politicians, so they find fault with both. For instance, in the area of conservation, the government will make certain decisions affecting the forests of the country that will be very unpopular in certain regions. There are protest movements formed locally, with support coming from outside. This is perhaps a Nordic tendency. The protests may seem to touch small things, a government directive for a park, a river, or development in a suburb. The protest begins. Within a couple of days, it's easy to see where public sympathy lies. In the sixties, it was almost always with the government.

Finland has no tradition of civil violence or political upheaval. We Finns are used to the law. We obey it. We're also accustomed to an efficient bureaucracy. Our struggles for independence have always

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been civilized. Now, there's a change in all this. Centuries of tradition suddenly seem irrelevant. There are problems in allocating authority, whether it should be central or local, and with this comes a growing disillusionment. We tie ourselves to trees and protest with our bodies, but this is all very new to Finland. Much of it has to do with preserving nature. Perhaps this civil disobedience is the legacy of the sixties. People become involved when something or someone they know personally is affected, whether it's a tree, a river, or children.

There's no visible conflict between Swedish Finns and Finns, but many ask why the Swedish Finns hold so many of the key positions. The Finns are very loyal and care for their countrymen a great deal. Academics who go abroad, for example, almost always want to return to Helsinki. Yet, the conditions of work are hard. At the University, not nearly enough research is done either in the social sciences or in the humanities. Researchers are required to travel too much. The Finnish Academy has a large research staff. It takes on talented scholars. Those who are tired of teaching can apply to the Academy to do research. Only three or four of the fifteen Academicians are in the humanities. The Finns are always looking toward West Germany. Of course, the Soviet Union is necessarily preoccupying. This doesn't mean that we go there to be educated. No one in Finland speaks Russian.

There's a basic pattern of technical dependence and cultural independence emerging. We can't afford to do extensive technological research, so we're dependent on the great powers. But that doesn't prevent us from pursuing our own interest in the arts. Discovery is almost a national tradition, part of our national heritage. We don't think of Denmark a great deal. To us, the Danes are simply foreign. Some say that all Finns hate the Swedes. We consider them "uppity." Finns consider themselves different, rebellious. Norway used to be the butt of our jokes, but now, there's less laughter. Oil gave the Norwegians a better image, a more urban look. We borrow ideas from Sweden but feel very separated from it, perhaps because of our proximity to Russia. We think we know everything there is to know about Russia. Are we perhaps deluding ourselves?

Finnish television and films are rather humdrum. We seem now to be in a noncreative period. The humanities and social sciences are clearly in crisis. Each is searching for new paradigms, but not many

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have been found. The level of Norwegian social science has certainly declined. While I was chairing a writers' seminar recently, I wondered whether Swedish literature has not also gone down. In Finland, historical scholarship is thriving. We're now able to handle the last war in a way we couldn't even a few years ago. There is a great sense that hard times may be coming. It's perhaps a "liturgical" approach, the almost automatic use of the late sixties' idiom. The real "language" that ought to concern us is the budget. It's still increasing. We continue to keep everyone out. We have no need for more labor. Even Iceland took a greater number of Vietnamese refugees than did Finland.

What do we read? Swedish literature, American fiction. We feel a sympathy with England, but its culture is neither popular nor well known. By contrast, American culture has made a great impact. Every third word in certain of our newspapers is in English. Most of this comes to Finland through a sort of Swedish filter. Finns think of themselves as the last outpost of the west, guarding against the east. It has taken us forty years to begin to think differently, to reevaluate our position vis-à-vis Russia. The Swedes colonized us and made us accept their legal tradition. But they denied us our culture. Finnish women greatly admire women abroad who have important positions. The most admired woman in a recent poll was the Finnish U.N. undersecretary.

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The remarkable thing about Nordic foreign policy is that the five countries pursue such different ends. Still, there is some community, there are certain bonds. These are very real for the small minority who communicate regularly with other Scandinavians. But there is no such community for the majority of Finns. The Nordic community is a political fiction. It may serve some political purposes to pretend that Finns belong to that community. The historical divisions that run through Finland have to do with fundamental things, such as the position of women and religion. These are the issues that really matter. Nordic cooperation was something of a slogan in the sixties and seventies. Three hundred thousand Finns emigrated to Sweden. Swedes vacation in Finland regularly. To us, Denmark is

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part of Central Europe. Finns who learned Swedish in school can communicate with Norwegians, but not with Danes. There's very little contact with Iceland, although there is a certain sentimental attachment. For example, there was overwhelming sympathy for Iceland when one of its villages was burried by a volcano. Does this add up to Nordic unity? Not at all. The scholarly community is very fragmented. For instance, Norwegian political scientists have many ties on the Continent, in England, and in the United States. Finnish social scientists have relatively few ties. The Finns originally came from the Urals and the eastern part of Europe. The country was industrialized only in the nineteen fifties. When I was a boy, it was a very different society. There was extensive movement from northern and eastern provinces of the country to the south. Schools and shops in many villages in the countryside closed. It was only the southern part of the country that grew quickly. The strong Social-Democratic majority of that period was based on rural workers. Now the Social Democrats receive their support from urban areas. The pattern of political support for social democracy differs from that of Sweden. Again, this is not a condition calculated to produce close relations. For those Finns who give it any thought at all, Norway is a country divided in two, the south and the north. The north borders on Finland. In the nineteen twenties and thirties, it was thought that the Finns were dangerous, that they possibly intended to invade Norway. Norway was Eldorado for the Finns.

You ask whether the Finns are concerned about their economic troubles. Finns are *always* worried about themselves. What issues preoccupy us? One week, defense is the main topic, and the next, it's the environment. We've had coalition governments, made up of the Center and the Left, since nineteen sixty-six. Now, a change in the social structure has made the Conservative party stronger. Women and young people are voting Conservative. The Center party is very strong in rural areas. The Social Democrats are strong in the cities. They want to see change. For them, the Center party has no meaning. Society is more homogeneous. People are all very patriotic. No one makes much of the class struggle. The politicians make a big show about an incomes policy. Liberalism is dead. The call is to think of ourselves as a nation, and not as separate interest groups. There's been a high degree of unanimity in Finland on defense policy since the mid-sixties. But there's a question as to

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whether we ought to freeze defense expenditures or increase them. Norway's foreign policy is weak. Our Social Democrats criticize the passive policies of Denmark. Denmark has a big problem with defense spending. Life could be made very different for Finland if U.S. missiles were installed in Norway. How would Russia react? Perhaps we Finns are Nordic by necessity.

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On security, Finland has a pact with Russia which requires that we consult if a crisis arises. The danger is in how this obligation would be interpreted. Until the Russian Revolution, Finland was a grand duchy of Russia. We sometimes tend to deny this connection because we're so anxious to belong to Scandinavia. It's a mistake for us to ignore our geography or our history.

Intellect and culture play a greater role here than in certain larger countries. Great achievements generally come from abroad. Finland and perhaps Norway have some hope of maintaining independence in their culture, but no prospect of military or economic independence. I think scholars and scientists have a greater impact here than in very large countries. This may be true of all the Nordic countries. You ask whether the differences in culture between the Nordic countries are substantial. No, they're not. Denmark used to be the cultural gateway for the Nordic world, but it no longer is. Sweden is now less isolated. Finland has contact with Russia, and Denmark has close ties with the Anglo-Saxon world. Sweden's culture dominates the region because of her wealth. Still, the differences are minor. In all the countries, cultural life is important. But we're living in a period of cultural decline. For example, Finland is much too small to compete in the sciences. Research is too costly for Finland to engage in many disciplines. Physicists go to countries where they can do research. Sweden is strong in science. Norway and Finland are not. The pessimism that you find pervading our societies is connected with the bad economic times. We are a bit better off in the humanities with respect to financial support and research opportunity than people say. Finland was never really competitive in the sciences, so humanistic studies flourish. Still, there have been changes. In Finland, the great classical period in the humanities and in the sci-

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ences was from eighteen eighty to nineteen twenty. There were a few very great men in our cultural life then. But after any great period, there always comes a time of flatness. Also, the rapid democratization of culture has not always been to the advantage of learning. Still, there was a boom in industrial design in Finland after the last war. Also, we excelled in architecture. Some will tell you that Finnish literature is more interesting than Swedish.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, before independence, Finnish students traveled to Germany. Many were very poor. They seldom went to England, and almost never to America. Some went to study in St. Petersburg. A few went to Sweden and Denmark, but these were not the preferred places to go. After the Second World War, it was the United States that Finnish students went to, and there was a significant brain drain. Now it has stopped. Most students go to England and Switzerland for medical studies, and some to Sweden and Denmark, but this is not common. Germany is slowly coming back, but it does not yet have any great cultural contacts. There were significant intellectual contacts with Russia during the last century, but there is little such contact now. There are few exchange students, primarily because of language difficulties. Finnish students don't know Russian. During the last century, many people knew some Russian. Today, few Finns know any. Our Slavic professors come from Sweden rather than Russia. We find that we have little to learn from Russia, whereas Russians are eager to learn from us.

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The problem today with Finnish social science is that it does not have adequate financial support. This is due to international difficulties. In America, there are Reagan's budget cuts. Everybody has the same difficulties. This is true even in Russia. The younger social scientists here are having a particularly hard time. Interest in the Third World has become stronger in Finland, and it is interesting to speculate on how and why this is so.

Finns are always the last to be hit by a recession because of our ties with the Soviet Union. Structually, Finland is between East and West. Our development is behind that of the West, but our achieve-

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ment is significantly ahead of Eastern Europe. The key to this is rarely acknowledged. In Finland, the farmers owned the forests. There was substantial wealth to be made from trees, so the farmers became capitalists fairly early. Because Finland was so close to St. Petersburg, a hundred thousand Finns went to work in Russia. Yet, until very recently, this economic phenomenon was not an acceptable field of study. The Karelian Isthmus became advanced and prospered largely because of stimulation through exchanges with Tsarist Russia. The Finns were to St. Petersburg what the Danes today may be for West Germany.

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Finland was a nation of farmers until the turn of this century. The beginnings of industry in eighteen sixty were very tentative. They involved the sawmills situated at the mouths of a few rivers. At the turn of the century, Helsinki had one hundred forty thousand inhabitants. After the revolution in Russia in nineteen hundred five, we had an opportunity to accumulate capital for new kinds of industrial enterprise. But it was all very slow. Finland was a wood-producing nation. Sweden produced steel. This led to a quite different sort of economic development. In Sweden, the forests are rotting. They haven't developed forestry techniques as the Finns have done. The Danes were an agricultural people. They had no tradition of big industry. Norway was a maritime nation, and now it's preoccupied with developing its oil. How long will this last, we wonder. The amount of capital required for oil development is enormous. The Nordic countries are in the process of becoming an integrated part of the world. In place of the old Finnish-Russian relationship, we have a Finnish-Swedish one. Security issues are paramount for all of us. There are also political issues. The Nordic countries pay a price for their concern with social justice. Will we be able to maintain our social gains? For many of the young, this is the dominant question.

Small countries can only work and prosper in an atmosphere of international cooperation. The key to economic development is free trade and planning. The only way that Finland can compete, particularly if competition becomes more intense, is to gain in effi-

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ciency. We are now in competition with the forestry of both Canada and the United States. We must seek to keep up demand for our products in the OECD area.

The main problem that the OECD has is its millions of unemployed. Finland is fortunate in that it has achieved social consensus. It makes us the most stable country in Scandinavia. As a people, we're in fundamental agreement about the problems facing the nation. In Sweden, interest groups in industry and in the private sector generally are in fundamental disagreement with the unions. Perhaps our defense problems have helped us to reach this consensus. In any case, national cohesion may be our most vital asset. We have an able, industrious, and educated labor force. This cannot fail to help us in our industrial strategy.

We are exceptionally conscious of our place internationally. For example, our paperworkers know that their jobs depend upon eighty percent of what they produce being exported. We're shocked that Sweden didn't see its own vulnerabilities in world markets.

Sweden is talking less today about the African countries. Their interest in Africa was not cynical. Many Swedes believed that they had a duty to aid the underdeveloped countries. Swedes think they know how to solve all problems. Finns have learned by experience that they must work hard at keeping markets. *We* discovered markets in Russia. Sweden was not interested in Russia. Its ambitions were wider. It had the whole world. But we knew that we had to exploit the opportunities that presented themselves. We learned the hard way.

We must solve our problems with our feet on the ground. We can thank the war period for a great deal. Consensus is not without its problems, but it does make for national cohesion. We gained an education through war. We are the beneficiaries of that terrible experience.

* * *

What distinguishes the Nordic countries from much of Central Europe is climate and population density. For example, in Lapland, the distance between neighbors is often as much as one hundred fifty kilometers. Too much of the GNP in Finland goes to taxes. Giving

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more than a third of one's income to the government is giving too much. Most people are greatly concerned about the public sector. Far too much is spent on too many transient items. Finland's bureaucracy is smaller than Sweden's, but it's beginning to seem excessive. The hospitals are very, very expensive to run. It's true that our military expenditures are smaller than those of Sweden, Norway, or Denmark, and that many ministries have no more people than they need. Still, the government interferes too much in agriculture and forestry.

Swedish industry is not healthy. The Swedes have their head in the refrigerator and their feet in the oven. They have twenty-four good companies that are endowed with good technology and have access to good multinational markets. But many old, established companies are doing poorly. The textile industry has moved from Sweden to Finland and to other countries with lower wage levels. Shipping, mining, timber, and steel are all in bad shape. The wage level in Finland is a third less than Sweden's.

Nothing much has developed out of Nordic cooperation. Joint ventures have not produced a great deal. As for the free labor movement, it's easier for the Swedish-speaking population to move than the Finnish. Nordic cooperation presumes a certain frame of mind that does not now exist.

Swedes are natural pessimists, but their managers are often well-educated. They are serious and modern. We have a lot to learn from them, but also a good deal to teach them. Finland imports oil from Russia in order to secure trade with it. We also buy steel from Russia. Russia produces a good quality of steel, but its oil is very high-priced. If Finnish Esso had been more free, it would never have agreed to buy Russian oil. In this instance, the government did not follow the philosophy of buying at competitive prices in the world market. Why did we do it? To secure access to Soviet markets. Finland produces icebreakers, but they have no world market. This kind of business keeps Finnish shipyards working. We pay more than the world price for Russian oil to get their business for our icebreakers and for much else. They demand very high quality in imports. The present unfriendly relations between the United States and Russia are holding back the trade patterns of Europe. But Finland is Russia's door to the West. The Soviets obtain Western technology through Finland. As for our total trade with Russia, we are behind Ger-

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many, France, and England. Still, we profit from our position. We find that it's not an advantage to speak Russian in Russia. When one does, the Soviets immediately become suspicious. They believe that anyone who speaks their language must be a spy, and prefer to have all negotiations controlled by an interpreter.

* * *

Our language makes us a lonely country. We have a feeling of youth because our industrialization is relatively recent. It came through paper pulp, but was not really significant until nineteen fifty. Finland has a young business class. Many of our most able managers were trained in Sweden. We have never reached the stage of welfare that Sweden and Denmark attained in the great reforms of the nineteen sixties. Our education and welfare expenditures are well below the levels there. But neither has our public debt reached the same proportions, and with their example as a warning, it never will. The national GNP is taxed at thirty-five percent. The tax rate was stopped before opposition had a chance to mount. Still, there's been a universal tax protest for the last four or five years. It's been agreed that we should not increase the degree of taxation, and there is a broad understanding to this effect among all the parties. We have been governed by a coalition of the Center party, Socialists, and Communists since nineteen sixty-six. The Conservatives have made gains, but the coalition still holds the majority. This doesn't allow much room for change, but it does provide stability. If there's been any change, it's that the coalition has become increasingly moderate.

Our situation is so precarious that foreign policy must always take priority over domestic arrangements. Finland is unaccustomed to its new role vis-à-vis Russia. Children are required to learn two languages in school, Finnish and Swedish. There's no room for a third one. There is a plan for a third language in upper school, but this can be French, German, or Russian. It's surprising that more students don't study Russian, knowing it can help produce a good income. With literature, it's not that important, because we read all the classics in translation. In fact, it's long been the custom to read foreign literature this way.

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You ask how politicians are regarded in this country. There's a marginal feeling of criticism and contempt for them that comes largely from the influence of the mass media. But the media are not as influential in Helsinki as they are in Stockholm.

There's a different attitude toward authority in Finland. In Sweden, everyone uses *tu* instead of *vous*. Until a few years ago, it was *Herr Doktor,* and all the rest. They have the influence of a monarchy and a landed aristocracy to live down. Finland was always dominated by farmers. It's an egalitarian state, with no tradition of wealth. Finns have always been poor. Even the squires were not really wealthy. It's the same in Norway.

You ask about equality between the sexes. Finland was the first country to give women the vote. We created a tradition of equality that has not been realized in many other places. Feminists still complain, but no one takes it very seriously. Women are usually employed outside the home, but only a few have become leaders of industry. Only one woman in four hundred achieves eminence in industry. There are not many women in journalism, and only two or three who have gone to the top in newspapers. Women generally choose careers in education, social services, or politics. But all this is not terribly important.

Education has always been taken seriously in Finland. Early on, we had a literacy rate of one hundred percent. The schools maintain their prestige. We have a unitary system. Certain Conservatives may be unhappy about our education system, but it's esteemed in both Norway and Sweden. The secondary schools are overcrowded. Perhaps we have too many *lycées,* too few polytechnics. Our universities aren't large enough to accept everyone who would like to attend. About twenty to twenty-five percent cannot be admitted. We believe that Swedish educational standards are insufficient. It is thought that Swedish schools are inferior in quality. Anyone educated in Sweden who wants a government position here must take a Finnish exam. An old immigrant who returned to Finland was asked for his impressions. He found us "well-to-do and instructed."

What about the grey market? There was a scandal two years ago, but no one talks about it much anymore—although they still do in Sweden. There's a black market in small technology and handicrafts. You can't get your house painted without promising not to report it to the tax authorities. The unions remain prisoners of their

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ideology. If they go empty-handed to their members, they're thought to have failed. Their overblown rhetoric is simply to give the illusion that they're achieving something for their members, and perhaps also to keep them from turning to communism. One has difficulty following Finnish politics. It's a devious business. There are many obscure side moves. The unions are now asking for a share in company ownership, but they reject the Swedish model. Still, it's one of the few ways a union can show that it's active.

* * *

You ask whether I feel like a foreigner when I'm in Sweden. No, I feel culturally at home. In Finland, wars forced women to go to work. Not in Sweden, though. In Sweden, women believe they can trust the man to support them. Finnish women learned that they cannot always count on having a breadwinner around, so they have to earn a living. Since industrialization came late to Finland, it hasn't been long since women moved from the country to the towns. Couples had to buy homes with hard currency, and both had to work to do so.

Single men have social problems, such as alcoholism. A single woman with children is generally poor. In Sweden, she would receive more unemployment insurance. Women's wages are higher in Sweden. Finding a house they can afford is difficult for young people in Finland. It's easy to rent an apartment in Sweden.

Finnish families spend most of their leisure time at home. We're very home-centered. We passed quickly through the phase of unmarried cohabitation. Anyway, this is not much of an issue in Finland. Sex before marriage is rather common. In the old days, marriage followed pregnancy. Ninety percent of Finns marry. In nineteen twenty, only sixty percent of those living in towns were married. Someone who doesn't find a partner is considered to be very unlucky. But in Sweden, the single woman is now praised a good deal. There is an increasing tendency toward informal relations between men and women outside marriage. A miserable fate awaits the single male. Ten years ago, women had to fight to be allowed to go into restaurants unescorted. Now we have singles dances. Women in Finland earn sixty or seventy percent of what men

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earn. This figure is lower in Norway. In Sweden it is up to eighty percent. Among public sector employees, men are more quickly advanced. They've learned to get around the law governing equality of wages in this sector.

* * *

Finns buy a lot of books. Books bring status. Finland has a population of four million. Two encyclopedias sell well here without any help from the state. Books are traditional Christmas presents. There's no publishing crisis in Finland. The same can be said for Norway, though it's somewhat less true of Sweden. Books are important to people on the periphery. In the old days, the priests always had good libraries.

After Napoleon's time, only Sweden and Denmark had aristocracies. In Finland, the priests had the status that was reserved for the nobility in Sweden and Denmark. One may speak of North Sea Scandinavia and Baltic Scandinavia.

Sweden used to have a brilliant historical tradition, but since nineteen forty, the study of history has declined markedly. Now, it's termed fascist and old-fashioned. Although history is lost to Sweden, the other countries—Norway, Finland, and Iceland—have a great sense of it. Every parish has its own history, and there is a good deal of interest in national history as well. Copenhagen is the Vienna of the twentieth century for Scandinavians. We Finns have gained in self-confidence because we've found that the Swedes lack courage. We're proud of our identity as Finns, partly because we've managed to keep Russia out. There were only three nations that were not occupied during the war. We were one of them. We managed well after it. We've tamed the Russian bear, haven't we? Finns operate on a world scale. Sweden imagines that it does, but its real influence is—or was—in Scandinavia.

Back in Tsarist days, many Finns went into the Russian army and the diplomatic services. They brought back a broader thought to Finland, a world view. Stockholm's last great period was in the nineteenth century. St. Petersburg was founded in seventeen hundred three. One can't think of Finnish history without realizing that there are more Russians across the frontier in Leningrad than there are

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Finns in the whole of our country. We've been forced to think about world politics. Swedes imagine that they're realists, but they know nothing about Russia.

St. Petersburg and Helsinki are tied together by the sea. But we can't forget Latvia and Estonia. They're economically important. They're our forgotten brothers, now absorbed by the Soviet Union. German-Russian rivalry was crucially important in the First World War. Finland had its own government and laws before nineteen-seventeen. Our president has the same powers as those enjoyed by the Grand Duke before that time. The Czar was the Grand Duke of Finland. He set aside every Thursday for the business of governing Finland. There was a governor and ministers, all of them living in Finland. St. Petersburg Russia, not the Asiatic Russia exemplified by Moscow, was what influenced Finland. The country prospered under the duchy. The Czar wanted to make Finland into a model of what a progressive society should be. Finland and Poland were to be his model states. Napoleon and Bismarck wanted to conquer through external force. The czars wanted to create model states from within their own country. By becoming rebellious, the Poles took themselves out of the experiment.

The Swedes have banned geography from their schools. Students know nothing of geography, but it's thought they can solve all economic problems. Yet Sweden is not great enough to do this. And it's not great enough to dominate others, even in the Nordic world. The Swedish ambassador to Finland arrives imagining that he is our big brother. Finland has a bigger brother in Russia. Finland lives not so much in the shadow of Sweden as in the shadow of Russia. To understand that relation in all its complexity is to understand why those who bandy about terms like "Finlandization" understand very little about what is going on in our corner of the world.

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Arne Ruth

The Second New Nation: The Mythology of Modern Sweden

WHEN THE WEST GERMAN AUTHOR Hans Magnus Enzensberger titled his series of essays on conditions in Sweden after the elections of 1982, "Swedish Autumn," he evoked visions of gloom and decay, of the waning of life and energy, of Sweden as a spent force.[1] Enzensberger picked his symbol of Sweden's affliction with the poet's keen sense of metaphor. To the Nordic mind, autumn, not winter, is the opposite of summer, and summer is the mythical time of life, of youthful endeavor. In the Nordic imagination, the peak of summer is the time when dreams come true. The disappearance of light in the autumn has a moral significance. It is the collapse of the dream confronted with reality.

To the Swedish mind, the symbolism of autumn is fraught with other reminiscences as well. At the end of the last century, the image of Sweden as irrevocably aged was a cliché in the Northern world. The Finnish author K.A. Tavaststjerna has the hero of his novel *Patriot Without a Country* (1895) falsely accused by his compatriots of being a Russian agent and lets him escape to Sweden. The difference in political climate is characterized in the novel as similar to "leaving a wild fight among a group of high school pupils [to find refuge in] a gathering of elder[ly] men . . . who, after a particularly refined dinner with a plenitude of wines, are discussing religion and the affairs of states over their glasses of arrak punch." In comparison with Finland, and even more with Norway, the junior partner in the union on the Scandinavian peninsula, Sweden seemed paralyzed. Strindberg scorned the defenders of the union by calling Nor-

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way "a young and healthy country chained to a rotten and decrepit one." He was echoed from across the fjelds by Björnstjerne Björnson: "The Swedes are an old people full of doubt, the Norwegians a young people full of belief."[2]

A contemporary Swedish poet captured this climate of national self-doubt by describing his country as "an old one, who stands broken and fearful / and doggedly boasts of the deeds of his youth / that this Sweden has had its summerdream / that with its memory one whispers now: forget! / to every thought leading forward."[3] The summer dream of the Swedes, of course, was the "great-power" era of their country a century and a half earlier. Almost a century of unbroken peace had left their martial talents fallow. All around them, even in neighboring Norway and Denmark, the wheels of industry and commerce had started to turn, symbols of a new kind of power. The Swedish political and intellectual elite felt increasingly inferior to their peers elsewhere. Their vain efforts at patriotic ego-boosting were mocked by radicals like Strindberg, who in the 1880s openly professed cosmopolitanism as the only tenable attitude for a Swede. It took the first three decades of the twentieth century to forge a new patriotic feeling aimed at the future.

Even though this state of national depression is now largely forgotten, the shadows of self-doubt are felt across the abyss of a hundred years. Swedish political culture in the 1980s seems more fragile, less rooted in a firm conviction of its own values, than the cultures of the neighboring countries. This may seem to contradict the traditional view of Sweden as a self-righteous model for the world. In fact, Sweden's vulnerability appears to some extent to be the unexpected consequence of the country's position as a model. In terms of social psychology, the sense of being admired by the world is the antithesis of the state of doubt that plagued Sweden's self-identity a hundred years ago. But the dialectics of history in this instance seem not to have provided for a synthesis. The basic uncertainty reemerges as the trajectory of Sweden as the embodiment of social progress goes into decline.

Against this background, it seems clear that the case of Sweden cannot be explained simply in terms of a general "Scandinavian" model, even though the Nordic countries are faced with similar social and economic problems. The difficulties of maintaining a level of social security that requires more than half of the GNP, in a pe-

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riod of worldwide inflation and recession, are obvious. With the partial exception of oil-rich Norway, all the Nordic countries are caught with seemingly chronic balance-of-payment deficits as well as budget deficits. All appear to have reached a point where tax rates can no longer be further increased. All are rocked by the international wave of conservative and neo-liberal ideology that seems to challenge the very foundations of Nordic values. The political repercussions of all these events have certainly changed the image of the Northern world as a bedrock of social harmony. The Social Democrats, long considered to be the only rightful guardians of the Nordic welfare states, have lost elections everywhere.

If we are in fact, as Rolf Dahrendorf has suggested in a recent book, approaching "the end of the social-democratic century," it is no wonder that the Nordic countries should find themselves in a state of ideological uneasiness. The key words Dahrendorf uses to characterize the social-democratic era have also been pillars of the Nordic concept of political values: economic growth, equality, work, rationality, state, and internationalism.[4]

If economic growth, for one reason or another, is unattainable in the foreseeable future; if the network of social security established in the period since World War II proves too costly to maintain; if technology no longer serves to widen employment but to diminish it; if scientism is eclipsed by a "return of the sacred"; if citizens increasingly blame the state for not fulfilling the promise of creating a free and just society; if the idea of an international community governed by law and contract once more gives way to great-power politics and overt military and economic competition among nation-states—then the change will not simply be a matter of concern for Nordic Social Democrats, but would go, rather, to the very core of national culture in the Nordic countries. The crisis of social democracy would be a crisis of national identity as well, and for reasons that I will try to spell out in the course of this essay, Sweden would be even harder hit than its neighbors.

II

To the casual observer, Sweden may still seem to be the exception to the crisis image of social democracy. The Social-Democratic party of Olof Palme was swept back into power in Sweden in 1982. The new government was hailed even by industry as an improvement on

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the fragile coalition that it succeeded. It started with a series of dramatic economic measures, among them, a 16 percent devaluation of the krona, reminiscent of the first step of the innovative policy that allowed Sweden to avoid the worst effects of the depression of the 1930s. The measures proved astonishingly successful; Swedish exports have surged by almost 10 percent; the balance of trade again shows a large surplus.

Yet, in the second Swedish autumn after the restoration of the Social Democrats, it seems clear that the old magic of the thirties won't work again, even though the reasons for the failure are not immediately apparent. There is no sign that any sizable portion of the Swedish population is seriously disaffected with the basic virtues of the welfare state, even if an increasing number complain about its cost. The quality of life, to all appearances, is still strikingly higher than in most other parts of the world. Even in the dismal eighties, there are no slums in Sweden, no derelict industrial landscapes, no dark lots full of litter at the edges of towns. The trains still leave on time, running quietly past endless forests, glittering lakes, and neat wooden houses painted dark red. The image of *trygghet,* the warm, enclosing reassurance against all ills, which for fifty years has been the guiding light of Swedish social effort, is still remarkably vivid.

So is the image of the *jämlikhet,* the egalitarian passion that has been almost as important as moral force. The legendary *titelsjuka*—literally, title sickness—of Sweden's upper crust lost its last symbolic manifestation when the mandatory rendering of titles in the telephone directory was finally abandoned a few years ago. The curious usage whereby strangers were addressed by their title in the third person fell into disrepute during the sixties. The polite plural form of "you" has been almost completely dropped in favor of the singular *du*. Everyone is on a first-name basis, including the authorities in their dealings with their clients.

It may, however, be a sign of the changing times that this attempted informality on the part of the officials has started to evoke resentment. A writer in a Stockholm liberal daily complained recently that the use of *du* in official messages served as a benign mask of Big Brother. The argument was deliberately overstated, yet it indicated that the symbolic manifestations of *jämlikhet* are starting to crack under the impact of a new perception of reality. Myths are so-

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cially useful only as long as they are not consciously perceived as myths.

The mythology of modern Sweden has been shaken by a series of recent events. On October 4, 1983, 75,000 people, arriving from all over Sweden by special trains, marched on the streets of Stockholm to protest government plans to divert part of the profits of Swedish industry into five regional employee investment funds, partly controlled by the unions. The turnout was at least twice as high as anyone had predicted. And although the demonstration had been heavily sponsored by big business, it was obvious that the protesters were not just businessmen. A clear majority of the Swedes seem to view the funds with suspicion. The blaringly antiegalitarian fact that roughly one percent of Swedish households own three quarters of the shares of Swedish industry has, temporarily at least, receded into the background at the prospect of having the unions as major shareholders of that industrial might.

Shortly after the demonstration, the government disclosed its plans for the long-term reduction of Sweden's record budget deficit, plans which showed quite clearly that the Social Democrats can no longer offer social reforms, not even minor ones. For years to come, they will administer policies that mean—to use a prevalent metaphor of contemporary Swedish politics—a "tightening of the belt." The most remarkable aspect of the budget plan, however, concerned a rather small adjustment in terms of money. Departing from a national consensus that has guided the entire postwar period, the government proposed a freeze of Sweden's aid to developing countries. The aim of using one percent of the GNP for development aid will, for the present at least, be given up.

In early November 1983, the government was rocked by a scandal that forced one of its members to resign. The minister of the judiciary, Ove Rainer, who had for long been a top civil servant before entering the government, was accused by a Social-Democratic newspaper of paying almost no taxes on an income of more than 2 million crowns. It turned out that he had used a loophole in the tax laws whereby tax-deductible interest on large loans can be paid in advance, the loans themselves being used for investment in appreciating state bonds. His transaction, though perfectly legal, was so obviously contradictory to Social-Democratic morals that he had to step down.

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Simultaneously, there began a public controversy concerning the increasing number of children being taken away from their parents and into custody by social boards because of suspected child abuse. The practice gained a considerable amount of international publicity, but only recently has it become a major topic in Sweden. A press conference was arranged in an attempt to give the international media the official view of the matter, but when the authorities, rather than evading the issue, explained the practice as a result of increasing psychological pressures on Swedish family life, this served only to make matters worse. To many of the foreign observers, the failure of the government's policies now seemed even more apparent.

The unusually large number of correspondents covering the event is a sign of the extent to which Sweden's international image has been transformed in recent years. Sweden has definitely fallen from grace. If the cliché of political journalism in Western Europe fifteen years ago was of Sweden as the realized utopia of industrial peace and social justice, the stereotype of the eighties appears to be of Sweden as the home of Big Brother. [5]

The reversal of perspective reflects a change in the European ideological climate rather than a real change in the moral content of Swedish social policies. Children were taken away from their parents in the golden age of the Swedish model without causing reporters to hurry to Stockholm from far and near. Recent statistics show that there is indeed cause for concern at the number of children subjected to physical, sexual, and psychological violence from their parents. (Incidentally, the Swedish authorities are also aiding battered wives to an extent that is unheard of in other countries, but there has been no international outcry against this practice so far.) There is every reason to believe that the incidence of child abuse is just as high in other parts of Europe.[6] The real issue appears not to be the welfare of the children, but the ideological question of the state's prerogatives versus individual and family rights. The case of Sweden takes on new political significance in the changing ideological climate of the eighties. The image of Sweden has evolved into one where the *fears* of, rather than the hopes for, modernity—and the latter have shrunk notably of late—are projected.

The new atmosphere affects the internal Swedish perception of reality as well. Stripped of political rhetoric, the idea of the wage-earners' fund is clearly inspired by the logic of compromise and prac-

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ticality that once worked wonders as a propellant of change in Swedish society. The economic reasoning behind it seems irrefutable. It would give a fillip to fixed investment, which has dwindled in the last four years. It would make a minor dent in the mold of dynastic entrepreneurship that has for so long given Swedish industrialism a feudal flavor, without in any way threatening basic power arrangements. It would serve as a trade-off to the unions, in exchange for making the necessary sacrifices in pay to reduce the budget shortfall.

And yet, in spite of Social-Democratic party assurances that the funds would control a maximum of 7 percent of the shares quoted on the Stockholm stock exchange by 1990, and will not expand beyond that, employers and shareholders alike have chosen to view the funds as the final step toward the abolition of private property in Sweden. Even though some foreign investors have predicted a positive effect of the funds on the Stockholm stock market, Sweden's major private investors—if their rhetoric is any indication—seem bent on deserting Sweden as the government's words gradually become deeds. The conservative opposition has pledged to revoke the Parliament's decision, taken late in 1983, to start implementing the funds. A climate of *apocalypse now* has been clouding the issue, in marked contrast to the pragmatic rationality that is supposed to characterize Swedish political discourse. The result has been a polarization of public opinion surpassing anything experienced since World War II.

The fate of the minister who, in order to reduce his taxes, used legal tricks known to every Swedish capitalist, is also a telling sign of the changing climate. The quest for equality in Sweden has not excluded the existence of various loopholes to evade the prohibitive progressive taxation. During the greater part of the postwar period, the upper and middle classes profited heavily from the rising prices of real estate and the fact that interest on any kind of loan could be written off against income. It has never been government policy in Sweden to make it impossible to become rich, but the ethics of making money and hanging onto it have been enshrined in an etiquette as rigorous and intricate as Victorian sexual morality. The basic rule has been that productive investment should be rewarded (sometimes lavishly), whereas financial transactions intended to bolster individual profit, rather than industrial effectiveness, are intrinsically shameful. And there has been a strong taboo among the rich against

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using formal legality to reduce taxes beyond a certain point. To pay less than 10 percent on an income of 2 million crowns is a clear breach of etiquette. Unfortunately for the system, the minister who tried to get away with doing so was simply following the general trend in recent years.

III

The secret of Swedish social ethics is often said to reside in the word *lagom;* be that as it may, the word can at least be used to illuminate some of the dilemmas now facing the Swedish model. Untranslatable in its exact sense, *lagom* means *just right,* as well as *in moderation; sufficient,* as well as *appropriate* and *suitable.* It connotes not only a quantity, but a moral judgment on it as well—always relative, of course, to other quantities. The "golden mean" captures one important sense of the word but is far from exhausting its intricate usage. The expression is said to derive from the drinking habits of ancient Sweden, where the jug of beer was passed around a group of men; "making the rounds" is *gå laget om* in Swedish, and according to this etymology, *lag-om* is short for *laget om.* At any rate, the image of the drinking bout is a telling metaphor for the moral implications of the word. To drink more than one's share from a community jug is of course unforgivable, but drinking too little is equally unsociable; it means opting out of the common spirit. Interestingly, *lagom* appears to be a peculiarly Swedish concept. Norwegian and Danish have only approximate equivalents.

Swedish society at present seems to be confronted with an increasing number of individuals, sometimes acting in collusion as powerful interest groups, who have lost the inhibitions of the *lagom* code. More and more, the authorities have been tempted to enforce the code by administrative measures, but this is felt by important segments of the population to represent a change in the delicate balance of repression and compassion that has constituted the *lagom* of state and local government. The concept of the "just" share was of course much easier to uphold in a situation of economic growth, when everyone could be compensated for being disadvantaged in the present by the prospect of a growing share in the future; the "common cake" was one of the most frequently used metaphors of Swedish political language in the era of seemingly unstoppable growth—with good reason. That it has now been superseded by the image of

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the "tightened belt" hints at the intricacies involved in upholding the *lagom* code in a time of scarcity.

With both its neighbors and the West in general, Sweden shares the social pressures arising from the decline of economic progress. In the era of affluence, however, the *lagom* code served to lessen competition for resources; individuals and groups favored by the market were willing to forsake part of their profits for the common good. Hence, the idea of progress became socially unambiguous. Well into the seventies, it could be used to integrate farmer, worker, and capitalist into the national culture.

The first important rupture came with the Kiruna strike in 1969-70, when the workers in the state-owned iron mines in northern Lapland, complaining about humanly degrading working conditions, struck unofficially and stayed out for three months. A wave of unofficial strikes followed throughout the country. For the Social Democrats, it was an alarming demonstration of the high risk they ran of losing the special relationship with the working class that had been the basis of their unbroken reign. They countered swiftly by shifting their emphasis from the material aspects of progress to the quality of work in industry. A commission on shop-floor democracy was given the task of preparing new legislation covering the worker's "primary right to negotiate" on any aspect of his work, including its method and organization and the choice of machinery and equipment. By the end of the 1970s, the unions had been given the formal right to participate in company decisions affecting major changes in the organization of the work force. Originally proposed in the mid-seventies as a step toward the formal take-over of private industry by the unions, but later stripped of their system-changing implications, the wage-earners' funds are another outgrowth of the controversy that was set in motion by the Kiruna strike.

The miners' action was the first major indication of growing resistance to the kind of technical and economic changes that had made Swedish industry continuously competitive on the world market. In the course of the seventies, the limits-to-growth message mingled with a newborn nostalgia, especially among urban youth, for the simpler rural values of Swedish life a generation earlier. A "green wave" swept the country, focusing eventually on the issue of nuclear power, and propelling the rural-minded Center party into government in 1976 in the first nonsocialist coalition since 1932.

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Almost from the start, the green wave exploited *lagom,* since it proved to be ideally adaptable to the orthodoxies of ecological thinking. Thus the basically conservative bias inherent in the concept of *lagom* was restored and used as a vehicle against the instrumental rationality of planners and technocrats in government and industry. Eventually, as the first signs of the tax revolt appeared in Sweden, triggered by the controversies in 1976 around celebrities like Ingmar Bergman and Astrid Lindgren, an old-style conservatism, invigorated by neo-classical economics, turned with a new attentiveness to the growth of bureaucracy. The public sector, it was felt, had definitely broken the bounds of *lagom.*

Thus the Swedish model, after having temporarily pacified its core group—the workers—was confronted on its flanks by two different kinds of conservatism, both of which questioned its underlying concept of progress. When regarded with the logic of the model, both opponents appear to be antisocial; ecological conservatism rejects the technological changes necessary to keep industry competitive, yet is unwilling to pay the economic price of scrapping industrialism altogether; the antibureaucratic conservatism wants to restore the free market, but refuses to accept the necessity of state action to remedy the social dislocations caused by market forces. Neither has provided a satisfactory solution to the problem of revolutionizing a system where almost a third of the voters are pensioners and another quarter are employed in the public sector. The result is a further erosion of the public spirit indispensable to the system. The universal demand for security remains, but the willingness to pay the personal price necessary to guarantee it diminishes. The Social Democrats are caught in a double bind. Their frantic effort to restore the traditional sense of rationality to the system only adds fuel to the antitechnocratic and antibureaucratic fire. Enzensberger epitomized the dilemma at the end of *Swedish Autumn.*

> The eternal guardians would like the unreasonable to come to their senses and be liberated from their sinfulness. But they are missing the problem. Every new regulation tears up another hole, every new measure of control intended to lessen the risk of the unforeseen serves to increase it, and the more tightly knit the institutions become the more vulnerable they are to internal and external disturbances. . . . The good shepherd believes the world is governed by intentions, good or bad. He believes in the possibility of predicting, and thus determining, the social processes. But what if this is

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nothing but an illusion? Could the good shepherd be an irrational concept? Could the evolution of mankind—to put it in theoretical terms—be a stochastic process?[7]

The heart of the vexation paralyzing the Swedish model, then, seems to be the antinomies of the notion of administered progress underlying it. The concomitant myths of paternal care and egalitarian national solidarity embodied in Per Albin Hansson's concept of the *folkhem,* the people's home, inevitably pale as belief in the rationality of the model grows weaker. In retrospect, the model presents the paradoxical spectacle of a nation possessing more of the outward trappings of modernity than any other society, yet at heart remaining the incarnation of Tönnies's mythical *Gemeinschaft.* With the cushions of tradition gone, the brutally modern forces of *Gesellschaft* throw the society's delicately balanced social structure out of gear. Adding to the problem is the fact that, as it gradually loses its importance as an international symbol of modernity, the system is deprived of another fundamental asset: the moral energy that was generated from its universalistic aspirations.

IV

During the sixties, some of the most far-reaching prophecies of the future of the Scandinavian welfare societies were made from the inside. In a newspaper article in 1965, Henrik Stangerup, a Danish writer, wrote a utopian version that reflects the then-current mood among many Scandinavian intellectuals:

> We are experiencing today in Scandinavia one of the most important experiments of world history. That may sound pretentious, yet it isn't. Scandinavia of today is the world's avant-garde society. What is taking place among us will happen in other countries tomorrow, as soon as they have reached a comparable level of freedom and welfare. We have an almost unlimited freedom of speech and freedom of the press. We have a standard of living that is the envy of the whole world. We simply have every imaginable opportunity to lead our lives in free development of our human and creative possibilities. . . . If we only know how to use our freedom and to realize it in our lives, our experience . . . will be of profit [to] the entire world around us.[8]

The sense of moving with the spirit of the world, of being the agent of history in fulfilling the oldest dreams of mankind, has been

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a tremendous inspirational force ever since the idea of progress first took hold of the Western mind. Social movements have tried to capture this animating energy by projecting themselves as vanguards of the future. Occasionally, an entire nation has become for a while the embodiment of progress; revolutionary France and Russia count among these, as does the Belgium of 1831 and, in a different sense, Britain in the era of the industrial revolution. Few nations have retained this role for very long. America, of course, is the exception. From its revolution on, the United States came to symbolize the forces of change. The dreams of the Old World came to life in the New. As Harald Elovson notes in his study on the impact of American thought on Swedish literature in the eighteenth century, even in a country as far removed from the spirit of revolution as Sweden, the American myth was firmly embedded by the 1780s.[9] The words of a Norwegian clergyman writing in 1781 are characteristic of progressive Scandinavians of the time: "God help America to fight its way to liberty that mankind may not perish in serfdom."[10]

The American myth became exceptionally important in the Nordic countries in the course of the nineteenth century. By the successive waves of immigration and return, the image of the New World as a haven of freedom was imprinted on the minds of broad segments of the Nordic peoples. Particularly in Sweden, because of its relative backwardness in industrial development and lateness in extending suffrage, worship of American ideals served as an alternative to national identification among members of popular movements, such as the revivalists and the teetotallers, and even among the nascent trade unions. The strength of the American myth among working-class Swedes eventually became the object of political controversy and even a government inquiry.[11]

The image of the United States, of course, had a symbolic value for those beyond its shores and became for them a medium whereby their hopes and fears could be projected. The tradition of European anti-Americanism—the aristocratic contempt for the "vulgarity" of American culture as well as political opposition to the peculiarly American combination of equality and individualism—has its roots in the opposition to this tradition of idealizing America.

The same dialectics of hate and worship have been at work in casting the Nordic countries, and especially Sweden, as the vanguards of social progress. Marquis Childs, in creating the image of

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Sweden as the "middle way" in the 1930s, was motivated by the desire to prove to his American audience that the policy of state interventionism and regional cooperatives inaugurated by the New Deal would constitute no threat to freedom. The fact that the politics of compromise in Scandinavia were designed to counter the threat of fascism, and were thus part of a radically different set of policy options, was largely overlooked by the American audience. Childs drastically overstated the role of cooperatives in Sweden, causing considerable trouble to the worthy officials of the Swedish Cooperative Union, who were flooded with a stream of American visitors in search of the secret of the middle way. Contemporary observers have pointed out that Swedish politicians at the time were rather taken aback at the American interest in their activities. During the war, Gunnar Myrdal noted that Swedish officials and labor representatives traveling in the United States went to a great deal of trouble to refute the image of Sweden as a real-life utopia, pointing out, among other things, that very many Swedes were still extremely poor by American standards.[12]

After the war, the myth of the middle way grew to the point of becoming political folklore in the Anglo-Saxon world. Eventually, the theme of class compromise was superseded by the image of general progressiveness. A succession of books with titles such as *Sweden—the Progress Machine* and *Sweden—Prototype of Modern Society,* many of them scholarly treatises, others rather in the tradition of Lincoln Steffens, helped to establish firmly the idea of Sweden, and eventually Scandinavia, as the spearhead of modernity.[13] The utopian vein was accompanied by a dystopian, or dark, shadow, ridiculing or attacking the allegedly progressive qualities of modern Sweden: the "clean well-lighted place" of Kathleen Nott's reflection, the home of "the new totalitarians," as observed by Roland Huntford.[14] The supposedly high rate of suicide soon became the basic *idée reçu* of the dystopian image of Sweden and the Nordic world, bolstered by President Eisenhower's famous (and later retracted) remark in 1959. [15]

On the European continent, the Swedish myth had a somewhat different trajectory. In 1935, a year before Childs's book, an equally admiring Frenchman, Serge de Chessin, wrote *The Key to Sweden,* which was translated into English a year later.[16] But the most effective propagators of the myth were the German and Austrian leftist

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politicians who, during the war, had lived in exile in Sweden and later carried the concept of class compromise back to their devastated homelands. Through the efforts of men like Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner, Bruno Kreisky, and a host of lesser known Social Democrats, the ideal of Sweden as a model for the reconstruction of Europe was firmly embedded in the Continent's political landscape.[17] It spread to France eventually, where it caught the imagination not only of the noncommunist Left, but of government technocrats as well. Through organizations such as OECD and ILO, important aspects of Sweden's innovative labor market policies were diffused throughout Western Europe. Under the chancellorships of Brandt in West Germany and Kreisky in Austria, conscious and partially successful efforts were made to project those countries into a model position; clearly patterned on Sweden's example, the theme of the "German Model" became an important part of Helmut Schmidt's election campaign of 1976.

When did the idea of Sweden as a model for the world enter the minds of the Swedes? In the absence of scholarly investigations, one has to surmise. Even though Childs's picture of Sweden was not entirely accepted by Swedish intellectuals and politicians, he nevertheless became a popular figure in the Swedish press. When he returned to Sweden in the late thirties to conduct research for his book on labor unions, *This is Democracy,* he was treated as an international celebrity.[18] In the thirties, the concept of Sweden as a model for America was striking enough to sell newspapers. After the war, figures like Dag Hammarskjöld and Count Folke Bernadotte became symbols of the diffusion of the Swedish civil-servant ethos into the world, firing the imagination of their compatriots.

In the early fifties, at the latest, the concept of the Swedish model had embedded itself in the nation's internal political rhetoric. Official institutions had become accustomed to foreign journalists and experts visiting Sweden to study the frontiers of social modernity. The neighboring Nordic countries entered into an informal partnership, whereby similar social reforms were rapidly implemented all over the North, with Sweden generally as the point of departure. In the eyes of the world, the image of the model was successively broadened to encompass the three Scandinavian countries, then later Finland and, to some extent, Iceland. The impression of the Nordic countries as inspired by a similar ethos was further enhanced by the

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fact that they tended to act and vote as a bloc in the United Nations and in other international organizations.

During the fifties, another important aspect entered into Swedish popular consciousness: the concern for the plight of the Third World. The ground had been prepared by the humanitarian efforts of Scandinavians like Fridtjof Nansen and Bernadotte. Missionaries of the revivalist movements also contributed to focusing moral energy on hunger and misery in faraway parts of the world; the 1952 Nobel Peace Prize to Albert Schweitzer served to further dramatize the issue. In terms of political consciousness, however, the breakthrough came with the vast amount of publicity devoted to the racial situation in South Africa. The tone was set in the early fifties by Herbert Tingsten in his capacity as editor of *Dagens Nyheter;* later, several younger writers followed in his wake. In 1961 Lars Gustafsson, then a representative of the very young literary set, noted that "in no other European country, Great Britian included, has so much newspaper space been used for description and discussion of the situation of the colored population in South Africa as in Sweden."[19]

Gustafsson made his observation as part of a polemic against conservative objections to the idea of Sweden as a world conscience. In an extended version of his essay, published in 1964 as an English language pamphlet, he widened the scope of the controversy, discussing at length the moral issues involved in the interest taken by Swedish public opinion in Third World affairs. He violently rejected the notion that moral protest was a way of evading real responsibility, pointing to Sweden's long-standing commitment to the United Nations and to the high target set for aid to developing countries as proof of a willingness to go from words to deed. He flat-out castigated as hypocrisy the protests caused by Sweden's increasingly active stance on international issues.

> I personally find it difficult to take this criticism seriously. It seems to me based in that kind of feeling of irritation which always arises when someone disturbs the amity of the dinner table by loudly and clearly calling one of those present a scoundrel. In my opinion, and I believe I share it with a good many, there are occasions when considerations to sociable good humor must give way to the truth. The talk about the ignorance of those protesting is founded to a great extent on a confusion of the terms: there is a difference between knowing the facts one is protesting against and the con-

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ditions which have led to their appearance. And there are facts which are unforgivable no matter how they have appeared.[20]

Yet, despite his conviction that moral protest needed no further justification than the awareness of oppression, Gustafsson acknowledged that the attitudes favoring protest in Sweden were derived from a rather special set of circumstances. He ascribed them to a combination of two factors: a feeling of guilt at the singularly privileged position of Sweden in terms of military, economic, and political security, and the desire to break out of the isolation imposed by Sweden's position "as a spiritual and physical peninsula on the outskirts of Europe." In fact, he wrote, the politics of internationalism has replaced earlier notions of national identity in Sweden, growing into an ideology shared by almost every Swede: "This kind of international conscience is, I believe, a way out [of] and a constant consolation for everything we experienced for such a long time as isolation. If Swedish patriotism exists nowadays, it consists of our desire to make ourselves heard in the connection with which this new solidarity confronts us."[21]

V

The notion of Swedish internationalism as an ersatz patriotism is intriguing. It has been common for both Swedes and foreign observers alike to comment on the lack of a traditional sense of national heritage in modern Sweden. The fact that Swedish political culture for many decades had seemed to lack any trace of romantic nationalism, yet obviously was inspired by a strong sense of common purpose, bewildered many of those writing on Sweden. An early case in point (1938) is Margaret Cole's comment in an anthology on modern Sweden by a Fabian study group: "The Swedes are far less dominated by their own national history than most of the other countries of Europe."[22]

The special blend of neutralism and moralism typical of Swedish attitudes toward the world is older than the concept of Sweden as a social model. In his 1944 study *The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden 1918-1939,* Tingsten traced its triumph as the basis for Swedish foreign policy to the interwar years. He posited as its main theoretical concept the small-state–great-power dichotomy. The notion of the small nations as inherently moral in contrast to large na-

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tions devoted to empire-building and the cult of power was common in late nineteenth-century thinking; Jacob Burckhardt can be counted among its earliest proponents. The fate of a Denmark confronted with Prussia and Austria in 1863-64 served to dramatize the point to Scandinavians. To many, it seemed a foregone conclusion that small states were doomed to be swallowed by the great powers.

In the early twentieth century, it became popular for liberals in Scandinavia to parallel the position of small nations in the era of great powers with the state of the workingman facing the ever-growing power of big business. The key to mastering the situation seemed in both cases to be association. Solidarity among workingmen paved the way toward organized labor as a counterforce to big business; similarly, solidarity between the small states would seem to be the only effective measure against the arrogance of the great powers in their quest to dominate the world.

Enlightened self-interest, it was believed, would unite the small states in the common goal of forcing the great powers into obeying the dictates of international law. Through settling their own international conflicts by means of arbitration rather than military power, the small states could set a moral example. The fact that the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union had been entirely peaceful was seen as a signal to the world. Later, the settlement of the Åland Islands dispute between Sweden and Finland, and the compromise solution to the border question in southern Jutland between Denmark and Germany after the armistice of 1918, contributed to the feeling that the Nordic states were forerunners in the struggle for a just and peaceful world order.

The idea that the national interest of small states could best be pursued by submitting to an international code of conduct—even if, as in the case of Sweden and the Åland Islands, this meant giving up territorial prerogatives—had a strong hold on Swedish public opinion at the end of World War I. When, in the debate about Sweden's entering the League of Nations, the conservative minority objected that Sweden's interests should not be sacrificed to international considerations, the Liberal–Social-Democratic majority easily won the day by replying that Sweden should join the League in her own interest. Woodrow Wilson's ideals had seemed to vindicate entirely the small-state ideology after the devastation caused by the great powers in the war; his proposals were greeted with tremendous enthu-

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siasm by Swedish public opinion. Though the disappointment was just as great when the United States once more withdrew into isolationism, this was never taken as a reason for Sweden to stay outside the League of Nations. On the contrary, the moral duty of Sweden—and its neighbors—to support the principles of the League seemed even more imperative. The project took on a utopian dimension. In Tingsten's words, it was felt that "the conditions prevailing in Scandinavia might be regarded as a model for a future world order. . . . The temptation was to assume that the whole world—or, at all events, Europe—after a series of vaguely conceived, far-reaching modifications, could be transformed into a similar group of states, a larger Scandinavia."[23]

Nils Andrén draws a distinction between two traditional schools of thought, the "realists" and the "moralists," with regard to the basis of Swedish neutrality, which serves to illustrate rather well the ideals that inspired this attempted universality.[24] Both view the evolution of Swedish foreign policy as a learning process. The realists, however, point to changing historical strategic-political realities as the main factor shaping Swedish policy. As long as these realities favored an expansionist military strategy, Swedish national consciousness was heroic rather than peace-loving; in fact, the mythology of the "great-power" era long outlasted its political foundation. Only with the dissolution of its union with Norway, when Sweden shed the last remnant of its great-power status, did the heroic ideas finally fade. The policy of neutrality—adopted in response to the reduction of Sweden's military significance and its political importance as a major regional power—finally merged with a "modern" consciousness of peace and humanitarian justice.

The "moralists," in Andrén's terminology, interpret this process as the result of a political and moral maturing. The leaders and the people of the country have grown wiser. The view of Sweden as an "old" nation—in the earlier heroic era, regarded as a fateful sign of weakness—is transformed into an asset: far from being left behind by the forces of progress, Sweden is the harbinger of a new international order. As the very first among nations, it has come of age.

At the core of the "moralistic" value system lies the hope that the interests and demands of nations can be satisfied within the framework of an all-embracing set of rules. Justice brings harmony. When Tingsten, from an essentially realist position, characterizes this ideal-

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ism as a version of the early liberal faith in the "invisible hand," he certainly has a point. But the fact that it seems hopelessly utopian as a program for day-to-day action does not necessarily make it irrational as a system of values for national policy. For a country determined to stay outside all alliances, it makes eminent good sense to regard international law as binding to all nations. That such a policy also appears morally superior becomes increasingly significant in a political context where foreign policy has to win the support of popular opinion. When the conservative resistance to full popular representation in Sweden was finally swept away after the First World War, it was a great advantage for the Liberal–Social-Democratic coalition that its foreign policy could be seen, in the new era they were ushering in, as an extension of the social philosophy guiding its internal politics. The fact that the realists very soon acceded to the basic principles of the moralistic interpretation of Sweden's national interest, and that, as Andrén notes, they have very rarely since then questioned it publicly, shows that the policy of internationalism has indeed had the status of a national ideology in Sweden. It has become an integral part of the mythology of the Swedish model. Equality at home and justice abroad have come to be regarded as complementary and mutually supporting values.

During the interwar period, however, the concept of international justice was given a rather conservative interpretation. The Social Democrat Östen Undén, the main architect of modern Sweden's policy of neutrality, used the analogy of internal class compromise to explain why Sweden had to support an international order that was seen by many as unjust. To postpone the work for an international legal system because there were injustices would be, he claimed, as unreasonable as if the working classes, before they had the vote, had tried to "adopt the standpoint that they could not cooperate in any system for maintaining law and order until all out-of-date and unjust laws had been revised. . . . If we would work for peace, we must accept as a starting point the conditions now prevailing, and trust to the future and the peaceful forces of development to reform the world."

As Tingsten points out, the analogy is flawed: the discontented working classes succeeded in winning "justice" for themselves by means that were often contrary to the law. In the interwar period, this inconsistency was left unresolved. But after World War II, it

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proved increasingly difficult to reconcile the ideology of egalitarianism at home with a conception of foreign policy that implied a commitment to the status quo. With the growing awareness of the plight of the Third World, "justice" came to be pitted against the formalities of the world order, "freedom," against a merely technical notion of peace. Wars of liberation were increasingly seen as a just means for the have-nots of the world to break the chains of an essentially colonial system.

Even though Sweden had no colonial past, it was obvious that it, too, profited from the conditions that were the target of the wars of liberation. In the North-South dimension, Swedish foreign policy could no longer be seen as a fulfillment of universal values. The discovery of a double standard in this sense was one of the main forces inspiring Swedish student protest in the late sixties.

This development provided a vital part of the political energy focused in Sweden on the war in Vietnam. Olof Palme's harsh criticism of American policies, inaugurated by his speech in Gävle in 1965, has been seen by some observers as an attempt to appease a militant faction in his own party. To some extent, it undoubtedly served such a purpose; nevertheless, this interpretation is certainly much too Machiavellian. In 1965 Palme had no way of judging the strength of the political forces that would eventually be mobilized by the Vietnam War. By speaking out against the United States, he took the risk of alienating a great many of the traditionally pro-American Social-Democratic grass roots, a political loss that would have been far more serious than the estrangement of a few thousand leftist youths. Rather, his stance on Vietnam should be seen as an attempt to reformulate the traditional policy of Swedish internationalism in light of the growing importance of the North-South dimension in world politics. His main effort in the Gävle speech was an attempt to analyze the Vietnam situation in terms of the small-state–great-power dichotomy. It marked the return of the small-state doctrine as a main theme in the discussion of Swedish foreign policy. This line of thought eventually became a mainstay of Palme's rhetoric on international affairs. In Swedish internal politics, it served as a bridge-builder between the Vietnam activists and a liberal-conservative opinion that felt America had betrayed its long-standing commitment to the principle of national sovereignty by meddling in a

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civil war. It was used with equal effectiveness against the Soviet Union over the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

In the course of the 1970s, the small-state doctrine increasingly became a vehicle to prove that Sweden was unequivocally on the side of the poor nations in the North-South conflict. Although Sweden has never formally become a member of the nonaligned movement—and it was not until the Algiers session of the nonaligned states in 1973 that it was even represented as a guest at one of its meetings—one can find numerous official Swedish statements giving support to the aims of the movement. Palme has done so on a number of occasions, often invoking venerable Swedish traditions:

> The endeavors of the nonaligned states are consistent with the traditional goal of Swedish foreign policy: to secure, in all situations and in the ways we choose ourselves, our national freedom of action in order to preserve and develop our society within our frontiers and according to our values, politically, economically, socially and culturally; and in that context, to strive for international détente and a peaceful development. The realization that durable peace and détente are impossible as long as small states are subjected to the Realpolitik of the great powers is a concept fundamental to social-democratic foreign policy since the beginning of the 1920s. . . . The same concept has guided us as we have shaped our foreign policy with regard to the Third World in the 1960s and 1970s. We have taken a stand for national freedom and independence. We have condemned intervention and interference in the internal affairs of other states—such actions must never be met by passive silences in the international system of relations between states; that would be interpreted as acceptance. As a small state we have as our goal a world in which the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention are fully respected. This has also made it possible for Sweden, albeit to a modest extent, to build bridges between South and North in a period marked by crisis and the risk of polarization.[25]

The widened scope of Swedish foreign policy to encompass declarations of solidarity with the poor nations of the word can therefore be seen as a fulfillment of the basic aspiration of universality, where Sweden's national interest is felt to be fully compatible with the cause of international justice. Sweden, along with a few equally advanced states, such as Norway and the Netherlands, has started to transcend the political logic of neo-colonial economic relations. Like the Brandt Commission Report, Palme's reformist vision, though it stresses that the political liberation of the Third World can-

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not always be achieved by peaceful means, is basically an idea of harmonious cooperation between rich and poor, to the advantage of both on the basis of a regulated market system. It is the Swedish Model on a world scale:

> What I have just said amounts to an endorsement of the ideas in favor of putting mutual interests in the forefront of the North-South dialogue. They reflect a reality. The endeavor to defend the peace, to use the advantages of the international division of labor, to further development in such a way as to favor everyone—all this must have the capacity to unite the nations of the world. If only the political will is there, I am convinced that it is possible to translate these objectives into a series of reforms and concrete measures in the field of international economic cooperation [that will be] of great importance [to] . . . balanced economic development.[26]

Sweden has the duty of setting an example for other nations to follow. This will mean sacrifices, but advantages will also accrue. In the "Social-Democratic Government Foreign Policy Statement" of March 1976, this duality is expounded in an exemplary way. It starts out by stating that Sweden, through development aid and active support of the endeavors of small nations to limit their dependency on the superpowers, has been able to establish a state of trusting cooperation with the new states. It goes on to stress the importance of Sweden's commercial and industrial relations with the developing nations, thus giving further cause for the suspicion, sometimes voiced by Sweden's industrial competitors, that the rhetoric of international solidarity is only the pursuit of commerce by other means.

There does appear to be some basis for such a suspicion. From 1962 to 1977, Swedish development aid to the Third World increased from 100 million crowns to almost 3 billion, or from 0.12 percent of GNP to 0.85. It almost reached the goal of one percent of GNP in the early eighties. Viewed in terms of real economic sacrifice, however, the figures are far from impressive. All during the seventies, Swedish exports to the developing countries earned four to five times the amount given in aid. In fairness, though, it has to be said that Swedish aid was given with no commercial strings attached, in contrast to the policy of most other industrial nations.

This is no longer unequivocally true. When Sweden was faced with a huge balance-of-payments problem and the risk of rising un-

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employment after the oil crisis of 1973-74, development aid increasingly came to be seen in terms of its potential feedback effects on Swedish industry. This change of direction, inaugurated by the non-socialist coalition in 1976, has not been reversed by the Social Democrats. In the fall of 1983, the proposed freeze in the volume of development aid, amounting in effect to an abandonment of the one percent target, was defended by Olof Palme on the grounds that a continued increase in the level of aid would be a provocation to the ordinary worker, who had to accept a falling real income. In view of the economic strains now gripping Sweden, his declaration would appear to be a realistic appraisal of the limits of the doctrine of international solidarity. The Liberals were the only party to defend the once unanimously accepted one percent level.

Thus Sweden no longer seems able to indulge, to quite the same extent, in the luxury of believing itself to be in a separate category from other industrial nations in its relations with countries of the Third World. Of course, no Swedish politician is likely to come out in support of the "old" economic order, as Henry Kissinger did in the wake of the 1975 UN session. Political pressure will continue to restrict the field of action for Swedish industry in countries like South Africa and Chile. Relations between liberationist Third World governments and Swedish Social Democrats will stay cordial. Swedish public opinion and, sometimes, government spokesmen will protest—and with good reason—against superpower interventions in the affairs of sovereign states. But in all essentials, the myth of Swedish internationalism is bound to deflate under the impact of the real conflicts of interest between the old and new industrialized countries, between traditionally rich and hopelessly poor nations in the North and South. Simultaneously, the increasing military pressure on the Nordic area following the end of superpower détente is likely to reduce the credibility of international action as a means toward furthering Swedish security. Swedish foreign policy stands the risk of going through a similar process of contraction such as occurred before 1939: from the solidaristic internationalism of the twenties, to an attempt to formulate a regional concept of security following the breakdown of the sanctions system of the League of Nations, and finally, in the neutral isolation of the war years, to an interpretation of the national interest so narrow that even Sweden's Nordic neighbors felt a sense of betrayal.

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Even if actual developments stop short of the gloom of this scenario, the fact that Swedish foreign policy appears unable to fulfill its utopian promise is certain to give right-wing observers malicious pleasure. Obviously, aggressions caused by Sweden's role as a world conscience fuel the model-baiting now in vogue in the United States and Western Europe. It is a true irony of history, however, that the political currents inspiring the anti-Swedish crusade are derived from the same ideological source as the policies of Swedish internationalism: classic liberalism.

The fact that this is not immediately apparent indicates that the restoration of neo-classical economics in recent years has left out an important aspect of the liberal message: the promise of a harmonious world order. The replacement of the *impulsion sauvage* by the *calcul civilisé,* in Benjamin Constant's terms, was, of course, an integral part of the early liberal ideology. The universal values of freedom, progress, and reason were pitted against the particularism of feudalism, reaction, and force. Economy, industry, and technology were seen as liberators from the restrictions of the warring state. The goods of life were to be won by peaceful exchange rather than by war and repression. In the modern version of neo-classical economics, however, the promise of harmony is restricted to domestic politics. It seems, rather, as if it carries the ideology of international confrontation not only as a material prerequisite, but as a political one as well.

Adding to the irony, the notion of realpolitik is restored at the very time that Constant's observation that modern wars are at bottom counterproductive is impossible to refute. The artillery of the Napoleonic armies was perhaps insufficient cause to deem personal heroism and delight in fighting as senseless; the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers certainly are. Thus, the problem of the internationalism embodied by the Swedish model is not, as simplistic right-wing interpretations often assert, a lack of rationality, but rather the increasing irrationality of international politics. As the actions of the major forces on the world scene are less and less determined by an agreed-upon set of rules, the possibility that any one nation can act as a guardian of universal reason diminishes. In this sense, the crisis of Swedish universalism is not merely a sign that a peculiar kind of national ideology is no longer valid, but a symptom of the wider di-

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lemma caused by the contradictions inherent in the very notions of rationality and progress.

VI

There were two events of great symbolic importance in Sweden in 1930, one marking the end of an old era, the other, the beginning of a new. The first is now almost totally forgotten: the point at which the number of Swedish emigrants returning from America surpassed those who were embarking for it. The other, the Stockholm Exhibition, was once considered to be a major national triumph, but in recent years, has taken on a somewhat ambiguous meaning.

The Stockholm Exhibition has been so enshrouded in mythology as to make it almost impossible to appraise its real significance. It served as the springboard of functionalism in all of Scandinavia, and within this context, its initiators waged war on the obsolete ideals of urban construction. But in the Swedish setting, functionalism was to become much more than an architectural style. Its proponents marched forward, exuding enormous self-confidence; they possessed a world view and a view of humanity which held that life and society can be broken down into a number of basic functions, and that these can then serve as the foundation for planned action. "Accept!" they cried, and the cry was directed as much at the past as at the future. History has nothing to teach those who hold the key to the latter.[27]

Why this attitude took hold more readily in Sweden than anywhere else has puzzled many. The pioneering work, after all, had been done elsewhere. Yet, the rapid breakthrough needs to be set against the background of the very old and rather peculiar industrial tradition in Sweden, for it was industry that provided the model for the social visions of the architects and planners. During the political turbulence of the 1920s, the factory seemed to be the only part of society that was capable of successful planning. Functionalism would represent industrial logic applied to social planning.

Compared to Denmark and Norway, industrialism in Sweden took off rather late, but once it did, the pace of development was dramatic. Around the turn of the century, Sweden's per capita GNP started to grow faster than that of Great Britain and Germany. From 1890 to 1914, technological developments favored Sweden in three

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important ways: the Thomas process of eliminating phosphorous from iron made Sweden's vast deposits of phosphorous iron ores in northern Sweden quite valuable; new techniques of chemical processing for the manufacture of pulp and paper transformed the country's enormous forests into a gold mine; and new methods of generating power by electricity made it possible to locate factories away from rivers. During this period, the foundations were laid for most of contemporary Sweden's huge engineering industries—SKF, ASEA, Atlas Copco, L.M. Ericsson, and Alfa Laval. These grew rapidly into major international concerns, so that the scale of Swedish industry differed qualitatively from that of its Nordic neighbors.

Modern Swedish industrialism, however, was shaped by an ancient legacy. The manufacture of iron dates back to the thirteenth century in Sweden. The mineral wealth of both iron and copper supplied the financial basis for Sweden's expansion into the Baltic area during the seventeenth century. The high quality of its ores gave Sweden's iron producers a virtual monopoly on the European market—in the first decades of the eighteenth century, for example, 80 percent of England's imported iron was Swedish—that lasted until the final decades of the century. State-restricted production to keep prices up made the iron industry immensely profitable and gave rise to the new class of industrial *seigneurs*.

Iron manufacturing took place in factory villages of a semifeudal nature, so-called *bruk,* where, despite the basic pattern of subjugation, the work force was in time provided with decent housing, medicine, and even schools, amenities that were unknown to the society at large. Local peasants became involved in the industrial process as suppliers of charcoal; in the iron manufacturing districts, this often constituted a major part of their livelihood. Thus the countryside, by way of the factory villages scattered throughout mid-Sweden, became familiar with the organizational forms of industry long before industrialism actually occurred. High culture was influenced by this environment, too; many of the leading artists of the nineteenth century came out of this early industrial culture, and later on, as this first phase drew to a close, it provided the setting for epic stories such as Selma Lagerlöf's *Gösta Berling.*

In his series on Sweden, Enzensberger found a trace of the earliest roots of the *folkhem* and the welfare state in northern Uppland's Lövsta *bruk,* an idyllic former ironworks, virtually unchanged since

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it was built around 1730. The straightforward symmetry within its rectangular boundary; the houses of the works-manager, the blacksmith, the assistant; next, the school, the pharmacy, the doctor; the wooden belfry whose bell called everyone to work; the church, in Carolingian baroque, with its exquisite period organ; and, then, the manor house in the middle of the French park on the other side of the perfectly straight village street—all symbolized to Enzensberger the Swedish model with its belief in planning and care, a protective reason and constructive cooperation between governors and governed.

The cultural patterns associated with the *bruk* tradition have been highly influential in clearing the way for Swedish industrialization, but unfortunately, we know surprisingly little about the actual process. The ease with which industrialization proceeded in Sweden has led modern historians to focus on the external aspects—on economic and administrative processes—rather than on the inner forces, the ideas and cultural patterns, that made this development possible. With few exceptions, they have stayed within the logic of the Swedish model, which entails the belief that the development has, on the whole, proceeded straight from darkness to light. The contrasts they have seized on consist of the conflicts between the two main classes of industrialism, those centering on the model itself. Swedish historians have shown a remarkable lack of interest in thinkers who have sought a radically different approach and who have questioned the very nature of industrial progress.

Whereas in other countries, the ravages caused by modernization have continued to influence ideology and political behavior, giving birth to competing views of the national heritage, the dominant view of Swedish history is overwhelmingly one-dimensional: it is the chronicle of the victors. The basic idea of this view is the belief that the ideological heritage of the predemocratic era was largely irrelevant to the ensuing development and thus, as a field of study for historians, can be regarded as an embellishment rather than an intrinsic part of the structure.

This perspective has left us with some major enigmas when it comes to understanding the foundations of modern Sweden, foremost of which would seem to be the extremely rapid pace of the ideological transformation connected with the establishment of parliamentary democracy. The extension of suffrage in Sweden was

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halting, and full suffrage came much later than in other Nordic countries. That only fourteen years elapsed between the democratic breakthrough in 1918 and the start of the forty-year-long unbroken reign of the Social Democrats is a point worthy of reflection. As Douglas Verney has noted, between 1909, the year of the general strike, and 1918, the year of full male suffrage, a change took place—without bloodshed—far more dramatic than any that had occurred in other Western democracies in a comparable period. On an ideological level, it meant the abandonment of a traditional, authoritarian, militaristic outlook, one tainted with mythology out of Sweden's imperial past, for progressive ideals. In internal politics, it signified a shift from defense to social welfare and education as the main areas of state expenditure. In foreign policy, it implies the relinquishment of Sweden's traditional orientation to the east and south in favor of new political and commercial ties with Britain and the United States. Humanitarianism and internationalism replaced the nostalgic nationalism of former decades.

To some extent, of course, this transformation was part of the general European war experience. As Michael Howard has pointed out, the First World War ushered in an era that was essentially civilian in its outlook.[28] In Sweden as elsewhere, it meant a change of the ruling elite. In 1920 a minority Social-Democratic government was installed, although its parliamentary base was extremely limited. All during the twenties, there was a rapid succession of weak governments. The armed forces, the upper governmental bureaucracy, and—obviously—industry were still dominated by the old elite.

One of the most glaring deficiencies in the prevailing view of the origins of the Swedish model is the lack of a detailed picture of the gradually shifting allegiance of this traditional elite. As an *ancien regime,* it was ideologically, politically, and economically much stronger than its counterparts in the other Nordic countries. It constituted an oligarchy in every sense of the word. In the conservative cabinet of 1908, headed by an admiral, six out of eleven members were nobles, as were thirteen of the twenty-three county governors. The aristocracy was, furthermore, the source of one third of the commissioned officers in the armed forces. In industry, the *seigneural* class still held a formidable position. And through the universities and institutions such as the Swedish Academy, intellectual life, too, was strongly linked to the oligarchy of power.

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Partly provoked by anti-Swedish liberal patriotism in Norway, partly by the antinational radicalism of the 1880s, aristocratic intellectuals in the 1890s forged a new right-wing nationalism based on the worship of nature and the mythology of Sweden's great-power era. The ruling circles grasped it eagerly. Thus, modern Swedish nationalism, in contrast to the situation in the other Nordic countries, became almost exclusively an upper-class ideology. Domestically, it was directed against the labor movement as a source of disruption, which in turn provoked a strong antinational reaction among workers. It took the Social Democrats until the First World War to close ranks behind a policy of national solidarity.

The new conservative nationalism, however, did have progressive traits. Notwithstanding its anti-Norwegian and antilabor nostalgia for ancient, heroic times, it also reflected a growing awareness that Sweden's future source of greatness would not be military prowess but industrial skill. Its symbols were traditional, but it was remarkably lacking in anti-industrial yearnings. Compared to the Wagnerian cultural pessimism that accompanied the industrial breakthrough in Germany, it stood out almost as a champion of rationality. Some of its proponents clearly sensed that if Sweden was to be a great power, its social structure would have to be altered dramatically. In the 1890s, a leading conservative intellectual, Harald Hjärne, professor of history at Uppsala University, framed the basic terms of a historical compromise in his famous formula, "Defense and reforms." Through the combined rewards of progressive taxation and universal suffrage, the workers would be enticed to accept the burden of a conscript army and generally to become patriots.[29]

The problem of integrating the workers into the national culture was central to conservative thought in the first decade of this century. At the same time that organized labor was being fought with great determination, the individual worker was being wooed—at least in theory. The sense of desperation one finds in the many conservative tracts dealing with the dilemma derives not so much from the political advance of the labor movement as from the fact that the workers—far from responding to the call for patriotism—were leaving Sweden in droves. It was emigration that finally spurred the shaping of a new set of national priorities. The conservatives' vision of a glorious industrial future was darkened by the fear that their factories would be left empty, without workers. Their self-confi-

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dence was deeply shaken by the seemingly inexplicable fact that emigration from Sweden continued steadily even while that from several other European countries declined drastically. Adrian Molin, a leading theorist of emigration, summed up in 1910 the inevitable conclusion in a typical example of conservative flagellation:

> There are of course people who think social discontent in Sweden is actually a result of the success of socialist agitators. There are also people who believe that the emigration is essentially the work of crafty emigration agents and unscrupulous recruiters. Actually, these views bear intimations of one of the most fundamental causes of both our social discontent and of emigration: the smugness of Sweden's leading social class, its blindness to the failings of its leadership. For both the labor movement and emigration are expressions of the little people's revolt against the governance of the ruling class and especially against its management of the nation's productive work. . . . What we need is an effective *democratic* reform policy with a sober, businesslike disposition, and with *conservative* respect for those values that deserve to be conserved. . . . The ability to believe in an end to emigration is tantamount to the ability to believe in a future for the Swedish people, in development into sound, realistic reform work, into forceful, energetic expansion, into a belief in Sweden's lucky star—Sweden's greatness.[30]

Molin, chairman of the then newly established National Association Against Emigration, publisher of the conservative journal *The New Sweden,* and close collaborator of Professor Rudolf Kjellen, the theoretician of geopolitics, traveled extensively throughout the United States, as part of an official government mission, trying to discover which aspects of American life were the main attractions for emigrants. The mission published a report that was not only the most thorough investigation into the causes of emigration undertaken by any country, but far more important, it was a complete survey of the Swedish national economy, the economic history of its various regions, and their potential for future development. Its stated aim was to see whether American social and economic conditions could be transplanted to Sweden, but its closing remarks were the most telling, for it was here that the concept of *planning for change,* later a basic aspect of the Swedish model, was introduced.

> Were we to attempt in a few words to give a brief indication of our own idea of the causes for the great emigration, then we would say that in Sweden we dallied twenty years too long with the railroads and thirty years too

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long with universal [actually, male] suffrage. And the most important cure for emigration, in other words, is, in the future, *not to get behind,* either in the matter of economic enterprise or in that of social reform.[31]

The report left few immediate traces, its recommendations becoming engulfed by the political turbulence of the First World War. In any event, emigration soon ceased to be a major issue. The controversy over it, however, did force a turn away from imperial nostalgia toward a new dream of industrial-economic supremacy. Greatness, it appeared, could be achieved in a different way—through a policy of rational cooperation between government and industry. But the bedrock of the old national consciousness, defense and reform, had placed Sweden at odds with its neighbors and had led its proponents to seek commercial outlets on the basis of geopolitical ties—and the conservatives were unable to see that their vision of greatness could be fulfilled only with a new elite in power, one that would envision the whole world as its market.

But their effort, however limited in vision, was publicly praised by progressive observers even before the war was over. Ludvig Nordström, visionary novelist and essayist, took the conservative dream of greatness as the point of departure for his own conjectures of Sweden's role in a new world, dominated by Anglo-Saxon values. Citing anonymous British commentators, he concluded that Sweden was now on the verge of real greatness:

> Sweden has a bright future, in part as an independent industrial country and in part as a connecting link between the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. Sweden—or perhaps more accurately Scandinavia—will become one of the focuses of world industry, abundant as it is in ample measure of ore, water power, and other prerequisites necessary for industry. It has the good fortune to possess a wise, alert, and well-balanced people geared for progress; good organization; sound political instincts; and some of the world's best engineers. And it has the privilege of being related racially to the Anglo-Saxons, that is, Englishmen and Americans, who together are clearly going to decide the form and fate of the world in the age to come. . . . Why, one may ask, could not Sweden become a model country for the rest of the world? It has everything necessary with its excellent race, its developed institutions, its talents, its instinct for sports, and its ethical prospects.[32]

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This is probably the first time that the notion of Sweden as a model was mentioned in a modern context. For Nordström, the idea was part of a scientistic vision of the new world order, heavily influenced by the utopianism of H.G. Wells. In the aftermath of the First World War, Nordström's extravagant claims count among several signs that Sweden was not wholly unprepared for the international attention it was going to receive a decade later. In October 1930, the emigration controversy finally became history, with the announcement that for every Swede leaving for America, four went the opposite way. And earlier the same year, Nordström's dream of Sweden as the forerunner of a scientistic world order was taken over by a new generation of architects, scientists, and social engineers in the wake of the Stockholm Exhibition. A few years later, Nordström himself was to write an immensely influential tract against the deficiencies of Swedish urban planning and sanitary conditions. Its title, "Filthy Sweden," was laden with the power of progressive mythology.[33] Under the banner of scientific planning, the fight against the "filth" of the old order was triumphantly waged in the decades to come.

VII

When the thirtieth annivesary of the death of King Gustavus Adolphus II was commemorated in Sweden in November 1932, one of the principal speakers was Johan Nordström, professor of the history of ideas at Uppsala University. Using rhetorical figures of almost baroque magnificence, Nordström tried to evoke the *zeitgeist* of Sweden's great-power era. He spoke of the reign of Gustavus Adolphus, "the Lion of the North," as "the springtime of Swedish history," enshrouded in a mythology of ancient deeds of valor, the very naiveté of which, according to Nordström, was proof of the vital force of the age. For the first time, Swedish national culture took on universal significance: it was brought into the heart of Europe as an agent of liberation. The emerging Swedish empire was spiritual as much as material; far from being the result of vulgar power tribulation, it had a moral purpose.[34]

Nordström's deliberately romantic interpretation of Sweden's rise to eminence in the seventeenth century was doubly anachronistic. As a picture of the spirit of the imperial period, it obviously bore only slight resemblance to reality. It was at odds with recent historical re-

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search that had laid bare the palpably material motives behind Sweden's military expansion. Adoration of the "warrior king" was rapidly becoming unfashionable. In fact, the festivities of 1932 were the last large-scale national celebration in Sweden anchored in the traditional great-power mythology.

Yet, despite Nordström's apparent lack of contact with the values of his time, his speech can be read today as a bold premonition of the new *zeitgeist* that was to emerge during the thirties in Sweden. The old historical tradition was rapidly scrapped as unfitting to a nation aspiring to the peak of modernity. The new mythology, however, retained significant elements of the tradition it was superseding. Swedish national culture would once more serve as a liberating force in the world. Sweden would build a new spiritual empire as the native land of modern values.

On the level of administrative structure, there was an important element of continuity as well: the state apparatus that administered Sweden's economic recovery during the thirties was heir to the ultramodern principles of statecraft established three hundred years earlier by Axel Oxenstierna, chancellor to Gustavus Adolphus. The tradition of rational administration of the public interest is the paramount and never discarded legacy of the great-power era in Sweden.

In what can only be called a model case of democratic regeneration, a political force that had been considered subversive only two decades earlier found itself to be the new guardian of this tradition. The communal bodies that had been born in reaction to industrial capitalism—the trade unions and farmers' associations—were allowed to share in the management of state affairs. The result was a change not only in the formal division of power, but in the moral quality of society as well. The new social forces infused their values into the state. It was a trade-off: the values would be backed by the authority of the state and even allowed to penetrate the educational system, but in return, the labor movement had to abandon its sectarian ideology. In doing so, it was transformed into a guardian of the national interest.

It is sometimes overlooked that this political change was consciously brought about as a democratic answer to the same economic and social pressures that had led to fascism on the Continent. The moral motive of combating fascism was an important feature

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of the alliances between workers and farmers that had been established in the three Scandinavian countries from 1933 on; in Denmark, the so-called Kanslersgade agreement—which allowed for measures to help the unemployed in return for a reduction of farm taxes—was concluded on January 30th, the day of Hitler's ascendancy to power. In Sweden, where a similar accord was struck a few months later, the antifascist objective was even stronger.[35] In the elections three years later, the links between workers and farmers proved a political boon to the Social Democrats. It gave them an absolute majority in the Parliament and thus a power base from which to forge the next step of the historic compromise: the Saltsjöbaden agreement of 1938 between industry and the trade unions.

The political authority of the Social Democrats was further enhanced by the success of their economic policies. They had boldly challenged the conventional wisdom of economists at home and abroad. Independently of Keynes, Ernst Wigforss, the minister of finance, had argued that by creating jobs and paying high wages, the purchasing power of society could be increased so that manufacturers would have more outlets for their products and unemployment would be eliminated. His actions proved him right.

Labor turned out to be the perfect executor of the plans for economic and social development that had been made decades earlier by members of the old elite. The political synthesis of the Social Democrats assured social stability and economic growth to both industry and the bureaucracy. Workers and farmers were promised social security, political power, and a fair share of the growing industrial wealth. The moral authority accruing to the Social Democrats from their success in defining the common good facilitated the transition from a traditional to a modern sense of historical identity. The events of the thirties—from the Stockholm Exhibition to the Saltsjöbaden agreement—were experienced even then by a majority of the Swedes as the starting point of a *projet de société:* the comforting vision of the people's home became the founding myth of what seemed like a wholly new social order. A new communal awareness was born, a consciousness of shared destiny that cut across both class and regional cleavages.

The most amazing aspect of this development is that it happened at a time when democratic culture everywhere else in Europe seemed to have lost its vital force. By calling his 1932 study of the develop-

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ment of democratic politics "The Triumph and Crisis of Democracy," Herbert Tingsten expressed a general feeling of despondency among European liberals of his time. And George Orwell, in his 1944 essay on Arthur Koestler, epitomized this view of the thirties as the starting point of an era of political decay: "Since about 1930 the world has given no reason for optimism whatsoever. Nothing is in sight except a welter of lies, hatred, cruelty and ignorance. And beyond our present troubles loom larger ones which are only now entering into the European consciousness."[36]

If the general political current of the thirties seemed to favor authoritarian government as the way to restore economic growth and social stability, Scandinavia in general and Sweden in particular appeared as the exception. Swedish intellectual climate was, on the whole, curiously optimistic, albeit in a low-key, reformist fashion. The contrast to the dominant mood of the decade was a favorite theme of foreign observers. In a typical comment, the *London Economist,* in a 1938 special report, described Sweden as an island of hope in a sea of despair.

The project of shaping a new national consensus in Sweden was thus invested with a universal moral and political significance. Against the forces of reaction and authoritarianism, Sweden took on the role of guardian of the values of 1789. Sweden's image of its future became inextricably linked to the effort of promoting its social model as the democratic solution to the liberal dilemma. In this perspective, the evolution of the welfare state could be seen as the ultimate fulfillment of the liberal dream. Universal material rights were added to the formal rights of citizenship, making the concept of equal opportunity much less of a fiction. The hope of the liberal project seemed to lie in discarding traditional concepts of the autonomy of the market.

Interestingly, this ideological perspective is clearly present in the earliest international interpretations of the welfare state. The term seems to have appeared for the first time in the English language in 1941 in a book by Sir William Temple, *Citizen and Churchman.* Temple, then archbishop of York, used it in contrast to the concept of the "power state," symbolized by Stalin's Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany.[37] Eventually, freedom from want was elevated to the status of an Allied war goal. The Atlantic Charter and the Beveridge report seemed to promise a postwar world based on a new

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liberal vision: the twin pillars of comprehensive social insurance at home and international cooperation abroad. Both were entirely consistent with Swedish visions of the future.

Thus, even at a time when powerlessness and neutral isolation forced Sweden into making formidable concessions to the Germans, the feeling of being the guardian of civilized values remained a vital collective force, in a sense, linking the very project of neutrality with the Allied war effort. Indeed, the concessions could be rationalized on this ground as being morally justified. Even the granting of transit rights to trains transporting German soldiers on leave from Norwegian duty could be expounded as a service to the Allied cause. Who would have gained from a German occupation of Sweden? Certainly not the Norwegian partisans who were using Sweden as a refuge and a place to coordinate their effort.

Attempts were made to define the limits of neutralism, the point where in fact it implied a lack of moral choice and a betrayal of the very principles it was supposed to guard. But the change in the fortunes of war after Stalingrad made such distinctions unnecessary.[38] The discussion arose again at the inception of the cold war, but by then the idea of neutrality as the foundation of the set of values embodied in the Swedish model had become unshakable. The cold war could be interpreted as an unfortunate reversal of the general trend of history toward peaceful cooperation. But even if the hopes of the Atlantic Charter had been thwarted, the social vision of the welfare state seemed now everywhere on the road to fulfillment, with Sweden leading the way.

The success story of the Swedish model had one curious aspect: the extent to which Sweden entered into a sort of competition with the United States as the symbol of modernity. New Deal liberals, much taken with the Swedish model during the thirties, had a vision of a spiritual axis running from Washington to Stockholm: America was to be regenerated by an infusion of Swedish social wisdom, while Sweden was to be rejuvenated by American optimism. Through the efforts of intellectuals like Gunnar and Alva Myrdal, widespread admiration in Sweden for the policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt merged with an interpretation of the American tradition as inherently progressive. The reversal of the New Deal after the war and the outright hostility to the concept of the welfare state by both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations was a tremendous

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blow to the hopes of a combined Swedish-American effort to reform the world. Yet, even after the feeling of a shared political destiny had vanished, admiration for American values remained strong. In the late fifties, the Social Democrats found a theoretical justification for enlarging the public sector in an American source: John Kenneth Galbraith's analysis of the disparity between public squalor and private affluence. Again, in the Swedish opposition to the war in Vietnam, the notion of common values played a role, protest against official American policy being interpreted as consistent with the "true" American tradition.

In the popular American literature on the Swedish model, the comparison between Swedish and U.S. interpretations of modernity is a recurrent theme, many writers in fact using the Swedish model as a vehicle to demonstrate aberrations of the American Dream. The tendency to pit the two models against each other appears in scholarly studies as well. Richard F. Thomasson, in his 1970 book, *Sweden: The Prototype of Modern Society*,[39] replying to Seymour Martin Lipset's famous assertion that America is the first new nation, declares that Sweden has eclipsed it as the foremost embodiment of modernity. Sweden came late to modern values, Thomasson observes, but it has come to accept them with special intensity. Swedes, he notes, not only have a strong commitment to democracy, egalitarianism, empiricism, and secular rationalism, but combine these with a belief in the malleability of institutions. Indeed, Sweden, even more than the United States, appears in Thomasson's analysis to fit Frank Thistlethwaite's description of the American mentality—"a society fluid and experimental, uncommitted to rigid values, cherishing freedom of will and choice, and bestowing all the promise of the future on those with the manhood to reject the past."[40]

Even as Thomasson's book was being published, reality belied his idyllic view of Swedish society. The miners of Kiruna had shaken the complacent belief that secular rationalism in itself could provide a yardstick for the common good. The much-praised consensus on modern values appeared suddenly to be little more than the arrogance of an elite, accustomed to running the affairs of state according to a purely formal definition of political goals. The "we'll-do-it-for-you" paternalism of the people's home now appeared to many to be autocratic rather than benign. And as the Social Democrats tried to regenerate support by emphasizing the moral issues of qual-

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ity of work and power-sharing in industry, a fateful weakness of the model came to light: the evaporation of binding value symbols. The mythology of progress proved unable to legitimize the new political signals. The Right felt the new destination to be a deviation from the model. The youthful Left, already in the throes of an existentialist revolt against technocratic modernism, saw the changed Social-Democratic rhetoric as yet another machination of instrumental rationality. With the oil crisis and the ensuing recession, whatever remained of the old consensus rapidly eroded.

VIII

Nothing fails like success. The Swedish model could not survive without the momentum of repeated accomplishment; for the system to retain the devotion of its subject citizens, the promise of the future had to be constantly renewed. Such a prospect, however, cannot be upheld for all of the people all of the time. Indeed, that so many believed it for so long is one of the wonders—and mysteries—of modern history.

So where does this leave the Swedes? In a predicament not unlike that ascribed to other Europeans by Stanley Hoffmann[41]—with their sense of national identity (and hence of national destiny) just bits and pieces floating in the here and now. The Swedes, however, have never been captured by the European myth, and their rejection of the past stems from sources different from those described by Hoffmann as underlying the spiritual misery of modern Europe.

It has also been more radical. Modernization has succeeded in Sweden to the extent even of eradicating the atavisms, the obstacles to collective efficiency whose existence on the Continent has for so long disturbed the Eurocrats of Brussels. In destroying those pockets of resistance, it might just be that Sweden has also rid itself of a crucial factor of regeneration. In the meantime, modernization is carried on, but with most of the old promises abandoned: it is now simply a matter of muddling through in difficult times. The Social Democrats have reappeared as the administrators of the fragments of collective destiny; their appeal, however, derives more from their perceived competence in holding growth stoppage and unemployment at bay in these troubled times than from any positive vision of the future.

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A plausible political alternative is nowhere in sight. Those on the right, guided by strategists at the powerful Employers Organization (SAF), have become captives of a neo-laissez-faire fundamentalism imported from Chicago, which is obviously impossible of fulfillment as government policy in a country where political participation and union mobilization are at much higher levels compared to the United States. In addition, the environmentalist lobby and the diverse factions of the left-wing have been losing ground. A fundamental problem for any movement seeking an alternative course is that there is no binding moral tradition behind the project of Swedish modernity. Unlike America, where political renewal is carried on by means of competing interpretations of its Constitution, Sweden has no commonly agreed-upon source of values to which the contending parties could refer. The Swedish Constitution is too recent and too much a product of the secular rationalism of the sixties to serve as a moral inspiration. There is really nothing but the tradition of democratic participation as such, to which the labor organizations appear as the only legitimate heirs. But even this could be eroded as the technologies of the information age force a realignment of traditional structures of employment and social integration.

Accompanying the death throes of the Swedish model are agonizing discussions about a nebulous entity called "the picture of Sweden." In contrast to the similarly motivated disputes in the neighboring Nordic countries, however, the Swedish discussion has been almost totally lacking in historical perspective. In Denmark, the national soul-searching has been, to a surprising extent, framed in reference to the traditions formed by the nineteenth century cleric, historian, educator, and writer, N.F.S. Grundtvig—whose two-hundredth birth anniversary in 1983 provided a convenient cue for the discussion. In Sweden, there is no similar cultural hero on whom an analysis of the deeper layers of national identity could focus. The Norwegians have a tradition of nationalism and democratic ideals dating back to the 1815 Constitution (which, incidentally, is still held in such veneration that all amendments are written in the original Danish). The Finns have their tradition of struggle for national independence and domestic reconciliation after their civil war as a constant source of historicity. All together, Sweden's Nordic neighbors share, albeit with differing connotations, the traumatic experience of the last great war. Hence, although fragmentation of the

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traditional sense of collectivity has been underway in these countries as well, it appears to have advanced far less than in Sweden.

Still curiously unshaken among the modern Swedish myths is the very backbone of the national consciousness: the collective sense of being exceptional. Unlike its counterpart in the United States, it has never been explicitly stated as an ideology. Nonetheless, Swedes undoubtedly share a feeling that their country, in a deeper sense, is immune to the crises affecting the world at large. This myth has been nurtured by the country's geographical isolation and the luck that has spared it from all European wars since the time of Napoleon. It was reinforced by the feats of technological, social, and political creativity that transformed Sweden during the twentieth century from a society of misery and backwardness into a model for the world. The coincidence of a completed social modernization with the breakthrough of a technological revolution after the Second World War, when Sweden, virtually alone among European nations, was left in possession of an intact and highly efficient industry, provided the material base for Sweden's rise to the status of a small state with the freedom of action of a great power.

The really remarkable feat of Swedish twentieth-century elites, then, appears to be the skill with which they converted their nation's small-state position from a handicap into an asset. Sweden managed to ride against the apparent tide of the century, which seemed to relegate the small states to the status of dominions of the empires. The very success of the effort fostered a national ideology in which seemingly contradictory elements were combined: a sense of common purpose as strong as anything ever dreamt of by nineteenth century romantic nationalists, yet uncommitted, even hostile, to preindustrial values. A rationalistic futurism took the place of religion; social and technological change was felt to be not only unavoidable, but morally imperative. Antitraditionalism became, paradoxically, the dominant tradition, a dynamism that was reinforced by the narcissistic feeling among the elite of being the object of admiration. Modern Sweden was a mini-Prometheus unbound. The temptation to continue this tradition will be very strong. Industrial organization and technological innovation are among the oldest and most formidable currents in Swedish culture. Sweden is quite likely to meet the challenge of the future in this field better than most other European nations. But there will need to be a new source for the cultural myths

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necessary to release once again the social energy that has for so long characterized the Swedish model. Sweden is now, for the first time in this century, fully synchronized with its Nordic neighbors and the rest of Europe. The problems are common to Europe at large. The age of Swedish exceptionalness appears to be drawing to a close. Hence, any search for a new historicity in Sweden will have to start with a reappraisal of the traditional links with the neighboring countries.

IX

In his 1936 travel book on Scandinavia, the Czech writer Karel Capek admiringly described the charms of the early Swedish model: "Sweden is the country with many bridges and roads but little politics; where the girls lack makeup, the dogs muzzles, the streets policemen, the bathing-huts keys, and the doors latches, where cars and bicycles are left unattended, where life is led without fear and the people are extremely hospitable."[42] European political journalists in the eighties quite obviously take a different view. No one can ignore the fact that, while Sweden still possesses many bridges and roads, it also has too much politics, muzzles on people as well as on dogs, and far too many policemen. The girls are still beautiful, but one would be hard put to find any without makeup. Indeed, boys use it nowadays too. And no one in his right mind would leave his bicycle unattended in any part of Stockholm for more than a few minutes.

But the same could be said for any big city in any Western—or, for that matter, Eastern—country. That the existence of these (and other related) phenomena in Sweden can be used to prove that Big Brother has decided to use Sweden as a laboratory, before taking over the rest of the world, is indicative not only of modern journalism's constant need for dramatic reversals, but also of the troubled view of the future now prevailing in Europe. What is attacked in the Swedish *contre-model* is a particular form of technological and administrative modernity that only fifteen years ago was hailed as the harbinger of a wonderful future. The baiting of Sweden seems to be a peculiar kind of exorcism.

George Orwell's vision looms over this discussion in more senses than the obvious one, that of the mythical power of the figure 1984. Despite the reassuring assertions that his prophecies have not come true (except in Sweden), there is a malaise in the air that is reminis-

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cent of the thirties. The world of the eighties gives as little reason for optimism as that of the thirties. To make matters worse, there are not even any clearly discernible representatives of evil; no Stalin and no Hitler. And the models of democracy of yesterday, tiny Sweden and magnificent America, have both faded. The predicament has produced neither villains nor heroes.

Could it be that the "larger troubles" that Orwell warned of in his essay on Koestler took forty years to enter the European consciousness? Could it be that Sweden's illusion of being the master of its own fate was a self-deception shared by all of Western Europe? If so, the anger now aimed at the Swedish model is simply the frustration caused by a common plight: the loss of a historical heritage and the inability to regain a sense of communality now that the blessings of modernity have proved ambiguous and alternative visions of the future are simply the recycled cliché's of yesterday.

ENDNOTES

[1]Hans Magnus Enzensberger, "Svensk höst" (Stockholm: *Dagens Nyheter,* 1982); partly published as "The Crisis," *The Scandinavian Review,* no. 2, 1983.

[2]Staffan Björck, *Heidenstam och sekelskiftets Sverige* (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1946), pp. 29, 28, 28.

[3]Ibid. p. 27.

[4]Rolf Dahrendorf, *Die Chancen der Krise: Uber die Zukunft des Liberalismus* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983), pp. 16-24.

[5]See, for instance, *Le Point,* October 17, 1983, "La Suède: le contre model," and *Der Spiegel,* October 24, 1983, "Schweden: Der Uberwachungsstaat." The Danish TV journalist Mogens Barendt topped the Danish best-seller lists for non-fiction (!) for several weeks in 1983 with his book *Tilfaeldet Sverige,* a vehement attack on Swedish bureaucracy.

[6]For a comparison of the statistics of various countries, see Åke Elmér, "Kinder-Gulag finns i Västtyskland," *Dagens Nyheter,* November 15, 1983, and Eva Moberg, "Föräldramakten rycker fram," *Dagens Nyheter,* November 20, 1983. The high Swedish figures for children placed in foster homes seem to stem in part from the fact that Swedish social workers have a much better "early warning system" for incidents of child abuse than their colleagues in other countries.

[7]Enzensberger, "Svensk höst," pp. 40-41.

[8]Politiken, April 23, 1965, quoted from David Gress, "Warten auf Fortinbras. Die Krise des Skandinavischen Modells," Der Monat 1, 1982, p. 16.

[9]Harald Elovson, *Amerika i svensk litteratur 1750-1920* (Lund: G.W.K. Gleerups, 1930).

[10]Quoted from Sigmund Skard, *The American Myth and the European Mind. American Studies in Europe, 1776-1960* (Philadelphia: 1961).

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[11]See *Emigrationsutredningen*, "Betänkande" (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1913).

[12]See Gunnar and Alva Myrdal, *Kontakt med Amerika* (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers förlag, 1941). A 1938 article in the *Atlantic Monthly*, "Unflattered Sweden," made the same observation.

[13]See, for instance, David Jenkins, *Sweden: The Progress Machine* (London: Robert Hale, 1969); Richard Thomasson, *Sweden: Prototype of Modern Society* (New York: Random House, 1970); M. Donald Hancock, *Sweden: The Politics of Post-industrial Change* (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1972). I am indebted to Michael Frayn for his perceptive observations on the limits of Swedish progressiveness (*The Observer*, April 21 and 28, 1974).

[14]Roland Huntford, *The New Totalitarians* (London: 1971); Kathleen Nott, *A Clean, Well-Lighted Place* (London: Heineman, 1961).

[15]Eisenhower's vaguely phrased attack on the welfare ideals were immediate front page news in Sweden and provoked an intense discussion. Herbert Tingsten published a formal rebuttal of the president's allegations in *Dagens Nyheter*, July 30, 1960. For a discussion of the Nordic suicide rate from the point of view of social psychology, see Herbert Hendin, *Suicide and Scandinavia* (New York and London: Grune & Stratton, 1964).

[16]Serge de Chessin, *The Key to Sweden* (Stockholm: Fritzes, 1936).

[17]See, for instance, Willy Brandt's article, "Schaut nach Norden," *Der Stern*, October 20, 1964.

[18]A typical example of the kind of publicity Childs received in Sweden can be found in Socialdemokraten, August 15, 1937: "Amerika kan Lära mycket av Sverige" ("America has a lot to learn from Sweden").

[19]Lars Gustafsson, *Predominant Topics of Modern Swedish Debate* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute Pamphlet, 1961), p. 4.

[20]Lars Gustafsson, *The Public Dialogue in Sweden: Current Issues of Social, Esthetic and Moral Debate* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söners förlag, 1964), pp. 113-14.

[21]Ibid., p. 117.

[22]*Democratic Sweden: A Volume of Studies Prepared by Members of the New Fabian Research Bureau*, edited by Margaret Cole and Charles Smith (London: George Routledge & Sons Ltd., 1938), p. 2.

[23]Herbert Tingsten, *The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden, 1918-1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 302.

[24]A discussion of "realists" and "moralists" in Swedish foreign policy debate can be found in Nils Andrén, "The Evolution of Swedish Neutrality," in *Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe*, edited by Birnbaum and Neuhold (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1982).

[25]Olof Palme, "Sweden's Role in the World," in *Sweden: Choices for Economic and Social Policy in the 1980s*, edited by Bengt Rydén and Willy Berström (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 244-45.

[26]Ibid., p. 252.

[27]A facsimile edition of the famous Stockholm Exhibition Catalogue was published for the fiftieth anniversary of the event: Gunnar Asplund et al., *Acceptera* (Stockholm: Tiden, 1980).

[28]Michael Howard, "War and the Nation-State," *Dædalus* 108 (4) (Fall 1979).

[29]Harald Hjärne, *Blandade spörsmål* (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers förlag, 1903). For a discussion of Hjärne's role in forming a new conservative ideology in Swe-

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[30]*Emigrationsutredningen*, Appendix XVIII, *Uttalanden av svenska vetenskapsmän* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1910), p. 20.

[31]*Emigrationsutredningen*, "Betänkande" (Stockholm: P.A. Norstadt & Söner, 1913), p. 890.

[32]Ludvig Nordström, *Sverige och världen* (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers förlag, 1919), pp. 75-76.

[33]Ludvig Nordström, *Lort-Sverige* (Stockholm: Kooperativa förbundets bokförlag, 1938).

[34]For a discussion of Nordström's speech in relation to social development in seventeenth-century Sweden, see Nils Runeby, "Barbarei oder Zivilität? Zur Entwicklung einer organisierten Gesellschaft in Schweden im 17. Jahrhundert," in *Europe and Scandinavia,* edited by Goran Rystad (Lund: Esselte Studium, 1938), pp. 203-18.

[35]See Ulf Lindström, "Fascism in Scandinavia 1920-40" (Department of Political Science, University of Umeå, unpublished dissertation, 1983).

[36]George Orwell, "Arthur Koestler," in *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell,* vol. 3 (London: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 281.

[37]See *The Welfare State: Selected Essays,* edited by Charles I. Schottland (New York: Harper & Row, 1967). For a discussion of the origin of the term "welfare state" and its various connotations, see Stein Kuhnle, *Velferdsstatens utvikling* (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1983).

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[39]Thomasson, *Sweden, Prototype of Modern Society.*

[40]Frank Thistlethwaite, *The Great Experiment,* pp. 319-20, quoted by Seymour Martin Lipset in *The First New Nation,* (London: Heineman, 1964), p. 98.

[41]Stanley Hoffmann, "Fragments Floating in the Here and Now," *Dædalus* 108 (1) (Winter 1979).

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Madeleine Gustafsson

The Silences of the North

AROUND THE TURN OF THE YEAR from 1982 to 1983, Sven Delblanc—perhaps today's most read and most highly regarded Swedish author of the interwar generation—published an article in which he complained about the inability of Swedish authors to write about their own time. Ever since romanticism, he said, Swedish prose has dealt mainly with the past, and by painting this background dark, has indirectly lauded the present.

What is striking about our narrative prose is that it so rarely deals with the contemporary, and when it does, does so with such little success. We are mostly historians, and we like to deal with a Sweden of Poverty, now gone. We sketch its misery in garish colors, thus serving the society that now prevails. Our readers can find pleasure and consolation in the conviction that, these days, "things aren't that awful." Any possible critique of contemporary life falls silent before literature's horrific images of the past. In this way, we serve the society we are a part of.

Still, the truth is that things are pretty hellish the way they are, though in a different sense from the Sweden of tenant farmers and the industrial proletariat. The truth is that our economy is rotting away, that the Sweden of welfare is falling apart; that the family is being disbanded without being replaced by any other social form, with demoralized children, alcoholism, and drug addiction as consequences; that all civic spirit is disintegrating and being replaced by gray criminality; that our liberties and rights are growing hollow; that the state church has suffered moral bankruptcy and has no help to offer the individual; in short, that Sweden is in a material and moral crisis without parallel.

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All this he, the novelist, asserts. But he writes it in a newspaper article. His literary prose is set in the period of our grandfathers' generation: "I'm no better than the rest, I can only plead a dreamlike, paralyzing sense of being stuck in a mythology and a way of writing dictated by forces outside myself."

At the same time, we are seeing from the other side of the mountains Norwegian novels thick as bricks, full of vitality and enthusiasm and indignation, novels that really claim to do just what Sven Delblanc wants: to write the truth about a nation.

What, then, is it that makes us smile at Kjartan Fløgstad's boyish, powerful epics about a people taking the step from agriculture to industry? Do we think we have the answer because we took the step one generation earlier? That would naturally be a totally unjustified conclusion.

Naturally, our countries are siblings—we understand one another's languages, we feel at home in the landscape in every respect, we have a self-evident sense of kinship and, in large part, a common history. But there is a time lapse between us that makes similar events always acquire their significance in dissimilar contexts. The essential traumas differ; our tabus are not the same. The others have experiences of war and occupation within reach of recall—we have not. Stimuli from the Continent reach us at different speeds and by different routes. The sensitive conversation topics vary; I can guess what those of the others' are, but prefer to deal with our own.

It's the way it always is between brothers and sisters: nearsighted comparison usually results in a keener eye for disparities than does a sense of similarity—which seems so striking to the outsider.

Imagine playing a party game, saying quickly the first thing certain words bring to mind.

"The Danes?"

"Tenderness. Humor. Melancholy. The most civilized people among us."

"The Finns?"

"Warmth. A kind of—I don't know what to call it—lack of self-preservation instinct, directness."

"The Norwegians?"

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"Youth. Everything that's part of it: vitality, the capacity for indignation and enthusiasm and—yes, the lack of perspective."

"What about the Swedes?"

"I don't know that one."

"There you see." At close range the picture falls apart: it was just a playful way of wording it; it doesn't explain anything.

So let's leave the comparisons and get back to Sweden—trusting that what holds for one of us *mutatis mutandis* also says something about the others.

There was a story that went like this. A man was going to show an American tourist—a woman—around Stockholm. It was during the sixties, and the economy was simmering away. Up at the top of Hamngatsbacken, where the power shovels had already chewed up a section of town consisting of little streets to make way for what is now Hötorgscity, she looked down into the pit of the building site and asked sympathetically, "Was Stockholm badly bombed during the war?"

A rather silly story, of course. Like most "funny stories," it contains a certain amount of veiled satisfaction ("What did I tell you?") and no small amount of aggressiveness—partly against the big country in the west that doesn't care enough about us to note differences between our history and that of our neighbors; partly against triumphant, arrogant, large-scale city- and social-planning; and—last but not least—against History, against Progress, which proceeded so quickly these records years and, like the American tourist, didn't care about such trifles as local traditions but swept across the country like a steamroller.

But concealed, naturally, and disguised in harmless jokes, who can actually object to the world advancing and everybody having things better? It's irrational to argue for special interests, particularly if they have to do with such imponderables as our being used to a certain street scene, being content with a certain (somewhat shabby) café, and assuming it would always be possible to buy buttons in a notions shop on Klara Norra Kyrkogata.

As long as everything advanced, the losses were viewed as little things it would be petty to bother about. A button shop (but who has time to sew on buttons nowadays?), a café you were happy in (but just think how dark and unhygienic it was), a familiar street

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scene that soon faded away in the presence of the architects' grand-scale visions of high-rise facades that rose like chalk cliffs out of the river of traffic, while the pedestrians moved safely in an auto-free underground rimmed by friendly shops.

Well, of course we know how things turned out. Or do we really know? Who is going to talk about it?

Probably no Swedish literature in modern times has achieved such large editions abroad as the ten-volume detective series entitled "Novel About a Crime," by the wife-husband writing team Maj Sjöwall and Per Wahlöö. I give a compassionate thought occasionally to all the excellent agencies that work so hard at distributing good Swedish literature abroad, who publish luscious brochures with catalogues in four languages, in which socially aware, moderately critical, decent, and prudent literature is praised. Are they aware of the kind of image of Sweden that is really being circulated? Do they ever suspect how the brochures' modest messages are being outvoted by these detective novels, stories in which the Swedes are described not as the cool administrators of the modern, conflict-free society, but as a population of farmers brutally urbanized by force, confused immigrants in the industrial society, divided and shunted about, and culture-shocked into alcoholism and drug addiction just like any other newly exploited natives?—stories in which the great transformation of the Sweden of Poverty into the Welfare Society is called—a crime?

What a blatant injustice.

And how unjust that the unjust depiction should be so much more illuminating than the just one.

The seamy side, what got left behind, the forgotten—this is the stuff of literature. Literature can never be loyal. (When authors tried to be, they directed their criticism at the past.)

A visitor to today's Stockholm, who is greeted by the high-rise buildings at Sergels Torg, where the cloud shadows slip across glass facades that gleam vacantly—how should he be able to tell that Sweden is actually a land of farmers? A little country, where the power of language was always synonymous with Power, pure and simple. With the exception of a few small isolated areas, we have hardly had any city culture in the European sense, deep or self-assured enough

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to tolerate the deviant as well: civilization stopped in Copenhagen. Swedish society is a village culture, for better or worse. Better: the judicious will to reach accord among those who know they must live together even in the future. Worse: the village spirit, the will to check up on everything, the envy—don't stick out in the crowd!

A small country, in which the talented tear each other apart like piglets in a much-too-crowded sty. Ideas hardly have time to be elicited before they get names, faces. The enemy never has time to become a principle; he becomes the next deviant to the left, to the right. Intellectual debate turns into a tavern brawl. One by one the wounded withdraw to cultivate their genius in bitter solitude in the wild.

Sweden's literature is that of its eccentrics. There never has been any *representative* Swedish literature. Some isolated themselves; others emigrated: Strindberg, Ola Hansson, Vilhelm Ekelund, Hjalmar Bergman, a whole tradition, still ongoing. Most of them have an airhole for their spiritual sustenance—an alien, alternative foothold. They may be Catholics among a people of de-Christianized Protestants (such as Birgitta Trotzig or Torgny Lindgren); childhood or second-generation immigrants (like Peeter Puide, Sigrid Combüchen, Ernst Brunner); great travelers (like Jan Myrdal or Willy Kyrklund). Their knowledge is not of the center of things but of the periphery, seedy boondocks—Delblanc's Södermanland or Lars Gustafsson's Västmanland—but their perspective is that of the experienced traveler, in space or time. What the best have in common, however, is not identification with the alien but vice versa; the alien inspection of the familiar.

This sort of thing is costly. (Not least economically: a tax system constructed for wage earners *or* employers efficiently sees to it that the existence of the deviants—and authors are by definition deviant—becomes impossible.) It costs peace of mind and a sense of being at home, and economic security—but above all, the sense of at-homeness.

This said as reservation: it is conceivable that the authors' unique position in the welfare society—increasing marginalization, a kind of, at best, institutionalized outsidership—has tuned their ears especially well to certain phenomena, certain changes, the increasing sense of *estrangement* in this country that has changed at record

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speed. It should be said. It doesn't make them any less competent as witnesses.

It isn't possible to live outside the society, at most it's possible to be tossed about in it, ripped out with hanging threads. The society is the bunker in which people and goods are preserved, the culverts with fluorescent lights and advent candelabra, the subway period August dash June, the long hangars of concrete, the floating towers of Babel with glittering lights, the pharmacies and the health insurance offices where there aren't any dogs, and exercise fields where there are grenade fragments and dogs, the parks, the demolition lots, rejuvenation areas, the destruction plants, the detoxification centers. —Kerstin Ekman, *A City of Light*

Our Native Country, for example. Sweden, that's suddenly become so damned strange. Have you noticed it? Overgrown fields where the spruces stand in their trim rows, railway stations where the trains no longer stop, gravel roads where old lumberjacks plow their nose into the gravel when they fall asleep at their mopeds, the TV cameras sweeping across the town squares spying for drunk Finns and kids on drugs. Sträng on the television screen explaining to us how much he's done for us, while the slums grow and the upper-class emigrates. Sweden—it's the little prince, who these days has learned to talk like a real company president or a second lieutenant in the reserves, his voice coarse and male. Sweden—it's a fight in a schoolyard in November, my friend. —Lars Gustafsson, *The Wool*

How did it happen, how did it come about that a transformation which developed out of a sense of solidarity and consideration, out of a community—exactly—could lead to this strange, harshly efficient, icily indifferent land? A country in which helplessness grows with care, estrangement with checking-up-on, and fury with gentle euphemisms?

Unjust? Naturally. The business of literature is not to shout hurrah but to air ulterior motives, to give some words back their meaning and rip the mask off of others. It's an underground war, enduring and unending, an incessant struggle against the abbreviations and abstractions, the chilly, impersonal, manipulative words.

Words like *föryngringsyta* (rejuvenation area). Compounds such as *individdjur* (animal individual), *återbruksdjur* (recyclable animal), *förbrukningsdjur* (consumption animal—P.C. Jersild). Formulations such as a "legally stipulated right to security against pro-

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longed aging and its tribulations" (C.H. Wijkmark). Words like *åtgärda* (to take measures).

It isn't justice they're out for; they want to rip the friendly mask off Power's face.

Literature helps us to see, not to understand.

Torgny Lindgren once wrote on the back cover of his book *Skol bagateller medan jag försökte skriva till mina överordnade* (School Trivia While I Tried to Write to My Superiors): "For twelve years I've been a teacher without ever comprehending what I was really doing. It is possible that from some other perspective, at a great distance, school may appear comprehensible. But those who are confined to it probably feel mostly just confused."

The book dealt, I recall, with a number of "cases," with problem children for the most part, and with the authorities' courageous but clumsy attempts to come to terms with their problems. In another language their helplessness would probably have been called "errors of level"—the steps were taken, so to speak, in a world different from the one in which the conflicts were being played out—but this second language would not have permitted a *description*.

The level at which the powerlessness of a strayed problem child, an abandoned part of the country, or an individual person can be understood in terms of "deficient motivation," "fractured infrastructure" or "alienation" is not the level of literature. The nature of literature is to put up resistance to this kind of "understanding."

After telling these stories, Lindgren departed from the depiction of the immediately contemporary and withdrew in his book to an antiquatedly provincial setting that was harshly stylized in its language. Straightaway, the text became incredibly strong, with an ability to explain going far beyond the immediate scope of the subject—but this is not going to turn into a literary stock report. What I'm trying to discuss is just one thing: how today's society is reflected in our modern literature; and if it isn't, why not?

"I sense anxiously how the years pass and my energies falter, and still I'm stuck here in the literary conventions of my age. Of my own time I could speak in parables and allegories and trifles, but the great, narrative prose about my age was beyond me," wrote Sven Delblanc in his New Year's message.

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Perhaps his dream is an impossible dream?

For novels are certainly being written. They're being written as never before. *Bildungsromane,* relationship novels, collective novels, series of historical novels, and psychological novels. But great narrative prose about our own time? No. The focus sharpens with the delimitation, and the clarity with the distance: the good books have either been penetrating portrayals of *one* person's world or bulky historical novels in which the roots of today's society have patiently been exposed.

And attempts have certainly been made to "explain." But the (mainly female) authors who wanted to chart "mechanisms of oppression" during adolescence or in a "couple relationship" too often suffer from a characteristic vagueness and predictability. And the Marxist-inspired collective novel produced some creditable but hard-to-assess social chronicles before it died. (In Norway it lived so long it had time to enter into a new, untested, and surprising union with baroque, Latin-American-inspired prose: technically, even though not ideologically, I believe the example of Kjartan Fløgstad is considered a possibility by many young authors in Sweden as well. Hence, as a result of the cultural time difference between our various countries, sometimes alternatives previously neglected are brought back to us as new suggestions, in a new situation and in new combinations.)

Most illuminating perhaps is the historical novel, which stops at the threshold of the contemporary. Or such books as Gustafsson's undisciplined novel series from the sixties, *Sprickorna i muren* (The Cracks in the Wall), strong in its depiction of equal portions of fantasy and fact, dream and reality.

Unable to comprehend their own age, the authors have depicted their estrangement in it.

But *this* they have done.

An inside-out description of the contemporary, in other words, whether the choice has been to stand in solidarity with the casualties of development, people as well as parts of the country, or to portray the discomfort of the inner-city's lit-up cement underground; to identify with the ejected in their irresolution or to rage against the chill, the heartlessness and hypocrisy of the new society . . .

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Hypocrisy: there we have, I believe, the key word.

It isn't the Power that oppresses and troubles me. It's this thing that doesn't exist where the Power exists. —Lars Gustafsson

Of course, we see not only what we see. We see against a background of memories and expectations, and nobody who does not know what does *not* exist in it can understand the pictures he is faced with. Perhaps it isn't so paradoxical as it may seem that the very welfare society that was to be the prototype of the earthly paradise came to be reflected so darkly in the literature. The dreams and hopes were, of course, the same.

That is was so, that the dark reverse side also entered into the picture, that the attack also gave expression to a community of values, did not become visible till the whole thing was over.

The degrees of freedom have diminished. The hectic rush for utopia has been replaced by daily fumbling. The shining model of the future has become one nation among others, its politics no longer inspired design work but a nearsighted repair job for which there is never enough time.

"You remember how the world was. Now it's the same, just a little grayer. A bit more mediocre than the way you remembered it" (Lars Gustafsson).

Perhaps it's not mainly reality that's changed? Perhaps it's only the contrast-sharpening light, the dream that's gone out.

The literature of the eighties is, paradoxically enough, more cheerful but less taut. A kind of fat, talky, picaresque novel is turning up, just as opaque as the society its heroes move in and take for granted as nature, unyielding and estranged, a backdrop. All is allowed and nothing seems especially serious.

But of this literature it is too early to speak.

Translated by Verne Moberg

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Lars Lönnroth

The Intellectual Civil Servant: The Role of the Writer and the Scholar in Nordic Culture

"WE ARE NOT THE BEARERS of consciousness. We are the whores of reason." With this severe indictment, the Swedish writer Jan Myrdal concluded his autobiographical *Confessions of a Disloyal European,* which became an international success among student revolutionaries in the late sixties. From a radical standpoint, Myrdal attacked the liberal and social-democratic intellectuals considered "enlightened" and "progressive" in most of Western Europe, particularly in the Nordic countries, where he grew up the unruly son of Gunnar and Alva Myrdal, both world famous as writers, scholars, and ambassadors of the "welfare system." According to Myrdal, such intellectuals are hypocrites living in a sort of antiseptic vacuum, far removed from the people and the real problems of this world. They systematically betray the noble causes for which they supposedly fight:

> We have betrayed with awareness, insight and consciousness, we have carefully analyzed all the wars before they were declared. But we did not stop them. . . . We describe how the poor are plundered by the rich. We live among the rich. Live on the plunder and pander ideas to the rich.[1]

In a more recent autobiographical work, *Childhood,*[2] Myrdal—older, but no less angry—has described the home of his parents (now both Nobel laureates) as a functionalist nightmare, a technocratic Brave New World, where genuine love and understanding could not exist. He claims to have felt more at home on the old-fashioned farm

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of his grandparents, who believed in conservative values like Lutheran Christianity, the Swedish monarchy, and the cultural heritage of the Vikings—values that his parents, in their social-democratic eagerness to build a rational and well-functioning welfare state, were seeking to destroy. The radical son thus sides with his conservative elders against the intellectual functionalism of his famous parents.

The Myrdal family, to be sure, is an unusual one, but it may nevertheless be regarded as a microcosm of the Swedish intellectual world. It is a world where outstanding writers and scholars such as the Myrdals are economically supported by the state and may wield considerable power as members of a social-democratic establishment; a world where conservatives and radicals may sometimes feel they are being treated with a repressive tolerance, which breeds frustration and anger; a world, finally, where the traditional cultural heritage of Norse myth and saga is being rapidly replaced by a new, functionalistic culture, which is experienced by some as cold and technocratic. Intellectuals who have adjusted to the system usually feel they are privileged, compared to writers and scholars in most other Western countries. But there are also those who feel, like Myrdal, that humanist values are being discreetly eradicated in the name of rationalism and Scandinavian common sense.

In the summer of 1981, Myrdal and three other prominent Swedish authors, all known as "radicals" in the sixties (Sven Delblanc, Sven Fagerberg, Lars Gustafsson), published a series of diatribes against the socialist intellectuals who dominated the intellectual scene of Sweden throughout the seventies. They were published in the conservative Stockholm daily *Svenska Dagbladet,* and their content was surprisingly similar to editorials that had appeared previously in the paper. The "Mass Media Left" was accused of having established a dull and repressive intellectual climate, in which "correct" political opinion was rated more highly than original talent and new ideas. Although presenting themselves as "cultural workers" in valiant struggle against commercialism, the writers and scholars of the "Mass Media Left" were here brutally characterized as watchdogs for a new political elite of socialist technocrats, insensitive to art and traditional humanist values.

The reaction in the conservative camp was predictably jubilant. Within the liberal and social-democratic press, however, the reaction was rather confused and ambivalent. Some members of the

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"Mass Media Left" dismissed the "Gang of Four" as renegades. Others admitted that their criticism was to some extent justified, although grossly exaggerated. A well-known Marxist professor at the University of Gothenburg, Sven-Eric Liedman, made the most ambitious attempt to refute their arguments from a socialist point of view. In a book entitled *Masters of Freedom, Lackeys of Freedom,*[3] Liedman admitted that the intellectual Left had to some extent become institutionalized and "established," a fact that could explain the disgusted reactions of passionate individualists such as Myrdal. According to Liedman, however, this development was necessary, since important intellectual work cannot be accomplished by solitary "peacocks," however brilliant they may be. In order to resist traditional academic conservatism and the forces of commercialism, socialist intellectuals should try to use the existing state-supported institutions. They should certainly not become technocrats; on the contrary, they should exploit the system to attain the knowledge necessary to function as true humanists. By siding with such undisciplined individualists as Myrdal, intellectuals would, in Liedman's view, give aid and comfort to neo-conservative interests.

This entire conflict is perhaps more typical of Sweden than of Scandinavia as a whole. Its themes, however, are heard quite often wherever Scandinavian writers and scholars meet, however persuasively the cultural attachés[4] of the Nordic countries try to explain that state support of culture is perfectly compatible with freedom of expression. For even though the intellectual in Scandinavia is neither a lackey nor a slave but an independent "cultural worker" pursuing the noblest of goals, he may sometimes appear to a foreign observer to be more like a civil servant—or even like Eliot's J. Alfred Prufrock:

> No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be;
> Am an attendant lord, one that will do
> To swell a progress, start a scene or two,
> Advise the prince; no doubt, an easy tool,
> Deferential, glad to be of use,
> Politic, cautious, and meticulous;
> Full of high sentence, but a bit obtuse;
> At times, indeed, almost ridiculous—
> Almost, at times, the Fool.

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THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL BUREAUCRACY

It is often mistakenly assumed that Social Democrats introduced the idea of government-sponsored literature in Scandinavia. Actually, the tradition can be traced back to the Viking period, when the kings of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden gave handsome rewards to their court poets, the *skalds,* for celebrating their exploits in poetic form. The present system of state-supported literary production, however, has its roots in the royal chancelleries of sixteenth century Denmark and Sweden (at that time, the only independent governments of Scandinavia, since Norway and Iceland were ruled by the Danes, and Finland, by the Swedes). Not only did the kings support poets, historians, and theologians directly engaged in government propaganda, but they also designed the universities and other institutions of higher learning to produce articulate men of letters who could serve as spokesmen for the state in high official positions.[5] Intellectuals in Scandinavia were thus, even at an early stage in history, entrusted with political responsibility and hence with a social status that was higher than in other parts of Europe (with the possible exception of France and Germany).

Yet the possibility for intellectuals to sell their products on the open market has always been extremely poor. Literary markets in Scandinavia are necessarily limited by both language barriers and the small size of the reading public in each country. (Attempts to create a common book market for all the countries have not succeeded because of a general unwillingness of the inhabitants of one country to read the languages of its neighbors, even though they are sufficiently close to permit mutual understanding.) Commercial book production did not develop to any extent until late in the nineteenth century, and it could only support a small group of writers, who were either international celebrities (like Ibsen or Strindberg) or popular even among the uneducated classes in their home countries. This means that the great majority of intellectuals in the Scandinavian countries have always been dependent upon the government for their living.[6]

The most influential and representative man of letters in Scandinavia has thus always been an *ämbetsman,* that is, a "civil servant," a term that in Swedish, Danish, or Norwegian may as easily refer to a clergyman, a schoolmaster, or a professor as to government of-

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ficials in the usual sense, since the church and the educational system have formed part of the civil service system since the time of the Lutheran Reformation. And since the Scandinavian governments on the whole have tended to be enlightened and nonrepressive, their state-supported writers and scholars have tended to be loyal spokesmen of the official ideology. The great exceptions to this rule are, again, writers like Ibsen and Strindberg or, in modern times, Jan Myrdal and Ingmar Bergman—rebels against the tradition, who have become greatly influential abroad yet unsuccessful in affecting the intellectual climate of their own countries.

Although the history of literature and scholarship in Scandinavia has always followed the history of government, the present intellectual bureaucracy is largely a product of the welfare state as it developed in the twentieth century. It is important to note that there is a great deal of difference between this new type of bureaucracy and traditional institutions like the Swedish Academy, the Scandinavian state churches, or the universities. While the traditional institutions are rather conservative and based on a strictly hierarchical structure, where formal rank and titles matter considerably, the new intellectual bureaucracy is, at least in theory, based on democratic interest organizations and grass-roots movements, where trust from the members is considered to be more important than rank. Instead of supporting writers by making them ambassadors or professors or members of a royal academy—as Scandinavian kings would have done in the eighteenth century—modern governments channel their support through the Writers' Union, the educational branch of the labor movement, or the public libraries (for example, by paying royalties to authors each time their books are lent). In practice, however, the new intellectual bureaucracy tends to be dominated by social democracy, just as the old institutions were, and still are, dominated by conservatism.

The traditional institutions ruled practically unchallenged until the period between 1870 and 1890, when the "modern Scandinavian breakthrough" occurred. This was the time of industrialization, the time when the social-democratic labor movement first made its appearance, and radical writers like Ibsen, Strindberg, and Georg Brandes built up their reputations by attacking established norms and traditions.[7] Most of the famous authors and artists of this gen-

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eration were Liberals rather than Socialists, but they often cooperated with the socialist leaders and contributed to the formation of the cultural policy and ideology that would, in the long run, be implemented by the Social Democrats. It took about half a century, however, before the socialist movement had developed its own cultural institutions to the point where they could be presented as serious alternatives to the older ones.

This happened first in Denmark and Sweden. During the twenties and thirties, Socialists in these countries not only took over the political government, but also managed to recruit many intellectuals into the party organization. Some of them became editors of socialist magazines and newspapers, writers of "proletarian literature," or teachers at socialist "folk high schools," a type of school originally introduced by the peasant movement but one that was eminently well suited to the needs of the labor movement as well. Others organized the various activities of the "peoples' houses" *(folkets hus)*, a sort of cultural center built by the labor movement in all the larger towns, usually including facilities for art exhibits, concerts, theatrical performances, and various types of adult education for the working class. Through the rise of such new institutions, which are today firmly established all over Scandinavia, writers and scholars were offered a new type of career, one quite different from the traditional academic career of civil servants, but different also from that of the "free intellectual."[8] This is the true origin of the Scandinavian "cultural worker," who sees himself as a spokesman of the proletariat and not of the educated elite. His heroic age was in the thirties, when the "proletarian novel" was still a new and exciting genre and the sociology of Gunnar Myrdal had not yet lost its revolutionary vitality.

The older type of cultural establishment prevailed, however, until well after the Second World War. Not until then were the Social Democrats powerful enough to begin restructuring the educational system and replacing the old forms of government-sponsored cultural activities with entirely new forms, which were in fact only superficially influenced by the "proletarian culture" of the twenties and thirties. In theory, the universities and other traditional state-supported institutions of arts and sciences would now take over the function of folk high schools and *folkets hus* as educators and cul-

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tural centers for the masses. The democratic humanism of the "modern Scandinavian breakthrough" would thus at last prevail over the feudal elitism of the conservative establishment. In fact, however, socialist planners invested much more money in technology and business administration than in any of the arts, "proletarian" or not. The needs of the labor market and the demands of big business gradually took precedence over the old cultural idealism of socialist intellectuals that had been fostered in the twenties and thirties. Within the party organization, still more within the ministries of culture and education, such intellectuals have been replaced by a new breed of technocrats, often socialist in theory but more likely to be interested in computer sciences than in proletarian novels or the cultural heritage of Ibsen and Strindberg. Although the state budget for education and culture has expanded enormously in all the Scandinavian countries since the early fifties, the humanists have thus tended to receive a thinner slice of the cake than they used to in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The student revolution of the late sixties brought a revival of socialist ideology to all the Nordic countries, particularly to some of the most recently established universities, state-supported theaters, and cultural divisions of the public media. As a result of this revival, the old humanist ideas about "proletarian culture" were temporarily taken up again, and the technocratic goals of educational planning deemphasized for a few years within some Socialist party circles, particularly in Denmark and Sweden. But there is now very little left of this fervent socialist humanism outside the small Communist parties on the extreme left. The old student revolutionaries have tended to become pragmatic and increasingly technocratic state functionaries, although some of them may occasionally conceal their pragmatism in the revolutionary rhetoric still believed to be the proper trademark of "cultural workers."

The "Mass Media Left" criticized by Myrdal is recruited from the ranks of such "cultural workers." In fact, however, the term "Mass Media Left" may be just as misleading as the term "cultural workers." Many of them belong neither to the Left nor to the mass media. The ordinary rank and file work as teachers in the public school system, functionaries of public broadcasting, or employees of government agencies set up to support the arts. Some of them are quite

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conservative, although it is true that some of the younger functionaries, who grew up in the sixties, use a political rhetoric that is vaguely "progressive," anticapitalist, and sprinkled with Marxist terms. Most of them, nevertheless, live solid middle-class lives and are not particularly daring in either their taste or their politics.

The leaders chosen by the governments to head the various cultural programs tend, on the other hand, to be more loyal than the rank and file to a particular party program. Some years ago they were often prominent intellectuals who had made their career through the folk high schools, the *folkets hus* movement, or socialist student organizations. Nowadays they are often ordinary politicians who do not know very much about art or literature but who nevertheless believe that "culture" is a useful commodity—like medical care or social security, something everybody is entitled to have. Many of them regard cultural policy as a technical problem of distribution, not as a problem of values and spiritual needs. Some of them have a somewhat paternalistic attitude to art, which they classify as a "leisure activity" comparable to soccer or jogging.

Yet it would be a serious mistake to believe that intellectual life in the Nordic countries is totally dominated by the well-meaning paternalism of such bureaucrats. Their power is challenged, not only by an "old guard" of conservative academicians and by radical "peacocks" like Jan Myrdal, but also by some young idealists with notions about Art as an eternal world of Truth and Beauty. There is also, as Liedman rightly observes in his book, a commercial establishment seeking to replace government control and public support of the media with private sponsorship of a type that, so far, has been more common in America than in Scandinavia. The commercial forces may in fact be more powerful now than they used to be, since the current economic crisis has forced some Nordic countries to trim the education and culture portions of their budgets. This development may well tilt the "Mass Media Left" to the right, as Liedman seems to fear.

Still, from a foreign point of view, the intellectual bureaucracy of "cultural workers" remains the most interesting and original feature of cultural life in Scandinavia today. It cannot be ignored, but it must be considered in the social context of each country separately, since their cultural traditions are in fact dissimilar.[9]

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DENMARK: SINFUL COPENHAGEN AND THE HONEST FARMER

Traditionally, Danish intellectual culture has been exclusively centered in Copenhagen, which is not only the capital of Denmark but the only sizable marketplace in the country and the largest and most international city of Scandinavia as a whole. In the beginning of this century, its picturesque medieval city center, where narrow streets dwindle into nowhere, contained the only Danish university, the only major Danish theatre (the Royal Theatre), the only major publishing house (Gyldendal), all the literary cafés, and practically all the intellectuals. The rest of Denmark was, from an intellectual point of view, provincial farmland, where the only enlightenment would be provided by rustic folk high schools.

Provincial culture, however, found its champions in the popular peasant movement, inspired by the ideas of N.F.S. Grundtvig, the visionary romantic poet and founding father of the folk high schools as centers of adult education in the country.[10] His followers have tended to regard Copenhagen as the center of decadence, academic snobbery, and elitism. With a fervor reminiscent of American fundamentalism, they have tried to replace the sophisticated urban culture of the capital with their own rustic alternative, an emotional blend of the Bible, Old Norse mythology, populism, and nationalism.

Yet the most important intellectual feuds of the "modern breakthrough" in Denmark were fought within Copenhagen culture. Its conservative camp consisted of older academics and civil servants, while its radical camp consisted of liberal students, artists, and journalists, plus some early Social-Democratic leaders. The radicals were sophisticated materialists and civil libertarians with a mocking, cosmopolitan attitude toward nationalism and Christian morality. Their ranks included most of the leading writers and scholars of the "modern breakthrough"—for example, Georg Brandes, the famous literary critic. The conservatives, on the other hand, were sufficiently traditional in their views to cooperate, eventually and after much hesitation, with the populist Grundtvig movement in the provinces. Their cooperation led to a sort of armistice between Copenhagen culture and provincial culture, whereby the University of

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Copenhagen and the Civil Service remained conservative, while the Grundtvigians took over the folk high schools and started to build up new centers of provincial culture and higher learning in Jutland and various other places.

The tradition from Brandes, however, prevailed not only in the newspapers and literary cafés of Copenhagen, but also within the intellectual leadership of the Social-Democratic party. It is significant that two of Denmark's most influential ministers of education in this century have been socialist intellectuals in the Brandes tradition: Hartvig Frisch (1893-1950), who wrote *Cultural History of Europe,* and Julius Bomholt (1896-1969), a novelist and Marxist critic. The latter was instrumental in establishing Denmark's present system of state support for the arts, channeling impressive sums of taxpayers' money through a National Foundation of the Arts *(Statens Kunstfond)* largely dominated by Copenhagen intellectuals. When the system was introduced in 1964, a populist movement against it was immediately started in the provinces by people from the lower middle class, who felt, with some justification, that the Foundation would support primarily immoral and incomprehensible works by long-haired Copenhagen intellectuals.[11] But the movement did not succeed in stopping the new system, which has developed into one of the major corporate forces in Danish intellectual life.

New universities were established in some provincial cities, especially in later years: Aarhus (1927), Odense (1966), Roskilde (1972), and Aalborg (1974). The university system as such remained a stronghold of academic conservatism until the late sixties, when it was suddenly and quite drastically transformed by a combination of student revolution from below and Social-Democratic planning from above. As a result, humanist studies in Denmark, especially at the newest universities, are very much flavored by Marxist ideology and by various popular movements such as women's lib and the socialist labor movement. The literary curriculum has changed in a few years from the national romanticism of Grundtvig and Oehlenschläger to the works of "proletarian writers" and various types of documentarists. Professors with "bourgeois" views and traditional ideals have largely lost their influence, except within a few learned societies, museums, and the old-fashioned institutions of marginal importance. Although this change has undoubtedly been

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traumatic for most older academics, it has also led to some interesting radical experiments in higher education, involving students and teachers in various collective projects within the arts and social sciences.

Traditional culture has been almost eradicated at the new universities, but it still prevails in the Royal Theatre, where the classical repertoire of the nineteenth century (the comedies of Ludvig Holberg, the ballets of Bournonville) is still cherished by tourists and by the old upper class of Copenhagen, which still—miraculously—lingers on. The new intellectual bureaucracy, however, outnumbers the old guard within the ministries of education and culture. Compared to their colleagues in Sweden, these "new" bureaucrats seem sophisticated, well versed in the arts, and not particularly technocratic. Their world, portrayed in some of Klaus Rifbjerg's witty satirical novels, is still large enough to harbor the followers of both Holberg and Brandes. But Denmark's severe economic crisis has recently forced them to change their priorities from the arts and the humanities to technology and other areas of direct importance to the GNP. According to their many Marxist critics at the universities, they have already sold out to Big Business.

The old populism of rural Denmark may nevertheless still inspire solitary media "peacocks" like Ebbe Kløvedal Reich, a former hippie, student revolutionary, and folk high-school teacher, whose verbose but jazzy novels and TV programs have managed to combine Marx and Grundtvig, socialism and national romanticism, sexual liberation and psychedelic mysticism. What makes his somewhat unclear message popular is probably, and primarily, that it challenges the intellectual bureaucracy of Copenhagen in a way that is exciting both to provincial peasants and to the urban middle class. Like Jan Myrdal in Sweden, Reich provides the fusillades necessary to prevent the intellectual scene of his country from becoming a "clean and well-lighted place."

NORWAY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN A NATIONAL COSTUME

In Norway, the "modern breakthrough" coincided with the national struggle for political and cultural independence. From a cul-

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tural point of view, the country had been a Danish colony since the Middle Ages, when Old Norse was replaced by Danish as the official and literary language. Norway's greatest intellectual in the eighteenth century, Ludvig Holberg, wrote his works in Danish (or Latin) and made his career as a professor and administrator at the University of Copenhagen (a typical career for a Norwegian writer at that time). Politically, however, Norway had in 1814 become united with Sweden. The intellectuals of the Norwegian "breakthrough" of the nineteenth century, therefore, had to fight a two-front war against both Copenhagen and Stockholm. Yet they had to struggle even more against the conservative upper classes of their own country, who were Danish in their literary taste and Swedish in their politics.

The political radicalism of Norwegian students, peasants, and workers was therefore combined with nationalism and a cultural heritage from the Old Norse period, when Norway had been an independent state. In their contempt for the academic culture of Copenhagen, they could easily find allies in the Grundtvig movement and the provincial Danish folk high schools.[12] Their greatest intellectual leader, Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, was a Norwegian Grundtvig and a Norwegian Brandes combined, blending radical or even socialist ideas with a romantic rhetoric invoking the memories of Edda and Saga. To a lesser extent, the same thing is true of Ibsen, the other great leader of the "modern breakthrough." Radicalism in Norway thus became radicalism in a national costume.

This cultural pattern has also been inherited by the Social Democrats of our own century. It is typical of Norway, for example, that one of its most remarkable Socialist leaders in modern times, Halvdan Koht (1873-1965), was also a scholar of Viking history. It is also characteristic that the cultural politics of several governments has favored *regional* culture rather than the culture of the Oslo area. Even within the academic and literary world, Norwegians are encouraged to use their dialects and regional ethnic symbols—at any rate, more frequently than is the case in either Denmark or Sweden. One reason for this of course is that Oslo is not large enough to dominate Norway in the same way that Copenhagen can dominate Denmark. But the most important reason is that modern Norway was born out of regional culture, *not* the upper-class culture of the capital.

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The language problem has been the single most important and upsetting problem of Norway within the cultural area. The problem consists in choosing between two official languages, *bokmål* and *nynorsk:* the first, a Norwegian adaptation of Danish upper-class language introduced in the Oslo area during colonial times; the second, an artificially constructed modern language, based on medieval Old Norse and the rustic dialects of Western Norway, where linguistic habits were not as contaminated by the Danish-speaking upper classes. Academic intellectuals have tended to prefer *bokmål,* while ardent provincial nationalists associated with the peasant movement have often preferred *nynorsk*. Nowadays, both languages are taught in school, and they are gradually being reformed to become more similar to each other. The problem is thus not as politically infected today as it used to be, but it still absorbs a considerable amount of intellectual energy, since every civil servant, journalist, or teacher is forced to master both, regardless of what his (or her) mother tongue happens to be.[13]

The political encouragement of regional ethnic culture has meant, among other things, that the provincial universities of Bergen, Trondheim, and Tromsø have been allowed to expand considerably. There are now also regional colleges *(distriktshøgskoler)* in Agder and Stavanger, as well as regional museums, theaters, and government-sponsored "cultural centers" devoted to ethnic culture. The fiction produced by state-supported Norwegian novelists also tends to focus on the regional problems in fishing villages and small towns, while the schools and the public libraries still emphasize the literary heritage from Bjørnson, the Norse sagas, and the peasant folklore of yesterday.

This means, on the one hand, that Norway has been more successful than Denmark or Sweden in keeping the international, commercialized urban culture out of the country; many Norwegians still prefer a book about life in the fjords to a book about life in Manhattan. On the other, regionalism may have its intellectual limitations. Although Norway has many outstanding novelists and a strong academic tradition in such areas as rural sociology, anthropology, folklore, dialectology, Viking history, and even philosophy, its literary criticism would probably seem slightly provincial to a Dane from the smart set of Copenhagen, versed in the latest "post-structuralist" theories of Derrida and Roland Barthes. More serious

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than such an apparent lack of sophistication, however, is the influence of religious pressure groups on education and on the cultural programming of the public media. Through the concerted efforts of such pressure groups, which derive their strength from particular rural areas along the southern and western coasts, the Norwegian public is prevented from enjoying many excellent films and TV programs enjoyed by their Scandinavian neighbors in Denmark and Sweden.

Norwegian intellectuals have in fact been rather slow in discovering that their country is no longer the rustic fjordland described by Bjørnson and the saga writers, but an industrialized European welfare state, with an economy based on North Sea oil and advanced technology. In the sixties and seventies, a new generation of radical proletarian writers (Dag Solstad and others) started to present the recent social changes of Norway in an entirely new way, one that may eventually change the image of socialist culture in Norway. It is still, however, the country where a social-democratic "cultural worker" may occasionally attend a public meeting dressed in national costume.

ICELAND: SAGAS INVADED BY INTERNATIONALISM

The literature of Iceland is even more nationalistic than that of Norway, since the Icelanders achieved their political independence from Denmark at an even later date—not until the Second World War. Even after the dissolution of Danish rule, nationalistic feelings were kept alive by the presence of American troops at the NATO base at Keflavik, right outside Reykjavik, the capital.[14] But the most important reason for nationalism is the fact that Iceland, in spite of its isolation, poverty, and small population (currently 240,000), is the only Northern country that has preserved a truly magnificent cultural heritage from the Old Norse period. This heritage consists primarily of the ancient Edda songs, the poetry of the skalds, and the Old Icelandic sagas, written on parchment in the thirteenth century but preserving oral traditions from the Age of the Vikings. Unlike most other national literary classics, these were kept alive by faithful copying in isolated farmhouses during a period of eight hundred years, most of which were spent under Danish rule. Even more important is the rich oral tradition, developed in more recent centu-

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ries, based on the myths, legends, and archaic poetic language of venerated Viking ancestors. Owing to this heritage, Icelanders until recently were able to preserve their cultural identity practically unchanged. And unlike the Norwegians, for example, they never accepted Danish as their official language but insisted on using their traditional saga idiom for all kinds of writing, a fact perplexing to most Scandinavian visitors to Iceland, who discover that even a newspaper advertisement in Reykjavik sounds like an archaic quotation from the Edda. Even more perplexing is the fact that ordinary Icelanders read so much classical literature and know a lot of ancient poetry by heart, particularly in the rural districts. Book sales would seem to indicate that they are more literate than their Scandinavian neighbors, perhaps more literate than any other people in the world—although *not* as a result of government policy but rather of cultural traditions from the Middle Ages.

Intellectual discussion in Iceland until recently was thus almost exclusively centered around the Old Norse heritage. Immediately after independence, for example, the energies of writers and scholars in Reykjavik were absorbed for years by efforts to get the medieval saga manuscripts back from Copenhagen, where they had been kept for the last two hundred years of Danish rule. When these efforts were finally successful, the government used a considerable amount of its budget for culture and education to build up a large and expensive research institute devoted to their study. The University of Iceland, which is a recent and rather small establishment, employs more medievalists studying the sagas than scholars within all the foreign language departments added together. And there has, at least until recently, been a strong tendency among Icelanders to regard their own literary tradition as something completely isolated from the rest of world literature. Modernist poets in Iceland have, for example, been reproached publicly for not adhering to the traditional rules of Norse poetry. And practically all well-known Icelandic intellectuals have, at some time or other, been accused of being overly influenced by foreign intellectual fads, not Icelandic enough in their language, insufficiently versed in the sagas and in local peasant customs, and so on.

Although such accusations may appear a bit parochial to outsiders, Icelandic culture is indeed a national treasure worthy of defense. And defense may in fact be necessary, since half of the small

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population now lives in the Reykjavik area, which is rapidly being transformed into something vaguely reminiscent of an American city like Wichita, Kansas, or Duluth, Minnesota. In recent years, Westerns have begun to replace the native sagas in popular imagination, English loan words have been introduced in the colloquial language of the capital, and the Reykjavik news media and popular magazines have become increasingly Americanized, in content if not yet in language. Needless to say, this development is experienced as a serious health problem by many intellectuals, and the NATO base at Keflavik is often seen as the source of contamination. This is the thrust of Halldór Laxness's famous novel *The Atom Station* (1948),[15] in which the traditional folk culture and proud Viking spirit of a simple country girl is contrasted to the decadence and mindless commercialism of the capital. In several later works by Icelandic authors, many of whom, like Laxness, tend to be Socialists, the same theme appears, often in cliché form, equating Keflavik with Sodom and viewing the American military presence as a humiliating occupation by foreign troops.

During the last years, however, this theme has lost some of its old appeal. To many observers, the NATO base at Keflavik does not exert any real cultural influence except as a symbol of Iceland's dependence on America. The Americanization that indeed exists in the Reykjavik area is first and foremost a result of the country's sudden integration, after a long period of cultural isolation, into the Western economic system and communication network. American popular culture would reach the Icelanders through films and television even if NATO soldiers were not there. And even the most nationalistic intellectuals at the University of Iceland have in fact become more international in their outlook and life-style during recent years, partly as a result of extensive travel and study abroad. The location of Reykjavik has also recently made their capital an ideal place for conferences, particularly for Scandinavian politicians and intellectuals who want to mix business with a bit of Nordic nostalgia. As a result of this development, the typical meeting place of Icelandic writers and scholars nowadays looks less like a Viking farmhouse than a stylish café in Omaha or Minneapolis.

Because of rapid cultural changes in recent years, there is now a rather wide generation gap within the academic and intellectual circles of Reykjavik. The older generation typically consists of people

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who were born in the country, grew up with the sagas, and participated in the nonviolent, but still important, struggle for national independence; the younger, of people who were born in Reykjavik, grew up surrounded by a sophisticated urban culture, and spent their most formative student years in Copenhagen, Stockholm, London, New York, or Paris. Although the older generation appears rustic and unsophisticated compared to the younger, it still dominates academic life. But the younger generation is rapidly taking over the media, and they have already found a new president, Vigdís Finnbogadóttir, to represent them. Like the former president of Iceland, Vigdís moves with great ease among writers and scholars, and she certainly knows her sagas—a qualification that is apparently still necessary for election in this remarkable country. Yet it is symptomatic that she, unlike her predecessor, Kristján Eldjárn, is not a learned academic expert in Viking archeology but a sophisticated theatrical leader and TV personality, well familiar with the international media world.

There is no doubt that Saga Land is rapidly being invaded by internationalism. But will the sagas survive as living tradition, or will they become dead national symbols, preserved only in academic mausoleums?

SWEDEN: THE OBLITERATION OF HISTORY

The "modern breakthrough" in the intellectual history of Sweden coincided with the country's unusually rapid and successful transformation from a poor agrarian society to one of the leading industrial nations of Europe. The cultural heritage of the Swedes had until that time been well represented by men such as Odalbonden, the rustic hero of a romantic poem of the same name by Erik Gustaf Geijer, often recited in Swedish schools. Odalbonden is a poor but independent farmer from the Viking Age, struggling to wrest a living for his family out of his meager soil—that is, when he is not defending the freedom of his kinsmen from foreign enemies. Although this heroic ideal still survives in some measure among Swedish-American farmers in Minnesota, whose ancestors left agrarian Sweden to find new land, it was soon felt to be obsolete among the young Swedes whose lives were being formed by the Industrial Revolution. As a result of this development, the old cultural heritage of

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Sweden became a concern for nostalgic conservatives. "Modern" and "progressive" Swedes did not look backward to the Viking Age but forward to a new and increasingly technocratic utopia.

The obliteration of history did not happen overnight but took about a century to accomplish. The early industrial leaders—for example, Alfred Nobel, who made a fortune selling dynamite and then used his money to institute the Nobel Prize—still felt it necessary to pay their respects to the cultural heritage represented by such venerable institutions as the Swedish Academy. In the same fashion, early labor leaders such as Hjalmar Branting (the first Social-Democratic prime minister of Sweden) felt it necessary to respect the cultural heritage of Strindberg and the other great writers of the "modern breakthrough" in Swedish literature. As late as the 1940s, Social-Democratic politicians were still insisting on both *Odalbonden* and the proletarian novel as proper reading for working-class children, while more conservative politicians were still concerned with the preservation of a more traditional historical heritage within the regular school system. After that time, however, the technocrats very rapidly gained the upper hand within all major parties and political organizations. In the new educational system of Sweden, built up by Social-Democratic governments in the fifties, sixties, and seventies, subjects such as history have almost disappeared, and the literary classics are no longer read. At the universities, advanced study and research in the humanities is not encouraged. The development in education parallels and explains the systematic destruction of historical buildings in the once charming center of Stockholm, now transformed into large functionalistic boxes of steel and concrete.

Such boxes would seem to be the proper setting for the new intellectual bureaucracy that rules not only the universities, but the media and a considerable part of literary production as well. Compared to both Norway and Denmark, Sweden is more dominated by its bureaucrats, particularly within the area of education. At the same time, Sweden is more advanced and efficient than the other countries in developing new systems of mass education, cultural programs for the underprivileged, state support for writers' local theatrical groups, "workshops" in art and literature, exhibits focusing on social problems or new technology, and so on. A considerable part of the state budget is spent on vast research projects aimed at improving the environment, integrating immigrant children into the

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school system, controlling the drug problem in the cities, improving the situation of women in the labor market, and so on. It would be grossly unfair to deny, as some foreign critics have, that such programs have been of great value, or to insist, as the British journalist Roland Huntford did some years ago, that they have only succeeded in making Sweden a country of "New Totalitarians,"[16] insensible to humanist values. There is, after all, a vast difference between the bureaucracy in Sweden and the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union or Poland.

Yet there are clear signs of dissatisfaction among some of Sweden's most talented writers and humanist scholars. Ingmar Bergman's decision to leave Sweden, after having been accused, on dubious grounds, of tax evasion, is not just an isolated case. There are others who feel, as Bergman did, that their creative talents are better appreciated in other countries than in Sweden, and that they will not be treated with respect by Swedish authorities unless they conform to the well-meaning but insensitive paternalism of the bureaucrats. One prominent novelist, Lars Ardelius, almost had his books removed from a public library for having said in public, quite truthfully, that librarians in Sweden nowadays appear to be less interested in books than in computer-based catalogue systems and similar matters. And Sweden's greatest poet of this century, Gunnar Ekelöf, has envisaged a future Sweden, completely ruled by bureaucrats, in which anarchist poets like himself will be condemned to collect the garbage produced by their own unruly minds:

> The night is silent. Only the garbage helicopter
> is whirling from door to door,
> driven by an outlaw of the future, an anarchist and poet,
> condemned for ever to remove the filth of the imagination.[17]

Ekelöf's extreme individualism is not, however, typical of Swedish writers. Some of them have been actively involved in government-sponsored programs to make literature and the arts available to large segments of the population. Others have started their own programs of a similar kind and received support for them from public funds. The poet Sandro Key-Åberg, for example, has traveled around with a cleverly devised program of "poetic games" for both children and grown-ups, intended to increase their creativity. Another well-known writer, Sven Lindqvist, has organized study groups

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in historical research for workers interested in learning about their own heritage; the motto for these study groups, "Dig Where You Stand," has become a political slogan within the labor movement. The concept of "cultural democracy" has been developed by two other celebrated writers, Bengt Nerman and Göran Palm, both of whom have received considerable public support in their efforts to break down traditional elitism within the literary establishment.

Such efforts have undoubtedly been of great value both to readers and authors, but they have, unfortunately, also encouraged some bureaucrats to favor extremely mediocre amateurs at the expense of serious artists, all in the name of "cultural democracy" and "decentralization of cultural opportunities." This has led to dissatisfaction among many writers and artists whose appeal is limited to a small group of connoisseurs. Their frustration has been further increased through the abolition of fixed book prices, the development of book clubs, and various new distribution systems, all of which favor the writers of best sellers. On top of this, the recent economic recession in Sweden has resulted in some cutbacks in the government's budget for cultural affairs, and more are almost certain to come.

Under these circumstances, it is almost touching to see the gratitude of many Swedish authors for some recent statements by Bengt Göransson, the Social-Democratic minister of culture, and by Anders Clason, the Liberal director of the Swedish Institute and former head of the Government Council for the Arts and Humanities *(Statens Kulturråd),* which indicate, quite simply, that they genuinely like good literature. Very few bureaucrats in their position have managed to convince authors that they do. Few politicians seem to realize that "government support of the arts" is not just a question of money but of moral commitment to high standards and a national heritage.

Within the academic world, government policy has created a new aristocracy consisting of experts in technology, medicine, education, and certain social sciences. These experts, many of whom tend to be members of the Social-Democratic party, serve on government committees or head special research institutes set up to be of use for government planning. Compared to ordinary professors, they have considerable power, which they often use to channel government funds away from more traditional areas to new ones that the planners con-

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sider to be more important. As a result, they are not always popular with the local academic establishments of the universities. Some have undoubtedly helped to develop important new areas like city planning or Keynesian economics, but they have also tended to make the humanities and the "pure" sciences seem obsolete and unnecessary compared to the applied sciences.

Most Swedish scholars in the humanities thus have to work under conditions more strenuous than those of their colleagues in Denmark or Norway.[18] There are very few full professors, usually only one or two at each university, even in major subjects like history, comparative literature, or Scandinavian languages. The other teachers are generally untenured and have teaching schedules that do not allow for any research or creative activities. Graduate students may receive some financial aid, but their living conditions are very poor, and their chances on the job market are practically nonexistent, since academic positions are scarce and the holder of a Ph.D. in the humanities is not rated highly on the labor market. The new educational system is built on compulsory job training, cram courses, and "objective" examinations with very little opportunity for humanist thinking. The system was supposed to give better opportunities for the working class than the old elitist system did, but there are many who doubt that it has had any such effects. According to Professor Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, a renegade from the Social-Democratic party elite, Swedish schools have been transformed into "parking places" for the unemployed. The humanist's task within this "parking place" would appear to be the entertainment of hopeless dropouts.[19]

The reaction of older Swedish humanists to the reforms in education has often been to retreat into their ivory towers with as much as they could save of the traditional cultural heritage. Some have tried to preserve, in a pathetic way, the outdated academic rituals and the rigid scholarly ideals of their professors. Others, trying to conform to the new trends, have given up the cultural heritage altogether. In a recent book about Swedish humanist traditions, Sven-Eric Liedman and some other Marxist critics have presented an unflattering picture of the academic old guard. The novelist Göran Hägg, on the other hand, has written an equally devastating satire about the new and trendy academic breed that has tried to replace serious literary scholarship with standardized Marxist debunking of

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Donald Duck and other harmful exponents of capitalist culture. Although Liedman and Hägg would seem to aim their fire in opposite directions, they both expose the humiliating poverty of humanist studies within the Swedish welfare system.[20] Many Swedish intellectuals today would be prepared to agree with both of them.

The main problem, however, is not that academic teachers are too conservative or too trendy, but rather that only a small number of leading politicians care at all about the cultural heritage of the past. The ruling majority of Social Democrats may be quite willing to write out welfare checks for "cultural workers," but they are not concerned about their own roots and traditions, especially not those associated with the sins of the feudal elite of yesterday.

Writers and scholars working in these obsolete areas of yesterday may not have to sacrifice much of their Swedish living standards, and they will certainly not end up like the anarchist poet in Ekelöf's satirical poem. It is more likely that they will be treated with the same efficient benevolence with which the Swedes treat the old, the sick, and the insane in large, supermodern institutions. Cultural attachés of Sweden can therefore truthfully claim that even their most eccentric and outdated intellectuals are well fed and cared for. Most of them may even cultivate their hobbies, provided they do not bother their fellow citizens.

FINLAND: BETWEEN ETHNIC ROMANTICISM AND SCANDINAVIAN MODERNISM

The intellectual life of Finland was for a long time dependent upon Sweden in much the same way that the intellectual life of Norway was dependent upon Denmark. Swedish was the official language of the bureaucracy, the academic community, and the educated classes, during the years in which the country was part of Sweden (until 1809) and even later, when it had become a province of imperial Russia (until 1917). Before the nineteenth century, the country did not even have a cultural identity of its own: its only university was Swedish, as were its authors, its books, and its newspapers. The rise of the Finnish nationalist movement eventually led to the development of Finnish as a literary language during the latter half of the century, but it did not become the main vehicle of intellectual expression until well after independence. Even today, Swedish is

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Finland's most important second language, and a fairly large, though diminishing, segment of the academic and literary establishment is in fact dominated by the Finnish-Swedish minority—that is, by Finnish citizens whose first language is not Finnish but Swedish.[21]

Although the coexistence of Finnish and Swedish culture may nowadays be characterized as peaceful, it is by no means unproblematic, and is fraught with bitter memories of the past. Both from a linguistic and an ethnic point of view, the two cultures are extremely different, the Finns belonging originally not to the Scandinavian family but to the Finno-Ugric tribes of Eastern Europe. Traditionally—for example, in the Norse sagas—the Finns were regarded by their Scandinavian neighbors as primitive hunters of the wild forests. They were supposed to be good at skiing and heathen witchcraft but not at reading or writing. In later times, the cultural differences were compounded by class differences, since the old aristocracy was entirely Swedish and often had nothing but contempt for Finnish folk culture.

The Finnish nationalist movement was originally started by Swedish-speaking intellectuals of the romantic era, partly as a means of preserving the semi-independent status of their province within the Russian empire. The Russians granted this status as a response in part to those who wanted the country to return to Sweden. The old Swedish university of Åbo (Turku) was moved east to the new capital of Helsinki during the reign of Czar Alexander I, who made it one of the most modern universities of Northern Europe. In this new academic environment, Finnish folk tradition was studied with considerable enthusiasm, and the use of Finnish as a literary language was actively encouraged. While western Finland largely preserved its intellectual heritage from Sweden, though in a more Finnish form than previously, eastern Finland became a laboratory for literary experiments in the Finnish language.

Since both Finns and the Finnish Swedes were struggling to achieve national unity throughout their country, great efforts were made on both sides to bridge the cultural gap between them. The Swedish-speaking aristocrats learned, for example, to use the language, the folklore, and the ethnic symbols of their Finnish servants. Finnish intellectuals tried, for their part, to shed their primitive and proletarian image by learning Swedish and by identifying their own interests with those of their Scandinavian neighbors. Both sides ad-

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mired the romantic nationalist poetry (in Swedish) of Johan Ludvig Runeberg (1804-77) and the epic songs (in Finnish) of the *Kalevala,* collected by Elias Lönnrot (1802-84). Efforts were also made on both sides to play a mediating role between the rival powers of Sweden and Russia, a mediating role that is still evident today, both in literature and politics.

Despite these efforts, the cultural and social differences within the population eventually led to serious disagreements, as the radical ideas of the "modern breakthrough" also reached Finland and the Russian rulers became more oppressive. Finnish-Swedish liberals tried to become more independent of Russian culture, while Finnish radicals saw the Swedish upper classes as their main enemies and tried to do away with the Swedish cultural heritage altogether. There was also a conservative Finnish populist movement, which aimed its fire against the liberal intellectuals of Swedish Finland, who were often considered to be immoral and unpatriotic. The internal strife culminated in the civil war that followed the Russian Revolution in 1917. At that time, however, the line was drawn between Finns who were radical Socialists and those who were not; the latter camp, which included the majority of both Finns and Swedes, was ultimately victorious. Socialist intellectuals like Otto Ville Kuusinen (1881-1964) fled to the Soviet Union, and socialism lost its appeal in Finland for several decades.

The civil war explains why intellectual socialism has not been allowed to grow and develop in Finland as it did in the other Nordic countries. The national heritage from Runeberg and the *Kalevala* has in fact been preserved until today by a coalition of the old Finnish-Swedish aristocracy and various populist movements, mainly recruited from the Finnish peasantry. This heritage was kept alive during the Second World War, when Finland again had to defend its independence against the Russians. It was not until recently that radical Socialists again started to play important roles in the intellectual life of the country. Social democracy of the Swedish type is a fairly new phenomenon, even though President Koivisto is indeed a Social Democrat.

The recent developments are important, however, because the Finnish portion of the cultural establishment has been growing at an enormous rate lately, while the Swedish portion is gradually stagnating. New universities have been established in what used to be

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romantic Finnish wilderness, far away from the traditional coastal areas of the Finnish-Swedish cultural elite. The bold modernist design of Alvar Aalto and other Finnish architects has transformed provincial forest towns like Jyväskylä into new cultural centers, where the arts and sciences of the "new" Finland are displayed more spectacularly than in any other Nordic country. Literature has moved, in a couple of decades, from romantic folklore to the most radical forms of modernism.[22] Some of it is undoubtedly inspired by the famous Finnish-Swedish modernism that flourished in the aristocratic neighborhoods of Helsinki and St. Petersburg around the time of the First World War (its greatest representative was the poet Edith Södergran, who lived from 1892 to 1923), but it is distinctly Finnish and not at all aristocratic or nostalgic. The present culture of the Finnish Swedes, on the other hand, appears to be as full of nostalgia as a decayed mansion of the old American South.

The contrast between old and modern culture, and also between the two ethnic traditions, is clearly visible in the campus area of Åbo, Finland's second largest city, which contains both the old Swedish university and a new Finnish one, situated in close proximity near the center of the city. The Swedish university consists of small, genteel wooden buildings, where the cultural heritage of Sweden and Swedish Finland is taught in a delightful, old-fashioned way, one that would be regarded as hopelessly outdated in modern Sweden. The Finnish university, on the other hand, consists of towering, ultramodern structures, drawing attention to the fact that this is an international center of modern science and technology.

Within such self-assertive monuments of Finnish modernism, one may still find, however, various artistic tributes to traditional Finnish peasant folklore, the myths of the *Kalevala,* and so on. The Finns are still as enthusiastic about their folk traditions as the Norwegians or even the Icelanders. It is the peculiar mixture of tradition and innovation that makes Finland particularly interesting from an intellectual point of view. It is a country where the poetry of Runeberg may still be admired by the same people who enjoy the modernism of Aalto or cry over the great proletarian novels of the Socialist Väinö Linna (born in 1920), who is already regarded as a national epic poet of the same stature as Runeberg.

In a country of this sort, still full of heroic and bitter memories of the past, state-supported culture will not become corrupted by the

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technocrats. What will happen, however, when Finland has achieved the same level of industrial sophistication, material success, and government planning that Sweden has? Will computer sciences then replace the *Kalevala*?

THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM

Enemies of the Scandinavian "welfare system" have often argued that the very existence of a large government bureaucracy constitutes a threat to intellectual freedom, especially if the bureaucrats can decide which writers and scholars will receive government money. There is an undeniable risk that talented opponents of the official norms will be neglected in favor of mediocre supporters of the establishment. As the cultural attachés of Nordic countries like to point out, however, this risk can be partly eliminated by channeling government money through organizations set up by the intellectuals themselves: writers' guilds, academic committees, and so on. This is in fact how most of the government money is distributed to the writers and scholars of all the Scandinavian countries.

On the other hand, the guilds and academic committees may themselves become parts of the government bureaucracy unless they are constantly criticized from below, especially by students and other young intellectuals with new ideas. This was in fact done during the "modern breakthrough." It happened again in the late 1960s, when the student revolution reached the Scandinavian countries from Germany and France.[23] At that time again, the established systems were rejuvenated, and controversial new concepts were introduced by writers like Jan Myrdal, who temporarily had an ideological influence similar to that of Brandes or Strindberg during the breakthrough. But the shock waves of revolution were rapidly absorbed by the bureaucracy, and many young revolutionaries soon became bureaucrats themselves, modifying their ideas to fit a "revisionist" welfare system, where the thinking of the older Myrdals is certainly more influential than that of their wayward son.

The Swedish authors Anders Ehnmark and Per Olov Enquist have described this development in their drama, *The Man on the Sidewalk*,[24] which played with considerable success during the late seventies. With satirical wit and some bitterness, they picture their own generation of student revolutionaries as slick opportunists, only too

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willing to throw away their Marxist books, their ragged jeans, and their Che Guevara posters when the government offers them a comfortable office and a secure life as loyal civil servants. Although Ehnmark and Enquist have not joined Myrdal's campaign against the "Mass Media Left," it is obvious that their fire is aimed in the same direction. And it is an interesting fact that the play has been as popular in Denmark as in Sweden, obviously because it deals with a problem common to both countries.

Although Marxist revolutionaries no longer constitute a threat to the intellectual establishment, there are other dangers that may in the long run break down the entire system of government support and control. The most immediate one is the commercialization of culture through the expansion of the international media industry and through the spread of the American sponsor system. The deregulation of book prices in Sweden, the rise of book clubs, the introduction of TV satellites, cable systems, and video—all of these new developments have favored a few best-selling writers and intellectual TV personalities at the expense of more lusterless "cultural workers" on the government payroll.[25] Two young Swedish experts in business administration have already predicted that certain types of literature, such as poetry, will soon not be published in book form any more, since this will be too expensive for the Swedish market. As an alternative, they suggest that new poetry be fed into large computer systems available to the general public.[26]

So far, the Scandinavian governments have made only feeble attempts to halt this trend away from individual book-reading to the mass consumption of the products of the commercialized electronic media. The economic stagnation will apparently prevent all the countries from increasing their budget for cultural affairs to the level necessary to compete with the large multinational companies in the media business. This means, on the one hand, that a world-famous genius like Ingmar Bergman will not have to worry about the rulings of Swedish bureaucrats, since the big media are likely to favor him. On the other, many Scandinavian intellectuals who cannot compete in the international media market will lose their present high status and be humiliated by the lords of the entertainment industry.

Another danger to the system, perhaps equally important although not as imminent, is posed by the increasing number of young

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and unemployed intellectuals, often graduate students, who simply cannot be accommodated within the present system. Many of them will earn high academic degrees and show considerable talent within some specialized field, but their chances of getting a regular job at a university or a government agency, as many of their elders have, are practically nil. They already constitute a highly qualified proletariat harboring considerable bitterness toward older and less talented intellectuals with secure jobs. Large numbers of these unhappy young people have formed bohemian underground movements in cities like Copenhagen and Stockholm. Some of them, for example, have fought the police in their attempts to protect old houses that the authorities wish to destroy in order to build new shopping centers or government buildings. Others have participated in peace demonstrations, marches against nuclear power stations, and so on. Although their ideology is often vague and confused, their whole behavior may be interpreted as one continuous symbolic protest against the technocrats and bureaucrats in charge of the intellectual hierarchy of Scandinavia, from which they are excluded.

When looking at these young people, one cannot perceive the blessings described by the cultural attachés of Sweden. They appear to be a tribe without a future, a species threatened by extinction like the Lapps or the wolves. Yet I strongly believe that it is from their numbers that some of the free spirits of Nordic culture will come during the next generations, the spirits capable of expressing the archaic anguish and the melancholy northern lights that social planners have not yet learned to control.

This prediction does not imply that the intellectual bureaucrats of Sweden are anything but honorable men and women, doing the best they can. Like the men who murdered Caesar, they have, with the best intentions, tried to eradicate the evils of a tyrannical feudal system in order to build a new and more democratic world, where writers and scholars are the true servants of the people. It is hardly the fault of these honorable bureaucrats that the forces of good art and good scholarship are somewhat unpredictable, perhaps even demonic, akin to the ghosts and phantoms of the Old Norse world. One may occasionally even suspect that they will always be as unruly as young Jan Myrdal was in the excellent home of his famous parents.

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ENDNOTES

[1]*Confessions of a Disloyal European* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 200-01.

[2]*Barndom* (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1982).

[3]*Frihetens herrar, frihetens knektar. Ideologier på 1980-talet* (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1982). This book provides extensive bibliographical references to the whole Swedish discussion about the "Mass Media Left."

[4]A special kind of diplomat employed by the larger Scandinavian embassies abroad to spread information about Scandinavian culture, arrange cultural exchanges, and so on.

[5]See, in particular, Bo Bennich-Björkman's pioneering work of literary sociology, *Författaren i ämbetet. Studier i funktion och organisation av författarämbeten vid svenska hovet och kansliet 1550-1850* (Uppsala: Svenska bokförlaget, 1970).

[6]For basic facts about the sociology of literature in Denmark and Sweden, see Sven Møller Kristensen, *Digteren og samfundet,* 2d ed. (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1974); Hans Hertel, "Det litterære system i Danmark," in *Bogen og læseren,* edited by Robert Escarpit (Copenhagen: Hans Reitzel, 1972); and Karl Erik Rosengren and Jan Thavenius, *Litteratursociologi* (Stockholm: Natur och kultur, 1970).

[7]See, in particular, Gunnar Ahlström, *Det moderna genombrottet i Nordens litteratur,* 2d ed. (Stockholm: Rabén and Sjögren, 1973).

[8]Cf. Lennart Thorsell, "Den svenska parnassens 'demokratisering' och de folkliga bildningsvägarna," *Samlaren,* 1957; Lars Furuland, *Folkhögskolan—en bildningsväg för svenska författare* (Stockholm: Utbildningsförlaget, 1971); Kristensen, *Digteren og samfundet,* II (1974), pp. 198-220.

[9]There is, unfortunately, no good comparative study of the literatures and intellectual development in all the Scandinavian countries, but much valuable information can be found in *Ideas and Ideologies in Scandinavian Literature since the First World War,* Proceedings of the 10th Study Conference of the International Association for Scandinavian Studies, held in Reykjavik, July 22-27, 1974, edited by Sveinn Skorri Höskuldsson (University of Iceland, Institute of Literary Research: Reykjavik, 1975). On the present status of the humanities, see also *Humanioras egenart,* edited by Tore Frängsmyr (Oslo-Bergen-Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget, 1983).

[10]Cf. Erica Simon, *Réveil national et culture populaire en Scandinavie. La genese de la højskole nordique 1844-1878* (Uppsala: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960).

[11]Cf. Anne Marie Kastrup and Ivar Lærkesen, *Rindalismen. En studie i kulturmønstre, social forandring og kultursammenstød* (Copenhagen: 1979).

[12]Cf. Simon, *Réveil national et culture populaire en Scandinavie,* pp. 117-266.

[13]Cf. Einar Haugen, *Language Conflict and Language Planning: The Case of Modern Norwegian* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1966).

[14]Cf. Donald E. Nuechterlein, *Iceland: Reluctant Ally* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961).

[15]*Atómstöðin* (Reykjavik: Helgafell, 1948); *The Atom Station,* translated by Magnus Magnusson (London: Methuen and Co., 1961); cf. Peter Hallberg, *Halldór Laxness* (New York: Twaine Publishers, 1971).

[16]Roland Huntford, *The New Totalitarians* (New York: Stein & Day, 1972).

[17]"Till de folkhemske," in the collection *Non serviam* (1945).

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[18]Cf. *Humanistisk och teologisk forskning i Sverige. Nuläge och framtidsperspektiv* (Stockholm: Statens Humanistiska Forskningsråd, 1973).

[19]Cf. Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, *Skolan—parkeringsplats för onödiga?* (Stockholm: Prisma, 1983).

[20]Cf. *Humaniora på undantag? Humanistiska forskningstraditioner i Sverige,* edited by Tomas Forser (Stockholm: PAN Norstedts, 1978); Göran Hägg, *Doktor Elgcrantz eller Faust i Boteå* (Stockholm: Wahlström and Widstrand, 1983).

[21]An excellent recent analysis of Finland's two national traditions is included in Matti Klinge's book, *Runebergs två fosterland* (Borgå: Söderströms, 1983), from which I have learned considerably while writing this paper.

[22]Cf. Johan Wrede, "Om relationer mellan idéer, ideologier och litteratur i republiken Finland," *Ideas and Ideologies,* 1975, pp. 19-38.

[23]Cf. Lars Lönnroth, "The New Critics of 1968: Political Persuasion and Literary Scholarship in Scandinavia after the Student Revolution," *Scandinavian Studies* 53 (1) (1981): 30-51.

[24]Anders Ehnmark and Per Olov Enqvist, *Mannen på trottoaren: förundersökning angaende mordet på doktor Plehve* (Stockholm: 1979). Other plays by these two authors provide excellent insights into the life of intellectuals in modern Sweden.

[25]For an analysis of this development, see Hans Hertel, "Formidling som kulturpolitisk program. Fra vækstfilosofi til grænser for vækst—og fra ideologikritik til kritisk litteraturformidling," *Kritik* no. 59 (1982).

[26]Dan Ahlmark & Bengt Brodin, *Bokbranschen i framtiden—en analys av möjliga utvecklingslinjer fram till år 2000* (Projekt Marknadsföring och distribution i bokförlag, Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, 1979).

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Gösta Rehn

The Wages of Success

"THE WAGES OF SIN IS DEATH." The wages of success are less one-sided. Concurrent with the Nordic countries' long-term economic progress and their establishment of advanced welfare programs, almost all social development curves have risen sharply, both in positive terms—participation in civic affairs, physical exercise, leisure-time study—and in negative—the misuse of alcohol and drugs, thefts, and crimes of violence.

In this paper, I shall be more concerned with Sweden than the other Nordic countries with regard to these developments; limited space as well as limited sources of relevant and comparable material have narrowed my focus.[1] (I will in fact omit Iceland entirely.) But I shall also make critical observations on Swedish policy that I do not trust myself to make on countries which I know less well. I have had less inhibition to confirm or refute the more or less realistic beliefs of those who see Sweden from the outside. In defense of this lack of balance, it may be noted that Sweden seems to be widely regarded as a prototype of the welfare state, that is, a society in which a particularly large portion of the income of individuals and families has been made independent of the market value of the breadwinner's economic performance, and where social services and transfer payments have made taxes very high.

To some extent, my paper is coordinated with that of Bent Rold Andersen, whose essay appeared in the previous issue of *Daedalus*. My description of Swedish labor market policy is the counterpart of his description of Danish social policy. Since I am in essential agreement with Andersen's main argument regarding the principal prob-

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lems of the welfare state, I have not repeated his theoretical reasoning. To provide relatively pragmatic information about what is going on in the Nordic countries has come most naturally to me as a Swedish Social Democrat and hardboiled reformist. Without pretending to present any grandiose views of the wings of history, I shall, however, also touch on some broader economic-political or ideological aspects of the problems we have to face. Therefore, I have not kept solely to the topic given me by the editor, the wages of success.

SOME BASIC OBSERVATIONS

The Nordic countries are among those with the highest per capita income in the world. After rapid increases during this century, and with the exception of Finland, which is catching up quickly, they have reached levels comparable to the United States (Table 1), a goal that in my youth fifty years ago seemed hopelessly distant.

Part of the increases registered in the GNP in all countries is more statistical than real. Unpaid household work, for example, has been changed into paid work and registered as such in national accounts. In addition, strong increases in female employment have caused labor activity rates to rise sharply. In 1980, 81 percent of the population aged sixteen to sixty-four participated in the Danish and Swedish labor forces, the top level in OECD. Norway, with 76 percent, and Finland, with 73, had more normal rates (despite a very high rate for Finnish women).

The basic policy of most of the regimes in power since the First World War has been toward pragmatic reform. Even during the periods when they had parliamentary majorities (with or without the help of the Communists), the Social Democrats promoted the effective functioning of a capitalist market-economy system, but hewed to an egalitarian welfare-state ideology by using taxation (including compulsory social insurance) to redistribute the rapidly growing national income.

The economies of the Nordic countries have been induced to perform well in several ways. Taxation laws have stimulated the use of profits for investment rather than for dividends and have influenced investments in a countercyclical direction—a rather consistent application of Keynesian expansionism. Regional development in-

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TABLE 1. Development of Per Capita GDP at Constant Prices

	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden	United States
Index, 1980 = 100					
1930	32	19	22	24	34
1940	40	24	27	30	40
1950	41	37	37	44	55
1960	53	43	47	58	63
1970	81	73	66	84	80
1980	100	100	100	100	100
Absolute values, 1980 U.S. dollar:					
1930	3,810	1,740	2,350	2,860	3,610
1980:					
"formal"	12,950	10,440	14,020	14,760	11,440
"real"	9,160	(7,340)	(9,920)	(10,440)	11,440

SOURCES: *OECD National Accounts 1950-80 and 1953-82* (for "real" figures 1980) and *European Historical Statistics 1950-70; Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970; Yearbook of Nordic Statistics 1982.*

Note on 1980: The "formal" figures are those used in most OECD publications. They are based on the official exchange rates. It should be evident that these figures are unrealistic with respect to the real relation between the United States and the Nordic countries. The exchange rates, which are used for the recalculation in U.S. dollars, do not mirror the real purchasing power of the currencies. The OECD has recently published new calculations based on an investigation of the purchasing power of the currencies of the countries of the member states of the European Economic Community in relation to the U.S. dollar—that is, only Denmark among the Nordic countries. The result is given in the last line: "real" calculations. The figures in parentheses for the other countries are all based on the "formal" figures, which here have been reduced in the same proportion as those of Denmark. Obviously, the preciseness of these figures is not very high. They indicate, however, what conforms with the impression from other material, namely, that the per capita GNPs of the Nordic countries are approaching, but not yet reaching, the level of the United States.

centives in Norway and an active labor market policy in Sweden have also contributed. Furthermore, public investment and housing have been subject to countercyclical and counterseasonal regulation, and this policy has helped lift long-term average activity to a higher level than it would otherwise have been. Partly involuntary undervaluations of the currency, which gave competitive advantages that were not too rapidly eaten away by wage increases, have also been important. On the other hand, there has been very little nationalization of private enterprise. As for other ownership, the state, counties, and municipalities have concentrated on social amenities, public utilities, and, in part, housing. Finally, except in agriculture, protectionism has been held down.

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As in all economies at this stage of development, public and private services employ about twice as many people as does industry, which, according to Scandinavian usage, includes manufacturing, mining, and building construction. The last few decades have witnessed a steady decline in the industrial labor force. In all four countries, manufacturing and allied industries now employ about 30 percent of the labor force, whereas the public sector has grown rapidly to similar levels and is particularly high in Sweden and Denmark.

The decline in industrial employment—even in absolute terms—after the mid-seventies, particularly in Sweden, must be seen not only as a consequence of the change in the composition of demand that follows the growth of real income, but also as a weakness in the overall economic structure. Our industries need to increase their capacity and sales volume, both absolutely and relatively, in national and international markets, so that the financing of public sector activities and transfer payments—most notably, pensions—can continue. Increases in such taxation needs are inevitable in view of the budget deficits, existing commitments, and expected demographic developments down the road.

All of the political parties in the Nordic countries have had a hand in the development of the welfare state, but the decisive element has been—and still is—the strong labor movement made up of Social-Democratic parties and the trade unions. Sweden has consistently had more of its workers unionized than the other Nordic countries, from the thirties until today. In 1980, 92 percent of Swedish wage earners and salaried workers belonged to unions, whereas Finland had approximately 85 percent, Denmark, 71, and Norway, 62 (these figures are probably exaggerated by at least 10 percent since they contain pensioners). The situation in most other democracies, where usually fewer than half as many workers are unionized, is similar to the situation in the Scandinavian countries in the twenties and thirties.

The power of the labor movement and of those sometimes allied forces that have worked in similar directions has not only led to increasing public services and a considerable redistribution of income through progressive taxes and transfer payment. There has also been a reduction in pretax and prebenefit income differentials compared to the situation prevailing twenty-five years ago, and even more compared to prewar times. The picture of course varies from country to

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country, but generally, the reductions of differences have affected all segments of the income structure—wages to salaries, and both in relation to profits; low-wage to high-wage branches of industry; individual low wages and salaries to higher ones in each branch; incomes of people in the countryside to those of city-dwellers; of women to men; of young workers to adults; and finally, in the payments made to the sick, the handicapped, the unemployed, and those on pensions in relation to persons currently earning income.

Sweden is a particularly strong exponent of the "solidaristic wages policy," which in practice means that all wage differentials are reduced, regardless of the differences in profitability of the various industries and companies, but with some consideration given to the different requirements of different jobs. Thus, the difference between the average wage level for branches of industry above the general average and those below that level has been narrowed to only 13 percent, as against 30 percent in 1960 and even more before the war. At that time (1939), a Swedish cabinet minister, as well as other high officials, had eight times the income of a blue-collar worker after taxes; now the relation is 2 to 1.

The economic difficulties of the last few years have resulted in retreats from the egalitarian trend on some points, but the long-term pattern is clear in all the Nordic countries.

The dispersion of ownership of wealth also seems to have declined up until the mid-seventies, but the accelerated inflation has helped some of those relatively well off to recoup in wealth a good deal of what they lost on the current-incomes side, particularly those who were able to build up fortunes by more or less speculative maneuvers in real estate and other inflation-prone areas.

In spite of this, the Nordic countries—perhaps with the exception of Norway, where income dispersion appears nearer the average for industrialized countries—appear to be among the most egalitarian in the world, this said with reservations for the precariousness of international comparisons of income and wealth dispersion.

WELFARE PROGRAMS—THEIR SCOPE AND CONTENT

May I suggest that the reader take a look at Tables 2 through 5 in order to get basic information about what I shall talk about in the following discussion.

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TABLE 2. Taxes and Contributions as Percentage of GDP

	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
1961	21.6	23.0	32.2	33.1
1978	32.1	32.3	38.9	40.8
1980	45.6	34.7	50.6	49.7

SOURCE: *Yearbook of Nordic Statistics.*

Certain characteristics of social policy can perhaps be called typically Nordic. As Andersen showed more fully in his paper, public services and payments are provided, under specific rules, to everyone who is entitled to them, regardless of means-tested need. Good examples are children's allowances and pensions, which are sent automatically to millionaires and the unemployed alike. On the whole, service institutions are free, or charge only nominal fees. During sickness, maternal leave, periods of unemployment, and old age—and partly also during postsecondary and other adult education—incomes are maintained not far below one's ordinary level. Although vehement debates often preceded the successive steps in the establishment of the welfare state, once the schemes were implemented, the battles were generally over. The hardest fought were those over generalized pension systems, when blue-collar workers began to ask for the same benefits that civil servants and most white-collar employees already had.

For the social welfare system to be successful, it was regarded as necessary that it be accepted by everyone—and this meant that all classes in the society would have to share in the benefits. People in Sweden are willing to pay rather high taxes—not without grumbling, of course—because they know that these assure automatic access to insurance benefits and full coverage of costs—hospitalization, secondary and higher education, and so on—at all income levels. Because incomes to the greatest extent are maintained proportionally through social insurance schemes instead of through across-the-board benefits, a great part of what the welfare state provides comes down to a reshuffling of money between different periods of an individual's life. This somewhat softens the radical egalitarianism that underlies the concept of the welfare state.

The advantage of this system, compared to private individual insurance schemes, is twofold: first, the risk-taking is spread over the

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TABLE 3. Social Expenditure by Function in the Nordic Countries (Including Education)

	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
Social expenditure per inhabitant, U.S. dollars, 1980	3,504	2,723	3,516	5,996
Total social expenditure in percent of GNP, 1978:	35.4	29.3	29.5	39.5
Compensations for loss of income[1]	13.7	12.6	11.6	18.3
Other cash benefits[2]	1.8	1.7	1.1	1.9
General services[3]	5.5	5.2	6.9	8.5
Services to children and families[4]	1.5	0.8	0.9	1.8
Services to the old and disabled[5]	3.1	1.0	0.9	2.0
Education, all types[6]	7.5	6.7	7.0	6.4

SOURCES: Items 1-5: *Levnadsnivå och ojämlikhet i Norden 1982* (Levels of Living and Inequality in Nordic Countries); Item 6: Information from OECD surveys of education. Totals: combined from the above.

[1]Pensions under various public systems, cash benefits in connection with unemployment, childbirth, illness, and work-related accidents.

[2]Childrens' allowances or tax deductions for children, advance payments of absent fathers' maintenance allowances to mothers, housing allowances, and social assistance.

[3]Medical care, dental care, treatment of alcoholics, employment service (placement), rehabilitation, labor market training.

[4]Child care, day-care service, homemaker's relief service, child and youth reformatory services.

[5]Municipal household assistance, other services for noninstitutionalized persons, pensioners' homes, old peoples' home, and care of the disabled.

[6]All schools (primary to tertiary), including courses for adults (but excluding labor market training), and contributions to free-study organizations.

entire population and the benefits are protected against inflation by automatic increases financed by the state (which can make such adjustments because its incomes in money terms automatically grow with inflation, which is not the case with private insurance companies); second, the costs incurred by a great number of insurance agencies fighting for the same clientele are avoided. Private insurance schemes, furthermore, fail to reach those who need protection the most, so that the society's most vulnerable population would be subjected to humiliating and administratively costly programs of social assistance—which the taxpayer in any event would have to carry.

Briefly, the high figures for the share of welfare expenditures in the GNPs of the Nordic countries, compared, for example, to those of the United States, Japan, or Switzerland, are to some extent the re-

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TABLE 4. Survey of Some Social Transfers, 1978

	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
Cash benefits (during women's leaves of absence from work) in connection with childbirth or care of children:				
Maximum number of weeks compensated	14	33	18	39
Level of compensations; percent of take-home per day for workers in manufacturing industries	89	60	100	93
Sickness insurance for employees:				
Benefits in percent of take-home pay per day for workers in manufacturing industries, single persons	79	43	100	94
Unemployment insurance:				
Daily benefits in percent of take-home pay per day for single persons and workers in manufacturing industries	79	44	64	77
Number of unpaid qualifying days	—	5	3	5
Old-age pensions, including full supplementary pension, percent of earlier net annual income for a worker in manufacturing industries:				
Single person	42	58	75	68
Married couple, without children	57	77	96	92
Children's allowances				
Annual amount in the case of two parents and three children, in U.S. dollars	1,065	826	1,111	1,577
Housing allowances:				
Percent of all families with children	7	13	8	39

SOURCE: *Levnadsnivå och ojämlikhet i Norden: Danmark, Finland, Norge, Sverige* (Levels of Living and Inequality in the North. A comparative analysis of the Nordic Levels-of-Living surveys. Published by the Nordic Council and the Nordic Statistical Secretariat, 1983). There have of course been changes since 1978, but these have not been so radical that they have destroyed the comparability between countries.

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sult of different systems of accounting and administration. Social benefits given in the form of tax reductions or as tax-free benefit payments tend to make the figure seem lower. In the North, where benefits are higher but counted as taxable income to avoid anomalies in individual cases, gross transfer payments and the need for tax revenues look enormous, even if the real net benefits received are the same.

There is a rationale in sending social paychecks—whether they are children's allowances or retiree's pensions—regardless of the receiver's other income. If all schoolchildren are entitled to free lunch, none can be stigmatized as "poor," and the need for a costly bureaucracy to calculate and control different payments per family is eliminated.

These principles have been largely accepted by those on all points of the political spectrum and applied widely in all the Nordic countries, although somewhat inconsistently: old-age pensions in part, and some other benefits too, depend upon income tests. Unfortunately, such features, when combined with high and progressive marginal taxes (the "implicit" marginal tax rate—the sum of all reductions from a person's pretax income increases, created by the marginal tax rate on taxable income and by reductions of social benefits following increased incomes), often create a "poverty trap." But for many above the poverty line as well, implicit marginal tax rates have become very high and inevitably invite cheating through nonreporting of earned incomes or through "tax-planning," for example, arrangements whereby high incomes are transformed into increases of capital values, which are less severely taxed. One result of the high marginal tax is do-it-yourself work; another is to choose leisure over income-producing work. The quantitative importance of all tax avoidance (legal and illegal) is much debated. Some serious research efforts in Sweden have indicated a limited increase, if any. Reductions of the input of work are sometimes interpreted positively, as improved obedience to the law about shortened working hours and as a healthy avoidance of "keeping up with the Joneses" by running on treadmills.

At any rate, inflation, combined with a tax system (in itself, full of loopholes) based on the assumption that the value of money would remain constant, has led to reinforced action against all sorts of "economic" or "white-collar" crime. On the other hand, Nordic

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TABLE 5. Overview of Social Insurance Reforms in the Nordic Countries during the Postwar Period: Year and Nature of Reform that Constitutes Basis of Present System

	Accident	Sickness	Unemployment	Old-Age Pensions	Superannuation (ATP)
Denmark:					
Year	1959-64	1960-71	1966	1956-64	1964
Nature	universal/compulsory 1964; income-graduated	universal/compulsory; state-financed; income-graduated	voluntary/unions; income-graduated	universal flat rate; state-financed (w/ supplements)	very modest improvements; fiscal stimuli to voluntary insurance
Finland:					
Year	1965	1963	1960	1957	1967
Nature	universal/compulsory	universal/compulsory; tripartite-financed	voluntary/unions; state pays 67%	universal flat-rate; state-financed	compulsory and universal for all employees; voluntary for self-employed; earnings-related

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TABLE 5. *continued*

Norway:					
Year	1958	1956/71	1959	1957	1967
Nature	universal/compulsory	universal/compulsory; state-financed; income-graduated	universal/compulsory	universal flat-rate; state-financed	compulsory and universal for all employees; voluntary for self-employed; earnings-related
Sweden:					
Year	1954	1958	(1974)	1948	1959
Nature	universal/compulsory	universal/compulsory; state-financed; earnings-related	cash support to noncovered; union-controlled	universal flat-rate; state-financed; 1969: supplements to persons with low ATP	compulsory and universal for all employees; voluntary for self-employed; earnings-related; after 1973, 100% employer-financed

SOURCE: Espling-Andersen and W. Korpi, "From Poor Law to Welfare States," in *Welfare States and Welfare Research: The Scandinavian Model,* edited by Erikson et al. (forthcoming).
Note: "Year" does not denote the introduction of the basic system but the years when the latest changes of importance were made; lesser amendments may have been introduced later.

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governments of all colors in recent years have retreated in some respects from the most extreme marginal tax rates.

LABOR MARKET POLICIES

An important element in social welfare is the security of employment and work income. Each of the Nordic countries has traveled a rather different road in quest of this goal. Sweden, with its "active labor market policy," administered by the Swedish Labor Market Board (LMB) and aimed at local job creation, retraining, rehabilitation, and other adjustments, has gone the furthest with such efforts, whereas Denmark, at the other extreme, relies primarily on unemployment insurance to cushion the impact of joblessness. Finland and Norway have followed intermediary paths. After rapid growth from the mid-fifties, expenditures of the LMB from 1970 on have varied between 2 and 3 percent of the Swedish GNP (see Table 6).

TABLE 6. Percentage of Unemployment in Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States

	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden	United States
1955-59	(6.5)	2.7	(3.4)	(2.5)	5.0
1960-64	(2.5)	1.4	(3.0)	1.6	5.7
1965-69	(2.5)	2.5	(1.8)	1.8	3.8
1970-74	(3.0)	2.1	1.6	2.2	5.2
1975-79	(8.0)	5.2	1.9	1.9	6.8
1980-82	(8.7)	5.5	1.6	2.6	8.1

SOURCES FOR ORIGINAL FIGURES: *International Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1958-79;* later years, current information in OECD *Main Economic Indicators.* The Scandinavian labor force surveys have practically the same definitions as in the United States. Figures in parentheses are approximate recalculations for comparability: the original figures were statistics from unemployment insurance systems.

Sweden's policy was conceived as a method of combining full employment and a high degree of equality of wages and other income with freedom from inflation. Early on, the trade unions had pointed out that it would be difficult for them to guarantee a noninflationary wage development if full employment were to be created by so high a level of overall demand in the economy that employers would be outbidding one another for workers. Full employment,

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therefore, would have to be ensured by a less expansionist fiscal and monetary policy in both general and undifferentiated terms, combined with selective measures for job creation and adaptability promotion—primarily programs to retrain workers in declining industries for jobs in expanding ones. After some initial hesitation, the government around 1955 accepted this approach and began to upgrade LMB rapidly to enlarge greatly its capacity of bringing "jobs to the workers" as well as "workers to the jobs."

Job creation consumes most of LMB's resources and now includes a quite lengthy list of programs. Besides traditional relief work, there is a growing emphasis on temporary public service employment, which is less costly than heavy investment projects with their inflationary side effects. There are sheltered workshops and "semi-sheltered" employment (whereby subsidies between 25 and 90 percent are given to employers for hiring handicapped workers); promotion of the start-up or enlargement of industrial enterprises in underdeveloped areas by subsidizing both investments and the hiring of additional workers; and other employment subsidies during various periods or for special areas and categories, either to help employers keep workers on their payrolls, at least for training during slack periods, or to provide them with incentives to increase their work forces. Since 1970 these programs have affected around 2.5 percent of the labor force, but this rate has been increased or decreased to counteract cyclical and seasonal swings.

As for adaptability promotion, the most important aspect is "labor market training," whereby unemployed workers can be retrained in viable new occupations, and where anyone can be trained in shortage occupations—that is, occupations with more openings than there are workers to fill them. At any time, about one percent of the labor force is engaged in retraining. State grants to support geographical relocation is a less costly program and usually affects about half as many workers.

This policy of making it easier and less expensive for enterprises to increase or at least maintain employment has the effect of reducing the need for high prices as an incentive to increase production. This is the anti-inflationary side of the active labor market policy, and it has been applied even during boom periods.

Unfortunately, despite these programs, cyclical booms were allowed to run their course too far in the inflationary direction before

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any braking actions were applied, with the result that Sweden's inflation rate was in line with the general OECD rate all through the sixties and seventies. A consoling fact is that the very low level of unemployment could be maintained without the much higher rate of inflation that "normally" could have been expected to follow (according to the Phillips curve theory).

During the seventies, largely as a response to the demand for employment security, other policies were developed, among them, legislation giving workers increased protection against dismissals. Although this policy tends to slow down economic progress—but only in a very small way—the Swedish people have been willing to accept this in order to achieve job security.

Another method to maintain employment, one outside the activities of LMB, is the financial rescuing of large companies in ailing industries, partly in the form of outright nationalizations such as took place under the Conservative-Center governments of 1978-82. This policy gives rise to two quite different views: that welfare states tend to brake economic progress in order to meet pressures from special groups instead of permitting the market to enforce structural changes; or that bolder welfare programs, in the form of generous help to workers to lure them into other industries, could have permitted greater expansion in profitable enterprises. LMB has of course been active in this regard, too. In fact, industries that seemed doomed five or so years ago (shipyards and steel are good examples) have been reconstructed into viable units, with reduced work forces.

Currently, employment promotion is increasingly being targeted to the more expansionist parts of the private sector (along with the municipalities). Subsidized "youth teams" employ many otherwise idle young people at reduced rates of pay, at least part-time. On-the-job training is being expanded as well. The payoff of these seemingly expensive activities is that for each dollar an employer pays out for an additional worker, the government earns about 80 cents in the form of taxes on income and savings on unemployment insurance.

Denmark is at the opposite extreme with respect to labor market policy: most of its public expenditures in this field goes out as payments of cash to the unemployed, via unemployment insurance funds, which are administered by the trade unions but which are

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strongly subsidized by the state. The public authorities in Denmark, more so than in Sweden, go along with the tendency of workers to regard their unemployment insurance funds as a guarantee that they will not be compelled to take a job outside their traditional trade. Thus the Danish unions—which are mainly craft, as opposed to the industrial unions of Sweden—have not pressed the government to establish programs of relief works or to promote labor market adjustment. With the unusually high level of unemployment in Denmark in recent years, however, the country has begun to apply more comprehensive measures for employment promotion, particularly for youth.

Norway and Finland have also implemented programs to promote employment and labor market adjustment, but less aggressively than Sweden. Norway has laid particular stress on regional development, as can be seen in their efforts to steer private and public investments to areas with weak economic development, and during the last decade, of course, revenues from North Sea oil have been used by the government to keep Norway's unemployment rate at a very low level.

NEGATIVE TENDENCIES: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN

Let me start with an anecdote from real life. Several years ago, I met a group of high civil servants, businessmen, and social scientists from an East Asian country. They were touring Europe, they said, because they were worried that their rapid economic growth would produce the same negative side effects as it had done here: environmental deterioration, youth delinquency, drug addiction, and women's lib movements. The Nordic countries were probably able to give these visitors a great many comments, since they have had good reason to debate these questions rather thoroughly.

Although the growth of per capita income can be viewed as a great success—economically, because it has increased the levels of income; politically, because a great part of this increase is devoted to social welfare purposes that reduce differences in income and exposure to social hazards—there is no question that it has its darker side. This tends to show up both in countries with strong social welfare programs and in those with weaker ones. There seems to be a strong connection between the growth of per capita income and the growth

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of crime (more theft, particularly among the young: less hunger, but more to steal!). Greater incomes also mean increased consumption of alcohol and drugs, with ensuing addictions leading to debilitation or crime, or both. The correlations, however, are far from perfect.

One negative aspect that seems to follow increasing income levels even more consistently is the rapid reduction of the birthrate—again, in both welfare states and other advanced economies. Neither seems to have created child-minded societies.

With respect to these repercussions of economic growth, the Nordic countries, on some points, seem particularly advanced; on others, quite the opposite. Inadequate statistics as well as lack of space prevent any comprehensive comparisons with other countries, those that have similar welfare policies and those that do not. I have, however, indulged in some hints about America on a few points, and readers from that country, and others, may supplement (or correct) these by their own knowledge.

The reduction of fertility after the end of the postwar baby boom has been rapid in all of the Nordic countries. With a net reproduction rate of around 70 percent, Denmark leads the downward trend in the North, but not in the world: Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands have arrived at even lower fertility rates. The other Nordic countries now have rates around 80 percent, a figure similar to that of countries of comparable economic structure and living standards, including the white population of the United States.

That advanced welfare states, despite their realization of economic security and income equalization for the masses, have experienced declines in fertility rates similar to those of other countries with high income levels perhaps has something to do with their comprehensive education systems and information activities promoting efficient family planning. There is, however, no denying that welfare policy has been directed more toward advantaging the middle-aged generation and new cohorts of pensioners, in the level of consumption and degree of income security, than toward making it easier financially for young couples to have—and enjoy—children rather than fretting about the expense of their upbringing. Apparently, also, neither sort of society has yet come to terms with the emancipation of women, a lapse made evident by—to use Alva Myrdal's expression—their "birth strike."

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Low fertility rates may, in the long run, play havoc with the entire social security systems in the Nordic countries—which have been fashioned to ensure a high standard of living for the aging generations to come—to say nothing of the situation of the elderly in countries where benefits are not even based on state-guaranteed general insurance systems. A greater consciousness of the need for a more child-minded family policy seems to be underway, but at this time, the effort lacks a sense of urgency. Immigration to fill the threatening gaps of manpower—and thus of taxpayers—may seem to be an easy way out of this situation for high-wage countries, but such a solution is not without its problems either; ethnic conflicts appear already to be growing.

As for the consumption of alcohol, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, despite their high income levels, have among the lowest per capita rates—seven liters of pure alcohol per inhabitant above fifteen years of age—while Denmark, at twelve liters, is near the general average for Europe and the United States. This represents a doubling of consumption from 1960—that is, a somewhat more rapid increase than total consumption—which recently has been somewhat lowered by the reduction in real wages brought on by the recession. But in all the countries, *alcoholism* (as distinguished from average alcohol consumption) is noted as a very serious cause of reduced work capacity, increasing hospital costs, family breakups, and crime.

One particularly dark aspect of the problem is that the consumption of alcohol had been starting at ever younger age levels, even among children of upper primary school age. The phenomenon, however, reached its peak in the early seventies and has tended to decline—at least in Sweden, owing perhaps to the energetic dissemination of information in the schools about the harmful effects of alcohol.

Drug addiction is a more limited problem. Marijuana in significant quantities found its way into the Nordic countries in the early sixties, but its use, too, peaked in the early seventies, to be followed by variations in usage, none of which appear to be trend-setting. It is impossible to make precise statements regarding its use in the Nordic countries, but one can safely say that it has not reached the level it has in some American states, where the use of "pot" appears to be widely tolerated.

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Beginning sometime between the two wars, the crime rate increased rapidly in all the Nordic countries. Since 1950, in fact, the rate has more than doubled overall, and in Sweden it has tripled. It is often argued that this is in part a statistical phenomenon: stolen cars are insured and therefore registered; raided orchards were not. But the increase is too strong to be explained away by this and other formal factors. Sociologists and criminologists are unanimous in their view that the mutually interdependent increases in crime and in alcoholism and drug addiction are intimately connected with the reduction of social controls under industrialized production systems, particularly in the larger cities, where the population has increased dramatically.

With due respect for the fragility of all crime statistics, it nevertheless seems that the rate of growth and the present level of theft and violent crime in the Nordic countries are among the highest observed in the industrialized countries, in particular, Sweden—which, however, is far below the United States. (This statement is based on information given by experts in the field; statistics are rather useless for the purpose of comparison because of different methods and definitions.) On the other hand, Norway's crime rate is certainly quite low. Both because it has maintained its social controls (there is less population concentration in the big cities and fewer large enterprises) and perhaps also its strong religious traditions, Norway appears to be more resistant to the social problems of highly industrialized societies. The effects of boom conditions created in some parts of the country by the exploitation of North Sea oil, however, has become cause for worry among some Norwegian sociologists.

A particularly serious aspect of the crime situation is that as the earning capacity of the alcoholic and the addict is reduced—necessarily—the need for money to support their habit is increased. From there, it is only a short step to theft and violence. That the welfare system is there to help people with reduced earning capacities matters very little to those who do not want to be helped. They view the social welfare apparatus and the well-meaning people who are there to help those in need in much the same way they see the police—as their enemy. We are struggling with this problem, but under considerable differences of opinion about the best method for solving it.

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SOME POSITIVE FEATURES

As I mentioned at the start of this paper, economic growth in the Nordic countries has been followed by very strong changes with respect to both positive and negative aspects of human behavior, particularly in Sweden. Here, I refer neither to the banal figures for the number of cars and telephones per million inhabitants, nor to the ravages of vulgar commercialism, but to such facts as a tripling of membership in adult education and sports organizations over the last three decades. About one third of the adult population participate in study circles arranged by the Workers' Educational Association and similar organizations. The other countries are not far behind. This development has taken place alongside the great expansion of full-time and part-time schools for adolescents and adults, and job training—and *despite* television. In addition, the Nordic peoples are among the most sports-minded in the world, as evidenced by the multitudes who take part in the many Nordic equivalents of the New York marathon. Their active participation in studies and sports—which seems to be without equal in the rest of Europe—indicates that the growth of income and leisure and the social protection offered by the institutions of the welfare state have led to more than mere passive consumption, such as alcohol and television; they have led to more active and enriched lives.

Civic-mindedness, to the extent that it is expressed by participation in elections, which was already high before the war, has also grown. Since that time, the rate of participation has been between 75 and 90 percent, or more, and continues to grow. There also seems to be a growth of membership in civic organizations despite a decline in some of the older, more institutionalized types. Environmental protection has become an important concern for many, but the popular movements mobilized around this matter appear to be less vehement than in other countries where the poisoning of the environment is more acute.

Other positive phenomena could be ascribed to the welfare institutions established in the Nordic countries; the extreme reduction of infant mortality (a result of prenatal and postnatal health services); longer life-spans (perhaps a result of better living conditions for the aged, under improved pension systems and access to medical care that is practically free of charge); the reduction of traffic accidents

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and traffic fatalities to very low levels by international standards (clearly a result of determined efforts aimed at accident prevention).

It has appeared difficult, by systematic empirical research, to give significant evidence for the often held belief that the institutions of the welfare state tend to brake economic progress by reducing incentives for productive performances and adaptation to the need for structural changes, which are otherwise promoted by income differences and the chance for profit. To some extent, even those who lead in the promotion of egalitarianism share such beliefs, but their view is that some economic drawbacks may be acceptable if the social values of equity and personal freedom are achieved. They have also been able to point out, however, that it has been possible to use welfare programs to *promote* economic efficiency and progress. A few examples: The subsidization of housing and regulation of building construction have not only helped low-income families, but have promoted the utilization of manpower and other productive capacities that would otherwise have been idle during seasonal and cyclical swings. The great pension reforms were partly directed toward ensuring the accumulation of capital, which was to be used particularly for residential building construction to relieve the housing shortage that appeared after the war. That they also allow a worker to go over to another job without loss of pension rights makes for better adaptability in the labor market. The expansion of both academically oriented and vocational schools and courses, open to youth from all income and age levels free of charge, provides for increased productive capacity and adaptability. And the health care system, available to rich and poor alike, implies advantages both to the worker, in rapid recovery from illness, and to the enterprises that employ them.

Unemployment insurance, too, in combination with a labor market policy that promotes occupational and geographical adaptability, does not only, as some contend, "hold back the supply of labor and increase voluntary unemployment." Rather, it helps—as it was intended—those who have lost their jobs to make a better readjustment for more productive employment. Before the present system was instituted, the lack of alternative income compelled the unemployed worker to take the first best job he or she could find, without much help toward making a rational choice and readaptation. This was certainly not conducive to economic progress. Further-

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more, the reduction of wage differentials, through both a solidaristic wage policy and progressive taxation, rather than acting as disincentives to labor mobility, in reality often has had the opposite effect: when wages in different industries are relatively equal, workers in declining industries are more amenable to joining those that are expanding, because this does not mean a step downward on the wage scale, something that is otherwise often requested of redundant workers but which always meets with resistance.

In the economic debate, a request for "wage flexibility" is often recommended as a means to promote mobility: to make wages low in declining industries and high in expanding ones would stimulate mobility in the desired directions. In reality, such flexibility would provoke conflicts and very costly inflationary wage races. Therefore, the Swedish policy is to spend money to stimulate readaptation as such (training and moving allowances, etc.).

The proponents and sponsors of the welfare state have been quick to point out that their reforms have not undermined economic progress—as had been predicted since the thirties—by making citizens the passive users and abusers of social benefits. In a way, this is a central positive "wage of success."

Highlights from Level-of-Living Inquiries

In all the Nordic countries, relatively comprehensive inquiries have been undertaken to show living standards and ways of life of all population groups. Results from a series of three, undertaken in 1968, 1974, and 1981, are available in Sweden, although not yet from the other countries.

These inquiries of course mirror the well-known material progress of the period 1968-81, but they were also designed to throw light on a number of often hotly debated questions of a type relevant for a study of "the wages of success." These questions should test common hypotheses about increasing interpersonal isolation, polarization of work between "empty" and "meaningful" tasks, and other influences of societal developments upon personal life and behavior. Some results:

Physical and mental health: Improved physical fitness; lower frequency of nervousness and anxiety and use of sedatives, but more of common ailments like colds and backaches.

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Working life: Increased personal freedom during working time; more psychological pressures through more qualified work, but not through any increase of monotony and emptiness of tasks; more disagreeable situations on the shop floor owing to noise, poisonous materials, and so on.

Personal relations in everyday life: More frequent contacts with relatives and friends; fewer cases of strong isolation; clear progress in equality between the sexes in daily chores.

Recreation and culture: Confirmation of other information about high levels (one third of the population) and rates of growth for participation in free studies and sports; also some increase of book-reading and other signs of improved "qualitative content of leisure time."

Exposure to crime: Slight increase (uncertain) for theft; also for violence and threats (to 4 percent of population). This question was not asked in 1968, and the result probably underrates the long-term development.

Civic activities and relations with public authorities: Marked increases of participation in work of civic organizations and contacts with elected representatives; more complaints about administrative decisions and actual actions to get correction of errors, for example, by tax authorities; reduction by half (to 9 percent) of the number of citizens "politically poor," that is, neither feeling able to take such action nor knowing anyone to ask for help.

A general observation was that class differences in life-styles have been reduced, although not to any very marked degree.

Observations on the levels-of-living studies of the other Nordic countries (one each in Denmark and Finland: two in Norway not mutually comparable) and general judgments by connoisseurs indicate that situations and developments are in no way radically distinguished from those noted here for Sweden, except for points already indicated.

A Note About the Young

Youngsters who grew up in the Nordic countries in the last few decades did so in a rather permissive society. Earlier authoritative and restrictive laws and moralizing attitudes had been largely eliminated, as had the grip of religion over peoples' lives and thoughts.

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Corporal punishment was forbidden in schools, and parents were admonished to avoid it at home as well (in Sweden, even by law). Submissiveness to parents, to older people in general, and to superiors in schools and in the workplace was replaced, in its good version, by a healthy comradeship, and in its bad, by disgusting irreverence. Sex education was gradually shifted from dark backyards to schools and the mass media; the stigma of out-of-wedlock childbirth disappeared. The only point on which authoritarianism was strengthened was the prolongation of compulsory schooling, from around the age of thirteen before the war to fifteen or sixteen in the fifties and sixties. The most spectacular reaction to all this among the young was to obey the advice of their teachers and parents to continue their schooling into the noncompulsory high schools. Today, around 90 percent do, compared to the handful before the war and the still limited numbers who did so during the early postwar years.

The manifestations of both positive and negative types of behavior and attitudes that are visible in the general population are intensified among the young. They not only increasingly participate actively in sports and educational and cultural leisure-time activities, but share a growing interest in environmental concerns and international questions. But along with these "good" developments, there is a great increase in youth delinquency, particularly around the age of fifteen. In the fifteen-to-seventeen-year-old age groups, 4 percent were found guilty of some crime in 1980, compared with one percent in 1950. For adults over twenty-five, the frequency is much lower and has "only" doubled to about one half of one percent. These figures are from Sweden and are the highest among the Nordic countries, but all, even Norway, are beginning to have "youth" problems.

Two Japanese government-sponsored international surveys, in 1972 and 1978, reveal a lot of interesting things about the attitudes of contemporary youth. About two thousand young people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four were interviewed in eight industrialized countries—including only Sweden among the Nordic countries—and three less developed countries. No less than 60 percent of the youth of the industrialized world declared disagreement with the opinions of their parents, but only 35 percent of the Swedes did so. They scored highest when it came to having "no quarrels with parents during the last six months," having "had a happy child-

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hood," and preferring to talk with their parents rather than with others about worrisome personal problems. More often than in any other country, they declared themselves as having close friends and engaging with them in active leisure-time pursuits instead of doing nothing.

On these and other points, the surveys contradict the contemporary propaganda image of Swedish youth as particularly lonesome, isolated, alienated from their parents, and totally resentful of the "unfriendly" society their parents have "created." In a country where both positive and negative developments are strongly manifest, anybody can prove anything by shrewd selectivity.

MYTHOLOGIES

One of the wages of success is that friends and foes alike feel free to utilize whatever is useful for their own propaganda purposes. In this regard, Sweden is the example par excellence. For that reason, and because I know Sweden best, I shall comment on some of those positive and negative statements and beliefs about Sweden that seem to have taken on the aspect of revealed truth.

Before the war, the title of Marquis Childs's book *Sweden: The Middle Way* became the slogan for all those who believed that there was indeed an ideal society on earth—or at least one that approximated such a society. There, harmonious cooperation between organizations of workers, employers, and consumers, and a government-directed, unorthodox economic policy, had brought about great progress, both on the economic and social fronts. Swedish economists instead love to point out that their country's economic success owed less to its well-advertised expansionist policy ("Keynesianism before Keynes") than to Sweden's having been involuntarily thrown off the gold standard in 1931, then accidentally establishing an undervalued currency and being helped greatly by expansionist policies in their export market. They, as well as other social scientists, also often had to explain to overenthusiastic colleagues that there was still a lot of social backwardness in this utopia, even long after the war.

During the fifties and sixties, the propaganda for "the Swedish Model" again—and with some justification—concentrated on the fact that the very strong organizations of workers and employers

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could promote economic growth and full employment by guaranteeing peace in the labor market. Furthermore, said enthusiastic supporters, the active labor market policy and the full employment it brought about went far toward eliminating resistance to technological change, and this, they added, had been a determining factor in the postwar growth of the economy's productivity.

It is true that the Swedish trade unions have always encouraged their members to see the benefits to workers in new technological developments, and that they have taken a positive attitude toward the changes of labor market structure that these implied. But it was only with the recession of 1966-68 that the active labor market policy played any significant role at all in economic policy.

Favorable external conditions again explain a good deal of the relatively high rate of growth (nearly as high as in the countries devastated by the war) during the fifties and sixties, but certain features of economic policy—cooperation between workers' and employers' organizations and the elimination of resistance to technological change—probably played a part.

The centralized wage agreements typical for Sweden are often presented as an excellent example of "incomes policy." At times, such agreements did indeed imply a deliberate effort to put a brake on inflation; but when full employment was created by excess demand—rather than by monetary restraint combined with an even more forceful labor market policy—wage-price explosions soon took place, which in practice perhaps made inflation worse than it would have been under a less "responsible" policy.

Education in Sweden also comes in for much praise, the validity of which is debatable. The reforms instituted to democratize the system, to guarantee widespread access to advanced education, were undoubtedly rather comprehensive. They include the elimination of tuition at all levels, and stipends (however small) for all bona fide studies at secondary and higher levels—in the latter case, supplemented by automatic access to cheap loans; reorganization of primary and secondary schools into integrated classes rather than the separation of pupils early on according to intellectual potential; and encouragement of people of all ages to supplement their earlier education and training, supported in part by substantial allowances.

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There is, however, no hiding the fact that the desired rapid reduction of social class and sex differences through education has not taken place. Youngsters from working-class backgrounds, even those with high IQs and the potential for intellectual development, seldom go on to advanced study, whereas youngsters from academically inclined families almost always do. There is a plus side though; because of this, the working class is able to hold onto its future leaders.

A decidedly disturbing aspect of Swedish life, one that surfaced during an intermediary period, was the seemingly endless wait, the "queuing," for services that are the essential promise of the welfare state. According to welfare ideology, housing, health, education, and so on should become social rights to which everyone, regardless of economic resources, is entitled. The full realization of these benefits, however, is dependent upon the existence of material preconditions that could not be established instantly after the passing of a law; in the meantime, the "discontent of frustrated expectations" often became manifest. Although these growth pains have been largely overcome, remaining phenomena of this sort imply that partly spectacular inequities exist, for example, regarding child care, with or without access to day nurseries. These flaws in the welfare state construct, which have been difficult to amend during the worldwide slowdown of economic growth, are now playing an important role in the sharpened debate about welfare state versus market economy principles.

If the positive myths and propaganda statements are in need of modification, so also are the negative ones. Outstanding among these, of course, is Sweden's reputed world championship in the rate of suicides. President Eisenhower, who later apologized—and others, who did not—used it in the fifties in the fight against the welfare state. In fact, Sweden has ranked around sixth among twenty-one European countries in the rate of suicides, perhaps high because of unusually complete reporting.

The latest of the negative myths is the one about the "Gulag for children," a term used not to imply that some children are imprisoned in their homes and mishandled there, but rather to describe a situation where children below the age of fifteen in Sweden (as in several other countries where welfare authorities have been alerted to the "battered-child syndrome"), at the rate of one in a

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thousand annually, are separated from abusive parents against the latter's wishes. Here we can note a somewhat peculiar sort of "wages of success." Democratic forces, determined to protect personal integrity in relation to the bureaucracy, had succeeded in establishing laws that forbid the welfare authorities from revealing anything at all about their clients' private behavior—which, unfortunately, makes the welfare authorities defenseless against accusations when they run into conflict with abusive parents who can mobilize the mass media (both in Sweden and outside) against them. Thus, it is precisely the law protecting individuals against "big brother" despotism that permits the presentation of conflicts as cases of big brother behavior without the accused, the child-protecting officers, being allowed to defend themselves adequately.

On the macroeconomic level, those who believe that an advanced social welfare system can only be a disaster for the people it is supposed to help, now would seem to have proof positive: economic growth has lagged considerably, for both Sweden and Denmark, behind the general average for OECD countries during the period after 1970. If some of Sweden's earlier fame came about not only through rational economic and social policies, but also through a great deal of luck—making the positive myths look more justified than they in fact were—the opposite is now the case. Sweden was affected by the structural changes in the world market in ways that had nothing to do with its social welfare policies. It was among the countries most dependent on imported oil, and was therefore especially hard-hit by the oil crises of the seventies. In addition, since shipbuilding, iron ore, steel, and paper and pulp were important components of its export program, the worldwide setbacks in these industries were fateful for Sweden. There were also clear short-term mistakes with regard to exchange rates and anticyclical measures that had no relation at all to the country's large social policy sector. Thus the belief that social welfare policy and high rates of taxation underlay the 1970s slowdown of economic growth is in need of considerable modification.

OUT OF CRISIS?

The fact that some cases of conspicuous Sweden-baiting (as formerly Sweden-praising) can be refuted as unwarranted does not per-

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mit us to underrate the seriousness of the question raised both in the Nordic countries and elsewhere: Is there a crisis for the welfare state? There is of course the problem common to all: how to restore and maintain full employment without quickly undermining it by inflation. Then there is the particular problem for advanced welfare societies: how to finance public expenditures to meet foreseen increases (for servicing the needs of an increasing elderly population, with its frequent illnesses; improving the economic conditions of families with children, which have lagged in welfare development; and so on). A taxpayers' revolt is always a real possibility, either on the political level (by voting *for* large expenditures but *against* the taxes needed to finance them), or through rich people's emigration to other countries, or through the establishment of an underground economy out of reach of the tax collector. I shall try to indicate below possible directions in which solutions might be sought.

The two basic problems—unemployment and financing of reasonably balanced budgets—are of course interconnected. The future of the welfare state, perhaps of democracy itself, depends upon full employment. The societal costs of high unemployment, in terms of national income lost and increased public expenditures, will make financing of the other costly tasks of society a most precarious undertaking indeed. The classic strategy, now widely used all over the world, of maintaining high rates of unemployment to counteract inflation will not, over the long term, create the rate of economic growth necessary to absorb surplus workers into public and private service activities, as employment in manufacturing tends to diminish with increased productivity. A boom strong enough to create full employment will generate such high profits that these will work against achieving consensus with wage and salary earners about the necessity to hold the line on inflation.

A solution to the problem of maintaining full employment without inflation must include a reallocation of the existing charge of taxes-cum-subsidies on payrolls and other elements of production costs, which makes it more advantageous for enterprises to increase production and sales on the basis of low prices rather than to maximize their profits through high prices on limited output. There are already a few of these programs on the drawing boards or being experimented with—cash grants and tax credits to firms for increasing or maintaining current work forces and for increasing capital equip-

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ment or production volume, all more or less financed by higher overall tax rates than otherwise, but *in toto* implying a reduction. But none of these programs is wide-ranging and durable enough to have a telling effect, nor are the incentives offered to firms and workers in some countries to make positive adjustments (i.e., to enter into other activities or transfer to new industries), rather than spending vast sums to prop up ailing industries or to pay people for keeping out of the active labor force.

The problem of restoring or maintaining reasonably balanced budgets will not be easy of solution, given the foreseen automatic increases of social expenditures under existing commitments. The young generation of taxpayers, those who will have to underwrite these expenditures, is bound to decline. Furthermore, particularly in Sweden, the marginal tax rates are already above 50 percent for average incomes and often 70 or 80 percent for those with higher incomes (as well as those in the poverty trap)—insofar as those incomes are revealed to the tax authorities. In fact, those in high-income brackets often can evade paying their full tax by transforming income into increases of capital assets. A consequence must be that people in lower income brackets feel they should be able to work to earn money tax-free, as they see those in the higher bracket do, even without working. The legitimacy of the entire system, it appears, is put in question among a growing number of citizens, although still a minority in the Nordic countries. All of them, except Sweden, have seen the emergence of new political parties based on antitax ideologies.

There seems to be no question that the rate of growth of public expenditures will have to be reduced. Many argue for privatization of some public services or at least for the introduction of payment or increases in those services that already require some payment. On some points, this may be both rational and socially defensible, but the possibilities for any major retreat in that direction seem rather limited.

Then, too, we have the notion of "The Heartless Welfare State," the title of a recent "libertarian" pamphlet by a leading Swedish conservative politician, his thesis being that with less "compulsory solidarity" through taxes, social services, and insurance, people will have more money for personal charity and for establishing local organizations for social services. Another variant of the anticentralist

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ideologists is expressed in recommendations for local job creation by small enterprises or self-help organizations, and the creation of small production units—all implying a natural milieu for self-determined and co-determined enterprises as well as more grass-roots democracy. "Small" may be "beautiful" both in industry and social services, but it is no secret that networks organized on the basis of local or group solidarity alone will inevitably leave many out in the cold. Those of us who want to improve the welfare state, not destroy it, have propelled our thoughts along quite different lines.

Undoubtedly, some part of the bridging of goal conflicts indicated by this discussion must consist of creating a closer and more visible relationship between what the individual pays and what he receives from the welfare system. But this must be done without any return to a nineteenth-century type of local self-administration wherein the advantages gained from very broad risk-sharing and access to compensation for inflation—which only the state can provide—are lost. To cut up the population into a great number of small groups, each compelled to "run faster to stand still" in an inflationary race, could definitely destroy the economy.

The social benefits that each individual is entitled to can be readily connected with the taxes he pays, because much of what is paid simply switches a part of an individual's income between different periods of his life—always remembering, of course, that he is assured protection against inflation and personal hazards. It must be possible to allow the taxpayer to utilize his rights—rights that he is entitled to by virtue of being a taxpayer—much more in accordance with personal choice than is at present possible. This would throw into much less advantageous light the prevailing practice of tax evasion and clandestine work.

Some small steps have been taken in that direction by some countries, including those of the North, by giving individuals the right to retire at a time of their own choosing—after age sixty, for example—with pensions adjusted to actuarial tables. Adult training systems are beginning to contain elements of the same principle. The notion of changing part of unemployment insurance expenditures into credits to be made available to local communities or organizations, and used for partial financing of employment creation based on local initiatives, is being discussed in various countries. The com-

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bination of the "flexilife" idea and labor market adjustment appear to be particularly promising.

Other actions can be taken as well. Spending more money on better tax administration to yield a higher benefit-cost ratio is one. Increasing the efficiency of public services to reduce their cost is another old and good idea that current pressures to promote balanced budgets might stimulate. Any success in that direction, however, must include more job creation in other parts of the economy.

There is one final problem, one that bears on those of full employment without inflation and the maintenance of the financial basis for welfare policy. The classic method of increasing the accumulation of capital needed for the creation of sufficient workplaces to guarantee full employment is greater profits and capital assets among the wealthy. Naturally enough, this would work against a noninflationary income development and thus against any hope for the rational economic performance of a country. There are alternatives, however—for example, the accumulation of pension funds. Another is the creation, through legislation, of "employees' capital funds," or "wage-earners' funds." Early in the seventies, proposals for such a program for "industrial democracy" were introduced in Denmark, but were finally abandoned owing to a lack of interest on the part of important labor unions. In Sweden, LO, the central organization of blue-collar workers, has pushed this question insistently, so much so that it has prevailed upon the Social-Democratic government to offer a bill on wage-earners' funds in Parliament, one to be financed through an excess profits tax on a few thousand companies and an increase in the general payroll tax—together amounting to about one third of one percent of GNP per year. It is a strongly watered-down version of the original LO proposal, which aimed at a gradual take-over of most of the power over Swedish industry. The current proposal calls for funds, managed by government-appointed boards having a majority of representatives of wage and salary earners, that will be permitted to own a maximum of 10 percent of the value of shares on the Swedish stock market. The bill was passed by Parliament in December 1983. The business sector, not surprisingly, is still vehemently opposed, and the opposition parties have promised to abolish it if they win the next election.

What will happen in the next few years is an open question. The basic problem, however, remains: how to induce workers—under

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conditions of full employment, and who have an immediate interest in bettering their wages—to go along with the need for earmarking a great part of any forthcoming increases of the national income to two pressing tasks: the accumulation of capital for new and better workplaces *and* the collection of taxes sufficient to meet the growing demands of the public sector. It seems more than likely that some sort of democratization of both capital accumulation and workers' influence in industrial life will be a progressive development in all democratic societies, not least in those of the North.

ENDNOTES

[1]This paper is based partly on statistical and other material concerning levels of living and social policy developments from work in progress at the Swedish Institute for Social Research.

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Erling Olsen

The Dilemma of the Social-Democratic Labor Parties

AFTER FORTY YEARS OF LEADERSHIP in Scandinavian politics, the Social-Democratic Labor parties in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden were seriously challenged in the late 1970s —and they are still in trouble. All could explain part of their difficulties by the fact that they had been in office during at least one of the two worldwide recessions that followed the oil price shocks of the 1970s. Some could also point to their traditional internal problems of finding common denominators for different groups within their party. Neither of these explanations can be rejected, but they help little in answering the more fundamental question: Do the difficulties of Nordic Social-Democratic Labor parties indicate that their time has run out—do they in fact have a future?

The question is as simple as the answer is difficult. To try to give one, we have to ask whether the difficulties of the parties also could be explained by some more fundamental inadequacies of their theoretical models, practical policies, and political organizations. This is in fact what many Nordic Social Democrats have done, and the answers given have often been affirmative. This has started a new round of rethinking and reevaluation in the parties, aimed at developing strategies for new progress. The internal party debates show little disagreement about the nature of the problems the parties are up against, but there are wide differences of opinion on the development of strategies for new progress. The nature and dimensions of the problems and the differences of opinion on appropriate strategies for new progress can best be understood if the origins, the

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ideologies, and the historical developments of the Nordic Social-Democratic Labor parties are kept in mind. Thus I shall start with a description of the labor movements in their early years and follow them to their maturity in the 1930s, when their ideology became the motivating force in the Nordic countries. Having come that far, I will show how the movements changed their societies and themselves during their thirty to forty best years, and then analyze their less happy years of seniority, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, attempting to tell what went wrong and why. This analysis should lead to an explanation of the answers given to the most important question discussed in the Scandinavian Social-Democratic Labor parties today.

Although the Nordic countries are often considered to be rather homogeneous, they are in fact quite different. So also are their labor movements. Furthermore, both the economic environment and the political background of the Icelandic and the Finnish Social-Democratic Labor parties are enough unlike those of the other Nordic countries that the Finnish and Icelandic stories will be told in only a few words. The emphasis of this article will be on the parties of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. But even they are rather different. Much could be said about their dissimilarities, and when it is necessary for the understanding of what has been going on, they will be elucidated. But the main emphasis in this paper will be on the *similarities* and on the general conclusions that can be drawn from the experiences of these movements.

THE YOUNG LABOR MOVEMENTS

The Scandinavian labor movements were inspired primarily by those on the Continent. These were Marxist movements, and while the ideas regarding the necessity of revolution and violence found no place in the Scandinavian version, most of the remaining Marxist ideas—the labor theory of value, the theory of immiseration, the theory of the state as a tool to be used by capital to exploit labor, the theory of the inevitability of recurrent and still more serious crises, and socialism as the final solution—were accepted in principle.

Although theory was important, the behavior of the Scandinavian labor movements was fairly pragmatic right from the start. There was close cooperation between the unions and the Labor parties,

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and because of this, the movement took for granted that it would improve both the working and living conditions of the laboring classes. But the timing of this interaction and its organization were different in the three Scandinavian countries owing to dissimilarities in economic environment and political background.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, Denmark was more urbanized and more industrialized than Norway or Sweden. For the most part, however, its industries were small ones, usually crafts, and the typical entrepreneur was a master employing a few journeymen and apprentices. This early urbanization and industrialization helped establish the trade union movement in Denmark rather early. The first unions of importance were formed in the early 1870s, and because of the dominance of crafts, were organized along these lines rather than by industry. The national organization of labor unions had therefore to be a federation of the national craft unions. The Danish National Federation of Craft Unions had its beginnings as early as 1866 and was fully established by 1898. The political arm of the Danish labor movement, the Danish Social-Democratic Labor party, was created in 1871, when Louis Pio founded a Danish branch of the International Workingmen's Association.

The urbanization and industrialization of the 1850s and 60s had created an increasing demand for labor that favored unionization. The economic recession of the 1870s, however, crushed most of the unions. The police for their part did what they could to stop the Danish branch of the International, and in 1877, persuaded Pio to leave the country forever. He went to the United States on a one-way ticket paid for by the police. But in 1879 the Danish labor movement was reorganized, as one body with two arms: the union and the Party. The objective of the former was to take issue with employers through collective bargaining aimed at improving pay and working conditions; the latter was to work for the same ends politically, in the Parliament and in the municipal councils. The unions were to give the Party financial support and urge their members to join it, although they were not obliged to do so. The Party was to give the unions heavy representation in the party boards, and their members were urged to join a union—but, again, were not obliged to do so. The first Social Democrat was elected to the Danish Parliament in 1884. The Parliament turned out to be not only the battleground of the Party's fight for socialism, but also the place where

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cooperation with other parties could take place—for example, the Danish Farmers' Liberal party *(Venstre),* which also fought for universal suffrage and majority rule.

Urbanization and industrialization came later in Sweden than in Denmark, but when the Swedish industries did take off, they grew much faster and developed in a different direction. The early Danish industries had depended on the products of agriculture, while the early Swedish industries were based on those of forestry and mining. Unlike the crafts-dominated Danish industries, with their small units of production, the early Swedish industries were dominated by larger units using new techniques. One further difference was that the early Danish industries were producing primarily for the home market, whereas Sweden in the 1890s developed an important, competitive export industry and created an industrial tradition at home.

Because of Sweden's rather late urbanization and industrialization, its labor movement did not get started until the 1880s, and when it did, the unions gained ground in the new industries. Where Danish labor had been unionized predominantly by crafts, Swedish labor was mostly unionized in industries. The Swedish labor unions were also more centralized in their organization than the Danish, but not as centralized as those of Norway. To some extent, this reflects the different degrees of concentration in the industries of the three countries. The ties between the unions and the Party were also stronger in Sweden than in Denmark. When the Swedish Social-Democratic Labor party was established in 1889, most labor unions collectively enrolled their members into it. And when the Swedish National Organization of Labor Unions (*Landsorganisationen*—LO) was established in 1898, membership in the Party was made compulsory for all union members. This was soon modified, however. Nevertheless, the Swedish Party received more financial and moral support from the unions than the Danish Party did from theirs.

The political environment in Sweden also differed from that of Denmark during the second half of the nineteenth century. Democracy, for example, had not been carried as far as in Denmark. Both the Liberal party and the Social-Democratic Labor party had constitutional reform at the top of their list of priorities, and thus both welcomed close cooperation. Indeed, in 1896 the first Social Democrat, Hjalmar Branting, was elected to the Swedish Parliament on a Liberal ticket.

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Norway, during the second half of the nineteenth century, was less urbanized and industrialized than Denmark, but more so than Sweden. The early Norwegian industries were concentrated on a limited number of products—for example, paper and pulp, iron and steel—that were produced by relatively big units of production. The rather early start of the Norwegian industries and the high degree of concentration made it possible for the first labor unions to begin their activities, as in Denmark, in the early 1870s. The recession that crushed most of the Danish unions, however, also destroyed most of Norway's, but they were reestablished during the late 1890s.

In Norway, the whole situation was quite complex, made so by the political problems of the country. Of these, three factors were of principal importance. First, majority rule had been introduced in 1884, three years before the start of the Norwegian Social-Democratic Labor party. Thus constitutional reform was not an issue that could lead, as it had in Sweden, to close cooperation between the Social Democrats and the Liberals. Second, there was direct competition in the labor unions between the Liberals, who dominated many of the early labor unions, and the Social Democrats. Third, Norwegian politics were influenced by a strong antagonism between the center of the country and the periphery. This antagonism was obvious inside each of the political parties and inside each of the national interest groups, including the national labor unions. Because of it, strong, national labor unions proved difficult to establish. But the effort was made in spite of that. The structure of the Norwegian National Association of Labor Unions, which was founded in 1899, was more centralized than similar associations in the other Scandinavian countries. For that and other reasons, only one fourth of the union members were affiliated with it at the start. The early twentieth century, however, brought a new wave of industrialization based on hydroelectric power, with the new industries characterized by large units of production. This development favored the growth of the unions affiliated with the National Association. In addition, the central strike funds, established in 1907, and the Association's collective agreements with the Norwegian Employers' National Association also did much to bolster local union bargaining. Furthermore, the growth of the Association strengthened the Norwegian Social-Democratic Labor party, not only because the Party was heavily represented in the boards of the unions belonging

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to it, but also because these unions automatically enrolled their members in the Party.

In summary, we can say that there were obvious differences between the three early Scandinavian labor movements, but there were also similarities. Each regarded itself as a body with two arms—the union and the Party. In addition, they all saw their movements grow. Union membership grew because the unions were able to obtain remarkable increases in real wages owing to the new waves of industrialization and the rapid increases in productivity. At the outbreak of World War I, union membership was widespread in all the Scandinavian countries. The Social-Democratic Labor party had the earliest start and slowest growth in Denmark, but that growth was steady and sustained. In Norway and Sweden, the starts came later, but the parties grew faster. The result was that in 1914, all three garnered about 30 percent of the vote in the national elections.

To the Scandinavian Social Democrats, the growth of their movements was seen as a verification of the Marxian theory of the inevitable growth of the labor class. But the increase in real wages was clearly at odds with the theory of immiseration. For this reason, the labor theory of value was gradually given up as a reasonable explanation of the mechanism of the market. It was still important politically because it made labor the only real source of value, but it could not be used as a relevant theory of prices and wages in a capitalist market economy. So the Social Democrats went neo-classic: they became convinced that employers could afford to pay a wage equal to the value of the marginal products of labor. This told them that technical progress would not impoverish labor but enrich it. It told them, too, that unions could and should do whatever was possible to bring up wages to the ever-increasing values of the marginal product of labor.

As for the theories of the class struggle and of the state as a tool to be used by capital to exploit labor, there were differences of opinion within all the Scandinavian Social-Democratic Labor parties. Some party members remained orthodox Marxists, but others advocated cooperation between the classes and favored the use of legislative machinery and the powers of the state as a means of improving the living conditions of the working class. By the mid-1930s, all three parties had given up the orthodox Marxist views, but the roads traveled to moderate reformism were quite different.

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The Danes were the first to discover that cooperation could be more profitable to labor than a long and bitter class struggle. After a national conflict between labor and employers, the Danish National Association of Labor Unions and the Danish National Association of Employers came to an agreement, in September 1899, regarding some fundamental rules of the game, an agreement that has often been called the "constitution" of the Danish labor market. Its basic principles were joint consultation and negotiation and an absolute obligation for individual members of the labor unions and the employers' associations to live up to their commitments according to the agreements made by their organizations. These principles were not acceptable to all union members: some preferred more direct action, unfettered by any formal rules; others could accept some rules, but opposed the degree of centralization expressed by the agreement. This opposition became outspoken during the First World War, when real wages were falling and the National Association could do little about it—because it had to follow the rules of the game. The opposition also gained ground after the Russian Revolution. But the Syndicalists, as many of those who were opposed called themselves, were never a real danger for the Danish labor unions. They finally lost their influence in the early 1920s, when labor lost some spectacular strikes that the Syndacalists had initiated.

The Danes were also the first to discover the benefits to be gained in joining a coalition government. During the First World War, the Social-Democratic leader accepted an office as "control minister" in such a government. Some members of the Party, however, were opposed to such participation, and this was one of several reasons some members left the Party and formed a new one, the Danish Communist party. During the 1920s, the Danish Communists obtained less than one percent of the vote at the general elections. From 1924 to 1926, Denmark had its first Social-Democratic government. In 1929 Denmark got a majority government under the leadership of the Social-Democratic Labor party in coalition with the Social Liberal party *(Det radikale Venstre)*.

The Swedes did not give up orthodox Marxism as easily as the Danes, and when they did, they had more trouble with those on the far left. But by the mid-1930s, the Swedish labor movement was stronger than the Danish and no less moderate. In 1906 the Swedish National Association of Labor Unions and the Swedish National

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Association of Employers made an agreement similar to the one forged in Denmark in September 1899. In 1909, however, labor lost a big strike, and half of the members left the Association. Some joined a new Syndicalist organization, but the Swedish Syndicalists were never able to organize more than 10 percent of labor, although they were a major influence on the Association. Under their sway, it became reluctant to negotiate nationwide wage agreements, and cautious when it did so. The Association also refrained from making too many new rules of the game. During the 1920s, the Syndicalists lost their influence and the National Association gradually got a firmer hold on the unions. But it was not until 1938 that the associations of labor unions and employers could make a new agreement—the *Saltsjobad* agreement—institutionalizing the rules of the game so that they were as comprehensive as the Danish system of labor relations.

The Party was also affected by the loss of the strike of 1909 and the subsequent division of union members into moderates and Syndicalists. The left wing of the party broke away in 1917 to form the Left Socialist party, which received 8 percent of the vote in the election that year. In 1919 it became a bona fide Communist party, joining the Comintern. The moderates remaining in the Swedish Social-Democratic Labor party decided to join a Liberal coalition government in 1917, which was followed three years later by a Social-Democratic minority government that lasted until 1926. From 1932 the Social Democrats were leaders of *de facto* majority governments in Sweden, and in the election of 1940, the Party won 54 percent of the vote.

The Norwegians were the last to give up their more orthodox Marxist ideas—only reluctantly and not until the 1930s. The Danes and the Swedes had seen their far-left wings leave the Social-Democratic Labor party; in Norway, however, the Far Left just took over, first in the unions and then in the Party. The Norwegian National Association of Labor Unions started off being more centralized than the other Scandinavian National Associations. In 1907 it created a central strike fund, and the same year a national agreement, like the Danish September 1899 agreement, was made between labor and employers in the metal industries. But there was a good deal of opposition to this centralization, part of which could be explained by the traditionally strong antagonism between the cen-

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ter and the periphery. Part of it, however, was out-and-out Syndicalism. The intellectual leader of the opposition was an editor from Trondheim, Martin Tranmael, who had returned to Norway from the United States in 1915, where he had been influenced by the IWW. The Syndicalists gained ground during the First World War when the already low living standards of Norwegian workers deteriorated even more, far more than in the other Scandinavian countries. As in Sweden, the Syndicalists were able to postpone the making of an agreement spelling out the rules of the game, such as the Danish September 1899 agreement, until the 1930s.

The Far Left never won a majority in the National Association of Labor Unions, although they did so in many of the local unions that had enrolled their members collectively in the Social-Democratic Labor party. These majorities made a Tranmael coup possible in 1918. The Far Left took over the Party, and from 1919 to 1923 it even belonged to the Comintern.

This was too much for the moderate party members. In 1921 some of them broke away to form a moderate wing. In 1927 the two parties reunited, but the Party still used a very Marxist vocabulary—which explains somewhat why the first Social-Democratic minority government in 1928 lasted only eighteen days. But during the early 1930s, the moderates finally gained the upper hand. The development of a fascist movement in Europe and the emergence of such a movement in Norway as well convinced the Norwegian labor movement that their first order of priority should be democracy, and then socialism. The election of 1933 gave the Party more than 40 percent of the votes, and from 1935 on, Norway had a Social-Democratic government.

Having said this much of the three Scandinavian labor movements, we need a few paragraphs on the young labor movements in the other two Nordic countries, Finland and Iceland. Since industrialization and urbanization came later in these countries than in the others, their labor movements of course had a later start. Their cultures and traditions were also somewhat different, and above all, Finland and Iceland were not sovereign nations when their labor movements took off. Hence, the political arm of the movements—their Social-Democratic Labor parties—found it rather difficult to get a response. The struggle between classes within the countries was to some extent overshadowed by the struggle for national independ-

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ence. The young Finnish and Icelandic labor movements also had a rather orthodox Marxist philosophy in common, and seem to have been more radical than their Scandinavian counterparts. But for many reasons, there were also great differences between them.

At the beginning of this century, the economic structure and the cultural tradition of Finland reflected both the country's proximity to Sweden and parts of the two countries' common history. At that time, however, Finland was tied to Russia as a grand duchy under the Tsar. It did have some home rule, however, and this was extended after Russia's 1905 Revolution. The Finnish Social-Democratic Labor party, established in 1899, took advantage of these opportunities, and in the general election of 1916 captured a majority of the Finnish *lantdag,* giving Finland a Social-Democratic administration. The Finnish Social Democrats were influenced not only by the Scandinavian labor movements, but also by what happened in Russia. During the Russian Revolution, many Finnish Social Democrats went Communist and many participated as Reds in the Finnish civil war that followed the revolution.

The Whites won the civil war, and Finland became a sovereign nation with democratic political institutions. The years immediately after the war were difficult ones for the Social-Democratic Labor party. Externally, it suffered from being associated in the public mind as part of the beaten Reds. Internally, it had problems with radical groups that were opposed to the Party taking any government responsibility until it had regained a majority. Yet the Party profited from the fact that, until 1944, no Communist party was allowed in Finland. Stimulated by developments in the Scandinavian countries, the moderates gradually gained ground in the Social-Democratic Labor party. From 1926 to 1927, Vaino Tanner headed a Social-Democratic minority government, and from 1937 the Party took part in several coalition governments in close cooperation with the smallholders' Agrarian party.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Iceland was little urbanized and industrialized, most of its inhabitants being poor peasants and fishermen. Nevertheless, a labor movement was started, the stronghold of which was the seamen's union. Although home rule was granted to Iceland by Denmark in 1904, relations with that country remained the all-important political issue. Above all, Icelanders wanted genuine independence. Thus there was little room for

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a Social-Democratic Labor party, but one was established all the same in 1916. The whole Icelandic labor movement, in fact, was reorganized in 1916. Part of the inspiration came from young journeymen and students returning from Copenhagen where they had learned about socialism and the Scandinavian labor movements. Like the latter, the Icelandic labor movement was considered to be a body with two arms, and a National Association of Icelandic Labor Unions was created simultaneously with the Icelandic Social-Democratic Labor party. But unlike the labor unions and the Labor parties of the other Nordic countries, those in Iceland were fully identified with each other up until 1941.

In 1916 the Icelandic Social-Democratic Labor party, with its emphasis on the class struggle, was a rather orthodox Marxist party. Icelanders, however, were much more concerned about their struggle with Denmark. The Party therefore received little public response on general questions, but in individual cases affecting labor, party members gave the unions a good deal of support.

In 1918 Iceland came very close to having its dream of real independence realized. Thenceforth, it would have only to share a king with the Danes. The significance of this for the Social-Democratic Labor party was that relations with Denmark would no longer be the main issue in the general elections. The electoral system and the relative overrepresentation of the rural areas, however, made it difficult for the Party to get its proper share of seats in the Althing (the Icelandic Parliament), so that one of the first things the Party had to work for was electoral reform. This came in 1933.

The election of 1934 increased the number of Social-Democratic seats in the Althing spectacularly. Four years earlier, the more radical members had left the Party to establish a Communist party. This cleared the way for the participation of the Social Democrats in a coalition government, and since that time, the Party has become very influential.

THE MATURE LABOR MOVEMENTS

By the mid-1930s, the Scandinavian Social-Democratic labor movements had reached maturity. From then on until the end of the 1960s, the movements had some of their best years—by no means easy ones, but nonetheless rewarding. From an ideological point of

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view, the years can be divided into two periods. During the first, from the mid-1930s to the end of the 1940s, there was a general distrust of the market mechanism. The Scandinavian labor movements adhered to the old Marxist doctrine about the inevitability of recurrent and still more serious crises, and seemed to believe, too, in socialism as the final solution to most problems. During the second period, from the early 1950s to the late 1960s, there was renewed interest in the market mechanism. The Social-Democratic Labor parties were more or less convinced that, by following Keynes's theories, a high and stable level of employment could be maintained in a mixed economy. They also began to doubt whether orthodox socialism could be their final goal. As Marxism as an ideology began to fade, they found that it had to be replaced with something else. But again, what it was replaced with differed from country to country, reflecting diverse traditions, economic environments, and political backgrounds.

The years of the first period can be divided into the years of crisis, up to 1939; the years of war, from 1939 to 1945; and the years of reconstruction, from 1946 to 1950. During the whole period, the basic philosophy remained, for the most part, unchanged. Its policies of protectionism and bilateral exchange in external relations, government intervention in domestic life, and the buildup and extension of the social welfare system were found to be appropriate for alleviating the various crises, reducing wartime hardship, and promoting reconstruction. Dirigisme—economic planning and control by the state—was to replace laissez-faire. What was important, however, was that the economic environments and political backgrounds of the Social-Democratic Labor parties of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden were different during the years of crisis, war, and reconstruction.

Denmark, because it was so dependent upon world markets for export of its agricultural products, was probably hit harder by the world economic crisis of the 1930s than were Norway and Sweden. The Norwegians were even more dependent upon these markets, but their main exports, forest products, were in a less difficult position. The Swedes were the least dependent upon world markets, and therefore their industries managed best during these years. Neutralist Sweden prospered during the Second World War, while Norway and Denmark, both occupied by the Germans, suffered. Because of

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this, Sweden was the wealthiest of the Scandinavian countries by far. Norway, on the other hand, came out of the war with serious problems of reconstruction.

Like other impoverishing wars, the Second World War brought social unrest and made the working class more militant. These attitudes were reflected in the postwar programs of the Scandinavian Social-Democratic Labor parties, which all moved to the left. They were reflected, too, in the first postwar general elections, when Communists began to eat seriously into the Social Democrats' lead. In the 1945 general election in Denmark, the Communists earned 12 percent of the vote, reducing the portion usually given to the Social Democrats from 44 percent to 32. Part of this decline can be traced to the cooperation by both the Danish Social-Democratic Labor party and the Danish National Association of Labor Movements with the Germans during the Occupation. In Norway, the Communists also got about 12 percent of the vote in the 1945 election, but the Social Democrats maintained their 41 percent—perhaps because they had *fought* the Germans from the first day of the Occupation. In Sweden, the 1940 election had given the Social Democrats 54 percent of the vote. This could be regarded to some extent as a vote of confidence for the leader of the government during wartime. In the election of 1944, this was reduced to 47 percent, while the Communists received 10. In all the Scandinavian countries, the Communist vote was cut in half at the next general elections. It was obvious, however, that the Social-Democratic Labor parties now had some real competition from parties to their left—and that competition remains. In all the Scandinavian countries, the parties to the left of the Social Democrats also won some seats in the governing bodies of the labor unions, where they became a problem to the Social-Democratic union leaders, and still are.

Ideology, tradition, economic environment, and political background combined made Norway the most "dirigist" society in Scandinavia. Norway had more state-owned industries than Sweden, more state-owned banks and credit institutions, more government intervention in the markets for labor, capital, and commodities, and a more active regional development policy. Denmark left more to the market mechanism than the other two. It had practically no state-owned industries, and the government intervened only moderately into the markets for labor, capital, and commodities. Red tape was

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a problem, but not of the same magnitude as in Norway and Sweden. The latter trod a middle road between Norway and Denmark, but was perhaps the country that had the fastest and most comprehensive buildup of its social welfare system. It was also the richest of the three.

Around 1950 the Scandinavian Social Democrats gave up the last vestiges of orthodox Marxist theory. Casting aside the belief in the inevitability of recurring economic crises, they accepted instead the Keynesian theory of maintaining a high and stable level of employment through appropriate fiscal and monetary policies. The state obviously could no longer be regarded as a capitalist tool to exploit labor, but one to be used by a Social-Democratic labor movement to secure full employment. The development of the social welfare system also made it difficult to regard the state as an enemy of the working class. On the contrary; in many cases, it looked as if the state was one of its best friends. The Social Democrats could truly say, *"L'état—c'est nous."*

But government intervention into economic life was also reduced. Greater scope was given to the market mechanism, and protectionism was gradually given up. This change in attitude was attributable to the people's weariness with wartime regulations and with the first postwar poverty-ridden period, and to the feeling of togetherness with the Free World that fighting the Nazis had engendered. Not to be overlooked, however, is the generous economic support offered to the Scandinavian countries by the Marshall Plan if they joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

The 1950s and especially the 1960s brought dramatic economic growth and structural change to all the Scandinavian countries. All were able to maintain high, stable employment; during the 1960s, even Denmark had full employment. A new wave of industrialization made possible the absorption of farm workers and farmers who had been displaced by mechanization and a rapid increase in productivity. The new Danish industries, typically small and medium-sized, were specialized and export-oriented.

In Norway, the new wave of industrialization was somewhat different. Where Danish industrialization had been left to the market mechanism, the Norwegian state took a quite active part in the development of new industries. Where the Danes had developed a great number of very different small and medium-sized industries,

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the Norwegian state concentrated on a more limited number of modern large-scale, capital-intensive industries, for example, in the metal and petrochemical fields. The result was a greater industrial and geographical concentration in Norway than in Denmark, which in turn revived the old antagonism between the center and the periphery.

The geographical concentration of industries and the depopulation of the rural areas became a problem in Sweden too, although not as serious as in Norway. The Swedish government also took an active part in the process of industrialization, but not as vigorously as did the Norwegian. But where the Norwegian government tried to set up completely new industries, the government in Sweden directed its energies toward modernizing and expanding the existing ones, through, for example, the relocation of labor. An active labor market policy, in which workers were trained for new jobs and moved geographically to areas where industry was expanding, was welcomed as a means of maintaining full employment. Later on it would be regarded as somewhat inhuman to move people from their place of origin, and in the process, depopulate the rural areas and the small towns.

During the 1960s, the "center-periphery" problem became an important issue in both Norwegian and Swedish politics. It surfaced, too, in Denmark, but was not discussed with the same passion. The Social-Democratic Labor parties, however, were all stamped with a centralist image, which they tried to avoid by talking of more decentralization. But the public found it difficult to believe them.

Foreign policy also created problems for the Social-Democratic Labor parties in Norway and Denmark, which had joined NATO in 1949. The parties in both countries had an old neutralist tradition, but the experiences of the Second World War convinced most of their members that they had to join the defense of the Free World. The old traditions and the events of the Vietnam War, however, made life easier for the parties to the left of the Social-Democratic Labor parties. Since Sweden stayed neutral, the Swedish party of course did not have this problem.

By the end of the 1960s, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark all had some quite moderate Social-Democratic Labor parties, all of which had given up Marxism for some sort of Keynesianism and a welfare state ideology. In addition, they had held the reins of government

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during the long periods of growth and social progress. Now, however, they were at the age of seniority, and were challenged by a new Left and a new Right, both of which were rather aggressive.

By the end of the 1960s, Finland and Iceland also had some very moderate Social-Democratic Labor parties. Like those of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, they had been quite influential during the periods that saw the transformation of their societies into modern welfare states. But they, too, were running into all the problems of seniority. Unlike the Scandinavian parties, however, competing parties to the left of them had reduced their share of the vote to about 25 percent in the general elections.

Starting in 1944, the Communist party in Finland was allowed to participate in elections, and they blamed the Social Democrats for Finland's participation in the war against Russia as a German ally. After the Second World War, there was no question that Finland would have to maintain good relations with Russia, and this made it difficult for the Finnish Social Democrats to fight the parties to their left.

In Iceland, the problems came after 1936, when the French experiment with a People's Front government gave many Icelandic Social Democrats the idea to integrate with the Communists. The majority, however, were opposed. In 1938 a draft agreement between the two parties was rejected. The left wing withdrew from the Social-Democratic Labor party to integrate with the Communists in a new Socialist party. A short time after the split, the reduced Social-Democratic Labor party joined a coalition government. This created a vacuum for opposition from the left, and the new Socialist party knew how to use it. By the end of World War II, the relations between Iceland and the United States also became an issue from which the leftist Socialist party knew how to profit.

THE PROBLEMS OF SENIORITY

The campus uprisings in the United States during the 1960s and the May 1968 events in France paved the way for the New Left in the Nordic countries. By way of the media, the ideas of the New Left moved from the academic world into parts of the public sector. But the New Left never really influenced the labor unions and the blue-

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collar world that its academic elite talked so much about. Rather, it remained essentially an elitist academic phenomenon.

From an intellectual point of view, the New Left was strongest in Norway and weakest in Denmark. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that the New Left had its strongholds in the university departments of psychology, sociology, and political science, and these traditionally have been stronger in Norway (and Sweden) than in Denmark. From an organizational point of view, however, the New Left was strongest in Denmark and weakest in Sweden. One explanation is that the labor unions, which never really learned to like the New Left, were less influential in the Danish Social-Democratic Labor party than in the Norwegian and the Swedish. Another is that the Norwegian—and especially—the Swedish parties were much more stable and much stronger than the Danish party.

From the early 1950s to the present, membership in the Scandinavian labor unions increased, owing to urbanization, industrialization, and the unionization of white-collar workers in the service trades and the public sector. Traditionally, Swedish labor unions often made their members collectively join the Swedish Social-Democratic Labor party, strengthening the Party and constantly widening its membership. In Norway, fewer labor unions joined the Party collectively, and in Denmark, collective membership did not exist at all. Thus both parties were weaker than the Swedish party, and since 1950, have had a decreasing number of members.

In the early 1950s, party members accounted for approximately one third of the votes cast for all the Scandinavian Social-Democratic Labor parties. By the early 1980s, they still represented one third in Sweden, but had dropped to about one sixth in Norway and one twelfth in Denmark. This indicates that party members in Denmark and Norway may not be as typically representative of the Social-Democratic electorate as they were thirty years ago. What is important, too, is the decline in the number of members attending party meetings. Part of this can be attributed to the increasing demands on the time and attention of most people, particularly the middle-aged with children at home. Both father and mother usually have a job. Both often commute long distances to and from their work. There, they can choose from a variety of social activities, committee work, and so on, to take part in, and can, in addition, take advantage of

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opportunities to educate themselves in new fields. At home, they have apartments or houses and gardens to take care of, and of course they want to follow and support the development of their children. For this reason, most parents maintain close contact—individually or through parent-teacher associations—with their children's teachers. Television, listening to music, and reading are other activities that also vie for their leisure time. Only someone with strong political motivations will pass up these pursuits to attend meetings. And only someone with even stronger political motivation will accept an office in a party organization.

A motivated Social Democrat is usually a little to the left of the political center; a strongly motivated Social Democrat, quite far. This may give the party organization its leftist bias. Those who join the Party as individual members are usually to the left of those who vote for the Party in the general elections; those who attend party meetings may be to the left of those who merely join; and those running for office may be even farther to the left than these. This built-in bias is strongest in the weakest of the party organizations, that is, the Danish Social-Democratic Labor party, and the New Left was able to establish a stronger presence there than in the Norwegian and the Swedish parties. But it is there too.

The New Left was anti-Keynesian; it attacked the Social Democrats for having given up the Marxian theory and wanted it to return to Marxism, although in new versions. Despite the fact that part of its theory was formulated in American universities, the New Left nevertheless was not only anticapitalist but anti-American. It accused the Social Democrats of Denmark and Norway of having joined NATO, and the Social Democrats of Sweden of having in fact done the same, despite their formal neutrality.

The New Left was also anti-EEC, which it regarded as a capitalist club invented to exploit the poor countries of the Third World and to impoverish labor in Europe. It attacked Denmark's membership in the Common Market, and the cooperation of Sweden and Norway with this bloc through the European Free Trade Association.

The New Left was anticentralist and found economic and political cooperation in the European community to be part of an unacceptable centralism. It also attacked the Social-Democratic governments for having centralized domestic economic and political life, leaving the most important decisions to small groups of party and

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labor unions leaders. It wanted instead a decentralized, unauthoritarian society. Some of the advocates of the New Left came very close to the old Anarchist and Syndicalist ideas.

The New Left was antigrowth and anticonsumerism. It believed in the theories of the Club of Rome on the limits to growth. It attacked the Social Democrats as being too materialistic, and advocated zero or low growth. It wanted to conserve resources, protect the environment, and avoid the use of nuclear power. It also wanted to emphasize values that could not be measured in terms of money.

The Social-Democratic Labor parties were ill-prepared to answer attacks from the New Left. At the beginning of the seventies, they were even a bit afraid of this vigorous, semirevolutionary movement that in part seemed to be right in its criticism of contemporary society. Thus they gave in to some of the criticism and tried to be "young" with what they believed were the youth of the North. But this left them open to criticism from the New Right, whose denunciations were even stronger.

The New Right started as a populist movement based on a nonacademic supply-side economic philosophy. Its supporters were mostly low- and middle-income ordinary people, fed up with red tape and high taxes. In 1973 Mogens Glistrup created a tax protest party in Denmark, which earned 16 percent of the vote in the election that year. It has since been reduced to 9 percent, but it is still alive. Anders Lange in Norway created a party like Glistrup's, and it received 5 percent of the vote in the 1973 election, but this was reduced to less than 2 percent in the next. (Glistrup's party was more successful than Lange's perhaps because of Glistrup personally. He is extremely intelligent, dynamic, and full of humor.) No such party has been able to be formed in Sweden.

A New Right tax protest party could be established in Denmark simply because that country had had an old right-wing coalition government from 1968 to 1971 that had done nothing to stop the growth of the public sector and alleviate the tax burden. The Norwegians had had a similar experience with their nonsocialist governments until 1976. Hence, Swedes on the "old" right believed that they could do the job if they ever got the chance.

The New Right was considerably influential both in Denmark and in Norway—not so much because of its parliamentary activities but because the old parties were afraid of losing votes to it. It was, how-

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ever, not only the populist New Right that influenced Scandinavian politics during the 1970s and early 1980s, but the academic New Right based on Milton Friedman's monetarist economic theories as well.

Friedman, a University of Chicago economist who had received the Nobel Prize for his studies of the relations between the money supply and economic activity, claimed that Keynesian monetary and fiscal policies were at best inefficient and at worst harmful. Consequently, he recommended that governments give up Keynesian short-term anticyclical policies, and instead pursue a long-term policy of growth without inflation by allowing the money supply to grow at a steady but limited rate, for example, 3 percent per year. In the short run, Friedman said, this might cause uncomfortable fluctuations in production, employment, the rates of interest, and the rates of exchange, but in the long run, would lead to the desired growth without inflation.

During the 1970s, this economic philosophy was more or less accepted by the financial communities and the political Right of the Western world. From 1978 on, it guided the economic policies of the Thatcher government in England, and two years later of the Reagan Administration in the United States. But even the Central Bank and the treasuries of the Scandinavian countries were tarred with the monetarist brush.

What counted in Scandinavian politics, however, was not the academic virtues of monetarism, but its claim that Keynesian policies would lead to inflation, then stagnation, an increase in public expenditures, and finally a heavier burden of taxation—exactly what the Scandinavians had experienced during the 1970s. The two staggering increases in the price of oil brought two-digit inflation, and the recessions that followed created unemployment and low growth rates. The recessions hit Denmark the hardest. In Sweden, the effects on employment were less harrowing because of heavy government subsidies to distressed industries. The increase in oil prices, however, brought boom conditions to Norway's developing offshore and petrochemical industries. As a result, the Norwegian government borrowed so much money abroad that Norway was able to maintain high employment, despite the international recession.

In all the Scandinavian countries, public expenditure grew apace throughout the 1970s, owing primarily to the many reforms of the

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1960s. During the happy sixties, when most people believed in long-lasting, high exponential growth of the GNP, many reforms were implemented, especially in health, education, and welfare. During the introductory years, the programs often called for only limited increases in public expenditures, but they had a built-in high exponential growth rate. During the 1970s, the growth of the GNP slowed down, but the high growth of public expenditure continued. That unemployment benefits demanded an increasing amount of money during the recessions is of course another reason for this unprecedented growth.

The result of all expenditures combined was to increase the burden of taxation in Norway and Sweden from about 40 percent of the GNP in the early 1970s to about 50 in the early 1980s. The corresponding Danish figures were about 35 and 45 percent. Revenues from North Sea oil helped the Norwegian government avoid having substantial budget deficits. During the early 1980s, however, the Swedish budget deficit came close to 10 percent of the GNP, and the Danish, close to 15 percent.

To fight inflation and improve the countries' international competitiveness, the Scandinavian Social-Democratic Labor parties accepted incomes policies that some of their members and a number of the labor unions did not like. In several cases, the policies created conflicts between the Party and the National Association of Labor Unions.

To reduce the growth in public expenditures, the Scandinavian Social-Democratic governments all had to make serious cuts in their budgets and do away with or delay part of the reforms of the 1960s. This was disappointing to many party members. To prevent the great budget deficits from adding too much to aggregate demand, the Danish and the Swedish governments had to sell government bonds to an extent never before seen. This caused an increase in the rate of interest, which was detrimental to employment.

In addition, the Finnish and the Icelandic Social-Democratic Labor parties were buffeted by attacks from both the New Left and the New Right, forcing them to do some hard thinking and to make some reevaluations aimed at developing strategies for new progress.

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STRATEGIES FOR NEW PROGRESS

The development of such strategies is by no means an easy task, and the internal party debates have just begun. There are wide differences of opinion both within each of the Nordic Social-Democratic parties and between them. It is therefore too early to talk of a common Nordic Social-Democratic strategy for new progress. The pessimists fear that the parties may end up as did the British Labor party, which moved so far to the left that it lost members and influence. The optimists can see dimly the contours of some strategies for new progress based on a realistic assessment of what the Nordic Social-Democratic Labor parties are up against.

First, the parties are up against an *economy* that to a great extent has developed according to their prescriptions and does not work satisfactorily. Economic growth is too low, inflation is too high, public expenditure is worrisome, and the burden of taxation so heavy that it has contributed to the creation of an underground economy and a decline in taxpayer morale. To overcome these difficulties, two strategies are proposed.

The first is inspired by some Cambridge (England) economists and the CERES *(Centre d'Études, Recherche et Éducation Socialiste)* group of the French Socialist party. Its key concepts are a new protectionism, a new isolationism, nationalization of part of the financial institutions and big industries, more dirigism, and a further extension of the public sector. This strategy has some support from some of the intellectuals and populists of the three Scandinavian Social-Democratic parties.

The second strategy is much more complex. First, it is based on the assumption that the recession is an international phenomenon, one that only sustained economic growth through international economic cooperation can alleviate. Hence, any temptation to go protectionist should be resisted. Second, it accepts that international economic cooperation cannot be successful unless it is followed up by some international political cooperation. Thus those in favor of this strategy also favor *de facto* political cooperation in Europe and in the Free World. But the issue is very touchy. The Swedish tradition of neutralism, Denmark's reservations when it joined the EEC, and Norway's outright refusal to do so, make it extremely difficult for the Scandinavian Social-Democratic Labor parties to accept a *de*

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jure extension of international political cooperation in the Western world.

This strategy will also let the private sector grow and stop the growth of the public sector's use of resources. This means that the public sector's share of the GNP will decline. This should reduce the budget deficits at first, and later on, the burden of taxation. It is not easy for Social Democrats to accept such a shift in policy. For years they have been advocating a fast, strong expansion of the public sector. Furthermore, to let the private sector grow and to fight inflation, this strategy emphasizes the necessity of continuous incomes policies. This is also difficult for many Social Democrats to accept, especially many labor union leaders. But it should be easier if these policies are prepared through tripartite negotiations between big business, big government, and big labor.

Yet it is not enough to let the private sector make reasonable profits to stimulate growth. It would also help if these profits were not taxed so long as they are ploughed back into production. This strategy favors a change in corporate taxation that would stimulate corporations to do just this and to discourage paying higher dividends to stockholders. To facilitate investments, the strategy also advocates a nonmonetarist, low-interest-rate credit policy. To compensate wage earners for the unequal distribution of wealth that will result from such a policy, various plans for economic and industrial democracy, employees' collective funds, and employee participation in the decision-making process have been discussed, but it has been difficult to make these plans attractive to wage earners.

The strategy further advocates a widespread public-private partnership in dynamic, expanding industries. With minor modifications, it is proposed that the market mechanism be accepted as the leading allocator of resources. This would be a concession to private industry by the Social Democrats. On the other hand, private industries should accept responsible government capital participation, as has been the case in Norway. The public-private partnership should be followed up by a reallocation of resources in the public sector, upgrading the services given to private industries. These services are, for example, R&D activities, education of the labor force, and activities that promote mobility of the labor market.

Technology is the next challenge to the Social-Democratic Labor parties. Many people are afraid that technological development will

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throw them out of work, and in fact this has already happened. To meet this challenge, two strategies are tendered. Both advocate serious technology assessments and employee participation in the decisions to introduce new technologies. But the two strategies are very different in their attitudes. The first wants to see a slowdown in the introduction of new technologies, especially in the public sector. The second also wants to be very selective in the choice of new technologies, but basically, it wants to speed up their use, especially in the public sector.

The selectivity recommended by the second strategy in effect emphasizes that new technologies should be more capital-saving than labor-saving, and that they should improve, not deteriorate, working conditions, protect or improve the environment in the widest sense of the word, and make it possible to pay higher wages. To speed up the use of such techniques, the government should make a series of relevant R&D contracts with private industries, provide the necessary education of the labor force, and promote labor market mobility. For this strategy, the use of new technology in the public sector is extremely important. This is in fact the only possibility of giving industries and citizens better service when the resources allocated to the public sector cannot be expanded.

The third factor challenging the Social-Democratic Labor parties is *sociology*. The underprivileged are no longer a majority but a minority. The number of blue-collar workers is declining and is now below the increasing numbers of white-collar workers. The first strategy recommends that the Social-Democratic Labor parties stick to their old bases, the underprivileged and the blue-collar workers; the second wants to expand the basis of the party by changing it from a class party to one based on a more general idea of solidarity.

The fourth challenge comes from *ideology* and theory. Marxism has long since been given up, traditional Keynesianism and the mere expansion of the public sector seem to create more problems than they solve, and monetarism is unthinkable as part of a Social-Democratic ideology. Two different strategies are proposed. The first wants a revival of Marxism in a modernized version; the second advocates a modern version of Keynesianism. What should be added to Keynesianism is self-restraint in the labor markets, the capital markets, the markets for goods and services, and the political system—that is, in the allocation of resources to the welfare system and

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in the structuring of this system. Restrained Keynesianism is a key word to this strategy.

Grass-roots movements and new, important one-dimensional issues are the fifth challenge to the hundred-year-old Scandinavian Social-Democratic Labor parties. Many of the latter are dividing the Scandinavians across old party lines. Hence, grass-roots movements that focus on such issues have gained ground. Among these are environmentalism, peace movements, antinuclear energy organizations, and popular movements against the country's participation in the European economy and in political integration with the Continent. Some of the grass-roots movements have an impressive number of members and a very active membership. They have been able to grab the spotlight to a much greater degree than the political parties—who have been at a loss as to what to do about it. Two strategies have been proposed.

The idea behind the first is the well known "If you can't beat them, join them." This strategy wants party members to join these movements in order to exert influence on them, and conversely, to give places in the party hierarchy to higher-ups in the movements so that members of the movement will thereby vote for the Party.

The second strategy acknowledges that the movements are one-dimensional expressions of attitudes, but emphasizes the multidimensional character of the political parties, and at the same time, comes to terms with the fact that some issues—nuclear power and EEC membership, for example—may divide the party's members. Consequently, this strategy recommends that the Social-Democratic Labor parties learn to live with such internal differences and that they pay heed to the concerns of the movements—without either seeking representation in the movements or giving the movements' leaders easy access to party offices.

The sixth challenge to the Scandinavian Social-Democratic Labor parties is their relation to the *labor unions*. I have already mentioned how sociological development and the necessity of incomes policies have made it difficult for the labor parties and the labor unions always to play the same game. In some cases this has led to tensions detrimental to both. To avoid such tensions, two strategies have been proposed. The first seeks to reestablish the old tradition of full agreement between the parties and the unions in all major decisions. The second accepts the fact that the parties and unions are

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different institutions, working in different fields and under different conditions. Consequently, they should be allowed to behave differently, but should consult together so that each knows what the other is doing and why.

The final challenge is to arrest the decline in the number of individual members in the *party organizations* and to increase the number of members, now a very modest one, attending party meetings. I have described how this decline in membership and lack of interest in party affairs tends to make the party organization less representative. Again, two strategies have been proposed. The first is in favor of reviving the old mass movements, for example, by better "marketing" and new party activities. The second accepts the fact that the party organizations can only motivate a modest number of the parties' most active constitutents. Hence, this strategy recommends that party members show a high degree of self-discipline, taking into account the more moderate points of view of other citizens who might cast their votes for the Party. Further, it wants to transform the party organizations into training institutions for Social Democrats whose political activities for the most part will take place outside the party organization.

The debates regarding which course to follow may conceivably go on for a long time before it becomes clear which of the different strategies the Nordic Social-Democratic Labor parties will eventually choose. It may therefore be too early to answer the fundamental question of whether the time of the Nordic Social-Democratic Labor parties has run out, or whether they do indeed have a future. Nevertheless, I believe that their futures will be as bleak as that of the British Labor party if they choose strategies of the first type, but that the more of the second they choose, the brighter their futures will be.

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Johan Jørgen Holst

The Pattern of Nordic Security

THE NORDIC COUNTRIES HAVE TRAVELED different roads in their search for security.[1] Three of them—Denmark, Iceland, and Norway—were present at the creation of the Atlantic alliance and remain firmly committed to the Western system of defense agreements. Sweden has chosen a course of nonalignment aiming for neutrality in the event of war. Its overriding foreign policy objective has been buttressed by a strong national defense organization built around the products of a modern and versatile armaments industry. Finland has concluded a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union as a means of reassurance, and at the same time, through skillful diplomacy, has established "the land of the thousand lakes" as one of the neutral interlocutors in the process of East-West cooperation and negotiation.

The pattern that emerged during the first decade of the postwar period has stabilized, and its preservation and management exert a normative influence on the security policies of all the Nordic states. Attempts to create a Nordic defense community, involving only the three "core countries" of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, failed in 1948-49, primarily because Norway insisted that such a community establish clear links with the democratic states of the West, a move that Sweden was opposed to. Denmark found itself in the middle, but was unable to bridge the chasm between Swedish and Norwegian perspectives on the organization of security in the North.[2] The Nordic split was essentially one that ran along the midridge of the Scandinavian peninsula, and it reflected above all experiences during the Second World War. Sweden had managed to stay outside the

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war, although its neutrality had been stretched to accommodate to the shifting fortunes of war—at Norway's expense, in the early years, as German troops were granted the right of transit to occupied Norway. Norway was a member of the Allies by way of its government-in-exile in London, which at an early stage identified Atlantic cooperation as a necessary framework for the maintenance of peace in the postwar era; as the Norwegians saw it, the Anglo-Saxon powers would have to be made to adhere strictly to their responsibilities in Europe.[3] Norway's postwar leaders were marked by their wartime experiences, either in the Norwegian resistance movement, in German camps, or in helping to achieve Allied victory on the "external front." A brief spell of bridge-building, based on high hopes for the United Nations—whose first secretary-general, Trygve Lie, was the wartime foreign minister of the Norwegian government in London—ended as the Iron Curtain went down in Europe and threatened to remove Finland from the Nordic family of nations.

The states of the Nordic area did not constitute a coherent security system. The arrangements they reached became intertwined with the broader pattern of the security order that had gradually emerged in Europe. Sweden could look back upon a century and a half of peace and successful neutrality. Denmark was an appendix to a Germany that had never been successfully integrated into the balance-of-power system in Europe, and thus sought connections to counteract the forces drawing it into the affairs of the Continent. Norway had no tradition of an independent policy. The political struggle in the nineteenth century had focused on the dissolution of the union that had united the Scandinavian peninsula under the king in Stockholm. The Norwegian perspective was that of a maritime nation; it faced the Atlantic, its back turned on Europe. The country's physical configuration was translated into popular attitudes and shaped the outlook of the incumbent elite. Iceland gained full independence during the Second World War cognizant of occupying an important position in the Battle of the Atlantic. Since neither Denmark nor any other Nordic country could protect Iceland, it looked to American protection as the only available option. The wartime arrangements were woven into the postwar pattern. Finland had gone through a civil war in the wake of the Russian Revolution and liberation from Russia. The heroic struggle during the Winter War and the "Continuation War" led Finland to join with the "wrong side" during the

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Second World War. Its postwar options were constrained both by the Allied victory and the necessity of paying war reparations to the Soviet Union. The process of "Finlandization," however, became an exercise in skillful maneuvering to avoid the fate of Eastern Europe. Finland has been supremely successful in preserving political independence and a democratic political culture. Close relations with the Soviet Union of course restrain Finnish foreign policy, but they also provide a key to Finnish independence, even though they have been so often misinterpreted in the West as Soviet chains.

Although the Nordic states did occupy key positions in the balance of power in the modern period, these were shaped by its shifting configurations. They were able to live within the balance of power in Europe, even if they played little or no role in its management. Peace was threatened, however, whenever Russia went into alliance with the dominant power on the Continent; a replay of the Tilsit treaties always spelled danger. As for "Scandinavian solidarity," its limits were tellingly demonstrated in the Dano-Prussian War over Schleswig in 1864, the Russo-Finnish Winter War in 1939, and the German attack on Norway and Denmark in April 1940.

After the Second World War, Norway and Denmark became members of NATO on special conditions, which Oslo framed and Copenhagen seconded. Foremost among these was one which stipulated that no foreign troops were to be stationed on their territories in peacetime. In part, this was the result of domestic policy considerations. In 1949 Norway was little more than three years past a half decade of foreign military occupation. There was considerable opposition to NATO membership within the ruling Labor party. Foreign troops, it was felt, might create particular social tensions in homogeneous societies with a scattered population. In addition, foreign policy considerations dictated prudence. Norway had come out of the Second World War sharing a common border with the Soviet Union. Soviet troops had liberated parts of North Norway, but they did not stay, although the Norwegian government had been concerned lest they try to exercise leverage in the Soviet attempt to renegotiate the status of the Svalbard archipelago in 1944—which proved to be abortive. It was deemed important not to challenge Soviet security interests by granting base rights to Norway's Western allies. Part of the Allied intervention following the Russian Revolution, after all, had come in the North. Oslo wanted to fashion a

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balanced posture emphasizing both deterrence and reassurance vis-à-vis its new "great-power" neighbor. Furthermore, the United States did not have troops available to man garrisons in Scandinavia in 1949. Bases meant airbases for intermediate range bombers and their fighter escorts. Norway did not want to become a pawn in the struggle between the two superpowers for mastery in the world. It wanted alliance only to ensure stability and to erect barriers against aggression in Northern Europe. Membership in NATO did not involve an attempt to create a local military balance in Northern Europe. Such an objective would have been incompatible with their stricture concerning the stationing of Allied troops. Instead, the alliance was viewed as a means of assuring "drawing rights" on the military balance in Europe at large. The opposite side of the coin, the barring of bases, was called reinforcement. This reservation was conditional and depended on the absence of attack or threats of attack, and Norwegian and Danish authorities have insisted on the right to judge what the situation requires. At times, tensions have arisen between the reservations and measures designed to make their reversal in an emergency feasible and credible. The Norwegian government has refused to provide an inclusive definition of the proscriptions involved and has chosen instead to list specific exclusions from the proscription—that is, what their stance does *not* prevent.

Greenland and Iceland show a different pattern. During the Second World War, both were vital stepping stones between North America and Britain, and in addition to the American troops that had been stationed in Iceland since 1941, an American airbase was constructed at Keflavik, as were two in Greenland. American interests in the base facilities in Iceland, however, did not end with the war.[4] After the war, Washington requested negotiations for the long-term lease of military bases on the island. Iceland refused, and its Parliament approved a resolution declaring the 1941 agreement to station American troops there null and void, and demanded that the United States evacuate its armed forces within six months. Washington, however, was granted the right to use the airfield to fulfill U.S. obligations in connection with the occupation of Germany. When it joined NATO, Iceland too stipulated that no foreign troops were to be stationed there in peacetime. But since Iceland, unlike its East Nordic cousins, had no defense forces of its own, it concluded, under the impact of the Korean War and within the framework of

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NATO, a defense agreement with the United States to station an American defense force on the island. Iceland attempted to renegotiate the agreement in 1956, but this came to naught both because of the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Suez crisis. They did succeed, in an agreement in 1974, in limiting the number of American personnel on the base to 3,000. These forces have had unique restrictions imposed upon their intercourse with Icelandic society because of Iceland's jealous protection of its cultural identity.

The wartime agreement on Greenland of 1941 between Denmark and the United States was also succeeded by a new treaty, in 1951. The strategy of nuclear deterrence gradually brought the polar regions into the center of strategic gravity, and a third base area was established at K'aanaak, or Thule, in the extreme northwest of Greenland. During the fifties, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line against manned bombers was extended across Greenland from west to east, and 1960 saw the construction of a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System station.

The Faeroes have played only a minor role in the North Atlantic defense arrangements. A radar station was constructed at Sornfelli in 1959 as part of NATO's early warning chain, but no NATO military personnel are stationed in the Faeroes because of quite strong antialliance sentiments. After the war, the United States, in an apparent effort to provide a counterweight to Soviet attempts to change the status of the Svalbard archipelago, tried to retain the wartime radio-sonde station it had established on the Norwegian Atlantic island of Jan Mayen, but it complied with a Norwegian request to vacate the island in 1946.[5]

Hence, the restraints on direct military involvement apply primarily to Norway and Denmark, but they are in force in Iceland, too. The Norwegian and Danish measures of restraint, or confidence-building measures, have been viewed also as concessions to the interests of Sweden and Finland, the presumption being that a Western military buildup in the Nordic area could generate countervailing pressures against them. It has become part of the conventional wisdom that a condition of low tension may be maintained in the North by recognizing the interdependent nature of the defense arrangements in each of the Nordic states. A considerable amount of *a posteriori* rationalization is undoubtedly at play, but as the pattern crystallized, it assumed normative connotations: what had

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emerged should be preserved. It has become a recognized policy objective in each of the Nordic capitals to preserve "the Nordic balance." The term is in fact misleading; no balance has been established among the Nordic states, since they are not poised against one another. What there is, rather, is a pattern of mutual restraint with respect to the national defense policies that the Nordic states pursue, most particularly in relation to the military penetration of the area by outside powers. Restraint in respect to one set of outside powers may serve as an obstacle to others. But there is no balance with respect to external linkages either. Norway, Denmark, and Iceland are allied with the Western powers in a much more committed and encompassing manner than Finland is tied to the Soviet Union through its treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. What we have, then, is not so much a balance but a pattern exhibiting a decreasing degree of inclusion into the connecting tissue of the Western system of security as we move through the Nordic area from west to east. The Nordic states, however, belong to the West culturally and economically, and the Nordic area is predominantly a Western sphere of influence in the field of security arrangements as well. No automatic levers or mechanisms for adjustment exist in Nordic Europe, but rather a presumption of mutual sympathetic consideration.

The policy of "mutual sympathetic consideration" is primarily a Norwegian construct. From the point of view of the strategic interests that interact in Northern Europe, Norway is the pivotal area, with Iceland a close second. Finland and Sweden do not in fact have many available options, the former being constrained by its failures in the past and the latter by its successes. They have attempted to transform domestic (in the case of Sweden) and external (in the case of Finland) necessities into virtues in order to broaden their international roles. Those roles depend on regional stability and equilibrium in Northern Europe, but it is arguable also that successful interlocution in the East-West dialogue contributes to local stability and equilibrium there. Iceland's policy of restraint relates primarily to the size of the American defense force on the island and its relations with Icelandic society. The primary source of constraint is domestic politics. Denmark, which tends to follow the Norwegian lead and to shape its restrictions according to standards developed in Oslo, has to follow the "northern pull" to check the "continental pull" from

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the south. This concern has determined also the rather artificial delineation of the areas of responsibility of NATO's commands for Northern and Central Europe.

The Norwegian policy on foreign bases has in fact become a major vehicle for management of the security system in Northern Europe. Foreign bases would have implied direct Norwegian involvement in strategic dispositions, over which Norway would have little influence and which could come to dominate Norway's relations with its neighbors, turning them into semihostages of American strategic interests. Tensions between the consequences of alignment and Norwegian interests in regional tranquility could increase. As the "no-bases policy" became integrated into the foreign policy doctrine of Norway, it could be changed only at the cost of major domestic controversy and international repercussions. Instead, Norway chose to rely on the transfer of Allied military power in the event of an emergency. Hence, the credibility of the Allied commitment to Norway was not associated with the presence of a given level of its troops. Reassurance inhered in the capacity of the NATO allies to reinforce Norway in a crisis rather than in the presence of Allied forces during peacetime. At the same time, it is recognized that Norwegian security draws on the presence of American troops in Germany and Iceland. In the Norwegian view, security considerations were not synonymous with military calculations. Deterrence, rather, was more a function of political position and commitment than of military preparations. Norway has relied on its integration into the Western security system, causing a challenge to its territorial integrity to become a challenge also to the integrity of the system of guarantees that provides the basis for the Western alliance.

The postwar pattern gave the key positions in Northern Europe to the two Nordic states that had little or no experience or tradition in foreign affairs, while Denmark and Sweden, states with long traditions of involvement in the balance of power in Europe, had only marginal roles to play. Norway in fact had entered the international scene in 1905, after dissolution of its union with Sweden, by declaring that the objective of its foreign policy was to have *no* foreign policy. Finland experienced the imposition of the logic of the balance of power earlier than Norway, and the quiet Finns seem to have accepted its *diktat* with more equanimity than the more boisterous Norwegians. The tensions between realism and idealism continue to

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dominate the Norwegian debate on foreign policy. As the cold war enveloped East-West relations, Norway was in fact catapulted rather abruptly into the demanding arena of security policy in a pivotal area.

The chosen posture combined considerations of deterrence and reassurance with respect to neighbors and domestic society alike; the policy-making community has recognized that the stepchild of deterrence may be called provocation, and that of reassurance, appeasement. Security policy remains a balancing act, restraint depending upon preparations for its reversal in the event of aggression. Hence, Norway has cooperated with its allies in creating an "infrastructure" of airfields, harbors, and communication systems for receiving and supporting Allied forces that may be transferred as reinforcements in the event of war or the threat of it. Navigational aids and electronic intelligence systems exploit geographical advantages for Allied aims, and Allied maneuvers are staged regularly. Norway, however, emphasizes the creation of a stable and predictable pattern of Allied maneuvers. It is notified according to procedures spelled out in the Final Act from the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, although the level of 25,000 men, which makes such notification mandatory, is never reached. Eight Norwegian airfields have been earmarked and equipped as collocated operating bases for American fighter aircraft in an emergency. Allied Forces Command Northern Europe is located in the outskirts of Oslo.

The Nordic area constitutes a geostrategic unity shaped by technological developments and the prevailing constellation of contending powers. It forms in addition a psychostrategic unity shaped by a feeling of community and a recurrent nostalgia for Nordic separateness and autarky. Since the former constrains the manifestation of the latter, the two are in constant tension. It should be noted, however, that the Nordic area contains several partly overlapping core areas. With regard to developments in the Arctic, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden form one core; with regard to naval balance, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland form another; Sweden, Denmark, and Finland are the third, with regard to the Baltic; and in terms of direct involvement with external neighbors, Norway, Denmark, and Finland constitute a fourth. No single Nordic state has an indigenous core strong enough to extend protection to the rest. Sweden was too weak for

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this role. Norway, emerging as the key actor because of its strategic position and large petroleum deposits, is nonetheless dependent upon Allied protection and cannot assume the responsibility to protect other Nordic states. Norway is the most "Atlantic" of the Nordic states in outlook and association. Its future decisions will influence the pattern of security linkages in the Nordic area, but there is little or no recognition of this fact in the Norwegian debate on security policy. To some extent, the absence of a broader view or long-term vision in the Norwegian debate is attributable to a certain small-power mentality, to a presumption of insignificance, a reliance on remoteness and protection by external powers (it used to be the Royal Navy; now it is the U.S. nuclear umbrella). The debate on security tends to evolve along quite ethnocentric lines; it has a propensity for legalisms and formal agreement, and produces convulsions of messianism, wishful thinking, and mushy argument. Nevertheless, a pragmatic and incremental style of policy-making tends to contain the impulsive aspects of the debate from influencing actual behavior. In the future, however, social change may impact on the apparatus of government with greater force and thereby introduce greater volatility and uncertainty with respect to its output. Lawyers have traditionally dominated the Norwegian foreign policy bureaucracy, and international law, with its presumption of the equality of states, has provided a desirable framework for shaping international norms and relations.

The lack of a foreign policy tradition tends to stimulate both insistence on ideal standards and disregard for constraint. Foreign policy has been the responsibility of a small elite, and involvement in the calculation of means and ends, costs and benefits, and risks in relation to policy alternatives is much more narrowly confined in the foreign policy area than, for example, with regard to social policy and education. Hence, the same "professional requirements" are not applied to a debate on foreign policy as on key areas of domestic policy.

The Nordic states view themselves as small states, but in geographic terms, they are decidedly not. In area, Sweden is the fourth largest country in Europe, Norway (including Svalbard), the fifth, and Finland, the sixth. Only twenty countries in the world have larger territories than the Nordic countries combined, and if Greenland is included, only six. The Nordic states have a total population

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of 22.6 million; only thirty states have more inhabitants. Nearly one half of the states in the world have smaller populations than Norway (4 million). The Nordic countries are rich—their combined GNP is exceeded by only eight states. In terms of GNP per capita, the Nordic states compete for the top position. Many caveats should therefore be given when viewing them as small states, which, in many important ways, they are far from. The ratio of population to territory does, however, produce enormous problems from the point of view of defense.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The Nordic states are caught in the vortex of important strategic competitions.[6] The Norwegian Sea has become a transit zone as well as a deployment area for the Soviet Union's strategic missile-carrying submarines. The Kola peninsula, due east of the border with Norway, is home port to more than 60 percent of its capacity in this class of deterrent power. The peninsula, in fact, contains the largest concentration of modern military force anywhere in the world. It provides important keys to the Soviet system of early warning and forward defense against air and missile attacks. Actually, the ground and tactical air forces that have been deployed steadily to the peninsula are not overwhelming, neither compared to the Soviet military posture in other forward areas nor considered in relation to the force requirements in the event of an assault on the key areas of North Norway. Whether this restraint is deliberate is unclear, but from a Norwegian (and Nordic) point of view, the absence of a D-Day capacity on the Kola peninsula has much to do with the state of low tension.[7]

The Soviet forces are obviously sufficient for a sudden grab of the easternmost portions of Finnmark, but the strategic gains would be of only marginal value, and the impact primarily psychopolitical. Norway feels protected by the fact that no piece of NATO real estate has been conquered by force since the inception of the alliance, and a "Finnmark grab" would constitute a dramatic break with "tradition." The problem, then, is not primarily military, but rather one of maintaining Allied cohesion and unity to avoid tempting moves to test the will of NATO and thereby add the final straw. In addition, Norwegian (and Nordic) interests are served by maintain-

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ing a general climate of détente, the continuation of which would be incompatible with military moves across the system's borders. Norway has concentrated its defenses in the central portions of North Norway—which are of vital significance to the alliance—where the terrain provides opportunities for capitalizing on the comparative advantages of a defender in place.

Both superpowers have abstained from maintaining permanent naval patrols in the Norwegian Sea. In the event of war, however, a race for the "gaps" between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom (G-I-UK) can be expected. Without interfering with each other, both East and West carry out extensive maritime surveillance with high-endurance aircraft. It may be that each side sees advantages in the other being able to ascertain the absence of feared threats. Mutual observation can contribute to mutual reassurance. Norwegian maritime patrol aircraft are responsible for surveillance in the Barents Sea, thus preventing direct confrontations between American and Soviet aircraft close to Soviet territory.

Iceland, Norway, and Denmark are concerned that the increased naval capacity of the Soviet Union may enable the Soviet High Command to cut the transatlantic sea lines of communication, and hence separate the Nordic area from reinforcements from North America and Britain. Soviet submarines and naval bombers with stand-off weapons would constitute formidable scissors. To design around the problem, Norway has instituted a program of prepositioning of heavy equipment for a U.S. marine amphibious brigade, enabling troops and light equipment to be brought in by air transport. Denmark is considering similar arrangements, but the United States has been less willing to "reward" what is viewed in Washington as an inadequate indigenous defense effort. Reinforcement of Norway is essentially an "Anglo-Saxon" responsibility. In addition to the American marine brigade, the forces that could be transferred to Norway include a Canadian brigade group and a British Royal Marine commando brigade. The Allied air squadrons earmarked for possible transfer to Norway are also American, British, and Canadian. The Allied Command Europe Mobile Force is essentially a flag-showing deterrent force that could deploy advance air and ground force units. Iceland would be of pivotal importance for the protection of any airlift operations. Most of the ground troops necessary to fight off an adversary would have to be provided by Nor-

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way and Denmark. The presence of Allied troops, however, would ensure that a fight for Norway, for example, would not be confined to a fight against Norwegian troops. Moreover, Allied forces could provide weapons capabilities that would complement and expand those which Norway and Denmark could procure for themselves. The most critical weapon capability would be aircraft, particularly in Norway. It would not be possible for Norway to procure modern fighters in sufficient numbers to maintain air superiority against a sophisticated adversary for a prolonged period. If air superiority is lost, the ground battle will prove extremely difficult to win.

Norwegian and Danish perspectives have tended to focus rather narrowly on the need to defend their national territories against aggression and have neglected the role those territories could play in the conduct of a larger war. This is particularly surprising since it is the latter that motivates Allied support. The context, however, is changing. In the era of mutual stalemate, at the level of strategic nuclear forces and concern about denying blitzkrieg victories on the central front in Europe, attention and calculations focus on the relative capacities to prevail in a longer war. Such capacities impact on the deterrence of short-war options as well. In this context, it seems clear that the ability of the Western alliance to protect transatlantic sea lines of communication with aircraft operating out of airfields in Norway, and to deny to the Soviet Union the use of those airfields, will be of critical importance. Hence, the Nordic area will be of increasing importance to strategies for deterring war in Europe at large. The Nordic drawing rights on the general balance of power in Europe have been supplemented by European drawing rights on the strategic position of the Nordic states on the Atlantic.

All of the Nordic states except Iceland maintain systems of conscription and organization for rapid mobilization in an emergency. Norway could mobilize a force of some 325,000 men. Upon mobilization, the field army would consist of eleven brigades and additional defense units, as well as a home guard of 90,000 men. Fully mobilized, the 700,000-man Swedish army will consist of twenty-eight brigades, 150 independent battalions, and some 500 independent company units, as well as a home guard force of some 100,000 men. Finland would also mobilize about 700,000 men and field an army of twenty brigades. Danish geography and military organization differ from those of the northern Nordic states. The Danish

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army is comprised of five mechanized infantry brigades and three regimental combat teams. It is supported by an "augmentation force" reserve of 6,000, a field army reserve of 43,000, a regional defense force of 16,000, and a home guard of about 57,000. Equipment is a major problem for all the Nordic states; the exploding costs of modern weapons systems make it extremely hard to maintain up-to-date equipment for the large forces that would be activated upon mobilization. Deficiencies in firepower, mobility, and antiaircraft capacity abound.

The pinch is most visible in the air forces. Sweden, however, has a very strong air force; at the end of the forties it was second only to the Royal Air Force in Europe. Today it still consists of more than 400 combat aircraft, almost half of which are the modern Swedish-built *Viggen*.[8] Over the last three decades, Sweden developed and produced four generations of over 2,000 combat aircraft—relying rather heavily, however, on technology transfers, since all the jet fighters had British or American engines, produced under license, and a considerable amount of avionics from the same countries. The fighter version of *Viggen* (JA 37) has 20 percent foreign components, 14 of which are of American manufacture. This of course makes Sweden vulnerable to constraints on foreign sales imposed by American arms transfer policy. Thirty percent of the components of the multipurpose successor to *Viggen,* JAS, will be of foreign manufacture, and it is likely that this will be the last combat aircraft developed by Sweden.[9] Norway has purchased seventy-two F-16 fighters, a number very close to the threshold for meaningful numbers. It is likely that, on the basis of actual costs, Norway should have chosen a less sophisticated aircraft, one that could have been procured in larger numbers. The aircraft industries, however, do not cater to the requirements of small states, and the Soviet air forces have been growing in numbers and sophistication. Denmark will acquire fifty-eight F-16s to supplement her two squadrons with the Swedish F-35 *Draken*.[10] One of the major benefits of alignment for Norway and Denmark is the possibility of obtaining rapid reinforcements through the transfer of Allied fighter aircraft. NATO's reinforcement plans, combined with the conclusion of the so-called Collocated Operating Bases logistic support agreements between the United States and the two Nordic countries—for equipping and preparing their airfields to maintain and sustain Allied squadrons transferred in an emer-

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gency—constitute an important part of their deterrent posture. Much attention has been paid to standardization and "interoperability" with respect to air reinforcements in recent years. The Finnish air force consists of forty-three combat aircraft of Soviet and Swedish manufacture (MIG-21 and J-35).

The navies of the Nordic states are largely designed for coastal defense purposes and could in no event extend protection to the Atlantic islands. Iceland maintains no defense forces of its own, relying entirely on the American defense force of 3,000 men and a squadron of F-4 *Phantom* fighters at Keflavik. But this airbase renders wider services to the common defense of the West through surveillance; two AWACS aircraft and a squadron of P-3C *Orion* maritime patrol aircraft are stationed there, and shore terminals for the SOSUS system keep track of submarine traffic.

The Nordic pattern contains salient elements of restraint and reassurance. Norway and Denmark do not permit the stationing of Allied troops on their territories, but they insist that Allied maneuvers are necessary to underwrite deterrence. Allied maneuvers, however, are not permitted to take place in the northernmost country of Finnmark in Norway, leaving a distance of some 800 kilometers, measured along the main road between the areas, where such activities take place and the Soviet-Norwegian border. Allied military aircraft are not allowed to fly in Norwegian airspace on missions extending east of 24° East, nor are Allied naval vessels normally permitted to enter Norwegian territorial waters east of the same meridian. Denmark does not participate in maneuvers in the Baltic east of 17° East.

The defense postures of the Nordic states exhibit a considerable degree of complementarity. It is clear that they are not deploying their forces against one another. Norway, Sweden, and Finland concentrate a large portion of their military efforts in the north: the major portion of Norway's standing forces is found in the north; Sweden maintains four Norrland brigades especially trained for Arctic warfare, with a fifth to be added through force modernization; Finland is in the process of establishing a reinforced infantry brigade in the north. The Soviet military buildup on the Kola peninsula has caused the three Nordic countries to maintain a major portion of their forces in the sparsely populated regions of the north as a matter of strategic priority. In addition, concentrations are found around the capital areas. Norway, Sweden, and Finland have had to give pri-

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ority to the task of defending exposed territory rather than their populations. None has the capacity to withstand an all-out military attack from a great power. They count, however, on their location on the periphery of Europe: the major effort in the event of war will be focused on the central front. Thus they count on the balance of power in Europe, and Norway and Denmark provide the visible links to it through their membership in the Western alliance. Sweden has been defending the credibility of her policy of aiming for neutrality in war by pointing out that she has no responsibility for the defense of the key strategic hot spots of Northern Europe, North Norway, and the Danish sounds and belts. The design scenarios for force-planning in the Nordic countries do not include the option of attacking or defending against their Nordic neighbors, but neither do they include intervention to protect them. That task has been left to the external powers.

THE NUCLEAR ENIGMA

All of the Nordic states are technically capable of developing nuclear weapons, and with the possible exception of Iceland, all have economies that could sustain a nuclear weapons program. Yet they have all signed and ratified the nonproliferation treaty and the partial test ban treaty. None of the aligned states in Nordic Europe permit the deployment or storage of nuclear weapons on their territories, including the Atlantic islands. Nordic Europe constitutes a *de facto* nuclear weapon-free area. Sweden was the only country to consider an independent nuclear option seriously. Norway and Denmark considered permitting the storage of nuclear munitions for theater weapons, but the military arguments in favor of it were not very powerful and failed to overcome the broadly based social opposition to nuclear weapons. In addition, concerns with regard to regional and international order worked against the nuclear option.[11]

There is undoubtedly a certain amount of romantic escapism in the Nordic posture on nuclear weapons, a nostalgia for innocence, a wish to keep the ugly realities of potential destruction out of reach and out of mind. On the one hand, the Nordic NATO states have sought protection under the American nuclear umbrella, and Sweden and Finland have benefited from the nuclear stalemate; on the other, acceptance of nuclear abstinence has been transformed into an

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almost aggressive self-righteousness combined with a subliminal rejection of the dependence on nuclear guarantees. A rational decision in favor of the conventional option has tended to provide a basis for rectitude in relation to states where governments applied a different calculus. The absence of direct involvement in the management and operational planning for the possible use of nuclear weapons has tended to breed propensities for absolute rejection. This is not to deny the serious ethical issues raised by nuclear weapons, but only to point out that the public debate in the Nordic countries tends to ignore or reject the strategic issues involved. The Nordic societies have not been continuously engaged in the nuclear debate, which is essentially an imported product reflecting decisions and challenges in other European countries, but which is given the imprint of Nordic innocence and sincerity. Scandinavians tend to view their own position on nuclear weapons in absolute rather than derivative terms. Their actual decisions on nuclear weapons are nevertheless based on solid and rational calculation. Norway is a front-line state, and reliance on nuclear weapons could involve reliance on breaking the tradition of nonuse that has been in force since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That seemed like more of a burden than Norwegian authorities were willing to carry. In view of Norwegian proximity to key strategic installations in the Soviet Union—where nuclear and conventional, as well as strategic and theater, weapon systems and targets are intermingled—the dangers of escalation and explosive preemption might cause the United States as well to renege on a commitment to early use in an actual situation. The psychological problems of commitment and reassurance among the Allies are compounded by nuclear deployments, and they could become a particular burden on social consensus in small states. Furthermore, reliance on nuclear weapons may tend to weaken the national will for defense in smaller countries, as the task becomes wrapped in abstractions beyond calculation and prediction, and success moreover tends to elude credible definition. It is far easier to mobilize protest against nuclear weapons than to design schemes for their possible use in combat.

Nuclear deterrence may be accepted as an inescapable and even necessary temporary expedient for maintaining peace at large, but the Nordic people do not want their sons to fight with nuclear weapons. They have become used to the notion that nuclear weapons are

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not for use. Theater weapons carry connotations of use in a more immediate and concrete manner than strategic weapons. They have been rejected as an option by all of the Nordic states. Such rejections have tended to ferment into orthodoxy. Decisions that were controversial in the early sixties have become consensus positions in the eighties, making it harder for the aligned countries to participate in consultations and decisions about nuclear weapon deployments in the alliance. Hence, decisions that contributed toward reaching consensus about defense in the sixties may complicate the maintenance of consensus about alliance policy in the eighties. None of the aligned states in Nordic Europe, however, has protested against established NATO doctrine, nor has any expressed the desire to come out from under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Furthermore, in an actual war, Nordic Europe could not escape the effects of nuclear warfare even if such weapons were not used against or from Nordic territory. The fallout from nuclear explosions in Central Europe and the Soviet Union would be carried by the winds into the Nordic world.

SOME WINDS OF CHANGE

The "Nordic pattern" has remained stable throughout the last three decades, and the safest prediction would be that it will remain so. Several factors that will determine the shape of the pattern need to be addressed, however, before we embrace the notion of comfortable continuity.

The external environment is influenced above all by the disposition of the forces of the major powers. The Soviet Union and the United States will remain the preponderant powers impacting on the Nordic area for the rest of this century. Their primary concern will be the configuration and dynamics of the central balance of nuclear deterrence. Barring basic breakthroughs in antisubmarine warfare technologies—and that seems a fairly safe assumption—increasing weight will be placed on submarine-launched missiles. They will achieve greater accuracy, longer range, and greater diversification with respect to platforms (some dispersal in smaller submarines may break the trend toward concentration in larger vessels). Hence, the importance of the Norwegian Sea for the Soviet Union, as a deployment area for submarines carrying strategic missiles, is likely to grow. Dependence on transit through the G-I-UK gap may decrease

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as the shorter-range weapons become obsolete. Deployments in the polar regions may become an option, but there are few gains and many complications involved. Concentration in the Barents Sea also does not seem likely. Moscow will want to space out the deployments and separate the "threat corridors" open to their missiles. As they reduce dependence on forward deployments (because of increased missile range), however, they may feel tempted to establish extensive safety zones for their missile submarines extending far down in the Norwegian Sea and exerting considerable pressure on the position of the littoral states. These states would almost inevitably be drawn into the constructions of such a posture—essentially one of excluding American forces—which the aligned Nordic states would be dependent upon for support in an emergency. Even agreements on the establishment of submarine sanctuaries could have similar effects on the position of the littoral states, depending to some degree on the modalities with respect to protection of, and access to, the sanctuary zones. Such developments would tend to erode the credibility of alliance guarantees to the Nordic states and could generate pressures for neutralism. They could also cause Denmark to become more absorbed in the continental womb, while Norway, Sweden, and Finland might move into more parallel positions. Sweden, however, would likely be both unable and unwilling to assume any responsibility for the defense of a Norway under increased strategic pressure.

The Nordic area could also become vulnerable to the pressures from forward naval operations by both superpowers. A current trend in Soviet naval operations and procurement points toward a possible pincer movement whereby its Northern and Baltic fleets combine to cut off the Nordic area from the rest of Europe. The capacity to carry out such a threat would exert pressure not only on Nordic Europe in particular, but on Central Europe in general, in view of the role of Norway and Iceland in protecting the transatlantic sea lines of communication. There may in fact be some connection between the Soviet political objective of decoupling the American guarantee from Western Europe and the thrust of Soviet naval developments in Northern Europe.

At the same time, however, the Reagan Administration has set U.S. naval policy on a new course, one of being able to strike the Soviet navy at the source. The Soviets have a major problem: how to get

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out to sea. Nowhere can they expect unimpeded passage, but the access is best in Northern Europe. The heavy Soviet concentration on the Kola peninsula creates a "Pearl Harbor problem"—that is, of vulnerability to preemption. A forward American naval strategy may flush out the Soviet navy, causing it to disperse on early warning, with the attendant dangers of provoking the feared preemption in a crisis.

A forward naval strategy by the United States could also lead to its more frequent presence in the Norwegian Sea, thus breaking the pattern of mutual restraint and introducing the "Mediterranean model" of competing naval patrols into the Sea. This would undoubtedly alter the condition of low tension that has prevailed in the North, since increased Allied visibility, while strengthening reassurance, will almost certainly intensify the visibility of Soviet forces.

The introduction of long-range cruise missiles in the U.S. navy could in principle provide an alternative to air power as a means of holding the Soviet navy at risk at the source. A preemptive strike at the Soviet naval base complex on the Kola peninsula, however, would require such a large number of cruise missiles or aircraft sorties as to constitute an impractical option. Using the nuclear-tipped land-attack version of the "Tomahawk" cruise missile involves nuclear threshold considerations that are likely to be quite prohibitive. Moreover, underlining the land-attack option through a highly visible forward presence could heighten tensions in peacetime and increase the sense of danger and expectation of uncontrolled escalation in the event of a crisis.

The "reglobalization" of American strategy—with its sometimes quite explicit suggestions that the United States could elect to respond to Soviet challenges of its choosing by responding at places, again, of its choosing, and that it may decide to respond in the North, where the Soviet Union could be vulnerable to direct attack from American naval forces—has caused apprehension in the Nordic countries. Naval bases are almost always drawn into the conflict that engages their forces. Thus, this quiet corner of Europe may become the target of new linkage policies connecting it with the trouble spots of the world.

Such developments are likely to increase tensions between the United States and the Nordic states. The three Nordic allies entered into the alliance for the limited purpose of protecting the Atlantic

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area against direct aggression. They have always resisted suggestions or proposals for extending the alliance beyond the area to which it currently applies (they were far from enthusiastic about the membership of Greece and Turkey), and have always been critical of American political judgment with regard to sociopolitical conflict in developing countries, even when the Soviet Union or other external actors are stirring the pot as well. They also remain committed to their own notions of development and social justice in a global context, and from that perspective, U.S. power often comes down in support of forces opposed to "necessary" social change. It is always difficult for small powers to cooperate with great powers about their security. The great powers have the greatest weight, and the small powers are extremely conscious of this. In addition, perspectives differ; the great powers tend to concentrate on broader international patterns and connections, while the small powers concentrate on proximate relationships. The small states may develop self-centered and narrow-minded outlooks, while the great powers show a propensity for ignoring the interrelationship between global power relations and subregional equilibriums.

When assessing issues of international security, the Nordic states tend to apply a yardstick of social justice to project their own values. That propensity is sustained by a strong commitment to development assistance. The four developed Nordic countries are at the top of the international list of aid donors when aid is compared to GNP (Iceland is an exception, owing to the structural weakness of its economy). The propensity to give priority in the discussion of foreign policy to considerations of social justice rather than strategic requirements, however, tends to broaden the chasm that separates the Nordic states from the great powers. They possess neither the means nor the responsibility to affect relationships of power in distant regions. Hence, they tend to transform the thorny issues of international order into questions of distributive justice, causing considerations of power and influence to be overwhelmed by concerns about human rights and economic welfare.

A NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONE?

In recent years, opposition to further deployments of nuclear weapons has been growing in the Nordic countries, particularly in

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Norway and Denmark. The peace movement is part of a broader phenomenon with particularly strong roots in the Protestant areas of Northern Europe. It was caused by a cumulative process that started with reactions to the badly conceived and ill-managed plans for the introduction of the neutron weapon in NATO, grew under the impact of the confusing American debate on guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons (PD-59), and exploded in the wake of NATO's dual-track decision for modernization of, and negotiation about, intermediate range nuclear forces. Neither Denmark nor Norway would allow deployment of nuclear weapons in its country, but each had to share in the responsibility for the joint decisions. The public opposition was triggered by the Western decision rather than by the Soviet deployments of the SS-20 missile, which preceded and contributed to the rationale of the NATO decision.

The pattern of opinion seems to be fairly clear. In Norway, there was a slight plurality in favor of the dual-track decision in November 1983, by the time the Storting voted in favor of deployment by a plurality of one vote. Those in favor were 46 percent; those opposed, 44 (10 percent had no opinion). This much was clear in the male part of the population; women, however, were opposed. The propensity to support the decision increases as we move from left to right across the political spectrum. Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between knowledge about the decision and the inclination to support it.[12] Opposition to the dual-track decision no doubt reflects primarily fear of nuclear warfare and the belief that more nuclear weapons are undesirable. Opposition to, or uncertainty about, NATO's dual-track decision, however, does not translate into opposition to membership in NATO. Still, opposition may grow in the future as a consequence of perceived conflicts between nuclear opposition and NATO's posture and doctrine. Since nuclear weapons are not deployed in the Nordic countries, discussion—which focuses on clear-cut choices between rejection and acceptance rather than on alternative solutions—tends to have a somewhat theoretical and absolute quality.

Finland has been the traditional champion of the idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic area. For two decades Finnish foreign policy could be counted on merely to flag the suggestion without elaborating a concrete plan. Some observers have suggested that it was an alibi more than a proposal for actual implementation,

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since it established Finland in a specific role. The idea was rejected by the other Nordic states; they argued, rather, for the inclusion of Soviet territory and the Baltic in order to reduce the nuclear threat against the Nordic area. Norway and Denmark feared that the idea of a nuclear-free zone was designed to move them in the direction of nonalignment—a suggestion that was included in a famous speech by the then Finnish premier, Urho Kekkonen, in early 1952—and insisted that they would not join any arrangement confined only to Nordic Europe.

In 1980-81 the Norwegians resurrected the idea, and Finnish circumspection was replaced by Norwegian simplicity and legalism. The idea emerged in the left wing of the Labor party, which was in power at the time. The party leadership chose to steal the thunder of its left wing and transform the simple proposal into a complex design for linking a formalization of the nonnuclear status of the Nordic states with broader regimes for the regulation and builddown of nuclear weapons in Europe. No longer was the inclusion of Soviet *territory* considered desirable, since this would tend to open up a wedge for Soviet political dominance. Instead, general regimes would provide a context for a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic area, involving the withdrawal and builddown of Soviet battlefield nuclear weapons—as part of an East-West arrangement for their withdrawal from forward areas—and agreed-upon reductions and constraints on medium and intermediate range nuclear weapons—as part of a U.S.-Soviet INF (intermediate range nuclear forces) agreement. Such general regimes would include a reduction of the nuclear threat against the Nordic area; they would, however, link the Nordic area to the broader security order in Europe rather than constituting collateral measures that would tend to decouple the Nordic area from the broader security arrangements. In the wake of the submarine incidents in Swedish waters—including the 1981 "whiskey-on-the rocks" incident of the stranded submarine with nuclear-tipped torpedoes right outside the main Swedish naval base—Sweden has reiterated her demand that the Baltic be "denuclearized." It has not, however, been specified if the Baltic should be included in the projected nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic area or whether it would constitute an associated arrangement. In view of the apparent proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Soviet navy and the fact that 60 to 70 percent of Soviet naval repair facilities are

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located on the Baltic, it is hard to envisage the nuclear prohibition, for one thing, extending to the passage of naval vessels and, for another, being based on effective control procedures.

A nuclear weapon-free zone is primarily an instrument for influencing the nature of peacetime relations. Such regimes would survive in wartime only as long as the major powers consider it to their advantage to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons. Such zones, however, could in principle assist the major nuclear powers in avoiding the use of nuclear weapons, provided they both prefer not to cross the nuclear threshold. The particular position of North Norway in close proximity to vital strategic areas in the Soviet Union would impose caution about escalation on both sides in the event of crisis or war. In fact, the existence of arrangements that would reduce the pressures for nuclear initiation would seem to be in the interest of both East and West. The danger of explosive escalation would still prevent an aggressor from pressing a conventional advantage to the limit, since he could not be confident that NATO would accept defeat rather than contemplate nuclear retaliation.

Norway and Denmark would have to explore the tensions and contradictions that might obtain between participation in a nuclear weapon-free zone and approved NATO doctrine. The question is not so much whether a presumption of conventional defense is compatible with the agreed doctrine, but whether an explicit exclusion of the option of nuclear employment is compatible with it. Other NATO members may worry about the consequences for cohesion within the alliance if more states were to reserve their position with respect to key elements of agreed strategy. The issue is not new of course; none of the Nordic states in NATO permit nuclear weapons to be stored on their soil. In any event, it is highly questionable whether a NATO policy of deliberate nuclear escalation is desirable and credible on the northern flank of NATO—particularly in North Norway—in view of its proximity to the Soviet base complex on the Kola peninsula, with its intricate commingling of strategic and theater nuclear systems. It may seem more important, in a situation of overall nuclear parity, to maintain the saliency of the nuclear threshold than to impose uncertainty concerning the risks of escalation across it. NATO strategy must be tailored to the specific circumstances in the areas to be defended.

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Different and competing visions and concepts prevail concerning the modalities and operational elements of a nuclear weapon-free zone.[13] The major division is between those who argue for a separate and isolated arrangement in Nordic Europe, and those who envisage the Nordic arrangement as an element in a broader pattern of constraints. The time may be nearing when the Nordic states are able to chart some common ground for a more coherent security pattern in their part of the world. It could both reflect and stimulate what Erling Bjøl has termed the "de-Finlandization" of Finland,[14] or break with the popular notion that Finland's position is essentially a derivation of its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.

TOWARD A NEW EQUILIBRIUM?

The Nordic area exists in the shadow of Soviet military power, yet the states have not been intimidated by the Soviet military preponderance. Countervailing power has been brought to bear through links of alignment and the broader pattern of international relations within which the Nordic states play their roles. It is sometimes suggested that Finland has been playing the role of a Soviet Trojan horse, that Helsinki has been forced by Moscow to act as a conveyor belt for Soviet interests and proposals. That model is misleading. The foreign policy pursued by Finland may be understood in terms of Finnish national interests. Helsinki has attempted to preempt Soviet pressure rather than succumb to it, has attempted to broaden Finnish freedom of action through the formulation of a line of foreign policy that has forged a broad domestic consensus and enabled Finland to play an international role, which in turn protects Finnish foreign policy against constriction. Geography and history, after all, constrain the foreign policy of all states.

Finland's choice is *sui generis*. It cannot provide a model for the other Nordic states with a different geography and history. For many years, Norway and Finland often found themselves occupying different poles in a verbal tug of war about security arrangements. In recent years, mutual confidence has replaced latent suspicions, as the process of East-West negotiations introduced greater mobility into the diplomatic process, and Finland emerged as a more confident actor with a flexible approach to the management of the Nordic pattern.

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The Soviet Union has been unable to exercise decisive influence over the Nordic pattern through the intimidating shadow or substance of its military prowess. Soviet pressure against any single Nordic state is likely to lead to reassessments in the others—or rumors of such reassessments—and the identification across borders of Nordic citizens with their fellows supports a system of implicit checks and balances. The "Nordic attitude" combines a propensity for harsh criticism of friends with rather obstinate resistance against would-be adversaries. The many reported submarine incidents around the Scandinavian peninsula in recent times have stimulated not appeasement, but the very opposite reaction. It is not clear, of course, that such encroachments (if the reports are right) are designed for intimidation. (They have not been accompanied by any specific or implicit demands. In fact, no one has acknowledged ownership of the submarines in question.) The incursions may be explained in terms of military objectives. In Sweden, they have focused on special military installations, with a view, perhaps, to their preemptive destruction in the event of war. In Norway, attention seems to be focused on reconnoitering possible hiding places in the deep fjords on the west and north coasts for use in a future battle of the Atlantic. Moreover, one can certainly reconcile the pattern of possible encroachments with the contingency of a wartime pincer operation to separate the Scandinavian peninsula from the rest of Europe.

The violation of Swedish sovereignty by Soviet submarines has resulted in strongly worded protests from two successive governments in Sweden. The cavalier fashion in which Moscow chose to deal with the matter suggests an arrogance of power that has caused broad concern in Nordic societies. The Soviet position seems to reflect insensitivity to Swedish sovereign rights, inflexibility of military command procedures, and Moscow's insistence on its own infallibility. The Soviet incursions are likely to have a major impact on Sweden's defense priorities as well as on its overall defense effort. Foreign critics have tended to view the Swedish reactions as mild. Viewed in the context of the Swedish style of foreign policy, however, the verbal reactions were by no means weak. Furthermore, what kinds of physical sanctions are available to a state like Sweden vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that would not, in fact, boomerang? Such are the frus-

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trations of weakness that most states have to endure in direct conflict with the major powers.

Social opposition to defense arrangements tends to focus on those that involve the Western alliance. Hence the peace movement in Scandinavia is the result of reactions to Western decisions rather than Soviet intimidation. A certain imbalance or double standard may be involved. The possible deployment of Pershing-IIs and cruise missiles generates more concern and protest than the actual deployment of the SS-20. But public opinion in the West tends to focus on decisions in the West, on decisions to which access is possible and over which influence may be exercised. The Scandinavian peace movement is neither predominantly pacifist nor neutralist, even if such elements are certainly present. It is primarily a protest against the danger of nuclear war as such, an existential danger that appears to transcend partisan divisions and political alignments.

Nevertheless, a neutralist nostalgia is undoubtedly present in Norwegian, Danish, and Icelandic attitudes. It is worth noting, however, that in the case of Norway, alignment rather than neutrality can now claim the longest tradition in the foreign policy of the young state, and it is the most recent tradition of the two. New generations have moved into positions of power, replacing the generation that had its attitudes shaped by the momentous experience of the Second World War. The revolution in education is making its impact felt in public claims for participation and the right to be heard in the policy-making process with respect to foreign and defense policy. Public opinion surveys show that interest in foreign affairs grows with the level of education and that the more educated strata over time influence the perceived scale of priorities for the electorate in general. Larger groups want to participate in the making of foreign policy, a fact that does not necessarily imply a more informed debate as much as a more heated one, as well as more frustration, since actual foreign policy-making by its very nature remains the responsibility of the few. The economic slowdown that has caught up with the Nordic states has dried up the increases in financial resources for further social reform, and political energy is turning toward less "costly" areas of policy. The dialectical interplay of society and the state could introduce greater volatility in the policy-making process, particularly in the aligned Nordic states. This

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could produce tensions within NATO, but it need not open the issue of alignment as such for serious reassessment in the Nordic states.

Norway has been concerned lest the European Political Cooperation (EPC) of the Community emasculate the North Atlantic Council and introduce a *de facto* two-pillar alliance system, one having little room for the exercise of influence by the small-power members of NATO who are not also Community members. Enthusiasm for the alliance could evaporate under the impact of perceived exclusion, particularly if the rise of EPC were to coincide with a more assertive American globalism, producing social controversy in Nordic polities. A possible countervailing option to a neutralist retreat would be an activation of a northern arch involving closer cooperation between Canada, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland (CANDI). Such a constellation would not be "unnatural," since all the states in question are paying increased attention to developments in the high north, where defense interests have to be correlated with strategies for resource management, environmental protection, and jurisdictional delimitation. Greenland and the Faeroe Islands would also perhaps prefer integration into such a framework rather than having to choose between Denmark and total independence, or between the European Community and North America. Since the introduction of home rule in 1979, the 50,000 Greenlanders have become increasingly aware of the strategic importance of their giant island. In a 1982 referendum, 52 percent voted to have Greenland leave the EEC, but negotiations are in progress that aim at permitting Greenland to leave the Community by January 1, 1985, and assume instead the status of an "overseas territory." This would mean reducing the population of the European Community by 0.02 percent, and its geographical size by more than half. The outcome remains uncertain, but even if Greenland were to leave the Community, it would not mean that it would also leave NATO. Greenland constitutes a strain on the Danish economy, with the annual cost for each inhabitant estimated at $3,400. Similarly, the Faeroes have been hit by a severe economic crisis, partly as a result of being excluded from the 200-mile zones in traditional fishing areas, partly owing to the confusion and oscillations in the EEC over fishing policy. Denmark subsidizes the islands at the rate of almost $775 per inhabitant per year.[15]

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Disputes over fishing rights, the delimitation of economic zones, and the management of fish stocks have produced tensions in the Northeast Atlantic among members of the Western alliance. Closer cooperation between Canada, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland could contribute to the containment of such disputes in the future and prevent them from escalating into the realm of defense cooperation. Management of developments in the Arctic region could provide a focal point also for cooperative arrangements involving the Soviet Union. The evolution of additional, partly overlapping patterns of cooperation involving links between Nordic states and outside powers could stabilize the Nordic pattern and reduce the saliency of the military factor and the divisions it entails.

With the exception of Norway, all of the Nordic states are net importers of energy. In the oil market, Norway is a marginal exporter, since total exports amount to only one percent of world output (30 million tons), but output is expected to increase in the 1990s. As an exporter of gas, however, Norway occupies a key position. At present it delivers 22 percent of the gas used in the United Kingdom and 12 percent of that consumed in the Federal Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France combined. Large new discoveries indicate a potential for a considerably higher production. Gas production requires long-term cooperation between buyer and seller, and since the markets for Norwegian gas will be Western Europe, offshore production could compensate to some degree for the distance created between Norway and the European Community when a national referendum turned down membership in it in 1972. The appetite for oil and gas has been whetted in all the Nordic Atlantic islands; in the Faeroes, it has been stimulated by the oil boom in the neighboring Shetland Islands. The craving for new riches could produce new disputes, particularly with regard to jurisdiction. Norway in fact is in the midst of an unresolved dispute with the Soviet Union concerning the delineation of sovereignty in the Barents Sea. The Faeroes may get into a similar dispute with the United Kingdom, and the dividing line between the economic zones of Greenland and the island of Jan Mayen remains unsettled. In the Baltic, several disputes among the littoral states concerning the division of the continental shelf remain unresolved, particularly in relation to the status of such islands as Bornholm (Denmark) and Gotland (Sweden). Hence, the evolution of the legal order of the oceans may

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cause new tensions to arise in the Nordic area involving both inside and outside powers. The Nordic pattern is unlikely to crumble under the pressures of such disputes, but it could change.

The Nordic pattern appears to have reached a stage of maturity where it can absorb and transform external pressures that do not amount to acts of war. The pattern is woven into the texture of East-West relations in Europe; it is neither beyond nor at the core of the balance of power, but is, rather, an important part of its present geometry. The major powers are to some extent kept at bay, but their potential involvement in the event of war contributes to the structure of the pattern. The Soviet Union is geographically close but ideologically distant from Nordic Europe. The United States has been brought in as a countervailing force at the express desire of three of the Nordic states. Norway is likely to be the last party to leave the bridge in the event that NATO should capsize on her voyage through the next decades. The dissolution of NATO would cause the Nordic pattern to crumble as well. A reconstitution of the political order in Europe, however, involving increased penetration of the system border separating East from West, accompanied by a reduction and regulation of the levels of armaments and the institution of confidence-building measures, could transform the overall framework so that a more coherent and tightly knit Nordic pattern could emerge. But as long as negotiations about arms control remain focused on notions of parity, expressed in numbers of weapons rather than on the effective blocking of offensive military options and the removal of military barriers to political reconciliation, the East-West division will continue to constrain developments within the Nordic pattern as well. The Nordic states are actively engaged in furthering the healing process in Europe. Helsinki hosted the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975. Stockholm will do so for the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe in 1984.

Will the Nordic states ever coalesce into alliance? It seems doubtful. They all lack the specific weight that is necessary to extend protection to the others. When the chips are down, they are likely to abandon their brothers rather than seek battle—Denmark learned that lesson in 1864, Finland in 1939, Norway in 1940. They can extend sympathy but not protection; they need protection and take sympathy for granted. The Nordic world is part of a larger world.

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Nordic security is linked inextricably to Atlantic and European security. Nevertheless, social change will impact on the substance and style of security policy. Alignment will not be the issue in Norway, Denmark, or Iceland, but the substance of alliance policy in general could cause an erosion in actual commitments. The peace movement may have peaked as a single-issue movement, but it is likely to have left a lasting imprint on political parties, particularly those in the center and left-of-center. General issues of principle deriving from the overall policy of the Western alliance may come to dominate calculations of interest in regard to specific security issues in Northern Europe. The role of nuclear weapons in alliance strategy is likely to remain an issue of active concern and controversy. Should NATO prove unable to incorporate and project the prevailing concerns into a more reassuring posture, further estrangement may ensue, and this could strengthen the nostalgia for neutrality. Romantic escapism and the arrogance of weakness, however, would still have to contend with the quiet power of rational analysis and a Scandinavian tradition of pragmatic problem-solving.

ENDNOTES

[1]See *Five Roads to Nordic Security,* edited by Johan Jørgen Holst (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973); *Nordic Security Today,* special issue of *Cooperation and Conflict* 17 (4) (1982); *Foreign Policies of Northern Europe,* edited by Bengt Sundelius (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982); and Erling Bjøl, *Nordic Security, Adelphi Papers* (181) (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983).

[2]See, for example, Barbara Haskel, *The Scandinavian Option* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), pp. 39-87.

[3]On Norway's wartime policy, see Olav Riste, *"London-regjeringa": Norge i Krigsalliansen 1940-1945,* vols. 1, 2 (Oslo: Det norske samlaget, 1973-79). The phrase is that of Dr. Arne Ording, adviser to Foreign Minister Lie, quoted in Riste, vol. 2, p. 278.

[4]See, for example, Geir Lundestad, *America, Scandinavia and the Cold War 1945-1949* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), pp. 23ff, 81, 244. On Iceland, see Benedikt Grøndal, *Iceland from Neutrality to NATO Membership* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971) as well as the articles by Bjørn Bjarnason in Holst, *Five Roads to Nordic Security,* pp. 61-76, and Gunnar Gunnarson in *Nordic Security Today,* pp. 257-72.

[5]Lundestad, *America, Scandinavia and the Cold War,* pp. 69, 71, 75.

[6]For further elaboration, see *New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic,* edited by Christoph Bertram and Johan Jørgen Holst (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1977)

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and Anders C. Sjaastad and John Kristen Skogan, *Politikk og Sikkerhet i Norskehavsområdet* (Oslo: Dreyers forlag, 1975).

[7]A fuller analysis of the Kola base complex may be found in Johan Jørgen Holst, "Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980's," *Cooperation and Conflict* 17 (4) (1982), particularly pp. 211-13. The broader issues in Norwegian security policy are discussed in Johan Jørgen Holst, "Norway's Search for a Nordpolitik," *Foreign Affairs* 60 (1) (1981): 63-81.

[8]For a good analysis of the complex *Viggen* program, see Ingemar Dörfer, *System 37 Viggen* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973).

[9]Ingemar Dörfer, "Nordic Security Today: Sweden," *Cooperation and Conflict* 17 (4) (1982): 276.

[10]For an excellent analysis of the F-16 decisions, see Ingemar Dörfer, *Arms Deal: The Selling of the F-16* (New York: Praeger, 1983).

[11]Analysis of the nuclear debates and evaluations in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway may be found in Jan Prawitz, "Sweden—A Non-Nuclear Weapon State," pp. 61-73; Niels J. Haagerup, "Nuclear Weapons and Danish Security Policy," pp. 34-41; Johan Jørgen Holst, "The Nuclear Genie: Norwegian Policies and Perspectives," pp. 42-60 , in *Security, Order and the Bomb,* edited by Johan Jørgen Holst (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972).

[12]For an analysis of the Norwegian data, see Johan Jørgen Holst, *Norway's Role in the Search for International Peace and Security,* NUPI/N-264 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, May 1983). For a more general depiction, see Bjøl, *Nordic Security,* pp. 26-27, 36-37, 39-40, and Ingemar Dörfer, "La Scandinavie ou la défense de la virginité nucléare," in *Pacifism et dissuasion,* edited by Pierre Lellouche (Paris: Institute français des relations internationales, 1983), pp. 107-40.

[13]For further analysis, see Johan Jørgen Holst, "A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Nordic Area: Conditions and Options—A Norwegian View," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 14 (3) (1983): 227-238.

[14]Bjøl, *Nordic Security,* p. 42.

[15]Ibid., pp. 32-33.

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Bernt Hagtvet and Erik Rudeng

Scandinavia: Achievements, Dilemmas, Challenges

SCANDINAVIA IS THE WESTERN PART OF SIBERIA; this is a fundamental geohistorical and geopolitical fact. Yet the peninsula is not inhabited by Slavs, Eskimos, or, to a great extent, Lapps. Despite its location on the northern tip of the Eurasian landmass, the area was, and still is, inhabited predominantly by people of northern Germanic stock and other tribes with ancient links to Europe. The significance of ethnic roots and the consciousness of a common linguistic and cultural heritage can hardly be exaggerated. In border areas like Scandinavia, they are even more important. Before Herder, Wagner, and the ethnofolklorists of the nineteenth century rediscovered the Germanic myths, these had for one or two millennia formed a common frame of reference in the whole Germanic world, the North included.

By the thirteenth century, most of the North had come under the influence of Christianity, although Swedish crusades in Finland still seemed necessary. Nothing is more indicative of the North's cultural closeness to the Continent than the sudden conversion to Protestantism soon after it was accepted widely in the North German states. Centuries before industrial capitalism emerged on the North Atlantic shores, Scandinavia had imported "the ethic of Protestantism" and was culturally prepared for "the spirit of capitalism."

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THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF SCANDINAVIA

Within the gradients of European macrohistory, the five Nordic countries make up a distinct region of Europe, a region of marked religious homogeneity after the complete break with the Holy See after 1517. Equally important in this regard was the standardization of vernacular scripts early on, Latin being replaced by native tongues. In addition, the countries were never subject to the political and administrative control of the Holy Roman Empire, and they succeeded in building up their own independent cultural institutions after the break with Rome. What counted in this early phase of nation-building, this thrust toward territorial consolidation, were differences in the economic resource base. Using the conceptual map devised by Stein Rokkan for the identification of the sources of variations in nation-building in Europe, we can array the five Nordic countries along two axes: one runs from north to south, and measures independence from Rome and the transterritorial networks established by Roman law and the Church; the other runs from east to west, and is generated by the combination of two factors—the strength of the city network and the degree of centralization brought about by the incorporation of primary-producing peripheries.

On the north-south axis, the Nordic countries are all the same distance from Rome. The differences in the resource base for nation-building were roughly as follows:

Seaward Periphery		*Successful Empire-Nations* *Seaward*	*Landward*	*Landward Periphery*
Weaker cities, once independent, later a subject territory:	Stronger cities, medieval empire, later reduced to dependence:	Stronger cities, continuous independence:	Weaker cities, continuous independence:	Weaker cities, subject territory:
Iceland	*Norway*	*Denmark*	*Sweden*	*Finland*

Rokkan emphasizes two distinct developments: first, the absence of a fragmented city-middle-belt of the kind running from Brugge and Antwerp to the northern Italian cities in continental Europe; second, the changes triggered during the later Middle Ages in the status of the seaward peripheries.

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Rokkan does point to the elements of a "city belt" in medieval Scandinavia (the trade route from the North German Hanse cities eastward to Visby and into the Gulf of Finland, westward along the coast to the Swedish province of Bohuslan and southern Norway to Bergen), but this route, with its cities, had been incorporated into larger territorial systems. This was quite different from the situation in Germany, where cities became petty princedoms and "free" cities. There were two cases of successful state-building in Scandinavia: Denmark and Sweden. The three other territories of the North, the seaward and landward peripheries, experienced long spells of dependence under these two states—Iceland and Norway under Denmark, Finland under Sweden.[1]

These early contrasts in the resource base for territorial consolidation can be seen as a structural precondition for the processes of mass mobilization that gained momentum after 1848. We shall put aside the explanation of variations in the steps of enfranchisement and the growth of mass politics, however, and instead devote ourselves to the primary task: the interaction between the North and the European powers from the early modern period onward, and its repercussions for contemporary learning ability.

The millennial fact of German ethnicity is as important for the later identity of the Nordic countries as the Reformation. A Nordic area mainly populated by Lapps or Slavs—or American Indians, for that matter—would probably have met with racial hostility and religio-political crusades from the European powers, and outright exploitation by them. Instead, peripheral Scandinavia, despite conflicts and wars, benefited from an extensive learning process through a variety of contacts with shifting European powers. Some of these contacts were quite violent and far-reaching. The Vikings, for example, were the scourge of Europe for several centuries, reaching as far south as Constantinople and Spain, and as far west as America. But on the whole, this learning process proceeded peacefully through commercial, political, and religious channels.

In this article, we shall deal with a few aspects of this peripheral position, more precisely, the advantages and dynamism inherent in this position and its legacy for Scandinavian society in the contemporary world. We shall argue that the political and social experiments launched in the thirties in the Nordic countries represent an

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excellent example of this creative adaptation of foreign influences to local conditions.

The world depression that followed the oil crisis of 1973 has clearly strained the social fabric of the Nordic countries. The present problems, in our view, may be analyzed as another test of political creativity and adaptation not unlike the ordeal faced by the Nordic countries in the interwar period. Creativity presupposes an ability to transcend existing paradigms in social thinking. This ability, in turn, depends on learning processes that draw on a variety of sources. It is our contention that this Scandinavian specialty faces its toughest test in the years ahead, and that the past experience in selective political and cultural borrowing is crucial for generating new growth and optimism.

SCANDINAVIANS AS IMPORTERS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION

For educated Scandinavians, life in Ultima Thule has been very much a frontier experience at the edge of the civilized world. Occasional encounters with, and myths about, Lapps, Eskimos, and—in Leif Erikson's case—American Indians contributed to the feeling of being at an outpost of civilization. This peculiar kind of frontier spirit was intensified by the barrenness of the soil, in most places, and the hardship of the climate.

Provincial as they had to be, these carriers of Western culture nevertheless displayed a remarkable intensity in their identification with "Europe" and a typical self-consciousness as frontiersmen and women. In rugged manor houses deep in the Norwegian forests, educated minorities read the classics and the latest contributions to European literature and philosophy. Nowhere was the *Almanache de Gotha* studied more eagerly than in the Danish aristocracy. The Norwegian constitution of 1814, the most liberal of its age, was the product of a tiny but widely read elite of civil servants well-versed in English, French, and American political and constitutional thought. Swedish natural scientists, who had been given first-class training in European universities, made decisive contributions in the early modern period that were second to none.

Scandinavian history can thus be read as a systematic process of importing knowledge from the centers of Europe—an ingenious ac-

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tivity of local adaptation and reorientation. Politically, this meant that at times the North would become a mere pawn in European power struggles, especially after the Napoleonic wars, when Denmark's unfortunate alliance with the French emperor sealed the fate of Norway. (Before that time, few paid much attention to the Nordic region in international power politics, except when Sweden interfered in the protracted wars of religion in the seventeenth century and, at the height of its imperial power, when it fought the Russians for supremacy over the Baltic and Eastern Europe.) Commercially, from the High Middle Ages on, this process of give-and-take meant learning to find an advantageous role in the various Hanseatic, Italian, Spanish, Dutch, and British attempts at creating world-systems of trade. One pattern emerges clearly from these early connections with Europe: Scandinavians could benefit from the spin-offs of conquest and exploitation without having to get their hands dirty in major colonial undertakings. (Denmark is somewhat of an exception in this respect; witness her adventures in the Caribbean.)

After the fall of Napoleon, when Nordic infighting ended, there was no real role for a ruthless, aggressive upper class with expansionist intentions. The absence of an agrarian-based *Junker* class (except in scattered areas in southern Sweden and Denmark) made the transition to democracy smoother, and left only small vestiges of either illiberal, antidemocratic thought or a peasantry that could be easily mobilized by plebeian mass movements of the right.

The characteristically Scandinavian sense of humanitarianism and innocence in international affairs was able to develop, and Nordic statesmen increasingly came to regard themselves as natural mediators, go-betweens, and peace-prize awarders on the world scene. It was hardly a coincidence that the first two secretaries-general of the UN, Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjöld, were Scandinavians. In the 1920s, Fridtjof Nansen, the polar explorer, gained preeminence as "the conscience of the world" in the League of Nations.

Intellectually, the most significant ideas taken from Europe were those of progress and modern civilization. Europe provided Scandinavia with programs for advancement and full-fledged modern institutions and technologies, which, given a certain time-lag, were enthusiastically imported. But despite the instances of creative local adaptation, the process was nevertheless one of *diffusion* from vari-

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ous European centers, a diffusion that depended for its success on the existence of highly motivated and selective importers.

With the advent of industrial capitalism, one of the first things the Scandinavians discovered was the limitation of smallness. Because of the backwardness and size of the Nordic countries, their markets were small and thus unable to sustain by themselves economic activities on a scale normal in Europe. In addition, mass emigration to the United States deprived the countries of valuable labor at the same time that it served as a safety valve for a potentially revolutionary segment of the population. The Scandinavians had to rely on the state and other collective arrangements more frequently than was the case in Great Britain, France, Belgium, and other countries. (Germany represents a special case due to its retarded economic spurt in the last century.) In Norway, this modification of traditional economic liberalism was labeled "the Norwegian system,"[2] but it was a "system" that not only the other Scandinavian countries developed, but also Germany and Japan, for somewhat different reasons. In the nineteenth century, the emerging strong Scandinavian state did not function as a center of its own, nor did it give rise to a particular brand of Scandinavian theory of *Staatsräson*. The external world, in fact, barely noticed this particular Scandinavian system.

It was in the cultural sphere that Scandinavia for a short, glorious period achieved preeminence, by producing such remarkable individuals as Hans Christian Andersen, Kierkegaard, Ibsen, Grieg, Munch, Strindberg, and slightly later, Sibelius and Saarinen. In the twentieth century, the cultural vitality of the smaller Nordic regions, Iceland and the Faeroe Islands, has been remarkable as well.

It was probably the magnificent Stockholm Exhibition of 1930 that, for the first time and on a massive scale, convinced international experts like the American journalist Marquis Childs that Scandinavians had come of age, not just as importers of modernity, but as *producers* of its newest forms. The forms embodied in the Exhibition were: rational simplicity of style (historians of Weimar would call it *sachlich*), visions of an egalitarian, reform-oriented society, the People's Home *(folkhemmet),* and a forward-looking economy under some kind of social control and not based on the exploitation of foreign lands. The Exhibition signaled a new area, not only in design and the arts, but in politics as well. Six years after its

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opening, Childs could proclaim Sweden to be a sane "middle way" between Bolshevism and unregulated capitalism.[3]

Before an independent Scandinavian design could emerge, however, it was necessary to cast off the yoke of European classicism. This happened in the 1880s and 90s,[4] during the period known as the "Viking revival," when Scandinavians were intensely preoccupied with medieval and Nordic-Germanic themes. Similarly, before the new egalitarianism could prevail, the enfranchisement of the lower classes and the gradual accession to power of the Scandinavian social-democratic parties in the twenties and thirties had to take place. In both cases, indigenous cultural and political traditions were transformed creatively after encounters with European influences. In both cases, there were local antecedents. The social-democratic parties, for example, found their specific form during the *fin de siècle* rediscovery of the Nordic medieval past, when Norwegian historians wrote about the egalitarian peasant communities of the Middle Ages and the absence of European-style feudalism. *Thus, politically as well as culturally, the triumph of an original Scandinavian form of modernity had links to the Nordic past. This continuity mingled with the foreign models implanted in the Nordic countries and set the stage for their present structure.*

THE SCANDINAVIAN WELFARE STATE: IMAGES AND PERFORMANCE

The Stockholm Exhibition's ideals of sociopolitical equity, simplicity, and accessibility found political expression in the growth of an extensive system of social insurance and benefits: that is, the Scandinavian welfare state. What was so remarkable about the political system during this period was its ability to transform itself in innovative ways. The welfare state is the primary example of this. The polarization and division that paralyzed Germany and Austria, and left them open to the Nazi onslaught, were prevented in Scandinavia through neutrality in World War I and a series of complex "crisis deals" between the primary sector in the economy and the industrial working class.[5] These compromises signified a fundamental realignment of the political forces in the five countries (though the situation in Finland is barely comparable because of the bitterness of the civil war), and had one important consequence: they showed

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that the party system was flexible and that the parliamentary system could handle the economic depression. Thus fascism, the prime threat of the thirties, never became more than an irritant in the Nordic countries, except in Finland.[6] On the parliamentary level, these deals laid the foundation for stable governments and paved the way for coalitions of labor and agrarian parties, which were more willing to use Keynesian-type economic planning and deficit spending to combat the slump. The most influential Social-Democratic theoretician, Ernst Wigforss (finance minister from 1932 until 1949), was one of the first to use deficit spending for expansionary purposes. In fact, in an imaginative *anticipation* of Keynes's *General Theory,* Wigforss had advocated deficit budgeting as early as the 1910s.[7] The Stockholm school of economics (Knut Wicksell and, later, Gunnar Myrdal) followed suit and prepared the intellectual ground for the acceptance of these ideas.

The welfare state as a concept is notoriously nebulous. The expression has British roots, its first prominent use being attributed to the Archbishop of York, Sir William Temple, who used the term "welfare state" in contrast to the Nazi "power state."[8] The concept was given wide circulation by Lord Beveridge in 1942, whose plan for comprehensive social insurance in Britain was implemented by the Attlee government after the war. The broadest definition of the welfare state has been offered by the British social historian Asa Briggs, who conceives of it as

> a state in which organized power is deliberately used in an effort to modify the play of market forces in three directions: first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income, irrespective of the market value of their work and their property; second, by narrowing . . . insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain "social contingencies" . . . which lead otherwise to . . . crises; and third, by ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services.[9]

To Briggs, the criterion of *universality* of services distinguishes the welfare state from what he terms the "social service state."[10] In the Nordic context, this distinction is crucial. The specific contribution of the Nordic Social Democrats lies in their attempt to broaden the scope of the social services to include a politico-social transformation toward equality. Whereas the social service state embodied the

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liberal ideal of equality of *opportunity,* the Social Democrats made an attempt to implement, through social services available to all, equality of *results*. In the words of Wigforss:

> The wage earner "cannot agree . . . that the welfare state . . . should secure a minimum livelihood for all, but allow whatever goes beyond this to be won through each individual's or each group's asserting itself in an unlimited competition for standards, wealth, and power. That spirit clearly conflicts with the ideas that both the trade union movement and social democracy seek to follow in their public labors . . . that it still shall be the labor movement's ideas of equality, cooperation, and solidarity that shall set their stamp upon society's continuing transformation.[11]

In his social philosophy, Wigforss was influenced by the English social historian and socialist theoretician R.H. Tawney. Herein lies his debt to Europe. The implementation, however, bears the marks of indigenous adaptation, the common Nordic pattern.

For our purposes, it would be worthwhile to ponder for a moment the philosophical foundations of the Nordic welfare state. In the social-democratic tradition, the maintenance of a minimum level of well-being for all of society's members is but one part of a broader concept of citizenship. In Tawney's view, it is the duty of society in general—in practice, the state—to accumulate national income and thereby make the conditions of civilization accessible to all.

The goal of the welfare state was to allow everyone to develop his or her potentialities to the full, irrespective of the accident of birth. Tawney rejected the accusation of the Right that there was a tension between liberty and equality. To him, planning gave liberty to more people. Equality created through social income—that is, generally accessible and free collective goods—would lead to *both* liberty and equality: it "not only subtracts from inequality but adds to freedom," as he put it. This redistribution through the state was "redistribution of liberty."[12] After the war, these ideas were crystallized in T.H. Marshall's famous concept of "social citizenship": an extension of the formal-legal definition of a citizen having civil and political rights to encompass a notion of citizenship that involved "a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilization which is a common possession."[13]

This is the ideological foundation of the Nordic welfare state as well. The United States, by contrast, comes closer to the residual wel-

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fare model, in which the private market and the family function as the natural channel through which an individual's needs are met. The political disagreement in Scandinavia has revolved mainly around different, rather technical arguments about the implementation of this social policy.[14] The basic idea of the welfare state as a social right is common to all mainstream parties in Scandinavia. The Nordic welfare state represents an important democratic historical compromise between two conceptions of rights: the liberal heritage from the eighteenth century, with its emphasis on political rights, and the socialist tradition from the nineteenth, with priorities given to social and economic rights.

During the postwar period, the overwhelming political consensus has sided with the basic principles of the welfare state. The factors conducive to this consensus, as enumerated by Stein Kuhnle, are:

1. The incorporation, strength, and political position of the labor movements

2. International developments, "learning" through such agencies as the ILO

3. The political consensus developed through the common experiences of the Second World War

4. The national economic capacity—sustained periods of economic growth that may have dampened the potential for conflict

5. Social policy research that has gone a long way toward changing perceptions about the causes of social problems and about the effects of improved social services on labor productivity

6. The populations of the Nordic countries—in 1970 the total population of the largest, Sweden, was approximately equal to that of Greater London (8 million)[15]

Broadly conceived, the Scandinavian welfare state model can be seen as an attempt to modify, even abolish the market mechanism when dealing with certain categories of people and needs. This can either be seen as the result of working-class political mobilization—a humanization or "taming" of capitalism by its most conspicuous victims—or as a protection against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system. For a long time, Scandinavian welfare capitalism was considered to be the best proof of the stability of a

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"mixed" economy, where the economy was run according to the basic capitalist principles of competition, accumulation, and economic growth, while the welfare state, on the basis of a high level of taxation, would "socialize" the costs of production by catering to the people who were unable to accommodate to the speed and strain of production, or people who could not otherwise participate in work—the elderly, the mentally and physically handicapped, the sick, and the children.

The first interpretation implies that the capitalists have been "domesticated." The "end of ideology" debate toward the end of the fifties and the early sixties can therefore be interpreted as a victory for the labor movements, at least in Scandinavia. With hindsight, we can see that the victory of the social-democratic and social-liberal ideologies and the supposed domestication of capitalism were temporary indeed.

The notion of "welfare capitalism," which was so unproblematic in the sixties, has now emerged as an unstable mixture of contradictory elements that were able to coexist in the postwar period of political and economic stability and growth, but that in a period of protracted recessions and stagflation, such as the present, threaten to fall apart—leaving us with a resurgence of more internally consistent, but also more incompatible, conservative and socialist ideologies. In Sweden, this deepening of ideological fronts is visible in the emergence of a new generation of hawks in the business community and tougher demands from the labor movement going beyond trade unionist bargaining points about wages and work environment.[16]

This easy period of cooperation, the very core of the Swedish and Nordic model, came to an unequivocal end with the victory of the nonsocialist parties in 1976, and was finally buried in the lockout instigated by SAF, the Swedish Employers' Union, in 1980. The new climate can be gauged by the determination of the Social Democrats, despite strong opposition, to implement their plan for extensive union-controlled wage-earner's funds, starting in 1984 and running through 1990.

The second explanation for the rise of the welfare state in Scandinavia—the notion of systemic self-protection—has been summarized by C.B. Macpherson: "The liberal state fulfilled its own logic. In so doing, it neither destroyed nor weakened itself. It strengthened

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both itself and the market society."[17] The underlying assumption in this line of reasoning is that the capitalist system had to be protected against the follies of its own practitioners; the social fabric would simply be torn asunder under the impact of unregulated capital accumulation. Capitalism, therefore, had to be softened.

The same kind of reasoning is found in T.H. Marshall, who, when writing about school reform and poor laws in the nineteenth century, views them as provisions that made capitalism work smoothly, "an aid, not a menace, to capitalism."[18] He concedes that the growth of "social rights within capitalism is at odds with the basic principles of that system"—that is, inequality—but he also points out that while "class-abatement is still the aim of social rights, it has acquired a new meaning. . . . It has assumed the guise of action modifying the whole pattern of social inequality." [19]

"RATHER A LARGE SWEDEN THAN A SMALL AMERICA"[20]

The question can now legitimately be asked: Has the Nordic welfare state modified "the whole pattern of social inequality," as it intended? This is a subject of considerable scholarly dispute. It is nevertheless possible to make a few observations on this point. The comparative perspective is as usual illuminating. The distribution of income is one of the prime components of economic inequality. After half a century of the American welfare state, the after-tax distribution of wealth and income in that country remains highly unequal. The top one percent of Americans owned 23.3 percent of personal wealth in 1945 and 20.7 percent in 1972. About 4 percent of the adult population own more than a third of all financial assets.[21] Summing up, Robert A. Dahl comments on the verbal commitment to equality in American public life: "The United States lags well behind a number of other democratic countries in reducing economic inequality. It is striking that the presence of vast disparities in wealth and income, and so in political resources, has never become a highly salient issue in American politics, or certainly, a persistent one. When concern has surfaced in mainstream politics, it has not led to much more than rhetorical denunciation: the only lasting product of Theodore Roosevelt's renowned attack on 'malefactors of great wealth' was the phrase itself."[22]

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Using a battery of welfare state indicators—revenue of the general government as a percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product), total public spending on education as a percentage of GNP, infant mortality, and GNP per capita—the British political scientist Francis Castles concludes that "the three Scandinavian countries *plus* the Netherlands are in a league of their own with respect to the level of welfare provision" (see Appendix—Table A). These countries occupy the four top positions with regard to the percentages of GNP disbursed by the general government, four out of five of the top positions with regard to public spending on education, and four out of seven with regard to health care. Castles confirms the social-democratic self-image of being socially advanced compared to other countries (See Appendix—Table B). "With the single exception of the Netherlands, no other advanced countries manifest anything like the same consistently high levels of welfare effort and output."[23]

Public policy experts like Walter Korpi[24] have argued that means-tested social assistance can be taken as an indicator of relative poverty—in other words, an indication of inequality. In developed welfare states such as the Nordic countries, work requirements are associated with the old poor laws, in-kind transfers are nearly abolished, and means-tested programs are seen as necessary but relatively minor complements to the social insurance programs. In Sweden, for example, means-tested programs accounted for only about 2 percent of government social expenditures in the 1970s; the remainder of the other programs are universal or give benefits according to simple information based on income. In the United States, on the other hand, about 25 percent of the expenditures for income maintenance programs in 1977 were means-tested, and somewhat more than 50 percent of the expenditures were given in kind, the most extensive programs being Medicaid and food stamps.

The use of work requirements has been increasing, and given the ideology of the Reagan Administration, will probably continue to do so. The stigma attached to the means-tested in-kind programs has made their abolition a high priority in the developed welfare states. In the United States, the recent reversal of direction regarding the development of a modern welfare state has underscored the differences between America and Europe. The same applies to the issue of national health insurance, a subject that was hotly debated in the United States in the 1970s, but which has since receded as an issue,

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partly because of the entrenched interests of the medical profession. That issue was decided more than a generation ago in Scandinavia as well as in other European countries.

The position of the Left has always been that the welfare state is a means to integrate the working class in a predominantly bourgeois society, and that its benefits accrue primarily to the middle class. Table 1 gives some clues to the redistributive effects of the Nordic welfare state. The results are mixed, with the Netherlands scoring highest on the percentage of total income redistributed to the lowest deciles. It is customary to explain the differences in terms of the level of economic development. But David Cameron has shown that differences in the distribution of after-tax income are only weakly related to the level of economic production. To quote Robert Dahl's conclusion of Cameron's work, the most important factor in explaining income equalization is by far "*the extent to which social-democratic and labor parties have played a significant role in the government:* income inequality tends to be least in countries where they have."[25]

In other words, it is reasonable to assume that deliberate political agency has been very important in shaping the present social reality in the Scandinavian countries. In Scandinavia, the welfare state has made a difference in modifying the whole pattern of social inequality. Two achievements stand out in particular: the *distribution* of medical services, as can be gauged from data on life expectancy, which is the highest in the world (in 1979, newborn boys in Norway could expect to live 72.25 years, girls, 79.00; the figures for the United States are 69.9 and 77.8), and the *quality* of that service, which is indicated by the rates of infant mortality (in 1980, 9.0 per 1,000 for boys, and 7.6 for girls in Norway; 15.9 for boys and 12.7 for girls in the United States in 1978).[26]

Francis Castles opens up the possibility that these results are more the consequence of the high level of political participation in the Scandinavian countries—more precisely, the organized strength of the working class—than to the nature of its ideological expression.[27] The importance of inclusive organization in the Nordic countries is confirmed by Robert Dahl, who reports that in the twelve polyarchies he examined, the proportion of persons not members of any voluntary associations is the lowest in the Scandinavian countries (20 percent in Sweden as compared to 80 percent in Italy).[28]

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TABLE 1. Some Characteristics of Social and Economic Structures in Selected Western Countries

	Inequality of posttax income, standardized for household size					
	Variance of Logs	Percentage of Total Income to Lowest Deciles	Unemployment 1959-76	Economic Growth Rate 1959-65	Increase in Real Wages 1959-69	Increase in Consumer Prices 1959-69
France	.136	4.2	2.5%	3.6%	3.6%	4.0%
Germany	.087	6.5	1.0	5.5	5.7	2.2
The Netherlands	.047	9.1	(1.7)	3.5	3.5	3.8
Sweden	.060	7.3	1.9	3.1	4.3	3.4
United Kingdom	.080	6.1	3.1	2.4	3.2	3.7
United States	.111	4.9	5.2	2.0	2.2	2.3

SOURCE: Walter Korpi, "Approaches to the Study of Poverty in the United States: Critical Notes from a European Perspective," in *Poverty and Public Policy. An Evaluation of Social Science Research,* edited by Vincent T. Covello (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980).

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Despite the current flow of derogatory comments on the Nordic welfare state, these achievements are unassailable. Yet the Nordic model is in crisis. Why? What kind of crisis? What is the future of the welfare state?

THE AMBIGUITY OF BENEVOLENCE

More than half a century after the Stockholm Exhibition and the first Social-Democratic government in Sweden (1932), there is a strange convergence in the evaluation of the Nordic welfare state between the Right and the Left. Although not on the same scale, it is similar to the process of disenchantment with the Soviet Union that took place among Western intellectuals after the disclosure of the Moscow trials—and it has begun to make itself felt.

This sense of malaise on the part of Scandinavia's ideological adversaries can assume different forms, from Roland Huntford's alarmist, tendentious, and rather crude projection of the Swedes as "the new totalitarians,"[29] to the German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger's sophisticated observations on paternalistic welfare etatism in the leading Swedish daily *Dagens Nyheter,* in the fall of 1982.[30] There is no question of the mental openness with which the Swedes received the latter's comments; in some quarters, they were received by so much warmth that it bordered on national self-flagellation.

Behind this reception there lurks a deep-seated sense of self-doubt. While Sweden was never the object of such hallowed projections of individual utopias as the Soviet Union, from the early forties to the middle seventies, the country was nevertheless seen as a repository of hope for a civilized politics far beyond her own borders. That perceptions of "the middle way" changed during the late seventies is politically significant and in itself indicative of a deep reversal of loyalties and a shift from optimism to pessimism concerning the future of rational social planning.[31] The Nordic countries, traditionally portrayed as the prototype of class reconciliation and political enlightenment, have increasingly been singled out as prime examples of advanced industrial societies in crisis, to some, even a nightmarish Orwellian projection of benevolent and ubiquitous control in the guise of a towering state (a "welfare dictatorship," as the Viennese *Die Presse* so gallantly put it). Why should this be so?

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There are basically two approaches in the contemporary criticism of the welfare state. First, there is the view that the welfare state has not made good on its promises, that there are not only scattered pockets of poverty amid affluence, but that the distribution of services is systematically skewed in favor of the haves. The Norwegian political scientist Knut Dahl Jacobsen summed up this approach succinctly in 1964, a period when the financial foundation of extensive social programs looked quite secure: "The greatest hindrance towards attaining the welfare state is the belief that we have one."[32] This sentiment is reflected in the titles *The Unfinished Welfare* and *The Hollow Welfare,* two classic books from the early seventies.[33]

Second, there is a more extensive form of criticism that goes beyond the mere existence of welfare institutions and directs its criticisms against "the middle way": the entire Nordic social formation with its belief in equality, its dense pattern of interest articulation and organization, its belief in the democratization of more and more realms of human activity, and its tendency to make the state responsible for broader and broader segments of social life, from child-rearing to old-age homes. This is the "ambiguity of benevolence" theme so effectively popularized by Enzensberger recently.

THE UNHOLY AMALGAM OF BUREAUCRATIC PATERNALISM AND INDIVIDUAL ABDICATION

Enzensberger is what Germans call a *Vordenker,* a writer capable of anticipating trends in their embryonic form. He believes that Sweden is in the midst of a rather ominous situation, one where the individual has abdicated personal responsibility, a situation where common morality has been lifted from the realm of the individual to the realm of the collective—that is, the state. Since more and more of human activity has been made the object of legal regulation or paternalistic intervention by the state bureaucracy, people have become accustomed to delegating to the state tasks that at one time they took care of themselves.[34] With growing urbanization, secularization, fragmentation, and alienation brought on by the deepening recession, people feel powerless, morally numb, and unable to experience in their daily lives the basic malleability of existence and the unavoidability of moral choice. A new amalgam between the old Swedish civil service state, barely democratized in its attitudes, and

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the working class has created a historical hybrid, one that makes the old liberal problem of the relationship between the state and the individual painfully acute.

Swedish society has been thoroughly "social-democratized": well-intentioned, benevolent, and caring, yet, Enzensberger warns, potentially authoritarian and intolerant of deviance. The price of etatism is conformism and diminution of the sense of personal responsibility: the right to one's own problems has been taken away and turned over to professionals, whose self-interest is care. This social-democratic culture has inevitably triggered a "Social-Darwinist reaction from the Right." Enzensberger also interprets the outbursts of social aggression from Swedish youth groups and widespread vandalism in the urban areas as inchoate but significant protests against the prevailing paternalism of Swedish society. Faced with this all-embracing state apparatus, Enzensberger sees the potential for strong rightist reactions, more sinister than the tax rebellion parties in Denmark and Norway, because of widespread unemployment and an underlying exasperation that is perhaps more pronounced in Sweden than in other parts of Scandinavia.

This is a cultural critique of the classical sort, evocative but no doubt exaggerated. It can also be framed in the language of economics as well. The current fashionable theories of governmental overload, welfare backlash, and tax revolt are but one way to reformulate Enzensberger's critique. Equally important, the demands made on the political system have changed dramatically. In the fifties and sixties, people were striving for material goods and increased welfare; in the seventies, postmaterial values competed with traditional materialist demands. Constrained to care for the former demands, the political system, in particular the bureaucracy, often gave the wrong answers as it attempted to satisfy popular demands. The growing feeling of alienation measured by the increase in grass-roots actions, civil disobedience campaigns, one-issue groups—in short "irregular politics"—is an indication of a new distance between the governors and the governed. This poses a series of problems for Scandinavian democracy, which has traditionally been wedded to the idea of broad popular participation.

A further difficulty is that even if the Nordic countries succeed in curbing inflation and stagnation and once again experience growth, it is obvious that growth in itself will not solve all their problems.

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Increases in welfare tend to have a diminishing effect: up to a point, everybody may gain from purchasing a car; after the optimal point has been passed, however, the number of cars creates as many problems as it solves. In Scandinavia, this phenomenon has been given a new name: *Køsamfunnet* (literally, a "society of queues"). Most probably, we have passed the time when increased growth could solve social problems, ease class tensions, give more to each citizen, and make further expansion of the state apparatus possible. Instead, this growth caused serious environmental problems, personal strain, and congestion, while unleashing a revolution of expectations that, in their inclusiveness, made public services look even more wanting in scope and quality.

A MOOD OF FIN DE SIÈCLE?

Obviously, there have been other factors, above all trends in international politics and the economy, that have darkened the social-democratic horizon. Somehow the mood is similar to the pervasive doubt and pessimism that Carl Schorske so brilliantly analyzed in a generation of increasingly frustrated Viennese liberals.[35] But the problems besetting Scandinavian *fin de siècle* this time are not, it is hoped, on the same scale as those of the Hapsburg Empire. The real strength of Scandinavian society has been its remarkable capacity for the orderly and flexible resolution of conflicts, which thus far has not been threatened by rising unemployment and the social problems that are its inevitable by-product.

The peaceful organization of all kinds of interests, however—"corporatist mediation," the institutionalization of formal participation, negotiation, and compromise throughout the society—may have reached a level of "unintended" bureaucratic complexity that has itself become a severe problem. There is little comfort in the argument that the Scandinavian welfare bureaucracies are in truth merely small, efficient task forces compared to the stupendous military-industrial complexes in other nations. As Mancur Olson demonstrated recently in *The Rise and Decline of Nations,*[36] the peaceful, smooth organization of interests tends to become the rigid irrationality of the vested interests, severely limiting the scope for rational action and change. Precisely because the state, increasingly in all-pervasive collaboration with the big organizations, was selected

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as the prime instrument for so much well-intended social reform, its very size, complexity, and rigidity are now widely seen as impediments to the purposeful development of Scandinavian society, and further tax increases are viewed as probably counterproductive. There is little talk about "social reform" these days, but significantly, there is one new reform that is much talked about—that of public administration itself, at all levels. The success of this reorientation, however, will depend not only on the Scandinavian ability to perceive the rigidity and economic cost of administrative structures that lead their own lives, but also on the ability to explore new social goals and public values.

Such explorations are indeed cultural projects, and the cultural dimensions of the present challenges are seldom perceived by the political economists, the administrative heavyweights who still set the agenda in Scandinavia. Yet, after decades of exceptional quantitative growth in bureaucratic structures, a structural fatigue[37]—a loss of spirit, failure of nerve, lack of authority—is being experienced by many believers in the old paradigms that once inspired so much dynamic action and institution-building. Somehow, the paradigms associated with the ordinary bureaucratic structures are now pictured as pale, grey, antiseptic. The economic experts also lost their legitimacy when they underestimated the duration of the stagflationary crisis of the seventies. This failure came to be taken as the empirical basis of perhaps one of the most fertile insights in the sociological and political literature on planning and rationality in Scandinavian social science, the application of the classical theory of unintended consequences and "contrafinality" of planning system.[38]

SCANDINAVIAN ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND THE FUTURE

More strongly than other observers (especially Scandinavian, we are afraid), we have emphasized that the Scandinavian trajectory up until the twentieth century must be seen in terms of diffusion and adaptation from the European centers. It is a story of the highly successful imitation of products and paradigms, colored by indigenous experiences. Our prime example has been the Nordic welfare state. For several centuries, the driving force of the "Siberian"-scattered, peripheral Scandinavian intellectuals was their ambition to make themselves and their people part of European civilization. For all

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practical purposes, all the five Nordic countries are now "civilized." Some would say they are "overdeveloped" and that their present signs of structural fatigue and sociomental resignation are expressions of nascent decadence.

We do not believe, however, that the Nordic countries will ever turn to the residual welfare model or the positive state concept that Republicans in the United States find so appealing. Future reformulations of the welfare state model will hardly deflect from the basic values it embodies, though there will be a renewed political struggle about the particulars of this redefinition. The struggle will be to find new means of pursuing the ends of social policy that lie at the heart of Nordic political culture. This will not be easy. It should not be forgotten, however, that the Nordic societies, with their thoroughgoing sense of equality and partnership between workers and employees, also contain *dynamic* elements lacking in other industrialized countries, elements that have been made the cornerstone of the explanations tendered for the innovative capacities of the Japanese economy.[39] Given these shared characteristics, it may well be that the Nordic countries have a better chance of lifting themselves out of the present stalemate than some other industrialized nations.

The Nordic countries have, in a deep sense, ended their learning process; that is, Scandinavia is now provided with all the "modern" institutions it sought to emulate from abroad, and has developed them to the full. But it is highly significant that when Scandinavians travel abroad nowadays, they increasingly feel there are few societies more advanced than their own, except in specific sectors. No other society is seen as having reached a "higher stage," one that could serve as an exemplar for Scandinavia. After the Second World War, the United States in many ways served throughout the world as an inspiring model of modernity, as did Sweden for other Scandinavians. For short periods—and for different reasons—in fits of political romanticism, Scandinavians reached out for models elsewhere: Yugoslavia, Cuba, Tanzania, China. But it is now evident that none could serve as a blueprint for societal development in the Nordic countries.

It is our thesis that the Nordic countries are at an unprecedented juncture: *they have stopped looking elsewhere for models,* and are looking toward their own intellectual and economic resources and their present form of modernity as the points of departure for the

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next phase. This venture is often mixed with the feeling of representing a straightforward, nonconventional rationality and an openmindedness that seem to them to be less clearly apparent in some of the class-ridden and culturally self-contained nations of Europe. As a result, there is now a search for a new "Nordic future," one with a varying but certainly greater degree of economic self-reliance than had been thought possible before. Several conferences, research, and exhibition projects testify to this new phase of Nordic assertiveness. These self-confident and optimistic explorations of Nordic futures, however, emerge in a certain twilight of the welfare state, at the really "Machiavellian moment" when the republican *virtù* of social democracy—egalitarian solidarity—is, in the eyes of leading Social Democrats, widely disintegrating.[40]

Cumulatively, as a projection of existential needs, and as an area for the provision of higher levels of materialist aspirations, politics had promised too much. Far from withdrawing into morose pessimism, however, a striking feature of contemporary Scandinavian life is the resurgence of culture. There has been a new and significant revival of the crafts, of carnivals, and local festivals, very often directly inspired by the experiences of Scandinavian tourists in warmer regions of the world, Southern Europe and Latin America.

AN END TO "ANTISEPTIC SCANDINAVIA" AND A NEW CULTURAL DIVERSITY

We are inclined to see these often very spontaneous undertakings as part of a quest for cultural renewal in the North. The old tendencies to state-guaranteed uniformity and national limitations of perspective are now challenged by a much greater love, especially among younger people, of cultural diversity in all forms—local, ethnic, immigrant, premodern, foreign, and so on. At a time when all the individual parts and ethnic groups within the Nordic area are creatively digging up their own past and exchanging their extremely varied cultural experiences with similar groups around the world, including Scandinavian immigrants in America, as well,[41] it will become more difficult to speak of "antiseptic Scandinavia." Again, this is a new trend; how far it will go in the direction of diversity of subcultures or new integrative superstructures of communication is not at present known.

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The new interest taken in "culture" in most political quarters is part of the new attention being paid to the forms of civil society versus the state. *Dagens Nyheter* has played a special role in revitalizing the classical liberal perspective of civil society, translated to the present challenges of Scandinavia. This perspective implies, partly, a stress on the necessary role of the market, and assigns a greater role to voluntary associations and the key function of individual and collective entrepreneurs. The comprehensive perspective of "civil society" has made it possible to discuss these questions in a spirit more open and less sectarian than before.

If in previous centuries the main ambition of educated Scandinavians was to import and adapt, the driving ambition in the years to come will be to participate and actively contribute to world civilization. We are small, but so are most other countries in the world. In this sense, we share many interests and historical experiences with the majority of nation-building countries. One such interest is to defend and develop our own languages and cultures. They, too, are small, and cannot compete on the world market, and therefore need special protection. The Icelandic Parliament, for example, decided long ago to institute one TV-free day a week so that the "living" culture of Iceland might thrive.

Being few in number, it is necessary for us to promote systematically the highest possible average level of "sweetness and light" in our populations. Quite simply, we cannot afford to have millions of our people living unemployed and half-doped on media drugs in cultural wastelands—that would be the whole of our population and would signal the end of enlightenment in Scandinavia. We shall therefore use our state apparatus, our media support systems, our schools, and our voluntary associations to promote alternatives to cheap international, mass-produced "bread and circuses." In the coming world information society, this cultural security policy will ensure the continued viability of our languages, our cultures, and our democracies—ensure, in short, our national survival. After the "Scandinavia Today" program, it would be interesting to see touring in the North a similar "America Today" program, a national U.S. policy effort to show us the best that America has to offer. Welcome![41]

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While we are writing this (October 25, 1983), the first snow of the season is falling. As the old people say, "When the rowanberries are abundant, you are in for an icy winter."

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Appendix

TABLE A. Values and Rank Orders of Four Indicators of Welfare for OECD Countries[1]

	Current revenue of general government as % of GDP[2] I	Public spending on education as % of GNP[3] II	Deaths in first year per 1,000 live births[4] III	GDP *per capita* US dollars[5] IV
Part 1:	1974	1973	1974	1974
Australia	28.9 (18)	5.0 (18)	16.1 (13)	5877 (9)
Austria	38.4 (11)	5.1 (16)	23.5 (21)	4372 (16)
Belgium	37.9 (12)	5.1 (16)	16.2 (14)	5466 (11)
Canada	38.6 (10)	8.0 (1)	16.8* (16)	6464 (5)
Denmark	47.4 (4)	7.5 (5)	12.0† (7)	6026 (7)
Finland	38.7 (9)	6.3 (7)	10.2 (3)	4712 (14)
France	38.9 (8)	5.3 (13)	12.0 (7)	5061 (13)
Germany	41.4 (6)	4.1 (22)	21.9 (19)	6195 (6)
Iceland	na	4.8 (19)	9.6* (1)	6465 (4)
Luxembourg	44.3 (5)	5.6 (10)	13.5† (10)	5987 (8)
Netherlands	51.4 (1)	7.8* (2)	11.2 (6)	5109 (12)
New Zealand	na	5.2 (15)	15.5 (12)	4388 (15)
Norway	48.5 (3)	7.8 (2)	10.4 (4)	5487 (10)
Sweden	49.4 (2)	7.7 (4)	9.6 (1)	6878 (2)
Switzerland	35.8 (13)	4.7 (20)	12.8* (9)	7340 (1)
United Kingdom	40.0 (7)	6.3 (7)	16.7 (15)	3371 (18)
United States	30.2* (17)	6.7 (6)	17.6* (17)	6660 (3)
Part 2:				
Greece	24.2 (21)	1.6 (25)	23.9 (22)	2139 (22)
Ireland	35.1* (14)	5.3 (13)	17.8* (18)	2180 (21)
Italy	32.6 (15)	5.4 (12)	22.6 (20)	2706 (19)
Japan	24.7 (20)	4.3 (21)	10.8 (5)	4152 (17)
Portugal	23.0 (23)	2.1 (23)	44.8* (23)	1517 (23)
Spain	23.1 (22)	2.1 (23)	13.6 (11)	2446 (20)
Turkey	27.5 (19)	5.6 (10)	153.0†† (25)	748 (25)
Yugoslavia	31.5 (16)	6.0 (9)	45.0 (24)	1315 (24)

SOURCE: Francis Castles, *The Social Democratic Image of Society* (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 68.
[1]Figures in brackets indicate rank order in series.
[2]OECD, 1977 (Basic Statistics: International Comparisons).
[3]*Unesco Statistical Yearbook 1975*, pp. 372-91.
[4]Source as 2 above.
[5]Source as 2 above.
*1973. †1972. ††1967.

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TABLE B. Selected Comparisons of Welfare for OECD Countries

Countries	Index of government revenue[1] I	Index of educational spending[2] II	Index of infant mortality[3] III	Index of pure welfare I-III	Index of GDP *per capita*[4] IV	Index of welfare state provision I-IV
Sweden	91	92	100	94	88	93
Norway	87	95	94	92	62	85
Netherlands	100	95	88	94	44	82
Denmark	82	87	83	84	67	80
Canada	43	100	48	64	80	68
Luxembourg	68	38	72	60	66	61
Finland	44	56	96	65	34	58
Switzerland	31	15	77	41	100	56
France	44	31	83	53	43	50
United States	6	67	42	38	83	50
Belgium	40	26	53	40	53	43
United Kingdom	49	56	49	51	0	39
Germany	56	0	17	24	71	36
Australia	0	23	53	25	63	35
Japan	−19	5	91	26	20	24
Austria	42	26	0	22	25	23
Ireland	28	31	41	33	−30	18
Italy	16	33	6	18	−17	10
Spain	−26	−51	71	−2	−23	−7
Greece	−21	−64	−3	−30	−31	−30
Yugoslavia	12	49	−155	−31	−52	−37
Portugal	−26	−51	−153	−77	−47	−69
Turkey	−6	38	−931	−300	−66	−241
Iceland	na	8	100	—	78	—
New Zealand	na	28	58	—	26	—

From Castles

$$^{1}\frac{(x_i - \text{Min}) \times 100}{\text{Max} - \text{Min}} = \text{Index}$$

Where x_i = General government revenue as a percentage of GDP.
[2]Index calculated as in 1.
Where x_i = Public spending on education as a percentage of GNP.

$$^{3}\frac{(\text{Max} - x_i) \times 100}{\text{Max} - \text{Min}} = \text{Index}$$

Where x_i = Deaths in first year per 1,000 live births.
[4]Index calculated as in 1.
Where x_i = GDP *per capita*.
In all indices, Maximum (Max) and Minimum (Min) figures are calculated from Part 1 of Table 2.

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ENDNOTES

We would like to express our appreciation to Ragnvald Kalleberg of the University of Oslo, Juan J. Linz of Yale University, and Sven E. Olsson of the Swedish Institute for Social Research for assistance in preparing this article.

[1]For a general overview of Stein Rokkan's work on European state-building and national political development, see his major work *Citizens, Parties, Elections* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget; New York: McKaye, 1970) and the commemorative volume edited by Per Torsvik, *Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures and Nation-Building* (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1981).

[2]The phrase was first coined by the great liberal politician A.M. Schweigaard in the nineteenth century. Cf. Jens Arup Seip, *Tanker og handling i norsk historie* (Thought and Action in Norwegian History) (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1968), pp. 22-79.

[3]Marquis W. Childs, *Sweden: The Middle Way* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936).

[4]See the impressive catalogue *Scandinavian Modern Design,* 1880-1980, edited by David Revere McFadden (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1982). This medieval inspiration and continuity of design was amply displayed at the recent Exhibition touring the United States as part of the "Scandinavia Today" program. For a related perspective on the United States, see Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture* (N.Y.: Pantheon, 1981, particularly chapters 2, "The Figure of the Artisan: Arts and Crafts Ideology," and 4, "The Morning of Belief: Medieval Mentalities in a Modern World."

[5]For a discussion of these important compromises, see Jan Petter Myklebust and Bernt Hagtvet, "Regional Contrasts in the Membership Base of the Nasjonal Samling," and Bernt Hagtvet, "On the Fringe: Swedish Fascism 1920-45," in *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism,* edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan P. Myklebust (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), pp. 621-51 AND 715-43.

[6]The general theme of fascism in Scandinavia is discussed by Ulf Lindström in his thesis, *Fascism in Scandinavia,* University of Umeå, Sweden, 1983.

[7]D. Winch, "The Keynesian Revolution in Sweden," *The Journal of Political Economy* 74 (2) (1966): 168-76, and more generally, B.G. Haskel, "What Is Innovation? Sweden's Liberals, Social Democrats and Political Creativity," *Political Studies* 20 (3): 306-10.

[8]William Temple, *Citizen and Churchman* (London: 1941), quoted from Anne-Lise Seip, *Om velferdsstatens framvekst* (On the Growth of the Welfare State) (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981), p. 20.

[9]Asa Briggs, "The Welfare State in Historical Perspective," *Archives of European Sociology* 2 (1961): 228.

[10]Abstracting from the historical record, Norman Furniss and Timothy Tilton distinguish between three forms of interventions in unrestrained markets and property relations: *the positive state,* whose aim is to protect the holders of property from the difficulty of unregulated markets and from potential redistributive demands; the *social security state,* a liberal construct with the aim of securing macroeconomic growth and a guaranteed national minimum; and the *social welfare state,* whose aim is environmental planning, solidaristic wage policy, close government-union cooperation, and general equality of living conditions, not

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only a general national minimum of income. See their book *The Case for the Welfare State. From Social Security to Social Equality* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1977), p. 14 ff.

[11]Ernst Wigforss, "Förstamajtal 1962," *Frihet och gemenskap* (Freedom and Community) (Stockholm: Tiden, 1962). This is his May Day address, reprinted in Furniss and Tilton, *The Case for the Welfare State,* p. 14.

[12]All quotations from Tawney's *Equality* (1931).

[13]T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge: 1930).

[14]The consensus should not be overemphasized, however. Anne-Lise Seip, in her essay "Velferdsstatens framvekst i Norge," in Seip, *Om velferdsstatens framvekst,* pp. 35-61 , distinguishes between several phases in its development, and singles out distinctive differences in the social-democratic and conservative principles of social legislation.

[15]Stein Kuhnle, "Welfare and the Quality of Life," in *Nordic Democracy,* edited by Allardt et al. (Copenhagen: Det danske selskab, 1981). See also his "Growth of Social Insurance Programs in Scandinavia," pp. 125-50, in Flora and Heidenheimer, *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981).

[16]The best discussion of these developments today can be found in U. Himmelstrand et al., *Beyond Welfare Capitalism: Issues, Actors and Forces in Social Change* (London: Heinemann 1981).

[17]C.B. Macpherson, *The Real World of Democracy* (Oxford: 1971), p. 11 .

[18]T.H. Marshall, *Social Policy in the Twentieth Century,* 3d. ed. (London: 1970), p. 35.

[19]Marshall, *Citizenship,* p. 47.

[20]Attributed to the German SPD spokesman Eppler in the cover story of *Der Spiegel,* October 9, 1972, "Schweden: Model für Bonn? " p. 122.

[21]U.S. Census Bureau, 1980, 470, reported by Robert A. Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 173.

[22]Ibid. p. 175.

[23]Francis Castles, *The Social Democratic Image of Society: A Study of the Achievements and Origins of Scandinavian Social Democracy in Comparative Perspective* (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1978) p. 73.

[24]See W. Korpi, "Approaches to the Study of Poverty in the United States: Critical Notes from a European Perspective," in *Poverty and Public Policy. An Evaluation of Social Science Research,* edited by V.T. Covello (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980).

[25]Dahl, *Dilemmas,* p. 175. David Cameron's work is a report prepared for delivery at the Harvard University Center for European Studies and the Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 1979-80—*Economic Inequality in the Advanced Capitalist Societies: A Comparative Analysis.*

[26]Tables 16 and 10, *UN Demographic Yearbook,* 1981, "Expectation of Life for Each Population Group, by Sex and Specific Ages," and "Death Rates Specific for Age and Sex."

[27]Castles, *Social Democratic Image,* p. 56. For an extensive review of participatory conditions in Norway and a normative-empirical assessment of pluralism, see William M. Lafferty, *Participation and Democracy in Norway: The "Distant Democracy" Revisited* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981).

[28]Dahl, *Dilemmas,* p. 67.

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[29]Roland Huntford, *The New Totalitarians* (New York: Stein and Day, 1972). This book has been seen as "Orwellian" in its conception, since it argues that the Swedes may not be aware of their own unfreedom; in fact, according to Mr. Huntford, they have been brought to the point where they have lost the meaning of true freedom.

[30]A political sociologist is of course more than usually skeptical when such a blistering attack is greeted with that kind of general acclaim. One could ask why the Swedes haven't heard this from one of their own before. The answer is that they have. What Mr. Enzensberger says was part of the common stock of traditional right-wing criticism of the Swedish model since the late sixties, albeit in less elegant and sophisticated form. The fact that it came from the left was a sensation. See his *Svensk høst* (Swedish Autumn), published by *Dagens Nyheter* in December 1982).

[31]Anyone interested in the selective use of imagery for domestic political purposes should consult the annual survey of the images of Sweden in the international press issued by the Swedish foreign ministry. The clippings range from the bizarre to the outright hostile, conforming with the swing toward disillusionment with the Scandinavian model. In 1982 the offerings included: "In Sweden they pass a law every 8th hour which includes a prohibition of some sort" (*La Razon,* Beunos Aires); "In Sweden there is a risk of arrest if you laugh in public places" (*Ekstrabladet,* Copenhagen); "The Swedish foreign debt increases with 300,000 Sw. *kronor* an hour in order to finance a bureaucracy which employs one third of the population in nonproductive jobs" (*Toronto Sun,* Canada). Reported in *Dagens Nyheter,* Stockholm, September 1, 1983, p. 1. The French *Le Point* (October 17-23, 1983) made a mockery of serious journalism by printing Cornelia Spar's sensationalist *La Suède: le contre model,* but it proves our point of the reversal of attitudes. Even *Der Spiegel* joined the ranks of *les terrible simplificateurs* in its coverage in the issue of October 24, 1983 (no. 43), entitled *Sweden, the Surveillance State,* though space is given to Prime Minister Olof Palme, who denounced the accusations of central control of Swedish citizens.

[32] "Politisk fattigdom" (Political Poverty), *Kontrast* (Oslo) no. 3, pp. 5-11.

[33]Gunnar and Maj-Britt Inghe, *Den ofärdige välfärden* (Stockholm: Tiden, Folksam, 1970), and M. Radetzki, *Den uthulte velferden* (Norwegian edition. Oslo: Gyldendal, 1974).

[34]American readers will be familiar with this theme from Christopher Lasch's *The Culture of Narcissism* (New York: Norton, 1979), which has been translated and widely read in Scandinavia as well. Professor Lasch's target is the helping professions themselves and the big corporations rather than the state.

[35]Carl E. Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York: Knopf, 1980). For a Schorske-inspired study of generations in Norwegian politics today, see Johan Galtung, Dag Poleszynski, Erik Rudeng, *Norge i 1980-årene* (Norway in the 1980s) (Oslo: Glydendal, 1980), chapter 5 .

[36]New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

[37]For a discussion of this concept in a broader context, see Johan Galtung, Tore Heiestad, Erik Rudeng in *The New Cambridge Modern History,* Companion Volume, edited by Peter Burk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 346.

[38]Cf. Jon Elster, *Ulysses and the Sirens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Øyvind Østerud, *Det planlagte samfunn* (The Planned Society), (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1979). Gudmund Hernes has popularized his insights into contrafi-

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nality through three exceedingly funny and best-selling collections of "Laws for Modern Man." These books have contributed to a new culture of black humor among Scandinavian civil servants with a sense of bureaucratic irony. Hernes was the director of the influential public study of power in Norwegian society *(Maktutredningen),* which has published a series of sociological studies of Norwegian society.

[39]Robert Cole, in *Work, Mobility and Participation: A Comparative Study of the American and Japanese Automobile Industry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 201, regards the Japanese experiments in small, autonomous work groups having a high level of competence and the view of the organization as an open social-technical system, as a parallel to similar efforts in Scandinavia.

[40]See John G.A. Pocock's perceptive analysis of the crisis in the early modern Italian city-state, in *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[41]Two big exhibitions about the Scandinavians in the United States will be shown the summer of 1984: "The Escape to America," at the National Museum in Copenhagen, and "The Journey to America," at the Sonja Henie and Niels Onstad Art Center in Oslo. Both exhibitions will later tour the United States.

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Matti Klinge

Aspects of the Nordic Self

TO FOREIGNER AND NATIVE ALIKE, the very term "the North" evokes both the essential image of the Scandinavian countries and the special qualities of their geography, their culture, and their politics. In the national anthems of three—Norway, Finland, and Sweden—it is not the individual country that is proclaimed to be the true object of Northern man's love, attachment, and identification, but the North itself. And it is the North *in* itself, characterized by its natural endowments—the summer night light, the woods, and mountains—and not its human achievements, that both forms the background for Northern man and exemplifies him.

This image of nature—wherein place is transmuted and becomes the embodiment of a complexity of thoughts—is still a strong element in Northern man's conception of himself. It is of course a rather romantic and idealistic notion, but one that is not unique to the North. Eighteenth century ideas about the *noble sauvage* were forerunners to the romantic exoticism of the early nineteenth, the age of the contemplative voyage. Chateaubriand, forced into restless exile by the French Revolution, not only discovered the original Americans and their continent's magnificent wilderness, but also made the inscrutable Near East intelligible. Napoleon and Nelson had gone to Egypt and Syria, but it was Chateaubriand who captured for Europeans its historical and religious values, who illuminated the *meaning* of this point of the compass.

From the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, however, the idea of the North changed. In the seventeenth, the North was often de-

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picted as an Arcadia, fertile and sane and valuable in its uncorrupted originality. This conception was emphasized particularly by the Kingdom of Sweden during the relatively brief period, from Gustavus Adolphus to Charles XII (1630 to 1720), when it was considered one of Europe's great powers. Sweden, it was said, was "the realm of the North Star"; unlike France, the sun's realm, it neither rose nor set; nor did it increase and decrease as did Turkey, the moon's realm, but remained constant. Despite this propagandist ideology, the North's political role in Europe waned, as Russia and Prussia, two modern-type states, came into prominence in the eighteenth century.

The North is sometimes represented as a peaceful and serene part of the world, far away and safe from wars—especially revolutions. The traces of escapism and conservatism in this romantic conception seem to lead logically to Northern man's sense of himself as existing on the periphery. Yet exactly where the periphery begins is somewhat difficult to define; in a sense, one has only to cross the Tiber to be there. What is important to understand is why the Northerner conceives of himself in this way, since in fact the North has been closely connected with the Continent for centuries. Old legal and ecclesiastical traditions, old towns, the cathedrals of Trondhjem, Turku, Uppsala, Lund, and Roskilde, medieval castles and manors, and cities such as Stockholm and Copenhagen, all bear eloquent testimony to the North's age-old participation in European civilization. The central commercial and political role of Denmark, too, negates the idea of peripherality, as does the close contact of large parts of Finland with St. Petersburg in the nineteenth century. Yet, despite these important historical, psychological, and economic ties to the Continent, Northern man's self-conception stresses peripherality and the virgin nature of his land.

Of course, very large parts of the Nordic countries are geographically peripheral. Seen from Paris, Rome, Berlin, or London, Iceland is indeed a faraway place, as are most of the noncoastal regions of Finland, Sweden, and Norway. Beyond Norway's long coast, which gave the land its name (Nor*way,* Nor*wegen*), lies a near-impenetrable hinterland of mountains and woods. Although the inland waterways in Finland and Sweden played an important role in linking certain areas of the interior to the coast—and still do—most of the inland remained either unsettled or only sparsely inhabited.

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And in spite of a flourishing tar trade, the woods were considered to be of little value; most economic activity, from the Middle Ages to the last century, was concentrated in the agricultural sector. Finland, Sweden, and Denmark were grain exporters—this, despite the great famine of 1867-68 that took the lives of a hundred thousand Finns and Swedes, and the fact that, up until the very end of the last century, the daily bread of many of their own people was made of tree bark mixed with grain. Until that time, there was no system for effective winter traffic—the infant railway network not yet reaching into the interior—so that it was possible for grain to be exported from the coastal areas while those in the hinterland starved.

The industrialization of the Continent, along with a new technique for making paper from pulp, and other technological changes, made the woods and wilderness areas newly valuable. At the same time, competition from America and Russia—which, because of new agricultural methods and improved transport systems, had increased their exports of grain—caused the North to turn to the export of animal products, timber, and paper. More important by far, it forced them to industrialize. The move toward exporting timber and paper meant as well an extensive population shift to the north in Finland, Sweden, and Norway. This socioeconomic background, when seen in context with aesthetic, moral, and psychological aspects, helps to round out the Northerner's traditional sense of peripherality.

The idea of a virgin, original landscape turns the mind toward aesthetic and moral values. One of the most influential characteristics of this romantic notion of landscape is that of solitude—man alone, in contemplation of God, Nature, and Man himself. Nature conceived in this way, as well as the sense of closeness to it, played an important part in Nordic man's self-identification. Moreover, the nonurban, peripheral tradition—which is only one aspect, but often the dominant one, of the image—is closely linked with the notion of being poor. Certainly, the North, especially in its hinterlands, was poor compared to Central Europe. In large parts of the North, cultivation of the soil is back-breaking, toilsome labor, and the short summer makes agriculture a risky enterprise. Finland's national anthem (for long regarded as the national anthem of Sweden, too), whose lyrics were written by the poet Runeberg, stresses poorness

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as an important element in the notion of fatherland. The country is poor, says Runeberg, and is therefore rejected by foreigners; but for its inhabitants, it is the best of countries because of its beauty, its summer night light, its seas and highlands and skerries. In both the anthem and in his other works, he emphasized the religious notion that the poor man is closer to God than the rich. Since Finland in the nineteenth century was a grand duchy under Russia, the emphasis meshed neatly into the conservative political philosophy. But the theme itself was hardly one of political propaganda; the idea of religious contemplation before nature had figured importantly in the European history of ideas, and special conditions in the North had fostered its development into a national ideology.

It is not difficult to understand how this development could take place. The self-identification of any national group evolves primarily out of, and has deep roots in, the ideas dominant in the upper strata of society at the time when the main elements of such thought reach the masses. The views are then modified to fit the social reality. It is in this way that Americans have come to see themselves as the people of liberty and progress; Germans, as thinkers; Russians, as a people destined to suffer.

To speak of a part of the world as being north, south, east, or west, implies of course a relation to some other part. In the Nordic world, that relation is primarily to continental Europe. It is in relation to the Continent, therefore, that the North is Nordic, and it is in relation to Europe that the North sees itself as poor and peripheral, and often as young and parvenu.

Although the bulk of the population lived in the coastal regions and most economic activity took place there, much of Northern man's self-identification in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was nevertheless based on an idealization of the man of the hinterlands and the harsh conditions under which he lived. Neither urban man, nor his cities and industries, ever became as important in the national self-consciousness as did the farmer, especially the poor peasant eking out his living near the edge of the wilderness. In the nineteenth century, ideal types were created for the peoples of all nations: the American represented agricultural and industrial enterprise; the Frenchman, the champion of freedom and fighter of revolutions; the Russian, the sentimental, religious peasant. In fashion-

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ing his image, Nordic man joined enterprise and mastery over difficult living conditions to a deep, natural religiosity and loyalist ethos. Nordic man was free, but not rebellious; his mission was to carry his culture and the knowledge of God ever more deeply into the wilderness. This notion of Nordic man was most apparent in Finland and Norway, egalitarian countries that, having once been part of the old Swedish and Danish empires, had no historical centers of their own. With only weak urban, bourgeois, and noble traditions, and lacking a continuous monarchial presence, these countries, through their poets, painters, and composers, turned their relative peripherality into a virtue and an ideology—hence, the central role of the artist in Finland and Norway. Without the stuff of history, the memory of kings and heroes, these countries could do little to build a historical national identity, as Sweden and Denmark were able to do, even though at times the Finns and Norwegians laid claim to at least part of that history.

The notion of being an agrarian, peripheral society played a central role in Denmark and Sweden, too. In the nineteenth century, the loss of great or middle power status turned Denmark away from external affairs and colonial ambitions toward the small domestic world surrounding the glittering capital of Copenhagen—whose grandeur was somewhat anomalous, considering the political realities. Hence, the stress in Denmark on its language, its folklore, and on Scandinavianism. The *høyskole* (popular college) ideology and religious movements must thus be seen in part as an attempt to find internal stability after the collapse of the greater state.

Sweden in this respect held the middle ground. It, too, had an old capital, a court, and a great military tradition. But Sweden also had its forested periphery and enormous uninhabited expanses, mystically believed, in the summer light nights, to be directly under God. A religio-aesthetic national romanticism of various forms and style, seen in the works of Runeberg and Sibelius in Finland, and in that of Grieg in Norway, strongly influenced Swedish self-identification. We can see this today in the Swede's admiration for the Finns and Norwegians. In their primitivism and aestheticism, they seem to the Swedes to be nearer to nature, and therefore nearer to the original forces of good and evil. The drinking habits of the Finns and Norwegians, certainly not very different from those of the Middle and North Swedes, are nonetheless seen by the Swedes, and the Danes

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as well, to be especially irrational, even mystical. Consciously or not, the Finns themselves often play upon this theme. Recently, President Koivisto of Finland, on an official state visit to Iceland, spoke (with a smile?) about Finnish and Icelandic mysticism, based upon the preservation of old folklore (the *Kalevala* and Edda) in the outermost reaches of the North—Iceland in the west and Karelia in the east. But this too-close tie to the past has perhaps only served to hinder Northern identification with urban and European values.

In the nineteenth century, Finland's proximity to St. Petersburg, at that time the important westward-looking capital of Russia, contributed to the Finnish consciousness of taking part in world affairs. Many Finns served in high posts in the Russian Imperial army, and in that milieu, developed global views. This tradition survives in the activities undertaken by Finland in the area of international politics, when tensions between today's great powers call for initiatives toward the maintenance of peace, such as those that led to the Helsinki Conference (1973-75) on European security and UN-related diplomacy.

For all its seeming homogeneity, the North is, in many respects, not a unified area, and its different groupings and patterns are readily apparent. From the points of view of climate, commerce, and history, the North can be divided into coastal and hinterland areas. The major portion of the population lives along the coasts and in those inland areas having close water communications to the sea. Norway developed around a waterway, and Iceland, of course, was totally dependent upon water communications. The Danish Sound, much like the Turkish Straits, has always played a central role. One waterway, the southeastern, opens out of the Sound and follows the coasts of Germany, Poland, and the Baltic countries. Another connects the Sound with the Swedish coastline up to Stockholm, and from there, to the Mälaren Lake system, then northward up by the Sea of Åland to the large Gulf of Bothnia, which in the north approaches the Arctic Circle. Finally, from the Sound to the Gulf of Finland and to the River Neva and Lake Ladoga runs the passage—important in ancient times and even today—that connects the Russian river systems and Russian inland with the West. Finland and Estonia are situated near this line, but the passage runs quite close to the area around Stockholm.

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On the Norwegian coast, in Denmark, and in the whole Baltic Sea area, German commercial and handicraft traditions were an important influence from the Middle Ages on, especially in cities such as Riga, Tallinn, Stockholm, Turku, Wiborg, and to a high degree, St. Petersburg. Together with Christianity, these traditions dominated the entire Baltic area up to Lake Ladoga. This strong, ancient tie between the countries of the North and the culture, religion, ideas, and economy of the Continent thus acted as a counterweight to the customs of the hinterlands.

The German impact tends to be overlooked in surveys of Nordic history, apparently for nationalistic reasons. In language and faith, however, two areas of critical importance, the impact is unmistakable. From roughly the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the Danish and Swedish languages were Germanized to a very high degree. Icelandic, in fact, which was untouched by German influences, is less easily understood by the other Scandinavians than German, although in some ways it sounds familiar. The linguistic closeness is now less clear because the German spoken today is based on Southern German—that is, high German *(Luthersprache)*—not the Baltic and North Sea Coast low German, which is closer to Dutch and Danish. German-speaking centers, from Bremen and Hamburg to Lubeck, and Danzig and Riga to St. Petersburg, influenced the language lexically, semantically, and structurally. After the Protestant Reformation, moreover, the creation of written languages by translation of the Bible increased and legitimated Germanization. This linguistic evolution can also be seen in Finnish—where many new features were introduced when the Bible was translated into that language—and Swedish, the two languages most used by the peoples of the Swedish Kingdom.

The Northern countries, along with Lower Germany, are the center of Lutheran Protestantism; bishops from all of them, as well as from Estonia, assist at one another's consecration. In the Northern countries, the churches are state-churches, the bishops being appointed either by the sovereign or the head of government, according to traditions dating from the sixteenth century.

The last two centuries have seen a diminution of this strong continental, commercial influence, but much of the tradition nonetheless remains. Moreover, the social-democratic ideologies of our time perhaps attest to a renewed desire to defend urbanism and its values

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against the more nationalistic and agrarian values of the centrist parties and even those of the Communists.

Geography, communications, history, the various aspects of economic life—all give us several different ways of grouping the countries of the North into distinct entities. Finland, Sweden, and Norway are the "wood" countries; all border Lapland, and in the extreme north, there is extensive internordic traffic and cooperation. A "midnorthern" cooperation zone includes North Sweden, Middle Finland, and Middle Norway. There are strong internordic contacts in the south around the Danish Sound, especially in the area around Copenhagen and the former Danish provinces of southern Sweden. Western Sweden, from Gothenburg, looks westward, to Oslo and southern Norway; eastern Sweden, the part of the country around Stockholm, has traditionally been oriented toward the north and east.

As for language, Finnish is also spoken in both northern Sweden and Norway; the small Lappish minority, on the other hand, is divided into four main language groups or dialects. And because a small portion of the Lapps are orthodox, they can be further grouped according to denomination. Danish and Norwegian are close to each other linguistically, especially the more common of the two Norwegian languages, and Swedish is not only the language of Sweden, but also the other, although minor, national language of Finland. Nevertheless, in this part of the North, internordic linguistic unity is unknown, even if, in the nineteenth century, Scandinavian cultural—even political—unity was urged on the basis of a pretended linguistic unity. Such unity is found, rather, only in certain social classes, and language difficulties therefore typically arise in the many areas where internordic cooperation takes place. The concept of linguistic unity is maintained primarily in university congresses and symposia and in the research environment, and of course in the commercial world. Thus, unless they belong to certain groups of specialists, Nordic authors will be read in the other Nordic countries only in translation, with the exception of Swedish-speaking Finnish authors, who can of course reach the Swedish public.

Neither the majority of Finns nor, in modern times, Icelanders, Greenlanders, Faeroese, the Lapps, or the Germans in southern Denmark were part of the Nordic linguistic community. Icelandic is an

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old form of Norwegian, "on ice," as it were, in the periphery. Finnish has also preserved many of its old adopted Swedish and German words in the more archaic forms of these "donor" languages. If regarded from the standpoint of the historico-genetic morphological "language family," Finnish is quite different structurally and lexically from the other Scandinavian languages, and belongs, together with Lappish and Estonian, to the Finno-Ugrian language group. But from a semantic and functional point of view, which is certainly more accurate for a real understanding of Finnish-speaking Finland, Finnish is very close to Swedish, since the culture expressed by the language is almost the same. This leads us to the historical division or grouping of the Scandinavian area into old political and cultural empires, whose impact can still be seen in certain ways of behaving and thinking.

Until 1814, the Danish Empire was made up of Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Greenland, the Faeroe Islands, Slesvig, and Holstein down to Hamburg, and from the earliest times until 1658, the southern parts of actual Sweden. Since he was also the Duke of Slesvig and the Count of Holstein, the King of Denmark was in effect a German prince. In the Middle Ages, Denmark had formed a large maritime imperium that included the British Isles; later on, it occupied Estonia, whose capital, Tallinn—the city-castle *(linn)* of the Danes—is a reminder of that era. Although Denmark rather early on lost its possessions in the Gulf of Finland, for centuries it retained command of many important islands in the Baltic and on the Estonian coast. Because it was part of mercantile Protestant Europe, Denmark always had important ties to Britain and Holland, but it also had a special connection to the German Empire, and maintained stable interests with the East, which often took concrete form in alliances with Russia against Sweden. In the nineteenth century, the marriage of a Danish princess to Alexander III of Russia established an influential dynastic tie between the two countries. Queen Margrete II of Denmark, in fact, was the first European monarch to pay an official visit to the Kremlin. Thus, although Denmark lost Norway in the Napoleonic wars, Iceland after the Second World War, and most of its German possessions, in its culture and foreign policy, and in the general outlook of its capital, it has an imperial tradition. Denmark is the most bourgeois and commercial of the Scandinav-

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ian countries, yet its agricultural identity, which is connected with the idealistic, voluntary *høyskole*-institute traditions, turns it toward the Northern countries, and its Northern identity remains strong.

The Dano-Norwegian common past is evident today in many aspects of daily life. One sees this most clearly perhaps in the institutional life. Centuries of unified administration, legislation, and religion mean that both countries share the essential concepts of religious, political, and judicial life. They hold much else in common, including the basis of their societies and what is called "higher culture." For Norway, Copenhagen was not only a great commercial center and the seat of the absolute monarch, but also the site of the only university in the Dano-Norwegian Kingdom, and thus the spiritual center of the realm. Furthermore, in a time when communication by sea was the only method possible, Copenhagen's position was central. This centrality was evident in the important role Copenhagen played in transporting cargo from one Icelandic coastal village to another on the opposite side of the island. Until an Iceland-round traffic line was created in the very last years of the nineteenth century, this was usually done via Copenhagen. Finally, Denmark and Norway today hold similar positions in their foreign policy. They are members of NATO, yet both bar foreign military bases from their shores.

In the Middle Ages, Norway was a kingdom, but during the centuries when it was part of Denmark, it lost its separate political identity, due in some measure to the rigid centralization policy of Denmark's absolute monarch. And because Finland had not been a separate state before it amalgamated, together with the central provinces of today's Sweden, with the Kingdom of Sweden in the thirteenth century, it was even more closely connected with Sweden. Finland was neither an administrative nor commercial subunit, but an integral part of the Swedish realm, and it was against the will of the entire population—Finns and Swedes alike—that the kingdom was divided, during the Napoleonic wars, by the Russian occupation of Finland in 1809. Even then, Finland preserved its old Swedish legislation, constitution, administration, and religion. For decades to come, Swedish remained the official language, until Finnish was slowly introduced as its equal in administrative and cultural life.

In Finland today, the old Empire lives on. Swedish is still one of the two national languages, and it is required to be taught in the pri-

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mary and secondary schools. Thus, even if only 7 percent of the population declare Swedish to be their mother tongue, most Finns do have some knowledge of it. Depending upon how one measures, roughly 5 to 30 percent of the Finnish-speaking population command Swedish to some degree. This of course ties Finland strongly to Sweden. That country, for its part, has a large population of Finnish extraction, made up of Finnish-speaking and poorly assimilated immigrants from Finland's poorest regions in the northeast, and of bilingual immigrants from southern Finland or the west coast. The latter are so well assimilated that most Swedes are unaware of their "foreign" origin.

The population flow reflects economic and commercial realities. The old Swedish Kingdom was a maritime system; its center was the crossing of the north-south axis of the Baltic Sea–Gulf of Bothnia and the east-west axis of the inner Swedish lake system–Gulf of Finland. This latter line, running from Gothenburg to Stockholm-Turku-Tallinn-Narva-Wiborg-St. Petersburg, was the area with the largest number of cities and the densest population. To the west, north, and east lay a large area of uninhabited wilderness. Southward, beyond a large central forest region and inhabited area, which formed a natural border against the Danish provinces of Scania and Blekinge, was an area of rich Central European sedimental earth, so different from the granitic soil typical of the North. Sweden occupied this area in the latter half of the seventeenth century and integrated it into the Swedish realm, forming, as it did, another population and production center. Later on, the Gothenburg area, with its growing western commerce, became another such center. Sweden's position became more western when it lost, through the treaty of Nystad in 1721, its Estonian and Livonian possessions to Russia, as well as its Finnish-speaking provinces of Ingria and Karelia. The territory was lost because of Russian expansionism, symbolized by the founding of St. Petersburg, in 1703, on soil not yet ceded to Russia. From that time on—the epoch of Peter the Great—Russia's persistence in conceiving of itself as a Baltic Sea great power led to the occupation of the eastern part of Sweden (Finland) and its attachment—not culturally or administratively, but militarily and strategically—to the Russian system. Russian hegemony in the Baltic lasted until Wilhelminian Germany emerged, at the turn of the century, as a rival sea power.

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In World Wars I and II, the Baltic provinces (*Ostseeprovinzen,* i.e., Estonia, Lettonia, and Lithuania) and Finland were involved in the Russo-German rivalry, and in both wars, Sweden came quite close to being involved as well. The First World War left both Russia and Germany in quite weakened conditions, and it was then that Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland asserted their independence. During and after the Second World War, however, only Finland—owing to its geographical position, its political and cultural traditions, and its army—was able to defend its territory against occupation. This evolution in the Baltic area strengthened the contacts between Finland and Sweden. Today, each seems to the other, in many economic and cultural aspects, to be more like the home country than a foreign one. In foreign policy, too, both countries are neutral, but each is ready to act as an initiator or negotiator for the peaceful solution of problems in Europe, in Northern Europe, and indeed the world.

For the most part, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden act jointly in the United Nations and in other international contexts. Of course they are not motivated by altruism alone; the small countries of the North are intensely aware of the importance of peace to their survival as independent, free countries. Memories of the German occupation of Norway and Denmark and the hard fighting and severe losses of Finland during the war, together with the heavy indemnities and land lost to the Allies (i.e., the Soviet Union) after the war, have left their mark on Nordic foreign policy. Each country's problems may have a different emphasis, but they unite often in common actions. As in other areas of cooperation, domestic politics plays virtually no part in foreign policy matters, because these deal with factors deeply rooted in the societies. And although Sweden had a vastly different wartime experience, remaining neutral and unoccupied throughout the war years, it still shares many of the foreign policy aims of its neighbors.

Regarding the experience of war, Sweden falls outside any grouping of the Nordic countries. Its size and central location naturally make it an important member of the North. I have already discussed its long, common history with Finland. With Denmark, it shares regional, commercial, even strategic interests; with Norway, a common frontier and the experience of political union from 1814 to 1905, a union that was not, however, completely successful and

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that left traces in both peoples' political psychology. Norway's independence and nineteenth century national history reflect the evolution of its feelings against Sweden, and the dissolution of the union was the last in a long series of losses suffered by Sweden, beginning with the famous battle between Peter the Great and Charles XII in Poltava in 1709.

Yet, despite their cooperation today in foreign policy matters, the past is another story. Both Denmark and Finland know only too well what it is like to be the neighbor of a great power. From 1849 to 1920, the Slesvig-Holstein problem, the *Sonderjylland,* pitted the Danes against the Germans. The principal German naval base at Kiel, *Reichskriegshafen*, was built in Holstein in 1898 and is still an important military center close to the Danish frontier. In the 1863 campaign, the other Nordic countries evinced great support for the Danish position, but few Scandinavians volunteered their services on the side of Denmark, and the decision of Sweden-Norway not to participate was seen as a final collapse of political Scandinavianism. This was a much discussed, but never implemented, policy that in theory, at least, would serve to deter both German and Russian demands. This attitude of noncooperation prevailed until the outbreak of the Second World War, when the Danes, who could not forget that Sweden-Norway had chosen to remain neutral in 1863, realized the futility of opposing Germany in 1940. In 1939, in fact, on the eve of the war, talks for a common Nordic military union failed, perhaps because they were seen primarily as a demand by Finland for guarantees against a Russian invasion; unfortunately, Norway especially did not realize its vulnerability to Germany. History repeated itself in 1949, when a proposed defense union between Denmark, Norway, and Sweden was stillborn.

The Soviet attack on Finland in the winter of 1939-40 is reminiscent in many ways of the 1863 campaign. The other Nordic countries were effusive in their good will and enthusiam, but there was no real involvement. Sweden did give Finland important financial and psychological support, and provided volunteers to help with the fighting, but all proved to be inadequate in the long, difficult struggle against a great power. The war was concluded with an honorable but very expensive peace for Finland. When the Russo-German War broke out in 1941, Finland, hoping to forestall occupation attempts by either, joined Germany and remained a co-belligerent, even if not

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a formal ally, until the summer of 1944. By that time, Germany was too weak to intervene militarily to prevent Finland's change of sides in the war. Despite the Nordic community's strong feeling of common interest and its common psychological front vis-à-vis the great powers, it was unable to leave old differences behind and band together to guarantee Finland's neutrality.

That the Nordic community was heterogeneous, that each country had its own interests to look after, became abundantly clear during the Second World War. The large area encompassed by the Nordic countries and their sparse populations made it impossible to defend all the coasts and frontiers, so that in a time of overwhelming external threat, it was, so to speak, each country for itself.

"Going it alone" still characterizes the external relations of the Nordic countries, a stance evident, in the years since the war, in their attitudes toward Sweden. Sweden had proved to be a weak neighbor during the war years, and each of the countries realized it had a much stronger one. For Denmark, it is, militarily speaking, NATO, a connection that seemed to arise naturally because of Denmark's full membership in the European Community. Denmark is both a Nordic and a Central European country, and in its role as the latter, participates in the Community's economic and military affairs. Norway, on the other hand, rejected full membership in the European Community, but its size and situation make it militarily vulnerable, and hence more interesting from both the NATO and Soviet points of view. Militarily and psychologically, Norway looks across the Atlantic to the United States and Canada, and, closer to home, to Britain and, mentally perhaps, especially to Scotland.

Although they are not members of the European Economic Community, Finland and Sweden, as members of the European Free Trade Association, have special agreements with it. Furthermore, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union are marked by a peaceful and prosperous cooperation, especially in commerce, where Finland's export of advanced techniques (e.g., icebreakers) and consumer goods (food and textiles)—which together account for between 15 and 25 percent of its total exports—in exchange for primarily Russian oil, has been an important factor in Finland's economy. This continues the old Nordic tradition of supplying Russia's western markets, a trade that contributed significantly to Finnish prosperity in the nineteenth century and was important to

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Sweden as well. It was in Russia, in fact, that Alfred Nobel made his fortune.

In accordance with the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 and by a special 1948 agreement with the Soviet Union, Finland maintains its neutrality and remains outside the great power conflicts. It has, however, pledged itself to defend its territory against invasions aimed at securing bases for attacking the Soviet Union, an arrangement that owes much to the old Russian-Soviet preoccupation with defending St. Petersburg-Leningrad. Mutual appreciation of each other's different systems of state and society is the basis of cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union.

Whereas wartime experiences have forced the other Nordic countries to realize that they are meshed inextricably in world politics, Sweden does not recognize that it is a weak neighbor; rather, the Swedish self is, or at least was until recently, imbued with the opposite feeling—namely, strength, a misconception that has its roots, apparently, in conditions after the war.

During the early postwar years, Sweden was a relatively rich and contented country; it had not only succeeded in staying out of the war, but had prospered both before and during it by exports of iron, steel, and other products. Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, on the other hand, had suffered both economically and psychologically from the German occupation; Finland, for its part, had not only sustained severe wartime damages and the loss of both territory and 100,000 of its men (out of a total population of 3.5 million), but was forced to resettle 400,000 Karelians and to pay war reparations. Thus, they were all poor cousins indeed in relation to the Swedes. The Swedes were often generous to their impoverished kin, but it was almost inevitable that they should come to see themselves as an economic and social "great power" in relation to them. Conditions in the world economy, together with Swedish skills and enterprise, allowed their society to evolve into what is known today as the welfare state. (A more interesting fact yet is that the Swedes believed this new socioeconomic system to be so special that it could serve as a model for export to other countries.) Lacking the intense attachment to nation and fellow countrymen that the experiences of war had developed in the other Nordic countries, Swedish patriotism changed from the traditional love of "King and Fatherland" to the

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idealization of material values, social services, and a high standard of living.

One could perhaps believe that the Swedish conception of welfare and the many moral and cultural values attached to it is based partly upon having been rich and safe when all of Europe, especially its neighbors, was weak and poor. But Sweden, too, has known weakness and poverty. In the nineteenth century, it was a relatively poor country, so much so that a very large portion of its population emigrated to America—far more in fact than from the other Nordic countries both in absolute and relative terms. Socioeconomic cleavages in the society were great, and the social tensions of those times inevitably cast a shadow on the Swedish national consciousness. But the other Nordic countries also had their internal problems.

During the Russian Revolution, Finland declared its independence from Russian hegemony. A civil war ensued, with one faction favoring closer ties with the new Soviet regime, the other opposed. Two decades later, the war with Russia and the Second World War almost totally overshadowed this internal division and contributed greatly to a feeling of national solidarity. Sweden's internal difficulties during the period of the revolution had much to do with its neutrality during the Finnish civil war, and during the Estonian war of liberation somewhat later as well. Yet Sweden has probably preserved more of the social tensions of those years than the other countries, despite the fantastic rise in the standard of living and the leveling of incomes.

Sweden's inflated self-esteem, proposed here as a topic to be discussed as a simplified model of a certain kind of internordic psychological dynamism, is an important element in the idealization and sanctification of material welfare that Sweden incorporated into its "model" during and after the 1960s. By transforming the standard of living into an ideology, Sweden developed an irreligious, ahistorical, antinational conception of society. The old, respectable *Bildung*-ideology was, especially in the fifties and sixties, gradually undermined. It was replaced by an educational philosophy that combines rigorous technological training with "soft," motivation-oriented, antidisciplinary pedagogics, symbolized in the teacher's diminished status in society in general and in the classroom in particular. Gone from Swedish social life is its former sophistication, transformed by an all-pervasive familiarity into something almost

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provincial. Swedish manners, according to their Nordic neighbors, have gone from one extreme to another much too rapidly. Because Sweden in many respects plays a central and dominant role in the other Nordic countries—although perhaps not to the extent that Swedes like to think—Swedish thinking and manners obviously influence their neighbors' behavior.

The irreligious and ahistorical outlook of the Nordic peoples goes far to explain their passion for good causes such as the peace movement and the plight of Third World countries. What they have is a bad conscience, brought on by the contrast between their own material good fortune and the terrible conditions under which the majority of humanity must live. Public demonstrations have always been part of the welfare state concept in Sweden, with the objects being demonstrated for or against typically far from home. An exalted self-esteem rooted in material success has much to do with this type of demonstration, the participants acting—in their own eyes, at least—as the world's conscience. Unfortunately, such self-esteem is quite fragile, built as it is on rather unstable premises. The experiences of war and poverty along with different foreign policy traditions, have meant that demonstrations play a much different role, for example, in Denmark, where there is a greater awareness of the fragility of European affairs.

The welfare state has brought with it an enormous amount of legislation—put more bluntly, steering; no one, after all, can pretend that the welfare state's standardization of the existing world corresponds to a common idea of justice and social order. The attitude toward steering, however, among the various groups in the Nordic countries is quite different.

Swedish social democracy, in all its aspects, good and bad, is probably the main architect of the welfare state. During its forty-year rule, its impact on general ideology, especially education, has been so deep that the changes brought about by the welfare state have proved impervious to some years of, admittedly, inchoate bourgeois rule. Moreover, as long as the economy continued to grow, no one seemed to mind the increased amount of legislation. The inclination for those in power to steer and for the population to obey has been successful in implementing national policy, but it has also managed to creep into other aspects of everyday life. For example, traffic in

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Sweden went from left-hand to right-hand in the late sixties, without any public outcry, despite the public's rejection of it in a plebiscite. Could anything like this occur in Britain? Hardly.

In 1973 Sweden adopted a new constitution; the old one of 1809, like the American, was one of the oldest in the world. Its age, however, appeared to impart no intrinsic value to it; on the contrary, perhaps to most Swedes, age itself gave cause for suspicion. The new constitution introduced little that was new to Swedish society, the way it was governed, or its politics. What it did instead was codify an evolution that had taken place long ago. This type of steering, where "modernization" is paid for dearly by the national consciousness, and where no real change is made, calls into question the whole notion of steering. But because the liberal tradition—in its original sense—in the North is rather weak, and the administrative machinery so strong, it seems that only economic crisis, war, or some powerful outside force will be able to change it.

The tendency to regulate is a well-known worldwide phenomenon, especially advanced in the North, most of all in Sweden. Today, it finds itself increasingly under fire. The slowdown in the economy, unemployment, and other difficulties have made the ordinary man of the North acutely aware that he is living in a semicorporate state, one where the real power lies with a seemingly omnipotent labor movement and a machinelike bureaucracy. Ridicule of this important and well-positioned group is on the rise. Often called the new privileged class, it controls monopolized sectors of society, which allows a feudal-type system of taxes and benefits, special favors, and so on to flourish. In addition, such control serves ultimately to undermine the high moral standards traditionally held by civil servants and to change for the worse their behavior toward their fellow citizens.

There is a distinct possibility that the worsening global economic and political situation will force the North to reexamine its current values and norms. New ways of thinking aimed at combining the best of the declining welfare ideology with other lines of social thought, old and new, can be found in the interplay among the Nordic countries. Critics such as Halldór Laxness foresee a re-Europeanization, even a re-Catholicization of the North. When the concept of the welfare state was introduced in 1930, it was a time not only of worldwide depression when poverty, even starvation,

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were everywhere, but a time that was not yet far enough removed from the famines of the last century for people to have forgotten them. Now the situation has changed. "Welfare" no longer has the same ring.

Together with East Germany, the countries of the North are the most Lutheran in the world. Still, one could hardly say that they are the heart of Lutheranism, for in fact it is primarily in West Germany that we find its spiritual and theological center. One could argue perhaps that the Northern countries have been extremely receptive to another "religion," that of American-dominated technology. Ninety-five percent of all Nordic students studying abroad after the collapse of Germany in the Second World War, and interested in the natural sciences, engineering, medicine, and even the social sciences, chose to study in the United States. The knowledge gained and the skills learned, however, had little to do with the moral and intellectual values of America, and therefore reflect a somewhat isolated campus life. This is in sharp contrast to the active role traditionally taken by the academic community in the Nordic countries.

One could perhaps pretend that Scandinavia—and again, mostly Sweden—has turned, in the postwar period, from a predominantly German-oriented theoretical and academic cultural outlook to one that is more American or Anglo-Saxon. Being both practical and pragmatic, such an outlook meshes nicely with the *volkisch* orientation of the society, one that pietists and grass-roots movements have, for a long time now, been working toward. Ideological debate is not in the Northern tradition. Rather, the spiritual milieu is one of "natural law and common sense," which, from a German or French point of view, is nonscientific and nonlearned *(unwissenschaftlich)*. The social advances of this century have gone on far too rapidly to allow for the creation of a substantial group of essayists, debaters, or analysts, especially any who are not beholden to one or another institution or group. Foreign ideas, therefore, may have some small influence on their views, but usually disappear without leaving a trace.

Besides the press, the classical theater of debate in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe was of course Parliament. In the Nordic countries, parliamentary life for the past twenty or thirty years has been quite dull. Governments are seldom dissolved by parliamentary voting; rather, their members, resign only after elections

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are held or, especially in Finland, because the coalition in power does not hold. This may explain why the Nordic countries have so anti-ideological an outlook; instead of ideology, we find a power syndicalism, which is their most important characteristic today, especially Sweden. In Denmark, political parties play a much more integral part in government, whereas the president in Finland, because of the role assigned to his office, acts as a counterbalance to both parliamentary power and syndicalism-corporatism. Presidential elections and foreign policy provide people with something besides welfare values and internal affairs to think about and discuss.

Public opinion and values can change very rapidly. To an observer of Sweden, a fresh wind seems to be blowing today, one that owes something to external factors, but perhaps more to the increased questioning of the desirability of expanding further an already too-large public sector. The years ahead promise to bring important changes, but they will not come without pain and difficulty.

In the eighteenth century, Poland and Sweden (-Finland) were both ruled by the nobility in almost sovereign Parliaments, and Denmark (-Norway) was an absolute monarchy. Primarily because it lacked a firm government, Poland succumbed to its neighbors' rapacity. Sweden, however, even though it finally lost Finland, fared somewhat better. Most important, through the efforts of King Gustavus III, Sweden in 1772 changed its form of government; the head of state, the king, gained in power, and together with the lower estates, destroyed that of the nobility. This Gustavian form of government, which gives the president of the republic considerable power—or at least the possibility of exercising it—has served Finland well since 1772, and continues to form the essential part of its constitution (dating from 1919). Parliamentary control of government in Finland rarely leads to ministerial crises, principally because of the tradition of forming coalition governments. Finland's external situation, with its need for an able and firm foreign policy, provides justification for the Finnish president's central role in the state, which is comparable to that of the president of France under the constitution of the Fifth Republic. Foreign policy can hardly be said to be a parliamentary affair, but of course it influences internal policy, too. Thus, President Urro Kekkonen's long tenure in office came to be seen as necessary, even by many who would otherwise not support

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him. Finland's neighbors find this difficult to understand, especially Sweden, which is sometimes critical of what it calls Finnish byzantinism. When Finland's external situation is taken into account, however, such long periods of tenure are finally understood and even admired.

External politics also play a role in Finnish coalition governments and in the tradition of consensus politics, whereas in the other Nordic countries, the classical mode of alternation of power is still viable. Royal power can no longer act as a counterbalance to the president's power in Finland (and perhaps now even in Iceland?) since it has waned everywhere and has almost disappeared in Sweden. In times of economic difficulties and tensions in great power relations, the change from Social-Democratic leadership to a bourgeois coalition, or vice versa, means little to the average citizen. Whether the tradition is one of alternation of power or coalition government, external factors make their claim for strong leadership, even if, in the process of obtaining it, the ways of Gustavus III are left behind.

But no country in the North lives in a vacuum; each is a pawn in the world game of chess. The Nordic self reflects its relations to the outside world, suspended between sentiments of inferiority and superiority. The Northern summer light is amazingly beautiful and divine in its serenity—but the long winter night demands a high price for it.

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